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'... / ABSTRACT 
Accompanying the emergence of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) in the 
1980s was the remarkable growth in these states' defence manufacturing and export 
capabilities. An important objective of this Ph.D. thesis is to explore and clarify the 
relationship between defence production and industrialisation in the NICs. 
My research employs an international political economy approach since neither 
the prevailing scholarship in the fields of international relations (which emphasises 
strategic and political factors), nor of development economics (which concentrates on the 
relationship of military expenditure and growth) are adequate. In addition, existing 
explanations of defence industrialisation have paid little if any attention to the critical role 
of the firm and of technology. As a consequence, they analytically fail to capture the 
complex process by which firms as well as states succeed or fail to achieve international 
competitiveness. 
As is argued in this thesis, firms playa crucial role in the generation, utilisation 
and diffusion of technology, which is essential to the attainment of arms production and 
export capabilities. Thus, a more insightful, powerful conceptualisation of the 
relationship between "defence" and "industrialisation" necessarily involves a discussion 
of firms and their technological capabilities, and how their behaviour is influenced by 
their strategic interaction with the state. This framework also explicates the differing 
levels of defence manufacturing and export performance among the NICs. 
The case studies in this thesis are of Brazil and India -- two industrialising 
countries whose defence/industrial bases are similar though their respective external 
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security environments differ markedly. A comparative analysis of these states suggests 
that the relative success of Brazil's arms industry in the 1980s was attributable to its 
highly developed, competitive capital goods firms and to a government technology policy 
that reinforced linkages between the defence and capital goods industries. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
The newly industrialising countries (NICs) are frequently perceived to be 
manufacturers and exporters of simple, low-cost, labor-intensive products. As producers 
of, for example, textiles, shoes and electrical components, these countries are assumed 
to have little or no indigenous technological capability, except the capacity to adapt and 
make minor modifications to imported foreign technologies. On this basis, one would 
not expect the NICs to enter international markets as competitive manufacturers of a 
range of high technology, defence products. 
Nevertheless, a number of newly industrialising countries have emerged as 
sizeable defence producers and exporters in the past two decades. These NICs include: 
Argentina, Brazil, India, South Korea, China, Singapore, Indonesia, and Taiwan, among 
others. 1 The growth of the defence industries in the NICs has also been accompanied by 
the increasing technological sophistication of their military products -- advanced fighter 
aircraft, armoured personnel carriers and main battle tanks, rockets and missiles, and 
naval craft. 
The ramifications arising from defence production and exports by the NICs are 
far-reaching. By contributing to the surplus capacity in the global arms market and to 
the wide diversity of arms supply, the NICs have degraded the ability of the major 
powers to use arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. The development of 
defence industrial capabilities by the NICs has also accelerated the proliferation of 
conventional as well as ballistic weapons and technology. The dangers of increased 
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proliferation were graphically demonstrated by the recent Persian Gulf War, in which the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was demonstrably aided by the transfer of arms and missile 
technology by Brazil and China. 
Underlying the broader emergence of the NICs as significant defence producers 
and exporters are differing levels of defence manufacturing and international 
competitiveness. Brazil was the world's seventh largest arms exporter and was ranked 
first or second (after China) in terms of defence production output and exports among 
the NICs during the 1980s.2 Building on indigenous R&D and international 
collaborative agreements, Brazil's defence industries became highly diversified and 
sophisticated producers of military equipment. The Persian Gulf and Middle East states 
such as Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia have been the largest purchasers of Brazilian 
defence products. Still, Brazil's arms exports have not been limited to the Third World. 
Both the air forces of the United Kingdom and France deploy Brazilian designed and 
manufactured fighter trainer aircraft. 
India, by contrast, provides a paradoxical example of a country that possesses the 
largest military-industrial-research complex among the NICs, and, at the same time, 
depends disproportionately on transfers of foreign defence technology. Its failed policy 
of self-sufficiency in arms production has necessitated substantial weapons imports from 
and licensing agreements with the former Soviet Union and, more recently, with West 
European states. 
The defence industrial capabilities of the East Asian countries also vary. Unlike 
India's self-sufficient approach, South Korea is developing its arms industry through 
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weapons coproduction and other collaborative agreements with U.S. and other foreign 
defence companies. Taiwan's technical expertise and moderately diversified industrial 
base enabled it to develop and build (with some foreign assistance) an indigenous high 
performance fighter aircraft (the Ching Kuo) in less than ten years. The lack of a 
sufficient technological base and financial resources have precluded Singapore and 
Indonesia from embarking on similarly ambitious defence projects. Instead, Singapore's 
and Indonesia's more modest defence production efforts consist largely of component 
manufacture and assembly work for the larger, international aircraft, shipbuilding and 
ordnance industries. 
This thesis seeks to explain how these countries derived their defence production 
capabilities and what accounts for the variance in capabilities and competitiveness in the 
international arms market among the NICs. While technology obviously has played an 
important role in shaping the defence-industrial transformation of the NICs, what lies at 
the heart of this transformation are the strategies and policies of the main actors 
participating in the generation and diffusion of technology; namely, firms and states. 
Much of the literature on the emergence of the NICs in the international political 
economy has tended, however, to focus solely on the state, ignoring the important role 
played by firms. The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate both how firm behaviour and 
firms' strategic interaction with the state determines the development of and variance in 
the defence industrial capabilities and international competitiveness of the NICs. 
This thesis is divided into three broad sections. The first provides the author's 
conceptual framework for analysing the rise of the NICs and their defence industries. 
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It contains an extensive review and critique of existing explanations from the political 
science and economics literature. 
The second section consists of case studies on Brazil (Chapter 3) and on India 
(Chapter 4). Based on the author's primary research in these two NICs, Chapters 3 and 
4 describe and assess the respective development and competitiveness of the Brazilian and 
Indian arms industries. These case study chapters discuss three topics. First, in each 
of the chapters the author examines whether the strategic environment was an important 
factor influencing the defence industrialisation process in Brazil and India, respectively. 
Second, the author describes these countries' defence industries at the firm level. She 
describes the firms, their main products and markets, and whether their technology and 
other strategies have led to the manufacture of internationally competitive defence 
products. Third, in both chapters the author investigates the extent and type of linkages 
existing between the capital goods and defence industries of Brazil and India. 
The third and final section of the thesis integrates the empirical findings of the 
Brazilian and Indian case studies into her conceptual framework. Drawing upon the 
research elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 5 provides a comparative analysis of 
the strategic interaction between firms and states in Brazil and India. In this chapter, the 
writer examines the forms and effects of the Brazilian and Indian governments' trade, 
industrial and technology policies on the development of these strategic industries. 
The striking performance and competitiveness of Brazil's defence firms in contrast 
to India's, which emerges from the case studies, is explained in terms of the differences 
between Brazilian and Indian firms' technology strategies as well as their strategic 
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interaction with the state. Using a game theoretic approach the author shows that the 
relative success of Brazil's arms industry is attributable to the interaction between firms 
and government that stimulated the technological competitiveness of Brazilian defence 
and capital goods manufacturers. In contrast, she shows that the strategic interaction 
between Indian firms and the government has stultified the development of both the 
defence and capital goods industries. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. The author re-states the broad objectives of her 
thesis on defence industrialisation in the NICs and re-evaluates her conceptual framework 
for explaining the variance in these countries' capabilities and export competitiveness. 
In this last chapter the author also shows how her research on the role of firms in 
Brazil's and India's defence industrial bases has important theoretical implications for the 
political science and economics literature discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, in noting some 
of the limitations in her work, the author suggests avenues for future research. 
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Endnotes 
'Throughout this thesis, the author's definition of newly industrialising country 
is based on the structural industrial characteristics of these countries rather than on the 
narrower and more conventionally used criterion of rates of manufactured exports. The 
author's broader definition of a NIC includes: the size and structure of demand for 
industrial products, the share of industrial manufacturing (output or value added) in 
GNP/GOP, the central role of the state in fostering industrialisation, heavy reliance on 
foreign sources of technology, and some indicators of international competitiveness. 
2Brazil is ranked seventh during the 1987-91 period after the former Soviet Union, 
the United States, France, China, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. These 
rankings are provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI 
Yearbook o/World Armaments and Disarmament, 1992 (New York: Humanities Press), 
272. 
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Chapter II 
DEFENCE & INDUSTRIALISATION: Why Firms Matter 
Two fundamental issues pervade the scholarship in international relations. First, 
what are the effects of changes in the international distribution of power and wealth on 
inter-state conflict and cooperation. And, second, what causes these shifts in the 
international distribution of power and wealth. Much of international relations theory 
addresses the first question.! This thesis is broadly concerned with the second issue, 
namely; how competitive advantage, which is essential in determining a state's wealth 
and power, is created and shifts among nation states. 2 This thesis also focuses on the 
underlying roles of industrialisation and technological change in shaping the international 
distribution of competitive advantage. Such a conceptualisation helps us better 
understand changes in the distribution of power and wealth. 
Defence and Industrialisation 
This section links the competitiveness of states in the international system to the 
need to maintain a national defence capability (e.g. power) and to promote 
industrialisation (e.g. wealth). It then explains how competition between states has 
centred on the development of industries that are militarily and economically strategic; 
broadly the defence and capital goods industries. While state intervention is critical in 
the creation of these industries, this section suggests that firms too are crucial 
determinants of the competitiveness of these industries and of a state's position in the 
international hierarchy. 
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In recent years, a number of studies have examined the determinants of 
international economic competitiveness. In particular, some researchers link the 
importance of technology in enhancing a state's industrial capabilities to potential 
competitiveness in key international markets. 3 In one of the most detailed international 
political economy analyses of the economic competitiveness of states, Cohen and Zysman 
observe that: 
Technological developments can provoke rapid market shifts ..... Some 
critical technologies can affect the competitive position of a whole range 
of industries; and if one nation uses these technologies to gain a lead in 
a vital product, it can forge an important trade advantage for itself. These 
are the strategic transfonnative industries .... This reshuffling of market 
position in a period in which important new strategic transformative 
sectors are emerging ... can result in new international hierarchies of 
wealth but also of power.4 (Italics in original) 
The idea that there exists a group of leading or strategic industries, which are 
critical to sustaining industrialisation and international competitiveness, is a recurring 
theme in international political economy as evidenced by recent debates regarding the 
utility of industrial and technology policies to promote global competitiveness in high 
technology industries. 5 Broadly defined these strategic transformative industries comprise 
the defence and capital goods sectors. 6 The important relationship between the defence 
and capital goods industries, in determining a state's hierarchical position in the 
international system, has been widely discussed and accepted in the literature from 
international relations and economic history. 
The defence industry is clearly essential to a state's military capability and power 
(and hence "the ability to pursue wealth"). More broadly, however, this industry has 
also stimulated the development of the capital goods sector, thereby influencing the form 
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and pace of industrialisation itself.7 For example, Rosenberg has shown how the 
requirements of the firearms industry shaped the initial development of the sewing-
machine, bicycle, machine tools, and later, the motor vehicle industries owing to a 
process of technological convergence. 8 In his article on the sources of international 
competitiveness, Chesnais suggests that England's international dominance during the 
18oos: 
was due less to its textile industry than to its metallurgical and mechanical 
industries, the technology these industries incorporated, and also 
England's military capacity, which allowed the industries to be 
established.9 
The capital goods industry has long been recognised for its crucial role in the 
industrialisation process. Three reasons account for its centripetal role: 1) The capital 
goods sector contributes the most to manufacturing value added; 2) It has 
characteristically high intra-industry linkages as well as backward/forward linkages to 
other industries, including defence; and 3) It generates and diffuses technology and other 
positive externalities throughout the economy. Not surprisingly then various economists 
have posited that continued technological learning in the capital goods industry is 
especially important because of its synergistic effect on an integrated system of 
industries. Indeed, as Rosenberg has shown, the very "pace of technical advance in the 
user industry may depend critically upon events in the capital goods sector. ,,10 
Several studies have documented the strategic significance of the capital goods 
industry for the production of military goods. ll In his classic discussion of the sources 
of military power, Knorr writes, "military potential ... derives from the composition of 
the accruing capacity for production. Military potential obviously benefits ... from an 
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expansion of the ... capital goods industries .... 1112 In another major contribution to 
international relations, Sen defines a group of industries, the majority of which are 
classified as capital goods, that are strategic for industrialisation and economic growth.13 
"The dual significance for military self-sufficiency and national economic independence 
can be held to provide the rationale for the desire [by states] to acquire this group of 
industries. "14 
It is clear now from this discussion that the international competitiveness of states 
can be linked to their aspirations and abilities to stay ahead technologically and 
commercially in key industries associated with the defence and capital goods sectors. 15 
Indeed, there is a growing body of research from both the OECD and newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) that highlights the role of the state in attaining 
international competitiveness. In general, these studies focus on the effects of 
government trade, industrial and technology policies on manufacturing competitiveness. 16 
Conducted at the level of countries and industries, their empirical analyses of the 
determinants of competitiveness are often limited to comparative macro/micro economic 
data on productivity levels, R&D spending, manufacturing value-added, and export 
growth rates. 
Nonetheless, as discussed more fully in the forthcoming literature review, such 
analyses cannot explain the complex process by which a country and its industries attain 
or fail to sustain international competitiveness. Many factors underlie the marked 
differences in performance and competitiveness among industries within a single state and 
across states. Explanations of international competitiveness from international relations, 
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international political economy and economics have focused on some of these factors 
such as states, interest groups and technology. These explanations, however, have 
generally neglected the pivotal role played by firms. 
The central argument of this thesis is that the international political and economic 
competitiveness of a state, and hence its hierarchical position in the international system, 
is importantly determined by firms. An understanding of firms as well as their 
interaction with other firms and with the state is crucial to explicating differences in 
international competitiveness. Thus, a corollary objective of this thesis is to elucidate 
the determinants of competitiveness at the firm level, in particular, firms' technological, 
managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities and strategies, i.e., firm behaviour. 
Firms obviously differ in their capabilities to innovate. They also vary in terms 
of their access as well as abilities to absorb and exploit new technologies. As will be 
shown later in the case studies, these differences in technological capabilities 
considerably determine a firm's competitiveness in domestic and international markets. 
In addition, these firm-level differences directly affect a state's industrial development 
and trade performance. A study by the DECD on the relationship between science, 
technology and competitiveness saliently observes: 
The international competitiveness of a national economy is built on the 
competitiveness of the firms which operate within, and export from, its 
boundaries, and is, to a large extent, an expression of the will to compete 
and the dynamism of firms, their capacity to invest, to innovate both as 
a consequence of their own R&D and of successful appropriation of 
external technologies. 17 
Nevertheless, firms' capabilities and strategies are sensitive to external influences 
(incentives and penalties), such as factor markets and macroeconomic forces, for 
19 
example, foreign exchange and interest rates. Consequently, states -- their trade, 
industrial and technology policies -- help shape the external environment of firms and 
their behaviour. 
In concluding this introductory section let us return to the initial question of how 
competitive advantage is created and distributed among nation states. As suggested in 
the discussion above, competition between states has centred on the development of 
industries that are militarily and economically strategic: the defence and capital goods 
industries. Although all states are equally motivated to create these key industries, the 
ability of states to be competitive internationally in these high technology sectors varies 
tremendously. How this competitiveness is achieved and leads to subsequent shifts in the 
relative political and economic power of states is importantly decided by two analytically 
distinct actors: firms and states. In essence, as this thesis will show, international 
competitiveness can be explained as the outcome of the strategic interaction of firms and 
states. 
Contending Approaches from the Ulera/ure 
Accompanying the emergence of the newly industrialising countries in the 1980s 
was the rapid expansion of these states' defence and manufacturing industries. The 
growth of these industries and their export success in global markets are important 
developments in the international system. They exemplify both changes in the 
competitive advantage of states that are engendered by the process of industrialisation, 
and possible shifts in the bases of power (loosely defined) within the international 
political economy. 
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The literature from political science and economics offers various contending 
explanations for the remarkable growth of the NICs' defence and manufacturing export 
capabilities. This vast literature can be organised around three distinct analytical 
questions. First, the fields of international relations and development economics 
concentrate on describing the motivations, capabilities and implications of defence 
production in the NICs. Second, scholarship from comparative politics and neoclassical 
economics attempts to explain the NICs' rise to international economic competitiveness. 
A third framework derives from the general focus of international political economy on 
how wealth and power are created and distributed. For example, defence and 
industrialisation are especially important to mercantilists, who have traditionally been 
concerned about how the state ensures national military security and economic 
competitiveness. 
As the author will demonstrate in the following detailed literature review, these 
theoretical approaches are inadequate. None effectively integrates firms into their 
explanations of the development of defence and manufacturing capabilities by the NICs, 
nor do they view the process by which export competitiveness is achieved as the outcome 
of interaction between states and firms. 
As argued in this thesis, firms playa crucial role in the acquisition, generation, 
utilisation, and diffusion of technology, which is essential to the attainment of an arms 
production capability and international competitiveness. Thus, a more insightful, 
powerful conceptualisation of the relationship between defence and industrialisation 
necessarily involves a discussion of firms and their technological capabilities, and how 
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a firm's behaviour is influenced by its strategic interaction with the state. Such a 
theoretical explanation also helps to explicate the differing levels of defence 
manufacturing and export performance among the NICs. 
International Relations 
The link between the NICs' impressive manufactured export performance and 
these states' burgeoning arms industries has been vaguely conceptualised in the 
international relations literature by the term "defence (or military) industrialisation" .IS 
In general, this literature, particularly the subfield of international security studies, has 
focused on assessing the motivations, capabilities and foreign policy implications of 
defence industrialisation in the NICs. Development economics has concentrated largely 
on measuring the particular economic implications (costs) of defence production activities 
for the broader civilian economy. The author will begin her discussion with a review 
of the scholarship from international relations. 
There are three major strands of the international relations literature, which focus 
on arms production in the NICs. First, beginning in the early 1980s there was an 
explosion of largely descriptive, individual country case studies, which hypothesised that 
defence industrialisation was a function of two basic determinants: motivations and 
capabilities. 19 Influenced by realist preoccupations with the projection and balance of 
power in the international system, these authors have emphasised primarily the strategic 
and political rationales for why the NICs initiated defence industrialising programmes. 
Accordingly, the role of threat perception often has been linked to regional arms 
races. For example, most studies argue that India's massive arms production programme 
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and consequently, its military buildup, are tied to its regional arms race with the Peoples' 
Republic of China and Pakistan. 20 The twin desires to ensure security of supply and 
improve self-reliance, in some cases caused by international arms embargoes, are other 
widely articulated rationales. Taiwan's and Israel's development of indigenous advanced 
fighter airplanes (the Indigenous Defence Fighter and Lavi) are said to have been 
prompted by desires for self-sufficiency in view of various U.S. administration refusals 
to sell these countries sophisticated aircraft. 21 A third set of strategic explanations for 
defence industrialisation involve regional hegemonic power aspirations. This politico-
strategic rationale is closely linked to prestige considerations on the part of those NrC 
arms producers governed by military regimes. Defence industrialisation, therefore, may 
serve to fulfill the military's national security role and to enhance its professional image 
and power abroad. The relatively recent emergence during the 1980s of arms industries 
in military-led Brazil and Indonesia were attributed to these states' hegemonic aspirations 
in Latin America and Southeast Asia respectively. 22 
The second strand of the international relations literature attempts to link 
capabilities -- industrial, technological, financial -- to the long-term viability of defence 
production and exports by the NICs. In contrast to the consensus that underpins the 
discussion of the motivations for defence industrialisation, the issue of defining 
"capabilities" has been far more problematic and the subject of much methodological and 
conceptual confusion as well as debate. Two schools of thought predominate. On the 
one hand, writers from the arms trade literature link the growth of NIC defence 
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industrialisation to the provision of security assistance and technology transfer 
arrangements from foreign suppliers. 23 In their view: 
the development of numerous arms industries ... with export capability or 
potential came about through the transfer of technology and ... defence 
production knowledge through license and coproduction arrangements with 
more advanced industrial suppliers. 24 
Subsequent studies have tried to measure qualitatively as well as quantitatively the extent 
to which individual NICs depend on various elements (licenses, technical data, designs) 
of foreign technology transfers. 2.5 
On the other hand, various studies correlate the process of defence 
industrialisation in the NICs to these states' growing technological and industrial 
capabilities. 26 Since defence production is one of the most complex manufacturing 
activities, requiring extensive industrial inputs from steel, metallurgy, machinery, and 
electronics, the increase in domestic arms production in the NICs, according one author, 
"can probably be explained in part by the growing manufacturing sector. Conversely, 
the desire to produce arms might also have enhanced the propensity to give priority to 
industrialisation in general and to certain industries in particular. "27 
Rather than flushing out more precisely the linkage between arms production and 
industrialisation, this literature has focused instead on devising a macrostatistica1 
methodology for measuring a NIC's defence industrial base. Using a variety of 
economic indicators, such as the share of manufacturing as a percentage of GNP, the 
number of scientists and technical personnel engaged in R&D, GNP per capita, etc., 
to comprise "potential defence capacity" (PDC) or the "potential arms production base" 
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(PAPB), these macrostatistical studies relate the prior existence of a PDC/PAPB to arms 
production output and exports by the NICs.28 
A widely cited macrostatistical study by Neuman, for example, finds that: 
the existence of a large military to provide an adequate market, combined 
with generous national income and a sizeable population to support the 
necessary industrial infrastructure significantly affect a state's long-term 
ability to produce major weapons systems .... 29 
Neuman as well as others (Wulf, Deger, Peleg, and Kennedy) have then used these 
indices of PDC to rank order the defence industrialising countries. For instance, 
according to Deger, "For the top six countries (Israel, India, Brazil, Yugoslavia, South 
Korea, and Turkey), there seems to be a close connection between the ranks given by 
actual arms production and the potential capacity of defence manufacturers. "30 
Building upon assessments of defence production and export capabilities of the 
NICs, the third and final strand of the international relations literature primarily focused 
on the policy implications -- foreign policy, regional security, conventional arms control -
_ arising from defence industrialisation in the NICs. At the centre of this literature was 
a vigorous and often acrimonious debate over the issue of whether or not the emergence 
of these defence industrialising countries signalled the erosion of an international system 
characterised by hierarchy and hegemony. 
Sparking this debate was the qualitative conclusion by Neuman, in her 
International OrganisaTion article cited above, that Third World arms production 
(including the NICs), was inconsequential to both the stability of the world order and to 
the international arms trade. Her assessment was based on the argument that such arms 
25 
production was technologically deficient in comparison to the arms industries of the 
advanced industrialised states: 
These developments demonstrate how difficult it will be for Third World 
countries to change the existing world military-industrial balance ... In 
light of these developments it is unlikely that LDCs will ever be able to 
achieve independence from foreign military transfers or mount a 
significant commercial challenge to the major arms suppliers. 31 
A number of subsequent studies (Schwartz, Louscher and Salomone) have 
challenged Neuman's questionable statistical methodology and thus her conclusions (Ross 
& Evans).32 Writing from the arms trade perspective, several authors have argued that 
Neuman presents an overly static view of the process of defence industrialisation. In 
particular, Neuman is criticised for her assumption that arms industries are only the 
product of general macroeconomic conditions of states and consequently does not link 
the transfer of foreign weapons technology to the development of defence production 
capabilities. According to Schwartz, the author of one of the most comprehensive, 
detailed rebuttals of Neuman: 
It is likely that production capability depends on the technology they have 
acquired from outside sources. Because much production depends on 
nonindigenous technology, the level of technology of weapons produced 
is not necessarily linked to domestic, industrial, technological, and 
economic capability. 33 
In essence, Schwartz argues that Neuman fails to consider the possibility of 
advances in defence production capabilities through licenses, technology transfers and 
coproduction agreements with foreign suppliers. "This is the dynamic Neuman ignored 
and the technological factor she overlooked."34 This view has garnered much support, 
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including a recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which found 
that: 
In 1988, for example, India, Egypt, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Brazil were producing 43 different major weapons under international 
licensing agreements ... As a consequence, several of these nations have 
attained significant defence industrial capacity and have entered the arms 
export business. 3s 
The conclusions from such studies obviously counter Neuman's belief that the 
impact of the NICs' defence manufacturing and export capabilities on the international 
system is negligible. According to Ross, for example, "To the extent that Third World's 
defence-production capabilities contribute to the diffusion of power and the erosion of the 
post World War II international hierarchy, the expansion of those capabilities would 
appear to diminish the prospects for world order. ,,36 This diffusionary perspective is also 
echoed in the previously cited OTA report. "Increasing proliferation of sophisticated 
weapons and technological know-how has injected new elements of uncertainty and 
concern into international relations ... 37 
Having completed a detailed overview and evolution of the international relations 
literature regarding defence industrialisation in the NICs, this author will now 
demonstrate why this literature is conceptually inadequate because of its failure to 
integrate the role of firms into analyses of the defence industrialisation process. There 
are three fundamental criticisms that the author wants to raise in relation to the 
international relations literature as a whole, and to the concept of defence industrialisation 
in particular. 
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The first criticism concerns international relations' analyses of the motivations for 
NIC arms production, and their near exclusive emphasis on the role of the external, 
international environment in determining the defence production activities of the NICs. 
A classic example of this line of argument is provided by Nolan in her study of two NIC 
defence manufacturers, South Korea and Taiwan: 
it is hard to see certain prominent features of these two small "garrison 
states" - including the vigorously pursued development of their indigenous 
military industries - as anything other than adaptations to the changing 
international environment. The single most important factor of that 
environment for both states has been their intimate relationship with the 
United States.38 
At issue here is the failure to link cause and effect; namely, the international 
relations literature does not adequately explain or specify how external pressures --
declining foreign military assistance, regional arms races, international arms embargoes -
- shape the process of defence industrialisation in the NICs. Often one finds in the 
literature separate treatments of motivations and overviews of the structure of a country's 
arms industry, without any intervening discussion of how these motivations relate to a 
NIC's capability to manufacture military products.39 For example, in analysing India's 
hostile strategic environment, many scholars have consequently linked India's huge arms 
industry to the regional arms race involving China and Pakistan. However, as the 
subsequent case study indicates, while India does face external threats to its security, its 
defence production capabilities are characterised by technological obsolescence, terrible 
inefficiencies, and huge dependence on foreign suppliers of technology. 
Another analytical problem is that while such exogenous factors may have an 
initial, stimulative effect on NIC defence industrialisation, endogenous, economic (as well 
28 
as political) factors may be of longer term consequence. Indeed, the international 
relations literature often neglects the economic incentives that are independently as well 
as increasingly encouraging arms production by the NICs. One exception is Evans, who, 
in a previous work, pointed to the importance of integrating economic factors -- foreign 
exchange earnings derived from arms exports, potential technological spin-offs from 
defence manufacturing, enhanced labour productivity and training, access to critical 
foreign technologies -- into international relations analyses.4o 
A final comment is that the preoccupation in international relations with 
exogenous international systemic factors ignores the crucial, central role of firms. As 
will be shown in the case studies that follow, the sharp contrast between Brazil's and 
India's defence production capabilities cannot simply be explained by the impact of their 
differing strategic environments. Other factors, such as domestic firms' technological 
strategies and interaction with the state, are the dominant variables. 
The second major criticism of the international relations literature on defence 
industrialisation in the NICs is its lack of any coherent theoretical framework. At 
present, this literature is characterised by extremely descriptive, individual country case 
studies. There has been little attempt to organise these case studies under a conceptual 
rubric, or to offer comparative analysis. In fact, such attempts have been rejected in 
some IR circles: 
the delineation of general, systemic factor cross-country comparison is not 
presently a valid approach for understanding defence-industrial production 
in 'industrialising states .... [I]n the absence of a detailed case study it is 
impossible to know whether or not countries have enough in common ... 
to constitute an appropriate group for comparison.41 
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Doubtless, case study methodology may offer a detailed explanation of one 
country's motivations for and experiences with defence industrialisation, for which the 
comparative macrostatistical studies mentioned above are unsuited. However, the 
continued lacuna of comparative approaches in the international relations literature, after 
nearly a decade of often duplicative case study analyses, reflects a certain theoretical 
laziness. No where is this laziness more evident than in the very concept of "defence 
industrialisation"; a subject to which the author now turns. 
The term "defence industrialisation" was coined as a shorthand way of 
conceptually linking the twin processes of defence production and industrialisation 
occurring in the NICs. In reviewing those studies that base their analyses on "defence 
industrialisation", this author is unable to locate a single definition or explanation of the 
concept.42 This analytical inability to clarify more precisely the relationship between the 
NICs' growing manufacturing capabilities and their arms production/export activities is 
the third and most fundamental weakness of the international relations literature. 
A primary example of the conceptual haziness over defence industrialisation that 
prevails in the literature can be found in one of the most well respected studies in the 
field, Arms Production in the Third World. Avoiding the necessity of defining what they 
mean by defence industrialisation, these authors write, "The link between arms 
production and civilian production has been firmly established in other studies. "43 
Ironically, the two studies to which they refer are the highly criticised macrostatistical 
works by Neuman, especially, and Wulf, discussed above.44 
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The concept of defence industrialisation thus degenerates into a circular debate. 
On the one hand, there are those authors (Neuman and Wulf), using macrostatistical 
indicators, who do not link the increasing intemationalisation of the arms industry and, 
as consequence, argue that the impact of NIC defence industrialisation is negligible. On 
the other hand, there are those, from the arms trade literature, who correlate defence 
industrialisation entirely to transfers of foreign technology, ignoring, in the first place, 
indigenous defence production capabilities. That these two IR-based approaches talk past 
one another is regrettable; that they do not extend our conceptual understanding of 
defence industrialisation in the NICs is problematic. 
Thus, in summarizing this critique of the international relations literature on 
defence industrialisation in the NICs, the author reiterates the need to develop a 
comprehensive theoretical framework; one that incorporates the role played by firms into 
analyses of defence industrialisation. Such a framework could then provide a better basis 
for well researched, methodologically sound, comparative studies. These are some of 
the objectives of this thesis. 
Development Economics 
The field of development economics has been only tangentially interested in the 
subject of defence industrialisation in the NICs. Instead, development economists have 
subsumed the issue of assessing the economic implications stemming from arms 
production activities, into the broader "guns versus butter" debate.4s The guns vs. butter 
literature addresses two interrelated questions: 1) What are the economic causes of 
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military expenditure in industrialising countries? and 2) What are the effects of such 
expenditure for growth and development? 
A study, which examines the causal relationship of defence and growth, is the 
highly controversial work of Benoit.46 Based on a sample of 44 developing countries 
(including the NICs), and six country case studies, Benoit reaches the surprising finding 
that defence expenditure overall actually stimulates rather than retards economic growth. 
This conclusion also is confirmed in his subsequent 1978 study: 
Contrary to my expectations, countries with a heavy defence burden 
generally had the most rapid rate of growth, and those with the lowest 
defence burdens tended to show the lowest growth rates. 47 
Additionally, Benoit argues that defence programmes, including arms production 
activities make "tangible" indirect contributions to the civilian economy through the 
provision of housing, medical care, education, public infrastructure etc.48 However, both 
the precise statistical methodology and his qualitative assessment of the contributions 
made by military programmes has received substantial criticism in studies conducted by 
other development economists.49 
The most substantive study of the wide-ranging effects of military expenditure on 
growth and development is Deger's Military Expenditure in Third World Countries.5O 
Her study offers a distinct analytical approach to understanding the guns vs butter 
tradeoff; one also that specifically examines the economic implications of defence 
industrialisation in the NICs. Deger argues that it is necessary to include the effect of 
the mobilisation of resources into quantitative assessments of the impact of defence 
spending on growth. As military expenditure increases it influences savings, investment 
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(absorptive capacity), and human capital formation -- important economic variables, 
which have previously been missing in the guns vs. butter debate. On the basis of 
econometric and empirical estimates, Deger reports that: 
the overall effect of military expenditure is to reduce growth rates. If we 
take all interdependent effects together, an increase in the defence burden 
[military expenditure] leads to a decrease in the growth rate through a 
decline in the savings rate, a fall in investment per unit of capital and a 
reduction in human capital formation.51 
The implications of these conclusions for Benoit's causal correlation of higher defence 
spending and growth rates are spelled out by Deger: 
Attention by Benoit, and others criticising his work, has generally focused 
on allocation based on a given production possibility frontier in the short 
run. This book, however, claims that even in the short run the very act 
of allocation will tend to shift the output possibilities open to the 
economy. 52 
Of more direct relevance to this dissertation is Deger's analysis regarding the 
potential impact of military expenditure on the process of defence industrialisation in the 
NICs. "It may increase the productivity of capital in civilian industries by adding to 
effective demand; it may lead to more capital intensive modes of production ... and it 
may produce through R&D a greater measure of technical progress. ,,53 Deger observes 
that while arms production activities on the whole are expected to provide a potential 
source of spin-off if the domestic industrial base can respond, the extent of these spin-
offs is often overstated. 
What then can be concluded regarding the potential contributions of the field of 
development economics to defence industrialisation in the NICs? Clearly this part of the 
economics literature has been consumed with the question of whether defence spending, 
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and by association, arms production, positively, negatively or ambiguously affects growth 
and development. Such a normative problem, however, deters as well as sidesteps the 
thorny task of substantively clarifying the relationship between arms production and 
industrialisation. 
To determine the interrelationship between arms production and industrialisation 
in the NICs, we need detailed investigations of the nexus between the defence and 
manufacturing sectors, to which cross-country, macrostatistical analyses are inappropriate 
methodological tools. As is foreshadowed here, case study analyses of Brazilian and 
Indian defence industrialisation reveals that India has paid a high societal price -- in 
terms of lower productivity, duplicative research and manufacturing efforts, larger 
defence expenditures -- because of the state's failure to integrate broader civilian 
manufacturing into its autarkic defence production sector. This finding would not have 
been apparent within the limited guns versus butter, cost-benefit calculus of the 
development economics approach to defence industrialisation in the NICs. 
While the international relations literature tends to describe the growing defence 
production capabilities of the NICs in isolation from the process of industrialisation, 
neither neoclassical economics nor comparative politics analyse industrialisation in the 
NICs with any particular sectoral focus on defence. As mentioned previously, the latter 
two literatures offer competing explanations of rapid industrialisation in the NICs. 
Neoclassical economics emphasises the primary role of market forces and the adoption 
of astute policies by "rational" governments. In contrast, comparative politics focuses 
on the political bases of industrialisation, delineating the political, historical, ideological, 
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and social factors that have conditioned the NICs' manufactured export performance. 
However, neoclassical economics and comparative politics have both assigned an overly 
limited role to the firm and of technology. As a consequence, they analytically fail to 
capture the complex process by which firms as well as states do or do not achieve 
international competitiveness. 
Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical economics correlates the NICs' rapid industrialisation and 
manufactured export performance to the successful application of the theory of 
comparative advantage with export-led growth strategies. According to comparative 
advantage-based analyses, the NICs' reliance on market forces to determine factor prices 
(particularly wage rates) and the removal of trade distortions and biases quickened the 
pace of industrialisation and exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods.54 
Additionally, the impressive rates of growth achieved by the East Asian NICs (9.4 %) in 
contrast to the Latin American NICs (6.9%) over 1960-83 were used by neoclassical 
theorists to assert the superiority of export-oriented versus import-substitution 
industrialisation strategies. 55 This tendency to view industrialisation and external 
orientation as causally related is rife in neoclassical discussions of the positive effects that 
exporting activities have had on total factor productivity in the NICs. Balassa et al. and 
Krueger, for example, suggest that competitive pressures force NIC exporters to improve 
quality, economise on scarce foreign inputs, reduce production costs, develop economies 
of scale, and to respond faster to market changes. 56 
35 
Nevertheless, possible neoclassical contributions to explanations of defence 
industrialisation in the NICs are extremely limited and inadequate primarily for three 
interconnected reasons. First, they assign an extraordinarily narrow and counterfactual 
role to the state, to the firm and to technology. The neoclassical economics literature 
provides a fairly prescriptive description of the process of industrialisation in the NICs, 
and explains the success or failure of states to implement the correct industrial strategies 
in terms of the rational/irrational behaviour of policymakers. Little, for instance, 
contends that, "the success [of the East Asian NICs] is almost entirely due to good 
policies and the ability of the people ... "S7 Underlying this rational choice view, however, 
is the assumption of a relatively passive role played by the state. According to the 
neoclassical view, apart from the provision of institutional arrangements such as a legal 
and monetary system, all the state has to do is to establish "correct" factor prices and to 
ensure non-discrimination against exports. 
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that this conceptualisation of the state is 
too narrow. Indeed, as is substantiated later in the review of the literature from 
comparative politics, neoclassical economists have written about the effects of policy on 
development, but generally have not examined the determinants of particular policy 
choices; they treat politics as exogenous. sa In essence much of the neoclassical 
economics literature has failed to consider the social, political, ideological, and historical 
conditions in which industrial policy is developed, and thus cannot explain why different 
industrialisation strategies are chosen, persist and shift among the NICs. 
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A second, related theoretical weakness is that neoclassical explanations fail to 
specify the contributions of firms and states to comparative advantage itself. For 
example, according to one critic: 
the only agents taken into consideration by neo-classical theoreticians are 
the countries. However, these nation-states are reduced to a blueprint or 
abstraction. They are merely containers of given combinations of factors. 
Their only reality is to constitute a pretendably insuperable barrier to the 
movement of productive factors.59 
In addition, the neoclassical literature offers an essentially uniform explanation for the 
economic performance of all the Asian NICs. Yet, as Fransman notes, "it is clear that 
there are radical differences in the extent and forms of government intervention 
undertaken by each of the four states. 1160 There are in fact many country case studies that 
explicate the specific mechanisms -- R&D support, export incentives, investment capital 
__ governments use to promote industrialisation in such NICs as South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Brazil. 61 
A final criticism of the neoclassical economics literature is that its adherence to 
the theory of comparative advantage precludes a fuller analytic explanation of the role 
of technology in the industrialisation process in the NICs. Following the work of Hicks, 
the prevailing conceptualisation is that changes in technology are simply induced by 
changes in relative factor prices.62 In the very highly stylised models used in trade 
theory, "technology" is taken to be freely available to all countries and, within countries, 
to all firms. Countries simply settle on appropriate levels of capital/labour intensities in 
accordance with their factor price ratios. Firms in a given industry all have the same 
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production function and select their factor inputs according to those ratios, shifting 
costlessly along the function as the ratios change. 
Fundamentally, however, the neoclassical emphasis on resource endowment, 
factor prices and the assumption that productivity is exogenously determined suppresses 
questions about the determinants of technical and productivity change, and hence 
international competitiveness. At issue here is the limited ability of neoclassical 
economics to incorporate the role of technology into their explanations of industrialisation 
and economic growth since technology is assumed to be exogenously determined and the 
acquisition of technical knowledge unproblematic.63 
Indeed, writers such as Nelson & Winter increasingly criticised neoclassical 
economics for its oversimplification of technical change and for its obfuscation of the role 
of this "large residual" in economic growth: 
What we now know about technical change should not be comforting to 
an economist who has been holding the hypothesis that technical change 
can be easily accommodated within an augmented nco-classical model. 
Nor can the problem here be brushed aside as involving a phenomenon 
that is "small" relative to those that are well handled by the theory; rather 
it relates to a phenomenon that all analysts (or virtually all) acknowledge 
as the central one in economic growth. The tail now wags the dog. And 
the dog does not fit the tail very well. The neo-classical approach to 
growth theory has taken us down a smooth road to a dead end.64 
Indicative of this criticism, is the growing recognition in the economics literature 
that innovation and technological change have a central role in the industrialisation 
process in the advanced industrialised countries as well as in the NICs. For example, 
an increasing number of case studies have begun to highlight the importance of 
technological innovation for industrial competitiveness in OECD countries. 65 The rapid 
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industrialisation experience of Japan especially, and its successful competition in 
international trade, has led to an awareness and interest in researching technology 
development in the NICs and in the Third World generally.66 Though a growing 
literature now exists on the economics of technological innovation and industrialisation 
in the NICs, it has, however, tended to ignore the generation of technology by 
indigenous firms. There are three principle reasons for this neglect. 
The first is economists' long-standing preoccupation with major innovations as the 
main source of technological progress. Technological change has thus been typically 
associated with innovations at the global frontier of technology, rather than along the 
frontier. 67 Since major innovations are assumed to take place in the advanced 
industrialised countries, neoclassical theory presumes that (to the extent that technological 
lags are admitted) that the transfer, assimilation and absorption of technology by 
industrialising countries is automatic and costless. 
A second, related reason is the near exclusive focus by both neoclassical and 
development economics on questions concerning the cost of transferring foreign 
technology and on the choice of technique. Stewart and James note that, "In the 1960s 
and 1970s most research on technology [in the industrialising countries] ... was directed 
at the question of labour or capital intensity of production technique (sometimes described 
as the "neoclassical" question).68 
Such a perspective has led various economic analyses of technology and 
industrialisation in the NICs to concentrate on "the terms of transfer and imperfections 
in international technology markets, rather than on the efficiency with which the 
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technology is used by the importer."69 Furthermore, one is asked implicitly to assume 
that once the patent, design, equipment, process technology has been transferred, firms 
(buyer and seller) will share the same stock of technical knowledge. But if firms in the 
neoclassical tradition have equal access and employ the same technologies, why then do 
some firms in the same sector succeed in manufacturing and others do not'] 
The result of such theoretical blinders is the tendency by neoclassical as well as 
some development economists to relegate the NICs to the role of manufacturers and 
exporters of labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturers, and the recipients of technology 
(via direct foreign investment/licensing) from the advanced industrialised countries. 
Hence there is a peculiar parallel between the economics and international relations 
literature, both of which assign these states to the lowest tier in the international political 
economy. As Lall pointedly notes of the neoclassical perspective, "There is, in sum, 
little ... which would lead us to expect indigenous enterprises from developing countries 
would enter international markets as competitive sellers of fairly broad ranges of 
technology. 1170 
How then can neoclassical economics account for the emergence of the NICs' 
international competitiveness in what is obviously one of if not the most technologically 
sophisticated industries in the world: defence production'] Clearly then we need to move 
beyond the conventional neoclassical paradigm and to integrate technology and its 
generation, use and diffusion by firms into our analyses of how states attain particular 
industrial competitiveness in global markets. We also need to define how such factors 
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as entrepreneurship, market structure, a state's industrial, trade and technology policies 
affect firms' behaviour and technological capabilities. 
More recent literature from a neo-Schumpeterian tradition has attempted to redress 
such lacunas in the literature on technology and industrialisation in the NICs.71 Briefly, 
this emerging literature has focused on the dynamic process of technological change in 
the NICs as well as in Third World countries. Two key concepts that underpin such 
analyses are "technological capability" and "technical/technological change". The former 
refers to the ability of a firm to transform inputs into outputs; the latter, refers to the 
introduction of new ways of transforming inputs into outputs. 
There are two primary research agendas within this literature. The first describes 
the nature of technological change and the various factors -- firms, market structures, 
technologies, government policies -- that affect the acquisition of technological capability 
in these countries. The consensus from such studies is that regardless of the initial 
pattern of acquisition, the assimilation and effective utilisation of technology by the 
industrialising countries is not automatic and costless, rather it involves considerable 
technological change and local innovation. 
Attempts to measure the output of technological change via data analyses of 
patents, bilbiometrics etc., has led to the second area of research: attempting to compare 
the technological capability of different countries by examining their technology exports. 
As mentioned above, technology exports are of particular interest to economists because 
they exemplify the changes in comparative advantage that accompany the process of 
industrialisation. As a consequence, much of this literature has sought to analyse what 
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is behind technology exports in the NICs, and more importantly, to devise how firms 
developed the technological capabilities behind those exports in the first place.72 
While some of this literature consists of empirical, micro-based, individual firm 
studies, which do, in fact, explore technology development at the firm level, the absence 
of any broader comparative theoretical preconception makes the findings of such studies 
hard to generalise. Lall's work on Indian engineering companies, Da Cruz's study of 
Brazilian metalworking firms, and Katz's study of select Latin American manufacturing 
industries, are examples of this approach.73 As acknowledged by two of the foremost 
researchers of this field, "The relationship between technological change and industrial 
development is an area where practical endeavors have outpaced analytical 
understanding. ,,74 
The evident failure of neoclassical economics to integrate the role of the state and 
the factors conditioning its influence into explanations of industrialisation in the NICs 
ignited rival theories from the political science subfield of comparative politics. In 
reaction to neoclassical as well as dependency approaches to economic development, the 
comparative politics literature has framed the issue in terms of explaining why the NICs 
succeeded in initiating industrialisation. Analyses of how the NICs achieved 
manufactured export competitiveness in the international political economy are couched 
using a "barrier to entry" framework. As a result, various authors from comparative 
politics have focused on delineating the political bases of industrialisation.75 
State activity in the NICs encompasses two distinct roles. First, the state is 
expected to adjudicate market failures. For example, state intervention in Taiwan, 
42 
Mexico, and Brazil in the form of creating public sector enterprises in high technology 
sectors is attributed to the presumed weakness (financial as well as organisational) and 
inefficiency of local capital. And second, the state is viewed as central to the resolution 
of collective action problems. The remarkable success of Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, in contrast to their Latin American counterparts, Brazil and Mexico, is said to 
be derived from the East Asian states' abilities to resolve conflicting policy goals and 
1· . I . t 76 coa ItlOna mteres s. 
Common to comparative politics studies of the NICs is the argument that 
industrialisation requires certain types of domestic political institutions, especially 
"strong" states, which are sufficiently insulated from domestic interest groupS.77 
(Insulation permits the formulation of coherent, cohesive policies and enables effective 
mediation with foreign capital.)78 Nevertheless, analyses of how the state influences the 
process of industrialisation vary considerably. Some scholars emphasise the nature of 
the political regime, class formation, while others note the importance of the sociological 
characteristics of the state's policymakers. As the following select overview of the 
comparative politics literature reveals, few if any of these studies, however, attribute the 
NICs' emergence and continued manufactured export growth to firm-level factors. 
One of the most articulate and elaborate theoretical analyses of the state and 
industrialisation in the NICs is provided by Haggard.79 In contrasting the two industrial 
"growth strategies" -- import substitution and export-led -- Haggard asserts that the 
"puzzle is to explain why countries adopted the industrial strategies they did, and why 
they sustained them over time. ,,80 To answer these questions, Haggard bases his analysis 
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on the role and weight of four independent variables: the international system (e.g. 
source of external pressure), domestic coalitions, political institutions, and ideas. He 
then explores the "logic, strengths and weaknesses" of each through a comparative 
historical analysis of four East Asian and two Latin American NICs. In essence, 
Haggard, as he has done elsewhere, argues that because the East Asian NICs have 
enjoyed substantial autonomy from both domestic and international forces, these states 
have been able to provide and implement the political and economic policies responsible 
for the success of the export-led industrialisation strategy. 
Another subset of the comparative politics literature has used industry-based 
studies to demonstrate the active role played by the state in initiating and promoting 
industrialisation, especially in high technology sectors. 81 Work by Grieco on the Indian 
computer industry and by Adler on the Brazilian as well as Argentine computer and 
nuclear sectors are particularly representative of statist approaches. 82 Using a bargaining 
school framework Grieco suggests that the Indian government was able successfully to 
mold the activities of multinational computer industry to secure stated policy goals. 83 
Reviewing the period 1967-80, Grieco finds that India initially made very little progress 
in attaining its computer goals related to corporate organisation, market structure and 
technology transfer, but it achieved significant progress in later years. Aiding this 
success, however, were the technology changes in the international computer industry, 
combined with changes in the industry's structure, which expanded the Indian state's 
COmputer opportunities and therefore its potential bargaining power. 
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While sympathetic to Grieco's criticism of the dependency school for its 
deterministic belief that in areas of high technology owned by MNCs, developing 
countries will fail in any attempt to initiate sectoral-based industrialisation, Adler argues 
that Grieco's methodology is inadequate. " ... case studies of domestic technological and 
industrial development in one sector may be of limited value in explaining why some 
developing countries succeed in domestic high-technology projects, while others fail 
despite their best efforts. ,,84 In basing his analysis of the contrasting experiences of the 
Argentine and Brazilian computer and nuclear industries, Adler implicitly differentiates 
himself from both Haggard and Grieco, when he suggest that one must look beyond the 
interaction of domestic and international structural factors and to consider the crucial role 
played by ideological groups: 
success was related to the ideologies of key actors as well as their 
perception of their country's ability to set and attain technological goals. 
Ideologically motivated groups of scientists and technocrats -- referred 
here as guerrillas -- ... were able to affect the decision-making processes 
of their state institutions. 85 
Adler goes on to note the importance of bureaucratic insulation which shielded these 
"pragmatic anti-dependent guerrillas" from clientelism and domestic political attack. 
Having now selectively surveyed the literature from comparative politics, are 
there any insights on which we can base our analysis of defence industrialisation in the 
NICs? From the outset it can be said that though the state is a necessary factor in 
explaining industrialisation in the NICs, it is not sufficient. The critical point to be made 
is that the near exclusive focus in the comparative politics literature on entry by the NICs 
into industrialisation is too static, and leads to the diminution of the role played by firms. 
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As this author suggests, the further a country or a state moves in the 
industrialisation process, the more important non-state actors such as firms become. 
Moreover, there may in fact be an irrevocable trade-off between the need for the state 
to overcome initial barriers to entry in the industrialisation process such as, the creation 
of high technology industries (including defence), and the competitiveness of that industry 
in the long run. Indeed, the implicitly static industry analyses of Grieco and Adler fail 
to consider the possibility or effects of such a tradeoff. As a consequence their 
arguments about the power of states and sociological factors to influence the pattern of 
sectoral investment crumble under the test of time. 
For example, Grieco's claim that the Indian government has succeeded in creating 
an indigenous, competitive and technologically advanced computer industry does not hold 
up to empirical scrutiny. Recent studies, including those from the Indian government 
itself, highlight several weaknesses in the organisation, structure and technology base of 
the country's domestic computer industry: high import intensity, negligible value added, 
huge technology lags (3-5 years), and uncompetitive domestic prices (on average 2.5 
times higher than international prices).86 Some computer industry analysts have argued 
further that India's hard core bargaining strategy with the multinationals was tantamount 
"to hitching our wagons to a particular level of technology without allowing for 
flexibility or maneouvrability. 1187 
Adler's conviction that the Brazilian computer industry derives its longevity and 
success because of ideologically motivated policymakers also is problematic. By failing 
to weigh the interests of such non-state actors as Brazil's manufacturing firms, which 
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have been strong opponents of the Brazilian government's sectoral policy (because of 
higher indirect costs of production), Adler failed to anticipate the power of these 
economic actors in gaining the recent revocation of the informatics legislation, which has 
nurtured and protected this industry. 
A second critical weakness of the statist approaches is their treatment of firms as 
exogenous to the process of industrialisation in the NICs. Like their neoclassical 
counterparts, most comparative politics theorists, if they discuss firms at all, simply treat 
firms as black boxes -- firms simply take orders from the state. In addition, by limiting 
analyses primarily to explaining the common factors conditioning the successful adoption 
of export-led industrialisation strategies by some NICs, comparative politics cannot 
account for the divergent performances at the sectoral as opposed to the macroeconomic 
level. Even those studies which are sensitive to this methodological issues, e.g. Adler's 
comparative study of the Brazilian and Argentine nuclear and informatics industry, treat 
sectors/industries as homogeneous and monolithic in their preferences and behaviour. 
The author concludes her review of comparative politics by suggesting that we 
need to understand and to incorporate the role of firms into analyses of the 
industrialisation process. We need explanations for differences between firms in the 
same sector within the same country and between different countries. As pointed out by 
business scholars, firms do not merely react to state policies and other factors affecting 
their external environments. "[M]any have actively sought to create new, internal 
sources of advantage. As they jockey for position [in international markets], firms often 
adopt quite different strategies within the same industry. 1188 To reiterate my argument, 
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the ability of the state to initiate and more importantly, to sustain industrialisation 
depends upon the technological capabilities and strategies of firms and the cooperation 
between firms and state to ensure that external economies from anyone industrial activity 
are captured within the national unit. 
International Political Economy 
As mentioned previously, the literature from international political economy 
focuses on the questions of how power and wealth are created and whether their 
redistribution generates conflict or cooperation. The specific relationship between 
defence and industrialisation is central to political economists', especially mercantilists', 
preoccupation with how the state derives and ensures national military capabilities 
(power) and economic competitiveness in international markets (wealth).89 Research on 
these related sets of questions has been profoundly influenced by a particular neo-
mercantilist conception of international political economy provided by Gilpin: 
Political economy ... means the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in 
international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power. 
In the short run, the distribution of power and the nature of the political 
system are the major determinants of this framework within which wealth 
is produced and distributed. In the long run, however, shifts in economic 
efficiency and in the location of economic activity tend to undermine and 
transform the existing political system. 90 
Although this concept has been quite influential, much of the research based on 
it is conceptually flawed. As will be shown below, firms play a critical role in this 
reciprocal interaction between wealth and power in both the advanced and newly 
industrialising countries. However, the existing literature in international political 
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economy often ignores the role of firms and fails to grasp their significance. Two 
examples illustrate this failure. 
The first is The Political Economy of International Relations. In this book, Gilpin 
refines his definition of international political economy further, emphasising the 
organisation of the pursuit of power and wealth by states. The essence of this 
organisation is the interaction between the state and the market: 
The state and the market have tended to displace other forms of political 
and economic organisation in the modem world because of their efficiency 
in the production of power and/or wealth ... State and market interact to 
influence the distribution of power and wealth in international relations.91 
Gilpin also clearly affirms the impact of strategic industries in spurring inter-state 
conflict, which is an important element in this author's argument that rivalry between 
states is based on the competitive development of the strategic defence and capital goods 
industries. His discussion of this impact, however, continues to emphasise the interaction 
of states and markets and to disregard the strategic role of firms: 
Embedded in this relationship of state and market ... is the interaction of 
economic and political change that gives rise to an intense competition 
among states over the global location of economic activities, especially the 
so-called commanding heights of modem industry. 92 
In brief, Gilpin argues that states and markets are the actors, and their interaction creates 
and causes shifts in the distribution of wealth and power. 
Gilpin's understanding of the relation between the state and the market seems to 
be based on an analogy with the neoclassical model of a monopoly. In a monopoly, a 
single supplier faces a set of consumers that are individually too small to affect the price. 
Although the monopolist must be concerned with the aggregate of consumers' behaviour, 
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i.e., the demand curve facing the monopolist, there is no strategic interaction between 
the monopolist and an individual consumer because the behaviour of the latter has no 
effect on the monopolist. In this setting, the monopolist sets prices and quantities and 
the consumers act as price takers. In Gilpin's discussion of the relationship between the 
state and market, the state corresponds to a monopoly supplier that sets governmental 
policies to which economic actors respond as price or, rather, policy takers. 
In Gilpin's theoretical discussion of states and markets, although not in his 
historical description of, for example the role of multinational corporations, there is no 
strategic interaction between the state and the economic actors comprising the market. 
"The market, II in Gilpin's words, "is a universe composed mainly of prices and 
quantities; the autonomous economic agent responding to price signals provides the basis 
of decision. 1193 (Italics added by the author for emphasis.) Firms, as strategic actors, 
play no role in Gilpin's theoretical conceptualisation. The burden of this thesis is, in 
part, to show that we cannot adequately explain the origins of and the shifts in 
international competitiveness without treating firms as strategic actors and examining the 
strategic interaction between firms and the state. 
The second example of the failure to integrate the role of the firm is Sen's 1he 
Military Origins of Industrialisation and Trade Rivalry, which is perhaps the most 
valuable and extensive treatment from international political economy on the role of the 
state in ensuring national defence and industrial competitiveness.94 Since it is the most 
sophisticated and systematic discussion of this issue, it is useful to summarise Sen's 
argument briefly. 
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Using the input-output research of a group of development economists, Sen begins 
his thesis with two of this group's findings. 9oS First, there are similar "structures of 
production" in different countries at the same stage of economic growth, as measured by 
per capita income.96 Second, there exists a group of industries that are essential for 
industrialisation and economic growth. Sen suggests that this economic phenomenon 
arises substantially from states' efforts to industrialise in response to the pressures of 
international competition: 
The state plays a crucial role in fostering and maintaining this pattern of 
self-sufficient industrial structure. The reason for this is to be found in 
the competitive relations between states in the international political 
system. Once the process of industrialisation has reached a significant 
stage in one country, others are compelled to respond by industrialising 
themselves .... 97 
More specifically Sen argues that the fundamental attributes of industrialisation are 
importantly predetermined by states' efforts to establish industries for defence and 
economic self-sufficiency. 
He indicates that in a number of latecomer countries, including Japan, Brazil and 
India, states have assumed a preeminent role in the creation of these industries for a 
variety of reasons related to market failure and high barriers to entry. Having linked the 
motivations for state intervention to the desire and necessity to maintain defence 
capabilities and industrial competitiveness, Sen then considers the effects of government 
intervention by these latecomer countries on the international system. 
The imperative of states to develop strategic industries, which often cannot be 
supported through domestic consumption alone, leads to the creation of global surplus 
capacity and ultimately to international trade conflicts. According to Sen: 
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The latecomer countries thus unavoidably threaten the established position 
of firstcomer countries [e.g. United States, Great Britain, Germany etc.]. 
This threat provokes economic rivalry over markets in the latecomer 
country itself, in third markets, and in the domestic market of the 
firstcomer. 98 
Sen's work thus provides an insightful study about the historic sources of contemporary 
international trade conflict and rivalry deriving from state pursuit of power and wealth, 
via the formation of strategic defence and capital goods industries. 
There is, however, a fundamental weakness in this important contribution because 
of the author's failure to integrate the role of firms into his analysis. If there are 
observable structural economic similarities between countries, why then are there 
subsequent differences between states' defence/industrial capabilities and levels of 
international competitiveness, given equal motivations and patterns of state intervention? 
Although Sen outlines the various common policies that latecomer states have used to 
foster these strategic industries, he does not adequately link such state intervention to the 
attainment of international competitiveness in these industries. In focusing solely on the 
motivations and patterns of state intervention across states and not on firms, he cannot 
explain variance at the national or industry level. 
Referring to two of Sen's cases of latecomer countries, India and Brazil, why is 
it that India's defence and capital goods industries are far less self-sufficient and 
internationally competitive than Brazil's, particularly when the Indian government has 
been far more interventionist than the Brazilian state in creating and sustaining these 
strategic industries? The development of these strategic industries is obviously not 
merely the outcome of unilateral actions by the state. This critical weakness may stem 
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from Sen's neo-mercantilist focus on the state as the predominant actor in international 
relations. By leaving out the critical role played by the firm and its strategic interaction 
with the state, Sen is unable to explain more fully the relationship between defence and 
industrialisation. 
lWzy Finns Matter: A Conceptual Framework 
The preceding review of the literature has illustrated that existing scholarship 
from political science and economics has generally neglected the role played by firms in 
defence industrialisation and in the attainment of international competitiveness. This 
Ph.D. thesis will demonstrate the importance of firms to these processes. It thereby 
contributes to a better understanding of how firms influence the international distribution 
of competitive advantage. To meet this objective, the author investigates the 
development of the defence and capital goods industries by the NICs. As shown above, 
these industries are critical to the creation and distribution of power and wealth by states. 
They strongly determine a state's hierarchical position in the international system. 
The central task of this thesis is to explain the development of these strategic 
industries by the NICs, and to account for the variance in their performance and 
international competitiveness across the NICs. The thesis uses comparative case studies 
from Brazil and India, two prominent regional political and economic powers, whose 
industrial bases are similar, though their strategic environments differ markedly. 
As indicated in Table 2.1, Brazil & India: Defence Industrial Indicators, India's 
capital goods sector is slightly larger than Brazil's in terms of capital goods as percentage 
of manufacturing value added, and the number of capital goods establishments.99 
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1.11 
~ 
I 
Source: 
Table 2.1 
BmriJ &: India: Defence Industrial Indicators 
~ 
I Brazil I 
Gross Domestic Product 
(1985) 188,250. 
Current U.S. Millions· 
Defence Expenditure/GDP 2.0% 
average annual percentage" 
R " D spending as a percent of GNP 0.7% 
1984/1982· 
Capital Goods as a percentage of 
manufacturing value added 25.4% 
(l985t 
Number of Capital Goods Industries 15.8 
(thousands)-
Number of scientists " engineers 32.5 
(thousands)· 
Lall 
'ntemationallnstitute for Stategic Studies, The Military Balance, London: IISS, various years. 
-Chudnovskyet aI. 
India 
: 
175,710. 
6.0% 
0.9% 
27.4% 
18.3 
100.1 
Dramatic differences are evident, however, between the Brazilian and Indian 
governments' allocation of resources to defence. India well outstrips Brazil in terms of 
spending on defence and public-sector R&D, and in the size of its scientific-engineering 
base. 
Nevertheless, during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s Brazil rose to 
become the leading defence producer and exporter among the newly industrialising 
countries. India, on the other hand, became the leading arms importer among the 
industrialising countries and in the Third World. 1oo How then did Brazil achieve its 
position as a leading defence manufacturer and exporter, despite its lack of a strategic 
threat and comparatively smaller defence industrial base? To explain the relative 
performance and competitiveness of Brazil's defence industry in contrast to India's, the 
author provides a general conceptual framework for understanding this contrast. 
Although this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of Brazil and India, it is 
equally applicable to other industrialising countries.101 
Three important dimensions define this conceptual framework. These three 
dimensions are centripetal to explaining the comparative development and 
competitiveness of the defence industries in the newly industrialising countries. The first 
dimension is the technology strategies of the defence and capital goods firms. A firm's 
technology strategy vitally affects the development of its underlying technological and 
manufacturing capabilities. 102 Differences in strategies can affect a firm's relative 
performance within an industry. A technology strategy entails decisions and efforts by 
a firm to monitor and search for new technologies, to invest in its own R&D 
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capabilities, to choose among different technologies, to absorb, and to adapt these 
technologies in ways that augment the capabilities of the firm. 
The successful development of defence industrial and export capabilities by a firm 
generally requires a technology strategy that involves all of these activities. For instance, 
in order to broaden a firm's existing technological capability, it is often necessary to 
monitor and search for relevant technological innovations internationally. Often, 
however, firms bypass and neglect this activity with costly results. As discussed later 
in the case study on India, one of the reasons for the perpetual manufacturing delays and 
technological obsolescence of India's Advanced Light Helicopter and Light Combat 
Aircraft projects was the failure of Hindustan Aeronautics to keep abreast of important 
weapons technologies. 
A more critical component of a firm's technology strategy is the ability to choose 
wisely among different technologies and to select the means for its successful transfer and 
absorption. Different technologies afford the firm with different opportunities to expand 
its productivity, performance and competitiveness. Thus, in choosing a particular 
technology, a firm is affecting its own future technological learning and experience, and, 
hence its capabilities. 
Many defence producers in the NICs often want and choose foreign technologies 
that are very close to the international technological frontier. In doing so, firms then 
have to consider how this technology can be effectively transferred through, for example, 
licensing agreements, coproduction arrangements, training and technical assistance 
programmes. In selecting how the technology is to be transferred, the firm consciously 
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or unconsciously determines the prospects for its subsequent assimilation and 
modification. This, in tum, affects the firm's long-term technological and industrial 
capabilities. As we shall see shortly in the Brazilian case study, Embraer's emergence 
as a leading manufacturer of small military and commercial aircraft was based on a 
conscious technology strategy that astutely selected foreign technologies, such as 
advanced composite material technology, and ensured their transfer and absorption 
through coproduction, offset and other arrangements with advanced foreign aircraft 
man u facturers. 
The second dimension to the conceptual framework is the ability of a NIC to 
develop an integrated defence-industrial base, characterised by strong interaction between 
defence and capital goods firms. The author maintains that the successful performance 
and competitiveness of some NIC arms producers is based on their tight industry linkages 
to a highly diversified and specialised capital goods sector. As demonstrated above, the 
capital goods sector is the locus of technological innovation in an economy. 103 The 
forward and backward flows between this producing industry and its user industry, the 
defence sector, are critical to ensuring the rapid inter-sectoral diffusion of related 
technologies and manufacturing processes. Indeed, without the interaction between the 
defence and capital goods firms, technological capabilities are likely to remain 
internalised within a firm, and will not develop sufficiently because the market is too 
narrow. One example of the beneficial impact of inter-firm linkages on the 
competitiveness of the Brazil's defence industry involves the capital goods firm, Metal 
Leve, which produces special alloy pistons for a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, 
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Embraer. Embraer's initial demand for and technology assistance to Metal Leve enabled 
the latter to develop the high quality and economies of scale necessary for attaining 
export competitiveness. 
State intervention, particularly its trade, industrial and technology policies is the 
third and final dimension of the author's conceptual framework. Differences in the 
extent and form of state intervention affect the relative pace, development and 
international competitiveness of the NICs' defence industrial capabilities. Such 
differences may include whether a state's trade policy is more inward or outward 
oriented; whether its industrial policies are highly regulatory or less interventionist; and 
whether its technology policy emphasises self-reliance through government-assisted R & 
D, or relies more on private-sector R&D initiatives. 
In choosing among these various policies, a state influences the competitive 
environment of firms and affects the linkages between capital goods and defence firms. 
For example, a government's industrial policies can affect the market structure in which 
firms interact. Differences in the distribution of firm sizes, degrees of vertical 
integration and market concentration ratios have implications for the rate of technological 
innovation and diffusion among defence and capital goods firms. For instance, a highly 
concentrated market structure, dominated by a few, large firms, may preempt 
opportunities for technological learning and diffusion, which could occur in a more 
competitive market characterised by an evenly distributed number and sizes of firms. 
By regulating the pressure of international competition on firms through, for 
example, controls on direct foreign investment or the provision of export incentives, a 
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state's trade policy also influences the technological development and competitiveness 
of its defence and capital goods firms. It is now widely recognised, for example, that 
exposure to the international market through export activities will have beneficial effects 
on a firm's continued competitiveness. Indeed, the international, as opposed to the 
domestic market, forces firms to be more efficient in terms of cost, quality, delivery 
times, and after-sales service. Ie» In sum, where an industrialising country lies along the 
three dimensions -- firms' technology strategies, the development of an integrated 
defence-industrial base, and a state's trade, industrial and technology policies -- does 
much to explain the development and level of international competitiveness of its defence 
sector. 
The Cases of Brazil and India 
Having outlined the conceptual framework, the author would like to use it to 
explain briefly the contrast in Brazil's and India's defence industries. This contrast will 
be developed at length in the subsequent chapters. As is foreshadowed here, the 
successful technological development and international competitiveness of Brazil's 
defence and capital goods firms resulted from these firms' own long-term, cumulative 
R&D efforts, and from a strategy that emphasised building systematically on foreign 
technological inputs -- licensing, training programmes abroad, coproduction 
arrangements. 
The success of Brazil's defence industry also derived from strong interindustry 
linkages with the capital goods sector. As the Brazilian case study will document, one 
of the reasons for the unusually high inter-industry linkages is that many of the country's 
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capital goods firms diversified into military production beginning in the late 1960s-early 
1970s. Reacting to various recessions in the domestic capital goods sector, some 
Brazilian firms became important defence manufacturers and global exporters. Other 
smaller capital goods firms converted part of their production lines to supply these larger 
domestic defence manufacturers. The beneficial effects of these inter-sectoral and inrra-
sectoral linkages on Brazilian defence and manufacturing competitiveness are highlighted 
in Chapter 5. Briefly they include more rapid technological development and diffusion 
between the capital goods and defence industries, the generation of economies of scale 
and specialisation, and the promotion of capital goods exports by smaller subcontracting 
firms because of the international reputation effects enjoyed by their larger suppliers. 
In Brazil, the government has limited its involvement in the defence industry. It 
has generally used its trade, industrial and technology policies to provide the necessary 
infrastructure which facilitates firm initiatives. The Brazilian government has tried to 
create a conducive environment that stimulates the technology acquisition and upgrading 
efforts of defence and capital goods firms by encouraging linkages to its R&D institutes 
and by financing private-sector R&D. The government has also promoted the 
development of the capital goods industry and has strengthened linkages between the 
defence and capital goods firms, via domestic content policies and by subsidising 
purchases of local capital goods. In addition, the Brazilian government's trade policy of 
promoting direct foreign investment and exports has induced defence and capital goods 
firms to employ technologies that are very close to the international frontier. 
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This issue of competitive pressure is a critical factor explaining the different 
outcomes in Brazil and India. In effect by applying competitive pressures from domestic 
as well as international sources, and by subsidising firms' technological efforts, the 
Brazilian government has incited close competition between firms. Brazilian defence and 
capital goods firms are thus induced to make large investments in technological learning 
and in other R&D activities, which, in tum, contribute to these firms' international 
competitiveness. 
By comparison, the failure oflndia's defence industry to develop indigenously and 
to achieve at least a modicum of export competitiveness stems from shortcomings in each 
of the three dimensions. First, Indian firms' technology strategies have not enabled them 
to generate new or even improve existing technologies, not only because of these firms' 
limited desire to learn but because of the inefficient use of foreign technologies. In many 
cases this behaviour by Indian firms was affected by the lack of interaction between the 
defence and capital goods industries. 
Indeed, as evidenced in Chapter 4, the physical and technological linkages 
between the country's capital goods sector and its defence industries are extremely 
fragmented, and have lead to the autarkic, duplicative development of each sector. This 
lack of integration has prevented the defence and capital goods industries from becoming 
more innovative and efficient through inter-sectoral learning and sharing. 
In stark contrast to the Brazilian government's primarily indirect intervention in 
the defence and capital goods industries, Indian government intervention in these vital 
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industries has been extraordinarily invasive. The Indian government has used various 
policies to direct the industrial and technological capabilities of its defence and capital 
goods manufacturers. In particular, the Indian government has emphasised a technology 
push approach through the development of a massive government science and technology 
infrastructure. However, as the case study on India will show, this infrastructure is 
characterised by excessive fragmentation, poor coordination and a high degree of 
concentration in R&D activities in government laboratories. Furthermore, given the 
relatively narrow focus on defence-related R&D and the institutional separation of the 
defence and capital goods industries, potential commercial spillovers have been limited. 
The Indian government has sought to protect and insulate its capital goods firms 
from international market forces by tightly regUlating direct foreign investment and 
imports of foreign technologies. Indeed, of the NICs, the Indian government has had the 
most restrictive trade policies. The combined effects of these policies have blunted 
incentives for India's defence and capital goods firms to invest and develop technological 
capabilities, leading to the structural obsolescence of these industries. This lack of 
exposure and access to foreign technologies has retarded the growth and exports of the 
country's defence and manufacturing industries. 
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Conclusion 
In sum, the central question motivating this thesis is: What accounts for the 
variance in defence-industrial performance and international competitiveness among the 
newly industrialising countries? The variance that we observe across these states poses 
two puzzles for existing theoretical approaches, discussed above. 
The first puzzle is that international relations theory, particularly the subfield of 
international security studies, would predict that states facing greater strategic threats 
would have the most technologically developed and competitive defence production 
capabilities. However, this is not what we will observe in the cases of Brazil and India. 
These case studies will show that the causal relationship of a country's external 
environment on its defence-industrial capabilities is underspecified. For example, 
Chapter 3 will document how, in the absence of a strategic threat, Brazil achieved its 
position as the leading arms producer and exporter in the NICs. Chapter 4 will reveal 
why, in spite of the enonnous strategic pressures -- threat of war with Pakistan and 
China as well as a regional arms race -- India's defence industry has largely failed to 
meet those threats. 
The variance in the defence-industrial capabilities and competitiveness across the 
NICs raises yet another theoretical puzzle. International political economy and 
comparative politics theories suggest that the international context (competitive relations 
between states) and state power ("strong"/"weak" states) jointly should explain the 
variance in the industrial and export performance of states' defence industries. lOS In 
particular, these theories argue that strong states should be relatively more effective in 
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achieving certain economic objectives. I06 But, as Chapter 4 will highlight, the Indian 
government, a purportedly "strong" state, with many policy instruments at its disposal, 
has been unable to develop and sustain a competent indigenous defence industry. Clearly 
this multivariate theoretical explanation, linking state strength to desired industrial 
outcomes, is also underdetermined. 
The author's conceptual framework helps resolve these puzzles by explaining the 
variance in the NICs' defence industrial capabilities in terms of the three dimensions: 
1) the technological strategies of firms; 2) an integrated defence-industrial base 
characterised by strong interindustry linkages between the defence and capital goods 
sectors; and 3) government trade, industrial and technology policies. This framework 
suggests the following hypotheses: 
1) The deeper a firm's technology strategy, the more likely that firm will 
become a competitive manufacturer and exporter. The term "deeper" 
refers to the ability of the firm to search, select wisely among foreign 
technologies, to secure their transference and effective absorption, and to 
investment in its own R&D in ways that augment the future 
technological capabilities of the firm. 
2) The tighter and more structured inter-industry linkages are between the 
defence and capital goods sector, the more likely the country's defence 
industry will be technologically capable and export competitive. 
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3) The more a government's trade, industrial and technology policies act to 
help stimulate firms' technological efforts and to expose them to pressures 
from both the domestic and international markets, the more competitive 
and technologically advanced a country's defence/capital goods firms will 
be. 
To conclude, the author maintains that in applying these three hypotheses to the 
case studies of Brazil and India, she is successfully able to explain the competitiveness 
of Brazil's defence industry in contrast to India's. 
65 
Endotes 
lKenneth Waltz (1979), for example, argues that conflict or war is less likely to 
occur in an international system characterised by a bipolar distribution of power than in 
a multipolar system. Robert Gilpin (1981) posits that the process of uneven growth 
between states leads to hegemonic wars. Robert Keohane (1984) attempts to show how 
regimes may help international cooperation survive the relative decline of a hegemonic 
power and the emergence of a more even distribution of power in the international 
system. Sen (1984) has argued that the industrial rise of latecomer countries, such as 
Japan and the NICs, unavoidably threatens the established positions of the firstcomer 
countries (e.g. United States, Germany) provoking economic rivalry and conflict in 
international markets. 
2Indeed, understanding the determinants of international economic competitiveness 
is especially relevant in the 1990s when the very relationship between wealth and power, 
as traditionally conceived, is being transformed. As the threat of global military conflict 
recedes, states according to Stopford and Strange, are now competing over the means to 
create wealth within their territory rather than for power over more territory. "Where 
[states] used to compete for power as a means to wealth, they now compete more for 
wealth as a means to power." See John M. Stopford and Susan Strange with John 
Henley, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition/or World Market Shores (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1. 
3See G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R.R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete, eds., 
Technical Change and Economic Theory (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1988); 
Jorge Niosi, ed., Technology and National Competitiveness: Oligopoly, Technological 
Innovation, and International Competition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
1991); and C. Freeman, The Economics 0/ Industrial Innovation (London: Francis 
Pinter, 1982). 
4Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, Manu/acturing Matters: The Myth o/the Post-
Industrial Economy, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 109-110. 
SLaura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-
Technology Industries (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992); 
W. Sandholtz, M. Borrus and J. Zysman et al., The Highest Stakes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). For historical treatments see Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives 
on Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); and Gautam Sen, The 
Military Origins 0/ Industrialisation and Trade Rivalry (London: Frances Pinter, 1984). 
6-J'he term "capital goods" generally refers to the machinery and transport 
equipment, which enter capital formation. For a specific product breakdown of capital 
goods one may refer to division 38 of the International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) and to section 7 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). 
66 
'This refers to Sen's (1984) argument that while the impact of military 
requirements was not the cause of industrialisation itself, military needs were "catalytic" 
in that they were instrumental in stimulating the pace and development of various 
strategic capital goods industries. 
8N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, 16. Technological convergence has 
a two-fold meaning. For instance, industries which manufacture differentiated products 
can be convergent because of their use of identical or similar types of machinery. 
Convergence also refers to the manufacturing processes that underlie, for example, the 
machinery and metal-using sector (e.g. the manufacturing technique of interlocking parts 
used in the firearms and textile machinery industries). 
9Fran~ois Chesnais, "Technological Competitiveness Considered as a Form of 
structural Competitiveness," in Technology and National Competitiveness: Oligopoly, 
Technological Innovation, and International Competition, ed., Jorge Niosi (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 153. 
IORosenberg, 200. 
IISee the classic study Ralph G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty 
(London: Longmans, 1952); Klaus Knorr, Military Power and Potential (Lexington, 
MA.: D.C. Heath & Company), 1970; and Sen, The Military Origins of 
Industrialisation. An interesting study of the development of the capital goods industry 
in relation to military production in Japan is provided by Toshiaki Chokki, "A History 
of the Machine Tool Industry in Japan," in Machinery and Economic Development, ed., 
Martin Fransman (London: Macmillan Press, 1986). For a timely discussion of the 
impact of commercial technologies on defence production see Jay Stowsky, "From Spin-
Off to Spin-On: Redefining the Military's Role in American Technology Development," 
in The Highest Stakes, oos., W. Sandholtz, M. Borrus and J. Zysman, et al (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). 
12Knorr, Military Power and Potential, 71. 
J3The industries which comprise the strategic set are: textiles, iron and steel, 
chemicals, machinery, paper and paper products, and transport equipment. See Sen, 
Military Origins of Industrialisation, 50. 
14Ibid., 7. 
ISDebate continues, however, over which segments of these industries --
semiconductors, aircraft, motor vehicles, machine tools -- are most vital to ensuring a 
nation's competitiveness in global markets. 
67 
16See Sanjaya LaB, Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries 
(Paris: OECD, 1990); Dieter Ernst and David O'Connor, Technology and Global 
Competition: The Challengefor Newly Industrialising Economies (paris: OECD,1989); 
Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrialising Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Gary Gereffi and 
Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialisation in Latin 
America and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Frederic C. 
Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987). 
171983 Report Science, Policy and Technology Committee of the OECD, cited in 
Chesnais, "Technological Competitiveness Considered as a Form of Structural 
Competitiveness," in Technology and National Competitiveness: Oligopoly, 
Technological Innovation, and International Competition, ed., Jorge Niosi (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 150-51. 
"See James Everett Katz, ed., Arms Production in Developing Countries 
(Lexington: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath & Company, 1984); James Everett Katz, ed., 
The Implications of Third World Military Industrialisation (Lexington: Lexington 
Books/D.C. Heath & Company, 1986); Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds., Arms 
Production in the Third World (London: Taylor & Francis, 1986); and Office of 
Technology Assessment, The Global Anns Trade (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, June 1991). 
19I1an Peleg, "Military Production in Third World Countries: A Political Study," 
in Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy, eds., Pat McGowan and Charles Kegley 
(Beverely Hills: Sage Publishers, 1980); Michael Moodie, "Defence Industries in the 
Third World: Patterns and Promises," in Anns Transfers in the Modem World, eds., 
Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); 
Katz, Anns Production in Developing Countries, and Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms 
Production in the Third World. 
2~aju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986); Harpreet Mahajan, Arms Transfers to India, Pakistan and the Third World 
(New Delhi: Young Asia Publishers, 1982); and Barry Buzan, Gowher Rizvi, Rosemary 
Foot, Nancy Jetly, B.A. Robertson, and Anita Inder Singh, South Asian Insecurity and 
the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
21See Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea (London: 
Macmillan, 1986); A. James Gregor, "The Republic of China in Taiwan," in 
Implications of Third World Military Industrialisation, ed., James Everett Katz 
(Lexington: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath & Company, 1986); A. J. Gregor, R.E. 
Harkavy and S.G. Neuman, "Taiwan: Dependent Self-Reliance," in Anns Production 
in the Third World, eds., Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson (London: Taylor & 
68 
Francis, 1986); and "Israel's Defence Industry: Evolution and Prospects," in The Global 
Arms Trade, Office of Technology Assessment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
printing Office, June 1991). 
22See Donald A. Weatherbee, "Indonesia: Its Defence Industries Complex," in 
Implications of Third World Military Industrialication," ed., James Everett Katz 
(Lexington: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath & Company, 1986); Bilveer Singh, "ASEAN 
Arms Industries: Potentials and Limits," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 8, no. 2 (1989); 
Clovis Brigagao, 0 Mercado da Seguran~a Ensaios Sobre Economia Politica de Defesa 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1984); Alexandre de S.C. Barros, "Brazil," 
in Anns Production in Developing Countries, ed., James Everett Katz (Lexington: 
Lexington Books/D.C. Heath & Company, 1986); and Renato Dagnino, "A Industria de 
Armamentos Brasileira: Desenvolvimento e Perspectivas," in 0 Armamentismo e 0 
Brasil: A Guerra Deles, eds., Amilcar 0 Herrera, Pinguelli Rosa, and Renato P. 
Dagnino (Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense S.A., 1985). 
23See Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982); Office of Technology Assessment, The Global Arms Trade; and 
David J. Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, eds., Marketing Security Assistance: New 
Perspectives on Arms Sales (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987). 
24David J. Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, "Brazil and South Korea: Two 
Cases of Security Assistance and Indigenous Production Development," in Marketing 
Security Assistance, 132. 
2SSee Ann Naylor Schwarz, "Arms Transfers and the Development of Second-
Level Arms Industries," in Marketing Security Assistance; and Stephanie G. Neuman, 
"International Stratification and Third World Military Expenditure," International 
Organization (Winter 1984): 167-197. 
260ffice of Technology Assessment, The Global Arms Trade; David Saw, "The 
Emergence of Third World Aircraft Industry," Military Technology, Vol. 4, no. 4 
(1988); and Thomas Ohlson, "The Asean Countries: Low-Cost Latecomers," in Arms 
Production in the Third World. 
27Herbert Wulf, "Arms Production in Third World Countries: Effects of 
Industrialisation," in World Armaments and Disarmament 1985 Yearbook, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1985), 366. 
28Gavin Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1974); Herbert Wulf, "The Structure of the Defence Industry," in The Structure 
of the Defence Industry'"ed.s .. , Nicole B~l ~d M.ilton Leitenberg .(London: Croom 
Helm, 1983); Ilan Peteg, Mlhtary Production In ThIrd World Countnes;" and Stephanie 
G. Neuman, "International Stratification and Third World Military Expenditure. " 
69 
29Stephanie G. Neuman, "Third World Arms Production and Global Arms 
Transfer Systems, " in Arms Production in Developing Countries, ed., James Everett Katz 
(Lexington: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath & Company, 1984), 21. This chapter is 
based on a previous International Organisation article, "International Stratification and 
Third World Military Expenditure" cited above. 
30Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic 
Effects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 169. 
3lNeuman, "Third World Arms Production," 28-29. 
32Louscher and Salomone, Marketing Security Assistance; Andrew Ross, "World 
Order and Arms Production," in Implications of Third World Military Industrialisation; 
and Carol V. Evans, "Reappraising Third World Arms Production," Survival (March-
April 1986): 99-118. 
33 Ann Naylor Schwartz, "Arms Transfers and the Development of Second-Level 
Arms Industries," 1 09. 
34Ibid. 
3SOffice of Technology Assessment, The Global Arms Trade, 8. 
36Ross, "World Order and Arms Production," 284. 
370ffice of Technology Assessment, The Global Arms Trade, 17. 
38Nolan, Military Expenditure in Taiwan and South Korea, 120. 
39See, for example, Katz, Arms Production in Developing Countries; Katz, 
Implications of Third World Military Industrialisation; and Ohlson and Brzoska, Arms 
Production in the Third World. 
40See Evans, "Reappraising Third World Arms Production. " 
4lNolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, 17. 
42 A prime example is Katz, Implications of Third World Arms Production. 
43Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, 29. 
44Ibid, refer to footnote number 3 on page 33. 
70 
45Emile Benoit, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Boston: 
D.C. Heath & Co.lLexington Books, 1973); and Nicole Ball, "Defence and 
Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study," Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. 31, no. 3 (April 1983): 507-24. Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in 
Third World Countries: The Economic Effects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1986). 
46Emile Benoit, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Boston: 
D.C. Heath & Co.lLexington Books, 1973) 
47Emile Benoit, "Growth and Defence in Developing Countries," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol 26, no. 2 (January 1978): 271. 
48Ibid., 277. 
49See especially, Nicole Ball, "Defence and Development: A Critique of the 
Benoit Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, no. 3 (April 
1983): 507-24; and Kenneth Boulding, "Defence Spending: Burden or Boon," 
War/Peace Report, Vol. 13, no. 1 (1974): 19-24; and Deger, Military Expenditure in 
Third World Countries. 
50Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic 
Effects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). 
51Deger, 244-45. 
52Ibid., 190. 
53Ibid., 195. 
54See, for example, I.M.D. Little, "The Experience and Causes of Rapid Labour-
Intensive Development in Korea, Taiwan Province, Hong Kong, and Singapore; and the 
possibilities of Emulation," in Export-Led Industrialisation and Development, ed., Eddy 
Lee (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1981); and Bela Balassa, The Newly 
Industrialising Countries in the World Economy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
55Statistical data on comparative growth rates is found in Sanjaya Lall, Building 
Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1990). See James 
Riedel, "Trade as the Engine of Growth in Developing Countries, Revisited," The 
Economic Journal, 94 (March 1984): 56-73; Anne O. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes 
and Economic Development: Liberalisation Attempts and Consequences (Cambridge, 
MA.: Ballinger Press, 1978). For a critique of the dichotomous view between import-
substitution industrialisation and export-led strategies refer to David Evans and Parvin 
Alizadeh, "Trade, Industrialisation and the Visible Hand," Journal of Development 
71 
Studies, 21, 1 (1984): 24-46; and Herbert Schmitz, "Industrialisation Strategies in Less 
Developed Countries: Some Lessons from Historical Experience," Journal of 
Development Studies, 21, 4 (1984): 1-24. 
S6Bela Balassa and Associates, Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial 
Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); and Krueger, Foreign 
Trade Regimes. 
57Little, "The Experiences and Causes of Rapid Labour-Intensive Development, " 
57. 
58This point has been made by, for example, by Stephan Haggard, Pathways from 
the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialising Countries (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990); and Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueshemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1985). 
59Charles-Albert Michalet, Le Capitalisme Mondial (Paris: PUF, 1976),42, cited 
in Fran~ois Chesnais, "Technological Competitiveness Considered as a Form of 
Structural Competitiveness," in Technology and National Competitiveness: Oligopoly, 
Technological Innovation, and International Competition, ed., Jorge Niosi (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 142. 
60Martin Fransman, Machinery and Economic Development (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1986), 159. 
6lInc1uded in this broad literature are: Daniel I. Okimoto, Between MITI and 
Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1989); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, ed., 
Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialisation in Latin America and East Asia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political 
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
62John R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan, 1932). As 
discussed below, the neoclassical focus on traditional research questions, such as the 
labour and capital intensity of technology, and the factor substitutability of labour and 
capital in response to differing factor prices, has tremendously influenced the emerging 
economics literature on technology and industrialisation in the NICs. 
63For an interesting discussion of the limitations of neoclassical economic 
treatments of technology, see G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R.R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. 
Soete, eds. , Technical Change and Economic Theory (London: Frances Pinter 
Publishers, 1988); and Jorge Niosi, ed., Technology and National Competitiveness. 
72 
64R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, An Evolutionary 711eory of Economic Change 
(Boston; Belknap Press for Harvard University Press, 1982), 204-205. 
65See NWsi, ed., Technology and National Competitiveness; Keith Pavitt, 
Technical Innovation and British Economic Performance (London: Macmillan, 1980); 
OECD, Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance (Paris: OECD, 1987); 
Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-
Industrial Economy. 
66 Among this vast and growing literature see Martin Fransman and Kenneth King, 
eds., Technology Capability in the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1984); Dieter 
Ernst and David O'Connor, Technology and Global Competition: Challenge for the 
Newly Industrialising Economies (Paris: OECD, 1989); Sanjaya Lall, Building Industrial 
Competitiveness in Developing Countries; World Bank, Korea: Managing the Industrial 
Transition (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1987); World Bank, Brazil: Industrial 
policies and Manufactured Exports (Washington, D.C., 1983); Simon Teitel, 
"Technology Creation in Semi-Industrial Economies," Journal of Development 
Economics, Special Issue: Symposium on Technological Change and Industrial 
Development, VoL 16, nos. 1-2 (September-October 1984): 39-61. 
67See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d edition 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1950) and Angus Maddison, Phases of Capitalist 
Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
68Frances Stewart and Jeffrey James, The Economics of New Technology in 
Developing Countries (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), p. 1. 
69Sanjaya Lall, Building Industrial Competitiveness, p. 18. 
70Sanjaya Lall, "Technology Learning in the Third World, II in The Economics of 
New Technology in Developing Countries, eds., Frances Stewart and Jeffrey James 
(London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1982), 158. 
71See Martin Fransman, Technology and Economic Development; Fransman and 
King, eds., Technology Capability in the Third World; Carl Dahlman, Bruce Ross-Larson 
and Larry E. Westphal, "Managing Technological Development: Lessons from the 
Newly Industrialising Countries, II World Development, Vol. 15, no. 6 (1987): 759-775; 
Simon Teitel, "Towards an Understanding of Technical Change in Semi-Industrialised 
Countries," Research Policy, 10 (1981): 127-47; and Martin Bell, Bruce Ross-Larson and 
Larry E. Westphal, "Assessing the Performance of Infant Industries," Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 16, nos. 1-2 (September-October 1984): 101-28. 
72See, for example, Carl J. Dahlman and Francisco E. Sercovitch, "Exports of 
Technology from Semi-Industrial Economies and Local Technological Development," 
73 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 16, nos. 1-2 (September-October 1984): 63-99; 
Sanjaya Lall, "Exports of Technology by Newly Industrialising Countries," World 
Development, Vol. 12, nos. 5-6 (1989); and Sanjaya Lall, Building Industrial 
Competitiveness. 
73Sanjaya LaU, "India," World Development, Vol. 12, nos. 5-6 (1984): 535-65; 
Helio Nogueira da Cruz, Muda~a Tecnologica no Setor Metal-Mecanico do Brasil: 
Resultados de Estudos de Casos (Sao Paulo: Instituto de Pesquisas EconOmicas, 
Faculdade de Economia e Administra~o da Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1985); and Jorge 
Katz, ed., Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries (London: 
Macmillan, 1987). 
74Simon Teitel and Larry E. Westphal, "Editors' Introduction," Journal of 
Development Economics, Special Issue, Symposium on Technological Change and 
Industrial Development, Vol. 16, nos. 1-2 (September-October 1984): 1. 
7SSee Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in 
the Newly Industrialising Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Gary 
Rodan, The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialisation: National State and 
International Capital (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); and David Collier, ed., The 
New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
760n Taiwan see K.T. Li, "The Growth of Private Industry in the Republic of 
China," in The Experience of Dynamic Economic Growth on Taiwan, ed., K.T. Li 
(Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1976); and Robert Wade and Gordon White, eds., 
Developmental States in East Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). On Korea, 
see Leroy Jones and Il Sakong, Government, Business and Entrepreneurship in Economic 
Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). For 
Singapore refer to Gary Rodan, The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialisation; 
and Linda Y.C. Lim, "Singapore's Success: The Myth of the Free Market Economy," 
Asian Survey, 23 (June 1983). For general reference, see Francis W. Rushing and 
Carole Ganz Brown, eds., National Development Policies for Developing High 
Technology Industries (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1986). 
77Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1982); Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "Institutions and 
Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study," World Politics, 42 (January 
1990): 210-32; and Robert Wade and Gordon White, eds., Developmental States in East 
Asia. One of the most extensive treatments of the role of the state in industrialisation is 
Guillermo O'Donnell's "bureaucratic authoritarian model" in which political repression 
is viewed as a functional necessity for rapid industrialisation in Latin American NICs. 
See Guillermo O'Donnell, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). David Collier and others have later 
74 
criticised the model for its economic determinism in Collier, ed., The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America. 
78 According to Haggard, "Three dimensions of the state as an institutional and 
legal structure bear on the ability of political elites to realise their interests. The first is 
degree of insulation from societal pressures, which in tum is a function of the 
institutional arrangements linking state and society. The second is cohesiveness of the 
decision-making structure itself. The third is instruments that are available to state elites 
in pursuing their political and substantive goals." Pathways from the Periphery, 43-44. 
79Ibid. 
8Ojbid., 3. 
81See, for example, Peter B. Evans, The Alliance of the Multinational, State and 
Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Gary Gereffi, The 
Phannaceuticai Industry and Dependency in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983); and Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, Transnational 
Corporations versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Automobile 
Industry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
82Joseph M. Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience 
with the International Computer Industry," International Organisation, Vol. 36, no. 3 
(Summer 1982): 609-32; and Emanuel Adler, The Power of Ideology: The Quest for 
Technological Autonomy in Brazil (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 
1987). For a condensed version of Adler's argument refer to "State Institutions, 
Ideology, and Autonomous Development: Computers and Nuclear Energy in Argentina 
and Brazil," Latin American Research Review, 23, 9 (1988): 59-90. 
83 According to Grieco these goals included: "First, India should participate in the 
ownership and control of foreign computer subsidiaries in the country. Second, ... 
wholly Indian producers should satisfy most of the country's computer needs, with 
foreign units temporarily supplying only very exotic technologies and large systems. 
Third, India should have access to and participate in the manufacture of the most 
advanced systems available internationally." See Joseph Greico, "Between Dependence 
and Autonomy," 612. 
84Emanuel Adler, "State Institutions, Ideology, and Autonomous Development," 
59. 
8SIbid., 83. 
86Government of India, "Report on the Computer Industry" in Studies in the 
Structure of the Industrial Economy, BICP, Ministry of Industry, Government of India 
75 
(New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1989). See also Sudha Mahlingam, "Computer 
Strategy in India: Strategies for Latecomer Entry," Economic and Political Weekly, 21 
October 1987, 2375-2384. 
87Confidential interview, with official in Commerce Ministry, Indian embassy, 
Washington, D.C., November 1992. 
"John M. Stopford and Susan Strange with John Henley, Rival States, Rival 
Firms: Competition/or World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 65-66. 
89See the classic studies by Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1935); Friedrich List, The National System o/Political Economy 
(New York: Longmans, Green 1904); Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives 
of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, II World Politics, 1 
(1948): 1-29; and Ralph G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects 0/ Sovereignty (London: 
Longmans, 1952). 
9ORobert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The political 
Economy 0/ Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 43. 
91Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy 0/ International Relations (princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 10-11. 
92Ibid., 24 
93Ibid., 10-11. 
94Gautam Sen, The Military Origins 0/ Industrialisation and Trade Rivalry 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1984). 
9SSee the pioneering work on industrialisation using the input-output methodology 
developed by Hollis B. Chenery and Tsunehiko Watanabe, "International Comparisons 
of the Structure of Production, Econometrica, 26, no. 4 (October 1958): 487-521; K.V. 
Santhanam and R.H. PatiI, "A Study of the Production Structure of the Indian Economy: 
An International Comparison," Econometrica, 40, no. 1 (January 1972): 159-76; and 
David Simpson and Jinkichi Tsukui, "The Fundamental Structure of Input-Output Tables 
and International Comparison," Review o/Economics and Statistics, Vol XLVII, no. 4 
(November 1965): 434-446. 
96rJ'hese development economists refer to the industrial structure of production in 
terms of 1) the similarity in growth patterns of countries is observable in terms of the 
growth patterns of different sectors and manufacturing industries, in relation to GNP per 
capita; 2) Comparability of a number of structural input-output indicators: a) measure of 
76 
backward-forward linkages which connect a single industry to others, b) the degree of 
triangularisation of the input-output tables, and c) the comparability of the technical 
coefficients between countries. A later Brazilian study, not included in Sen's book, 
provides further evidence for the existence of a structure of production. See Paulo 
Fontenela e Silva, Aspectos Tecno16gicos da Estrutura Industrial Brasileira: Uma 
Analise de Insumo-Produto (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1980). 
97Sen , The Military Origins of Industrialisation, 7. 
98Ibid., 158. 
99J'his data should be treated with extreme caution because of the inherent 
methodological problems involved pertaining to the availability and reliability of relevant 
economic data collected from developing countries. 
l(XlBased on 1992 data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
10lOf course the power of this conceptual framework ultimately depends on its 
usefulness in explaining the relative defence-industrial capabilities and export 
competitiveness in many different countries. Judgements regarding this power must 
therefore await future research. 
I02For an excellent discussion of the development of technology capabilities in the 
newly industrialising countries see Carl J. Dahlman, Bruce Ross-Larson and Larry E. 
Westphal, "Managing Technological Development: Lessons from the Newly 
Industrialising Countries," World Development, Vol. 15, no. 6 (1987): 759-775. 
103 A comparative study that examines the evolution of the capital goods sector in 
these and other industrialising countries is Daniel Chudnovsky and Masafumi Nagao with 
the collaboration of Staffan Jacobsson, Capital Goods Production in the 711ird World: 
An Economic Study of Technology Acquisition (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 
1983). See also Howard Pack, "Fostering the Capital Goods Sector in LDCs," World 
Development, Vol. 9, no. 3 (1981): 227-50. 
l()1Martin Fransman, Machinery and Economic Development, 32. 
105The concept of "strong" and "weak" states gained general acceptance in 
political science as an analytical tool for understanding the ability of government officials 
to implement particular policies. This conceptualisation was used first to explain 
divergent national responses and economic policies in the United States, Western Europe 
and Japan. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). More recently, the "strong" 
statel"weak" state concept has been used to explain why the East Asian NICs successfully 
pursued export-oriented growth strategies in contrast to the import-substitution 
77 
experiences of some Latin American NICs. See Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the 
Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
100000he comparative politics literature generally defines "strong" states in terms of: 
1) the cohesiveness of the state apparatus, 2) the extent to which the state is sufficiently 
insulated from domestic interest groups, and 3) the degree of autonomy state 
bureaucracies enjoy from society. Peter Hall extends this conceptualisation by including 
the capacity of a state to implement policy, if necessary over the objections of key social 
groups. See Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in 
Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 164. 
78 
Chapter III 
MARKET RATIONALES FOR BRAZILIAN DEFENCE PRODUCTION 
During the 1980s Brazil was the world's seventh largest exporter of major 
weapons and was ranked second, after the Peoples Republic of China, in terms of the 
value of defence production output and exports among the developing countries. The 
most prominent purchasers of Brazilian defence equipment include Iraq, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Kingdom, and France. Today, some of Brazil's leading defence 
industries are teetering at the edge of financial collapse, exposed to the recession in the 
global market for arms and to the vagaries of government policies. 
This chapter analyses the emergence and subsequent, recent decline of the 
Brazilian defence industry. In conjunction, the author delineates the specific relationship 
that has developed between the country's major defence companies and the Brazilian 
government, focusing particularly on: Embraer, a mixed private/state-owned aircraft 
producer; Engesa, a privately owned armoured vehicle manufacturer; and Avibras, a 
private missile firm. Rather than remain at the vague "country" level of analysis, which 
is characteristic of the international arms production/trade literature, the chapter's focus 
is deliberately at the firm as well as sectoral level. 
The argument underpinning this chapter is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
the rapid emergence and export success of Brazil's arms industries during the 1980s 
resulted from firms' own strategies as opposed to government intervention and 
promotion. However, beginning in 1990 some of the country's defence companies began 
to experience severe economic contractions, in some cases making them more susceptible 
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and open to government assistance. The reason for the recent shift towards coordination 
and cooperation in firm-government relations stems from the fact that, having gained 
international prominence, many of the defence firms are now considered national 
"strategic" assets by the Brazilian government. These companies' perceived value to the 
government in Brasilia is measured in terms of their export revenue potential, high 
technology capability, large and highly skilled, unionized workforce, and huge 
concentration in the industrial and politically powerful state of Sao Paulo. 
To provide the reader with the necessary empirical background and to delineate 
diachronically the interaction between the leading defence firms and the Brazilian 
government, this chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, the author re-
examines the conventional political and economic theories, which attempt to explain the 
emergence of Brazil's defence industries during the late 1960s, and their subsequent 
remarkable arms export performance. Conventional political explanations of the 
performance of the Brazilian defence industry emphasise internal, state-centric rationales 
on the part of the country's military governments. Economists, however, generally 
attribute externally induced, trade-liberalising factors. Based on her interviews and 
questionnaire survey data collected from Brazilian capital goods and defence firms, the 
author proposes an alternative hypothesis. She suggests that Brazilian defence production 
was initiated because of domestic sectoral conditions; namely, internal cyclical factors 
within the Brazilian capital goods sector encouraged firms to diversify into military 
production. A three-stage, econometric model is developed, which exhibits the weak 
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effect of government policies on this process of diversification -- a surprising result given 
the nature of the "militarised" state. 
Section II consists of in-depth, individual, firm case studies from Brazil's four 
defence sectors: aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles, and naval craft. Utilising 
information gained through interviews and company site visits, the author documents how 
these firms achieved international competitiveness through the pursuit of various 
strategies related to R&D, new product development and marketing. In the third and 
final section of this chapter, an assessment is provided of the deleterious impact of the 
global recession in the arms trade on Brazil's defence firms. Referring to the country's 
three major defence companies -- Engesa, Embraer and A vibras -- the author details the 
respective responses to the current trade crisis by these firms and by the Brazilian 
government. 
SECTION I: CONVENTIONAL THEORIES 
The conventional wisdom emanating from the political science and strategic 
studies literature has uniformly emphasised the supposed direct role of successive military 
governments in creating and promoting the development of an indigenous defence 
industry in Brazil. Influenced by the vast literature concerning the determinants of 
military intervention and involvement in Latin American politics, political scientists have 
argued that Brazil's defence sector was instrumental to the internal political and foreign 
policy aspirations of the military regime. 1 
The development of defence industries has thus been widely interpreted and linked 
by some authors to prestige considerations on the part of Brazil's military government 
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and to the need to enhance its political-economic power base. One such characteristic 
theoretical formulation suggests: 
Motivated by a well-defined, aggressive national development plan, the new 
military leadership vigorously fostered a Brazilian defence industry as a means 
not only to upgrade its military capabilities but to assist in the nation's overall 
socioeconomic development. 2 
Other writers, of a more "bureaucratic-authoritarian" orientation, such as 
Brazilian Alexandre de S.C. Barros, contend that the motivations for Brazil's defence 
efforts, "and the idea that it could be implemented realistically, spring from the armed 
forces' organizational culture .... ,,3 In particular, several political analysts point to the 
ideological role of security and development, "seguran~a e desenvolvimento", the 
national security doctrine, as formulated by Brazil's National War College, the Escola 
Superior de Guerra (ESG). (The ESG is also said to be the responsible state organ, 
where the military, conservative business leaders and technocrats are jointly trained "to 
disseminate an ideological orientation as well as ... bureaucratic capabilities. "4) The core 
of this "doctrine" proclaims the inseparability of national security from Brazilian social, 
cultural and economic development (hence the strategic justification for import-
substitution industrialisation). As Vargas observes, "The relationship that is established 
between national security and development derives from the geopolitical commitment to 
autarky or self-rule .... lIS From this perspective: 
The military becomes the essence or core of the social organism, and the 
military doctrine of national security links all social practices to the 
problems of internal and external defence and to infuse the entire civilian 
existence with this [militarisation].6 
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The indirect effect of the military's ideology of seguran~a e desenvolvimento on 
the development of Brazil's arms industry is suggested by a number of authors. For 
example, Franko-Jones extrapolates that "state intervention in the armaments industry, 
as mandated by seguran~a e desenvolvimento, reflects a pattern of state activity in 
Brazilian industry in general. ,,7 Dagnino suggests that this doctrine "shaped the 
production decisions of the defence industries because of the armed forces' perceived 
necessity of autonomous supply of counter-insurgency weapons.8 
Another set of political explanations relate the growth of the arms industry and 
its subsequent exports to the international system.9 These analyses advance the 
hegemonic aspirations of this South American giant. The concept of "Brasil grande 
potencia" is said to complement the Brazilian military government's perception of its 
enhanced role in international affairs. Specifically, Brazilian defence production may be 
seen to augment "that nation's long-time policy goal of maintaining dominance in Latin 
America and exerting greater influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the third world in 
general. ,,10 For example, the acceleration of the Brazilian Navy's nuclear submarine 
programme has been attributed to the aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict and 
to the Navy's subsequent concern over extraterritorial powers in the South Atlantic. 
The 1977 rupture in relations between the Geisel and Carter administrations is 
often cited as the immediate impulse behind Brazil's development of an autonomous arms 
industry. In response to U.S. restrictions on aid because of concern regarding the 1975 
nuclear agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, and purported human rights 
violations, Brazil's military government cancelled four military agreements with the 
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United States. \1 According to Fragoso, this break in military cooperation (including 
purchases of U.S. military equipment), impressed the armed forces with the need for 
self-sufficiency in arms production and in related industries. 12 In addition, Brazil's 
subsequent open arms export policy (particularly to Iraq and Libya), has been tied to an 
explicit attempt by the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) to pursue a foreign policy, 
independent of the United States. 
Motivations aside, political scientists have then considered what policy 
mechanisms the state (e.g. military) has used to promote the economic viability of the 
defence industries. The establishment of the Grupo Permanente de MobilizQfDo 
Industrial, the Permanent Group for Industrial Mobilization, in 1964 is often interpreted 
as marking the first explicit attempt by the military to develop an extensive defence 
sector in partnership with private industry. As a result of this association between the 
industrial federation of Sao Paulo (FIESP), and the military government, Brigagao 
writes: 
many sectors of civil industry were converted to the production of arms ... 
Amongst these sectors were: vehicles and automotive, mechanical 
equipment components, leather and shoes, textiles, aeronautical 
• 13 
eqUipment. ... 
Often influenced by U.S. writings on the "military industrial complex", analysts 
have also concentrated on the purportedly close interaction of a defence community or 
II tripe" , which involves the state, the defence industries and multinational corporations. 14 
One example of such cooperation is Brazil's helicopter industry, Helibras, which was 
until 1988 jointly owned and operated by the regional state of Minas Gerais and the 
French aerospace company, Aerospatiale. The military is likewise credited for the 
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emergence of the Sao Jose dos Campos "military-industrial-research park", where the 
largest aerospace manufacturing industries have located alongside the government-
financed, Air Force-operated, Centro Tecno16gico de Aeronautica (CTA). 
The economic literature clearly has had little interest in determining motivational 
factors. Instead, economists have concentrated on the question of what accounts for the 
relative success of Brazil's export performance, especially in terms of high-technology 
capital goods (inclusive of defence items). Much of this analysis has occurred under the 
rubric of the import-substitution industrialisation/export-led growth debate. 
The dominant explanation emerging from mainstream economics is that Brazil, 
like other newly industrialising countries, adopted the "right" international trade policies, 
by liberalising imports, adopting "realistic" exchange rates and providing incentives for 
exports. Above all, the Brazilian government managed to correct factor prices (often by 
the military government repressing wage rates) so that manufactured exports reflected 
underlying comparative advantage. For instance, Tyler attributes Brazil's industrial 
growth and expansion to a "policy strategy ... of ... fortifying markets and improving 
the functioning of the price system. "IS In sum, Brazil's industrial expansion and exports 
is explained by state reliance on market forces and integration into the world economy. 
Neither the strategic/political arguments nor the economic rationales, however, 
satisfactorily explain the impetus behind Brazilian defence production and its distinctive 
features. The political interpretation, while it attempts to introduce a pluralist view of 
the "state" (e.g. military, industry and MNCs), is arguably reductionistic. Namely, it 
presumes that state and defence industry preferences are uniform, and that there exists 
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great homogeneity within the defence sector itself. Such explanations have thus 
neglected any analysis of firm-level behaviour, and have assumed that government 
policies affect equally the various industries -- aircraft, shipbuilding, missiles, and 
armoured vehicles. 
In fact, data collected from recent interviews with all the largest defence 
producers suggests that the Brazilian military facilitated rather than determined the 
development of Brazilian arms production. First, we would expect the military regime 
to stimulate the defence industries through the central government budget. As Table 3.1 
indicates, Brazilian defence expenditures over the past twenty years are relatively 
insignificant, averaging 1.3% of GDP per annum (especially when compared to other 
large Third World weapons producers like India, whose defence expenditure/GOP 
averaged over five per cent for the same time period.) If we factor out weapons 
procurement from the budget, which constitutes approximately 28 % of total defence 
expenditures, the figures from Table 3.1 diminish considerably.16 
Additionally, the lions' share of the procurement budgets over these years has 
been allocated to the Navy (the nuclear submarine programme), and to weapons imports 
(such as sophisticated fighter aircraft). Yet, the major defence companies -- in the terms 
of value of production and exports -- manufacture missiles, armoured vehicles and 
aircraft. What then accounts for the rise of these industries if the state --- a military one 
-- is providing neither sufficient capital nor a market for domestically manufactured 
weapons'] 
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Table 3.1 BRAZILIAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 
Year Defence Expenditure! Defence Expenditure 
GNP (1985$ mill. and Prices) 
1965 2.10 1,628 
1966 1.81 2.038 
1967 2.40 2.682 
1968 2.11 2,646 
1969 2.16 2,969 
1970 2.00 1,937 
1971 2.49 4,007 
1972 1.89 3,349 
1973 1.68 3,401 
1974 1.16 2,560 
1975 1.19 2,289 
1976 1.13 2,512 
1977 1.08 2,556 
1978 .91 2,380 
1979 .75 2,122 
1980 .81 1,625 
1981 .57 1,736 
1982 .65 2,001 
1983 .62 1,886 
1984 .50 1,646 
1985 .76 2,741 
1986 .75 2,725 
1987 .50 2,412 
1988 .80 1,459 
1989 .37 1,180 
1990 .9 1,059 
1991 .8 1,080 
Source: The Military Balance, various dates. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Latest available defence expenditure figures are provided. 
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Obviously the export market may be a significant explanatory factor (especially 
given that the export ratio of the top five firms has been approximately 90%). This 
factor then leaves open the question of whether the military government used specific 
economic incentives to encourage defence exports, thereby maintaining the future 
economic viability of these firms. And, it is at this juncture where the political 
explanations converge with economic calculations regarding Brazilian export performance 
of manufactured goods. 
As mentioned previously, economists have largely attributed the increase in 
Brazil's exports during the mid-to-Iate 1970s to the conducive international trade 
environment. They also have emphasised the positive effect of liberal trade and 
industrial policies on Brazilian manufactured exports. However, such analyses have 
neglected important internal cyclical features affecting the Brazilian capital goods sector: 
In the years prior to the explosive growth in GNP and exports, industrial capacity in the 
capital goods sector was heavily underutilised. As Malan & Bonnelli have argued, "An 
outstanding feature of the industrial sector in Brazil ... was the existence of substantial 
idle capacity, especially in the manufacturing sector ... [This unutilised capacity] was an 
obvious factor in allowing the subsequent boom. 017 It is this factor that suggests the need 
for an alternative hypothesis. 
An Alternative Hypothesis 
The alternative explanation advanced by the author posits that domestic market 
considerations, rather than broad political motivations explain the tremendous growth in 
defence output during the last twenty years. Specifically, Brazilian capital goods firms 
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diversified into military production in response to the internal cyclical nature of the 
sector, especially during the two recessions, 1962-67 and 1980-84. In essence, the 
emergence of Brazil's defence sector was an unintended consequence of domestic 
economic fluctuations rather than the result of deliberate manipulation of market 
mechanisms by the Brazilian military government. Finally, though both political 
scientists and economists have attributed the development of defence industries, and 
competitiveness of arms exports to heavy state intervention by the military regime, such 
explanations appear to be weak, as the model shall demonstrate. 
The author would now like to defend this argument using data collected from her 
interviews with defence manufacturers and from a mail questionnaire survey of randomly 
selected Brazilian capital goods producers. (Please refer to the appendix for an overview 
of the research conducted in Brazil and for a brief discussion of the survey 
methodology.) Before she introduces the model, however, the author would first like to 
demonstrate the linkage of military diversification to conditions existing within the 
Brazilian capital goods sector. 
The Military-Industrial Nexus: Capital Goods & Defence Diversification 
The sub-period 1956-61 was characterised by the acceleration of industrialisation 
in Brazil and is associated with the increased participation of the multinational 
corporations in the manufacturing sector. In particular, the expansion of the 
multinational automotive industry in Brazil during the mid-1950s onwards played a key 
role in the development (through backward linkage effects) of the domestic capital goods 
sector. As a Vargas Foundation economist notes, "the setting up of [component] 
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industries facilitated the establishment of part of the capital goods sector particularly in 
the transport industry. 1118 The Kubitschek government aided this process by instituting 
the Executive Group for the Automotive Industry. According to a study by Gordon and 
Grommers: 
The essential features ... involved ... the importation of manufacturing 
equipment and of automotive components for a limited period of years, in 
return for a firm commitment by the automotive companies for the 
progressive replacement of imports by Brazilian-made components, backed 
up by specific plans for the deletion of imports. 19 
Subsequent programmes were developed for shipbuilding, tractors and railway 
equipment. During the period 1955-64 these programmes helped initiate "the [domestic] 
production of numerous other capital goods, for example, trucks, buses, agricultural 
tractors, light planes, and ships. 1120 As a result of this intensive import substitution 
industrialisation, rapid expansion in the capital goods sector occurred. The average 
growth rate for transport equipment was 25.1 % per annum (p.a.), for electrical 
machinery 20.7% p.a., chemical and pharmaceuticals 14.4%, and metal products 10.4% 
p.a. 21 
By the mid-1960s, however, domestic capital goods firms were in financial crisis 
as the recession in Brazil not only had dampened internal demand, but the new military 
government had introduced a policy of import liberalisation. According to Tadini, "the 
period comprising 1962-1967 was not one of grand transformations in the structure of 
the sector, which operated with unutilised capacity, as a function of the economic 
recession and of an anti-inflationary policy that restrained public investment.22 
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If we refer to Table 3.2, Physical Production of Select Capital Goods, the data 
provides a partial observation of the impact of the recession on the transportation sector. 
The statistics do show, however, an important phenomenon that affected generally the 
capital goods sector; namely, a great oscillation in demand. According to Lago, this 
oscillation had the additional "disastrous effect for firms' profitability and was in part 
also responsible for the low level of technology of a number of products"23 Another 
Brazilian economist, Tavares, notes the rapid drop in rates of capacity utilisation that 
accompanied this fluctuation in demand for capital goods -- the average was 75 per cent 
during the 1962-67 recession for capital goods producers. Her research indicates 
significant diversification amongst domestic capital goods producers in the last years of 
the recession. "This diversification is not only related to the productive structure of the 
industry, which is relatively flexible, but also to the instability of demand .... ,,24 
Two important factors relevant to the movement of capital goods firms into 
military production emerge from this discussion. The first relates to the timing of 
diversification and the second, to the diversification amongst producers of transport and 
machinery equipment. Note that the bulk of defence products, -- aircraft, armoured 
vehicles, naval vessels etc. -- all fall within the transport category. The questionnaire 
survey data do indeed reinforce this pattern of military diversification. According to 
cross tabulations of the data, the following firms all heavily diversified into military 
production at the end of the recession, or shortly afterwards. Amongst this group, 
Avibras, Bernardini, Engesa, and Embraer constitute the major Brazilian arms producers 
(measured in terms of the value of output). 
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1.0 
N 
Source: 
Table 3.2 
Physical Production of Select Capital Goods, 1962-67 
- --.~ 
---
-- -
Year Trucks Buses Ships Light Aircraft Tractors 
1962 38,743 927 22,740 48 8,826 
1963 22,851 1,179 49,150 31 11,018 
1964 22,249 2,245 56,680 20 13,302 
1965 22,653 2,306 16,620 15 10,804 
1966 32,299 2,754 16,340 44 12,709 
1967 28,561 3,245 78,380 12 8,868 
For trucks, buses and tractors, figures are provided by ANFAVEA, IndUstria Automobi/fstica Brasi/eira, 
Novembro 1972; for shipping data see SUNAMAM, Superintendencia Nacional da Marinha Mercante; and for 
light aircraft information is provided by Neiva, Aerotec and the CTA. Adapted from Luiz A. Correa do Lago, 
Fernando Lopes de Almeida, Beatriz M.F. de Lima, A Industria Brasi/eira de Bens de Capital, Rio de Janeiro: 
Instituto Brasileira de Economia, Funda~o Getulio Vargas, 1979, p. 136. 
Table 3.3: Diversification into Military Production 
I Company I Diversification ! Year ! 
Avibras small aircraft - missiles 1964 
Bernardini bank vaults - tanks 1967 
Mecanica Pesada turbines, engines - naval 1967 
Engesa oil drilling equip - tanks 1968 
Embraer civil - military aircraft 1969 
This pattern of diversification is duplicated subsequently during the second 
recession in Brazil, following the OPEC oil shock of 1979. However, before we tum 
to a discussion of the effects of the 1980-84 recession on this process of military 
diversification amongst capital goods producers, we need to understand the pre-existing 
conditions in the sector. Prior to the recession, the so-called "Brazilian Miracle" of 
1968-73 had a paradoxical effect on domestic capital goods producers. As Malan & 
Bonelli note, the higher rates of production occurring during this period did not entail 
substantial increases in productive capital and capacity.25 The continued instability in 
demand for capital goods also limited investment in the expansion of capacity utilisation. 
In an attempt to counteract these trends, the government introduced the Second 
Development Plan in 1974 (II PND). The Plan's emphasis on public sector investment 
and a policy of renewed import-substitution had a significant effect on the Brazilian 
domestic capital goods sector. According to Treblat, public enterprises had been 
considered a short-cut to industrialisation, "an expediency forced upon policymakers by 
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the absence of a well-financed domestic private sector and by Brazil's reluctance to allow 
transnational corporations into certain strategic sectors. "26 
The location of the majority of these enterprises in highly capital intensive 
sectors, such as energy, transportation, and steel, had a two-fold effect on the capital 
goods sector during this period. First, state enterprises were industries characterised by 
internal economies of scale, so they could supply the capital goods sector with lower cost 
intermediate inputs. Second, state enterprises were an important counter-cyclical source 
of demand for capital goods. For example, Treblat calculates that by the mid-to-Iate 
1970s, the 40 largest public sector firms accounted for between 40-59 per cent of 
equipment orders from local capital goods producers.27 However, just as the 1974-79 
period witnessed the expansion of the public and capital goods sectors, so did the 1980-
84 recession promote severe contraction in both these industries. When in late 1979 the 
Brazilian government cut investment in the public sector, the impact was acutely felt 
throughout the manufacturing sector. 
This recession was evidenced by declines in manufacturing growth rates; the 
average annual growth rate fell from 18.1 to 7.1 per cent during the 1980-84 period. 
The slowdown in the industrial sector was also reflected in the indices of capacity 
utilisation. Capacity utilisation in the capital goods sector declined from 83% in 1980 
to 78% one year later. Transport was severely affected with a fall from 86% to 71 % in 
the same time period. The 1981 economic recession was particularly localised in the 
industrial sector. Output during 1981 fell substantially in the capital goods industries 
(18.7%). This underutilisation of capacity was the direct result of investments made 
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during the 1968-73 period, based on the expectations of further expansion of state 
enterprises. 
The questionnaire data indicate that most of the firms, which diversified during 
the second recession, maintained their original lines of production, but turned to supply 
the larger, established defence producers with subcomponents. For example, one of the 
respondents -- an optical goods firm -- diversified in 1982 to supply the "heads-up 
display" for Embraer's Tucano military trainer aircraft. A company, which produced 
specialised stamping machinery for the automotive industry, found an additional customer 
in 1980 -- a tank manufacturer, Engesa. The development of these ancillary industries 
should be viewed as a response to the huge increase in internal demand by Brazilian 
defence producers, which was triggered subsequently by the 1980-86 boom in arms 
exports. 
If one cross tabulates those companies that moved into military production, with 
their respective reasons for diversification, some interesting tentative conclusions may 
be drawn. Referring to Table 3.4, in terms of the overall reasons for military 
diversification two explanations dominate: economies of scale and capacity utilisation. 
Within the transportation sector (aircraft, automotive, shipbuilding, and engines) the same 
explanations hold, with automotive emphasising capacity utilisation and aircraft 
emphasising primarily economies of scale. Having established a pattern of military 
diversification amongst capital goods producers in response to internal demand pressures, 
one may now tum to the three-stage model, which will test and measure the effects of 
Brazilian government policies on this movement by firms into defence production. 
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Table 3.4: Reasons For Mauary DiversijicaJion 
Reasons for Diversification 
Original 
Product 
line 2 3 4 5 
Flight Control 
Construction 
Electic Power 
Photographic/Optical 
Scientific Equipment 
Aircraft 3 I 
Railroad I I 
Shipbuilding 1 2 
Motor Vehicles 2 5 
Electric Wire 1 2 
Missile, Radar & Radio 2 1 
Electr. Ind. Mach. 
Machinery (incl. arms) I 
Computers 3 
Spec. Ind. Machinery I 2 
M~lWood Machinery I 
Agricultural Equip. 2 
Engines & Turbines I 
Metal Products 2 4 
Non Ferrous (Alum.) 2 
Iron & Steel 2 
Non-Metallic Mineral Prd. 
Plastic Products I 
Rubber 1 
Tyres 2 2 
Petroleum Refining 
Chemical Products 2 
Paints & Varnishes 
Syn. Fibres & Resins 
Clothing 
Carpets 
Textile Goods 
Weaving 
N=75 11 6 21 30 8 
Reasons: 1) Supply new market with new product 
2) Procurement policies of our customers 
3) Economies of scale - expand existing line of production to supply new customers 
4) Increase capacity utilisation because of sectoral decline 
5) Keep up with international technological developments 
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THE MODEL 
Using the questionnaire data set, a three-stage model was constructed to test the 
previously discussed economic and political factors that analysts commonly assume to 
have influenced the process of defence industrialisation in Brazil. A set of conditioning 
variables that constitute the baseline model is first created. Government policy variables 
are then added individually to the set to permit measurement of their respective effects. 
Dependent variables: 
a) Diversification; 
y=(diver=l) 
Constructed on the basis of a closed-ended question asking if companies had diversified. 
b) Diversification into military production and; 
ift..diver=l)A(diverres=l) 
then y=(divermil=l) 
This dependent variable is conditional upon diversification, and if firms converted 
directly into military production and/or retained their main product lines but diversified 
their markets to supply the armed forces (national and/or foreign) and/or other defence 
firms. 
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c) Share of total production devoted to military. 
y(mi~h/divermil:::l)=plmil*(domlal/lOO)+p2mil*(domla2/100)+p3mil *(domla3/100) 
Conditional upon military diversification, this dependent variable was constructed on the 
basis of the company's three main product lines, and the respective percentage that 
military product represented in total production. 
Inde.pendeot variables fill: Baseline Models: 
All of the following, with the exception of foreqsh and pink, are dummy variables in 
which the independent variable equals one for the indicated condition, and zero 
otherwise. 
Privco: 
Intrad: 
Extrad: 
Foreqsh: 
Perstrns: 
Expinc: 
Pink: 
Private company (versus mixed or state-owned); 
In-house R&D activity; 
External R&D -- usage of industrial, government, military or university 
research institutions; 
Percentage of foreign equity participation in the company; 
Hiring of foreign technicians and/or engineers & sending personnel abroad 
for specialised training; 
Increase in world demand for exports; 
Exports (increase = 1, decrease=-I, unchanged=O). 
(Variables expinc and pink were constructed as follows. Companies were asked whether 
their exports had increased/decreased (pink) over the 1977-87 period. Companies were 
then asked to what did they attribute this movement: changes in world demand (expinc), 
competitiveness of their product, etc.) 
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Part I: Baseline l\lodels 
Baseline Probit Model for Diversification* 
Prob(diver= l)=~(z) 
z=:{.239 +2.815privco-1.683intrad-2.426joreqsh +2.432perstrns -l.464expinc) 
(2.63) (.64) (2.81) (2.96) (1.96) 
Number of Observations = 67 
*Note: For this and subsequent models, asymptotic t-values are given in parentheses 
below the estimated coefficients. 
Baseline Probit Model for Diversification Into Military Production 
Prob(divermil = l/diver= 1) =cl>(z) 
z =(.385 + 1.929privco -1.683intrad -2.426joreqsh +2.0 19perstrns -1.465expinc) 
(2.57) (1.33) (2.94) (3.49) (2.77) 
Number of Observations = 50 
Baseline Regression Model for Military Share of Production 
(milsh/divermil = 1) = .668 + .248extrad - . 188intrad - .340foreqsh - . 149perstrns + .226pink 
(2.79) (1.19) (2.09) (1.41) (3.01) 
R Squared = .28 
Number of Observations = 50 
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Analysis Qf ~ Baseline Models: 
Of the five independent variables used in the two probit models, privco and 
perstrns are positive and highly significant. These results suggest that being a private 
company, with highly trained personnel (foreign or foreign-trained) increases the 
probability of firms diversifying or diversifying into military production. Thus, the 
earlier cited example of state ownership of defence firms, which has been used as a 
previous political explanation, is not supported by the data. 
Foreqsh and expinc, however, are negative and significant. A negative value for 
foreqsh means that the probability of a firm diversifying/diversifying militarily diminishes 
as foreign equity increases. The negative coefficients for expinc indicate a negative effect 
of increasing world demand for exports on diversification/diversification into military 
production. This latter result conflicts with the externally-induced, international trade 
rationales advanced by some economists. Yet, it is consistent with the econometric 
findings of Guimaraes, who, using cross-section data from the Brazilian capital goods 
sector, analyses the effect of industrial structure on export performance. He concludes 
that the export performance of Brazilian capital goods sector increased/decreased in 
relation to a decrease/increase in internal demand rather than world demand or export 
incentives. The results of his study also indicate that exports of intermediate goods 
(inclusive of capital goods) are sensitive to the level of domestic trade, while exports of 
final goods responded essentially to export incentives.28 
The milsh (share of military production) regression substitutes the variables privco 
(private company) and expinc (increase in world demand for exports) for extrad (external 
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R&D) and pink (exports), both of which are positive and significant. Extrad is an 
important finding because it supports the important relationship of Brazilian government, 
military and university research institutes with those firms engaged in defence-related 
production. (The centrality of this linkage of government-sponsored R&D activity to 
private defence firms is explored later in Chapter 5.) Pink also is a crucial explanatory 
variable because it indicates that military producers are large exporters, which is indeed 
the case. 
Part II: Government Policies 
Using the same baseline models for diversification, diversification into military 
production and military share of production, we now introduce separately individual 
government policy variables. In the interviews and mail questionnaire surveys, 
respondents were asked to assess the impact on their firm (positive, negative or no effect) 
of specific government policies over a ten year period, 1977-87. This period was chosen 
because it captures the boom period for Brazilian defence exports. A total of twelve 
policy variables was used in the survey, and four have been excluded from the model 
either because of their specificity to certain groups, such as multinational corporations, 
or because of their universal applicability. 
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Independent Government Policy Variables: 
Govsubc: 
Govltf: 
Fisinx: 
Govextx: 
Govprm: 
Govsubt: 
Govdmc: 
Govtax: 
Government subsidies for domestic capital goods purchases. Beginning 
in 1964, the Special Agency for Industrial Investment (FINAME) of the 
National Economic Development Bank (BNDES) attempted to stimulate 
the capital goods sector by providing subsidised financing for the 
acquisition of domestically produced machinery & equipment. 
Availability of government long-term financing for investment either 
through the BNDES or through national/regional banks. 
Fiscal incentives to export, including the credito premio (export tax 
credit); pre/post-shipment financing for capital goods with long production 
periods, provided by FINEX (Export Financing Fund), managed by the 
Bank of Brazil's Foreign Trade division, CACEX. 
Reduction or exemption on imports of capital goods. The Befiex program 
allows 70-90% duty and tax reduction on capital goods imports; 50% 
reduction on imports of raw materials and intermediate products if final 
products are exported. The transport industries have been heavily 
favoured by the Befiex system. 
Government procurement policies for targeted sectors such as informatics 
(computers) and naval equipment. 
Government subsidies for R&D activities provided by the BNDES through 
its programmes FUNTEC (Scientific and Technology Development Fund) 
and FINEP (Studies and Projects Financing Agency) to promote domestic 
technological capabilities at the firm level. 
Government domestic content policies i.e. "Law of Similars" . 
Reduction of the IPI (Federal Industrial Product) and ICM (State Value 
Added) taxes. 
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Probit Models of Government Policies on Diversification 
Policy Variable Estimated T-Value Percentage 
Coefficient Correctly Predicted 
Govsubc .527 .83 95.5 
Govltf .786 1.03 92.5 
Fisinx .777 1.21 94.0 
Govextx .461 .57 94.0 
Govprm .640 .26 95.4 
Govsubt -.002 .03 94.0 
Govdmc 2.208 1.33 94.0 
Govtax .843 1.04 95.5 
Probit Models of Government Policies on Diversification into Military Production 
Policy Variable Estimated T-Value Percentage 
Coefficient Correctly Predicted 
Govsubc -.365 1.00 83.6 
Govltf .137 .37 83.6 
Fisinx .134 .41 83.6 
Govextx .711 1.88 82.1 
Govprm -.001 .02 84.6 
Govsubt -.004 .08 83.6 
Govdmc 1.813 2.00 86.6 
Govtax -.137 .37 83.6 
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Reeression Models for the Effects of Government Policies on the Military Share of 
Production 
Policy Variable Estimated T-Value R Squared 
Coefficient 
Govsubc -.015 .25 .35 
Govltf -.080 1.12 .37 
Fisinx -.031 .56 .35 
Govextx .013 .18 .35 
Govprm -.006 .66 .36 
Govsubt -.007 .81 .36 
Govdmc -.020 .29 .35 
Govtax -.020 .30 .36 
As the results indicate -- in all three stages: diversification, diversification into 
military production and military share of total production -- the government policies are 
usually highly insignificant. Only in the diversification into military production probit 
model do two independent variables show significance: govdmc (domestic content) and 
govextx (reduction of import duties). At first glance the juxtaposition of these results 
appears to be contradictory. It may be explained, however, by the effect of these 
policies on two distinct sub-groups. Domestic content laws would encourage local 
subcomponent capital goods producers to diversify into military production, while 
reductions on imports would provide an incentive for larger producers of, for example, 
transportation equipment, to diversify militarily because of their improved access to and 
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demand for capital goods inputs embodying high technology (for example, specialised 
composite fibres or computer numerically controlled machine tools). 
An interesting and important finding is the poor performance of fisinx (fiscal 
incentives to export) in each of the three stages. In effect, this result undermines the 
arguments of Dagnino and Franko-Jones, among others, that the military government 
directly encouraged exports in order to maintain the long-term viability of defence firms, 
(given the absence of a domestic market). 
Indeed, in unusually candid interviews held at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign 
Relations, Itamaraty, and at CACEX, Ministry and bank officials said that the 
government had not formulated any policies towards the Brazilian defence industries and 
their exports until late 1986, when the arms market was already dec1ining.29 Only with 
the impending bankruptcy of Engesa in 1988, brought on by the unconc1uded Saudi 
Arabian Osorio contract, had any direct consultation and coordination occurred between 
Itamaraty, the Armed Forces' ministries and CACEX. When asked to assess the 
policy making process for arms exports sales, one Itamaraty official confessed, "frankly 
it's a mess. 1130 
Part III: Extended Sampling of Military Producers 
To verify the findings of the negligible effect of government policies on Brazilian 
defence producers, a second survey was conducted. This sample, however, consisted 
only of military producers, which accounts for a lower response rate (20%) than the first 
survey of capital goods industries (40%). Since this second data set contained known 
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defence firms, the two conditional probit stages -- diversification (diver) and 
diversification into military production (divermil) -- were dropped. Among the various 
baseline models run, however, significantly the same milsh (share of military production) 
baseline model as the original is re-established. This finding should attest to the 
strengths of the specification of the model and its explanatory power. 
y(milsh/divermil=1)=.664+.214extrad-.114intrad-.247foreqsh-.167perstrns+.182pin.l 
(3.02) (.73) (1.77) (2.14) (2.79) 
n=77 
R Squared = .25 
Obviously, however, any further analysis of the data on Brazilian defence producers must 
examine the effects of government policies on particular defence sub-sectors (e.g. 
aircraft, missiles) since sub-sectors may be more sensitive to the influence of specific 
government policies. 
Using the combined questionnaire data sets, the author created four samples 
representing the aircraft (AIR), armoured vehicles (ARM), naval (NAV), and missiles 
& small arms (MSA) industries. Respondents were selected on the basis of either being 
major weapons producers or manufacturers and suppliers of critical defence-related inputs 
(engines, turbines, machine tools, etc.) 
The equations shown below were estimated with an overall intercept and three of 
the four industry dummy variables (aircraft, armoured vehicles and naval). Thus, the 
coefficient for the overall intercept is equal to that of the omitted dummy variable 
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(missiles & small arms), and the coefficients of AIR, ARM and NAV are the respective 
industry coefficients relative to that for the omitted industry, MSA. Where: 
mUsh =bl 11 +b212 +b313 +b414 + ... conditioningvariables 
14=one-Il-I2-13 
such that 
y(milsh/divermil=l)=b4one+(bl-b4)Il +(b2-b4)12+(b3-b4)13 
Baseline Model for Industry Dummies & Conditioning Variables 
y(milsh/divermil-l)= 1. 14MSA + .05A1R-.28ARM -.149NA V +.241extrad -.S llintrad-.211ptrstrns+ .241p 
(5.74) (.44) (2.57) (1.26) (2.75) (2.51) (2.45) (3.19) 
n=46 
R Squared = .46 
An attempt was then made to determine if government policy effects were 
significant at the sub-sectoral industry level. Models were fitted to include interactions 
between each independent policy variable and the four independent industry dummy 
variables. Only three of the government policy variables showed significance for 
individual industries. They were government import tax reductions (govextx) for 
armoured vehicles, government ownership (govmkt) for small arms, and government 
procurement policies for the naval industry. 
In each of these cases, however, the set of industry-government policy interactive 
variables yielded no significant improvement over the baseline regression or over the 
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baseline plus the government policy variable, constrained to a single coefficient. 
Importantly, no single policy variable was significant at the five per cent level. Further 
experiments that pooled the most promising industry-policy interaction sets, two at a time 
and then three at a time, also failed to reveal any significant pattern. 
~ Results Qf ~ Milm Baseline Re&ression with ~ Inclusion Qf Government ~ 
Variables 
Policy Variable Coefficient T-Value R Squared 
Govtax 
-.072 -.90 .47 
Govsubc .041 .75 .46 
Govprm -.124 -1.60 .49 
Govdmc .033 .45 .46 
Govmkt .100 1.42 .48 
Govextx -.476 -.57 .46 
Fisinx -.098 -.18 .46 
Conclusion 
This first part of Chapter III has developed an alternative explanation for Brazilian 
defence production and export performance through the use of primary data and a three-
stage model. A more interesting and neglected field of research remains however. As 
evidenced by the previous critique, too much of the literature has thus far focused on the 
political and economic reasons that pushed Brazil and other Third World countries into 
military production. Not enough attention has been paid to the question of how and why 
Brazilian companies successfully broke into such a competitive global market. These are 
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the questions that have stimulated the second part of this chapter: an analysis of firm-
level behaviour, using case studies from Brazil's major defence companies. 
SECTION II: CASE SnmIES OF BRAZILIAN DEFENCE FIRMS 
Firm-level case studies are provided in this section from Brazil's four major 
defence sectors: aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles, and naval craft. Each of the case 
studies is based on the author's extensive site visits and interviews with corporate 
management, engineers and marketing representatives. Utilising this information, she 
provides a detailed overview of these individual companies and their product lines, 
documenting the various strategies -- R&D, subcontraction, coproduction etc. -- these 
firms have pursued to develop new products and markets. These case studies also serve 
as a fascinating account of the successes and failures these high-technology, start-up 
companies have experienced in the process of breaking into such an internationally 
competitive, high barrier-to-entry industry. 
Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (Embraer) 
"Nowadays at every 50 seconds, there is a Brazilian-made aircraft taking off 
somewhere in the world, carrying passengers and freight in its mission to produce wealth 
and find out opportunities, offering its contribution for a better world we all wish for." 
(Embraer corporate video) 
Embraer is headquartered in Sao Jose dos Campos, 80 km from the industrial city 
of Sao Paulo. Its main production facilities cover an area of 230,000 square meters. 
The company in 1993 employs approximately 9,000 people, of whom 2,000 are 
technicians and 1,200 are engineers. Seventy-four per cent of Embraer's work force is 
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employed in production. Since its foundation in 1969, the company has produced and 
delivered over 4,500 aircraft to civil and military customers in 47 countries worldwide.31 
(Please refer to Table 3.5 for a breakdown of Embraer's corporate structure and a listing 
of aircraft manufactured and delivered to date.) 
The rise of Embraer, from a fledgling Third World company of 595 employees 
in 1970, to the world's fifth largest aircraft manufacturer has been charted by industry 
observers and defence academicians alike. Analyses of Embraer's development are 
divided between narrow political and economic explanations. On the one hand, some 
observers, such as Dagnino, a well-known Brazilian political scientist, contend that 
Embraer's "functional logic is that of a State enterprise" and "its functional dynamics is 
molded ultimately by strategic military conditions. "32 
This means that, as it happens in the central countries in similar sectors, 
cost and investment limits are ... secondary in the decision making 
process. It is pointless to attempt to fit its actions and projects by a 
strictly entrepreneurial-commercial criteria. 33 
Contraposed to this interpretation, are rational actor explanations. Embraer's "feat can 
only be explained ... [because] ... it decided from the beginning that it would try to sell 
high-technology products to industrialized nations. It learned to identify a need, develop 
a product and market it successfully. 1134 
These analyses, however, are not theoretically integrative: They abstract the 
interests of the state, the firm, and the military from the effects of markets at both 
domestic and international levels. They also tend not to incorporate the centrality of 
technological development to such a strategic industry. 
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Table 3.5: Embraer's Subsidiaties and Products 
1) Industria Aeronautica Neiva, Botucatu, Sao Paulo 
In 1981 Embraer acquired Neiva and is now the sole stockholder. Neiva produces most 
of the Piper-licensed small, light aircraft. It also manufactures the indigenously designed 
EMB-201, Ipanema agriculture plane. The company employs approximately 530 people. 
2) Embraer Divistio Equipamentos (EDE), Sao Jose dos Campos 
Embraer's equipment division which produces mechanical and hydraulic systems, as well 
as weapons pylons and landing gear for the Tucano and AMX military aircraft. EDE's 
workforce consists of 365 employees. 
3) Embraer Aircraft Corporation, USA & Aviation lnternationale, France 
These subsidiaries provide sales and technical support for the company's clients located 
in the U.S, Europe, Australasia and the Middle East. Workforce consists of 135 
employees. 
4) Orbita Sistemas Aeroespacias, Sao Jose dos Campos 
Embraer's participation in this recently formed missile consortia is 40%. It will be 
expected to provide the design, manufacture and marketing of a range of guided missiles 
and rockets. 
Production History of Embraer until November 1991 
Aircraft Quantity 
EMB-110 Bandeirante 495 
EMB-120 Brasilia 245 
EMB-121 Xingu 106 
EMB-312 Tucano 416 
EMB-326GB Xavante 182 
EMB-201 Ipanema 678 
EMB-400 Urupema 10 
EMB-71O Carioca 288 
EMB-711 Corisco 499 
EMB-712 Tupi 144 
EMB-720 Minuano 285 
EMB-721 Sertanejo 205 
EMB-810 Seneca 786 
EMB-820 Navajo 137 
EMB-821 Caraja 33 
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This schism reinforces the need for a theoretical framework, which is based on 
the interaction between the interests and objectives of the state and its related agencies 
(the Brazilian Air Force, the CTA) , with the behaviour of the firm, Embraer. The 
conceptualisation offered by this author suggests that state involvement through fiscal and 
technology policies accounts for the initial development of Brazil's aircraft industry: first 
by providing the front-end capital for the creation of Embraer and by assuming initial 
procurement orders; and second, by facilitating and encouraging technology transfers 
from foreign companies and domestic research centres to the aircraft industry. Though 
many political scientists attribute a priori national security motivations for Embraer's 
establishment, this writer contends that the nature of aircraft production itself (substantial 
barriers to entry), and its international strategic role determined state participation. 
Indeed, the evolution of Brazil's aircraft industry has been conditioned largely by 
Embraer's concern for profitability and technological learning. Specifically, Embraer has 
developed using four concomitant approaches: 
1) The commitment to indigenous design and manufacture; 
2) Joint ventures with foreign aircraft producers to acquire and upgrade 
technological capabilities; 
3) Carefully phased introduction of domestic components; 
4) Product development balanced between military and civil domestic/export 
markets. 
Although the origins of Brazil's aircraft industry may be traced back to the 1940s, 
the creation of Embraer dates to 1962, when the CT A became interested in designing and 
manufacturing planes for regional air transport. 35 The results of the efforts on the part 
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of the CTA's Instituto de Pesquisas e Desenvolvimento (IPD) and the Institute's 
Departamento de Aeronaves (DAR) was the initiation in June 1965 of Projeto IPD-6504: 
the Bandeirante aircraft. (Bandeirante refers to the early Portuguese pioneers in Brazil). 
After consultations with many Sao Paulo-based industries, which were either 
unwilling or unable for financial reasons to invest in the manufacture of the Bandeirante, 
the CT A approached the Ministries of Finance, Industry and Commerce, and Planning 
for a solution. The result was the creation in 1969 of a mixed, state-privately owned 
company, Embraer, according to Decreto-Lei no. 770, and an initial financing scheme 
(Portaria 52 GB), authorised by the Finance Ministry. This latter law enacted in 1970 
allowed for a one per cent deduction on corporate income tax with the purchase of 
Embraer shares. In 1988 there are approximately 226,506 shareholders without direct 
vote, representing 92.9 percent of the capital ($330 million).36 The government, through 
the Air Force, retains control through its possession of 51 per cent of the voting shares. 
(Interestingly, the largest private shareholder in Embraer is the transnational automotive 
conglomerate, Autolatina -- a joint venture between Volkswagen and Ford). 
The Brazilian government stimulated demand for Embraer-produced aircraft by 
financing both the Air Force's purchase of 80 EMB-110 Bandeirantes, and the licensed 
production of 112 EMB-326 Xavantes with Italy's Aermacchi. Subsequently, the 
Agricultural Ministry placed an order with Embraer for an indigenously designed and 
manufactured agricultural dust/spray crop aircraft, the Ipanema. 
Indirectly, the Brazilian government provided exogenous research and 
development capabilities through its funding of such research institutions as the CT A, 
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whose mandate includes linking aeronautical research to industrial applications. (For 
example, the United States' NASA programme, the British Royal Aircraft Establishment, 
and India's Defence Research Development Organisation all assume the same function.) 
The transfer of the Bandeirante project to Embraer from the CTA included not only the 
transfer of disembodied technology and manufacturing "know how", but the movement 
of highly trained engineers from the aeronautical engineering institute, lnstituto 
Technologico de Aeronautica, ITA, who had been associated with the Bandeirante 
project. Such a transfer was also complemented by the activities of the lnstituto do 
Actividades Especiais (IAE), and the Industrial Support Institute, IFI, whose functions 
are to link and transfer research and development to industrial applications by qualifying 
domestic component suppliers. 
Three planes -- the Bandeirante, the Tucano and the Brasilia -- have marked 
Embraer's indigenous technological advance. As mentioned previously, the Bandeirante 
was developed at the CT A in response to the general aviation needs of a small passenger 
and freight aircraft, which could operate on the short and often unpaved airstrips 
characteristic of the country's interior. The CTA, in conjunction with Embraer, also 
decided to equip the Bandeirante with a more economical turbo-prop rather than a jet 
engine because the latter was considered too ambitious a project. 
Throughout the initial 1970s, the Bandeirante underwent many design and 
engineering changes, (stretching the aircraft from eight to 19 passengers) at the request 
of its domestic customer, the Brazilian Air Force, and foreign clients. Though the EMB-
110 is primarily configured as a 19-seat aircraft for regional passenger and cargo 
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transport, its design is enormously flexible. For example, using the same airframe, the 
Bandeirante can be deployed for air drop, search and rescue, maritime surveillance, and 
ambulance missions. 
The export success of the Bandeirante stemmed not only from its design flexibility 
but Embraer's strategy of market segmentation and price competitiveness. For instance, 
despite its intermediate-level, the Bandeirante was exported to developed as well as Third 
World countries. By 1975 many U.S. and European airline companies were feeling the 
pinch of higher oil prices, and the EMB-I10 turbo-prop was far cheaper to use than 
conventional small jets for feeder airlines. At the same time, Third World countries 
sought the Bandeirante for precisely the reasons it had been built for the Brazilian 
market, and because of the plane's low maintenance costs. In 1990, 500 units had been 
produced and were operating in 24 countries, primarily in the United States (over 147 
units are in operation), and within Brazil itself.3? 
However, because of the intermediate-level and small size of the Bandeirante, 
many other newly industrialising counties began to produce similar aircraft and compete 
for Embraer's market niche. As a consequence, the export market success during the 
mid-1970s onwards depended very much on price competitiveness. According to Table 
3.6, Embraer's Position in the Medium-Commuterliner Market, in the 20 passenger 
airliner category, the best price on offer in 1984 amounted to $2.1 million for Brazil's 
Bandeirante.38 
The success of the Bandeirante enabled Embraer to establish an international 
reputation in the commuter airline market -- a base from which it was well placed to 
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Table 3.6 
Embraer's Position in the Medium-Commuterliner Market 
Aircraft Company/Country First Price 
Flight U.S. Mill. 
(1984) 
212 Aviocar CASA (Spain) 1971 2.40 
Bandeirante Embraer (Brazil) 1968 2.10 
330 Shorts (UK) 1974 3.30 
Dash 8 DHC (Canada) 1983 5.20 
340 Saab-Fairchild 1983 5.30 
(Sweden/US) 
Brasilia Embraer (Brazil) 1983 4.70 
360 Shorts 1981 4.10 
Source: Flight International, September 1, 1984, p. 412 
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introduce its new product, the EMB-120, Brasilia. (Brasilia, the capital of the country, 
is built in the shape of an airplane.) The Brasilia was specifically designed to take 
advantage of the changes in the U.S. airline market, brought on by deregulation and the 
subsequent demand for new aircraft caused by the growth of the commuter and regional 
airlines. Indeed the design of the Brasilia, a 30-seat passenger, pressurized, twin 
turboprop airliner -- was heavily influenced by interactions with potential U.S. 
customers.39 
U.S. and European carriers presently flying the Brasilia include: Texas Air Corp, 
Britt Airway, Air Midwest; in France, Air Littoral; in the United Kingdom, Delta Air 
transport; and in Germany, Deutsche Luftverkehrsgesellschaft.40 The two principal 
attractions of the Brasilia are its performance (its 300 km cruising speed makes the 
Brasilia the fastest in its class), and its price and financing package. In 1984 prices the 
Brasilia cost $4.82 million and could be financed at 7.5% to 8% for 8-9 years with 15 
d 41 per cent own. In addition to civil sales, 26 Brasilias have been bought by the 
Brazilian Air Force for search and rescue and airborne early warning missions. 
The development of the Tucano turboprop fighter trainer, Embraer's first 
indigenously designed military aircraft enabled the company both to satisfy the domestic 
requirements of the Air Force, and to target a substantial export market niche. With a 
low price tag of $1.9 million, and over 600 aircraft sold worldwide, the Tucano has 
become the sales leader in the lucrative military turboprop trainer field. The Tucano also 
was the first military sale to a NATO country by a Brazilian company. In 1985, the 
British Royal Air Force selected the Tucano over established domestic and European 
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competitors, such as the British Aerospace Hawk and the Swiss Pilatus PC-9. In 1992 
France reached an agreement with Embraer for the purchase of 80 Tucano aircraft. 
Licensed illil Collaborative Pro&rammes 
Embraer has used licensed production and international collaboration arrangements 
to develop the company's technological capabilities and to offset the risks and investment 
costs of new production programmes. Among these various joint ventures, the Piper 
agreement, the AMX and the CBA programmes best illustrate this strategy. 
In the mid-1970s, Brazil was the largest single export market for U.S. general 
aviation aircraft. The Brazilian government's concern over the country's deteriorating 
balance of payments, and interest on the part of Embraer in the series production 
techniques of light planes led to an agreement with the U.S. Piper Aircraft Corporation 
in 1974. While Piper was responsible for the transfer of technology and technical 
assistance in the areas of manufacturing, materials handling and quality control, it gained 
a marketing stronghold in Brazil and Latin America because Piper's other competitors, 
Beach and Cessna, were largely excluded because of subsequent trade barriers on imports 
of light aircraft. (The custom duties on foreign-built aircraft were raised from seven to 
50 per cent.) 
In a report which assessed the impact of technology transfers by U.S. companies 
on the American manufacturing competitiveness, Baranson observes: 
Brazil is not unique amongst the more industrialised of the developing 
countries in its desire to develop an indigenous aircraft industry. It is 
perhaps unique, though, in its professional approach to that end. Its 
strategy of effectively closing entry to its markets for all but the foreign 
firm prepared to share front-end technology, to impart sophisticated design 
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and engineering capabilities, and to instruct Brazilian nationals in 
managerial skills has been extremely successful. 42 
According to Embraer, the Piper agreement arranged for "subcontracting and assembly 
of parts and components with other national manufacturers like" Aerotec", "Neiva" and 
"A vitec" . Thus, Embraer could successfully market a line of aircraft that gained 
immediate acceptance in the internal Brazilian market. The Piper agreement has also 
been interpreted by industry observers as part of Embraer's struggle to secure 
homologation for the Bandeirante in the United States. 
Finally, as a relatively small aircraft company, Embraer lacks the production 
capacity to develop and finance (through reinvestment) more than one project at the same 
time. Thus, when Embraer wanted to introduce the Bandeirante's successor, the CBA-
123, a 19-seat, pressurized pusher-prop commuter aircraft, it sought a major joint 
venture with Argentina's Fabrica Argentina de Materiales Aerospaciales (FAMA), 
aircraft industry. According to Embraer's managing director, Ozilio Carlos da Silva, this 
coproduction arrangement "would make possible for the partners to reduce the risks of 
the $300 million undertaking by creating a large initial demand for the aircraft and by 
splitting its development costs. "43 
The cockpit and the fuselage of the Brasilia have been used and the new engine, 
developed by Garrett -- a "twin-prop pusher" mounted on the rear, pushes the plane as 
opposed to traditional propeller engines that pull the plane forward.44 Production and 
financing is divided 67 per cent between Embraer and 33 per cent for FAMA. As 
indicated in Figure 3.1, eBA -123 Work-Sharing, the Brazilian company is responsible 
for the manufacture of: the cockpit, forward fuselage, section II of the fuselage center 
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section, wings, flaps, aileron, ground spoilers, spoilerone, engine nacelles, and rudders. 
The Argentine company is building the remaining fuselage center section, the rear 
fuselage, tail cone, vertical fin, stabilizer, elevators, and engine pylons. The rights to 
export the aircraft are also split between the two firms: Embraer has exclusive rights to 
market the plane in Brazil, the United States and Europe; Argentina may sell the eBA 
in Latin America and Africa. To date, Embraer has received 60 firm orders for the 
CBA-123, "Vector"; 40 from the Brazilian and 20 from the Argentine Aeronautical 
Ministries. 
Not surprisingly the project that has contributed the most to Embraer's 
technological development (through spillovers into other products) and least in terms of 
profitability, is the AMX collaborative project with Italy's Aeritalia and Aermacchi. In 
fact, an earlier project with Aermacchi to license produce the light military jet, Xavante, 
provided Embraer with the experience needed to become a full partner in the AMX 
programme. The Brazilian company has a 29.7 per cent share in the programme, while 
the shares of Aeritalia and Aermacchi are 46.5 and 23.8 per cent respectively. 
Production is divided accordingly: Aeritalia assembles the aircraft, and produces the 
fuselage center section, fin, and various systems for the AMX's front section and 
components for the wing and empennage. Aermacchi is responsible for the front and 
rear fuselage sections. Embraer contributes the wings, empennage, wing pylons, external 
fuel tanks, and landing gear for the AMX. (Figure 3.2, provides an illustration of the 
AMX.) The Brazilian Air Force will receive a total order of 79 AMXs to replace the 
aging Xavantes, and Italy's Air Force will take the remaining 187. At present no firm 
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export orders have been secured for this subsonic tactical support aircraft, despite its 
lower price tag of $10 million in relation to its competitors. 
The AMX and Brasilia programmes have required considerable investments -- an 
estimated $42 million in industrial capacity and composite materials technology. (An 
agreement for the transfer of a advanced materials technology and handling was 
previously signed between Embraer and the U.S. helicopter manufacturer, Sikorsky.) 
The surfaces and wings of these aircraft are constructed using such composite materials 
as carbon fibre, Kevlar and Nomex (honeycomb). As many as twenty to thirty layers 
of carbon fibre are used in the production of structures and are heated inside an air 
vacuum oven called an autoclave to 130-150 degrees centigrade. This "oven", which is 
50 meters long and 405 meters wide, is the second largest autoclave in the world. These 
aircraft also have required extensive investments in CAD-CAM technology, in which 
many of the aircraft parts are manufactured using highly sophisticated numerically 
controlled machine tools, some of which cost close to two million dollars. As one 
Embraer official wryly commented "The only thing these machines don't do is pay the 
bills."4s 
Following the pattern of the automotive industry, the aircraft industry also is 
becoming more interdependent and internationalised, despite its domestic strategic value. 
Embraer has become a subcontractor to other aircraft industries, and has been obliged 
increasingly to negotiate offset contracts for its exports. The president of Embraer, 
Ozires Silva, argues that offsets are central to ensuring foreign contracts, particularly in 
the advanced industrialised countries, where rationalisation of defence-related industries 
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has had important employment ramifications. Silva likened offsets to driving a herd of 
cattle across piranha-infested rivers in central Brazil. "You send one cow across as a 
sacrifice to distract the piranha. You lose that one, but the rest get across safely.1I46 
This willingness to provide offsets was an important factor securing the sale of the 
Tucano to the British Royal Air Force. Thirty per cent of the aircraft (the wings, 
landing gear and canopy) is made in Brazil, 60 per cent is fabricated under license from 
Embraer by Short Brothers in Northern Ireland. (Not surprising Short Brothers later 
received a royal award because the company was able to secure employment and create 
an additional 800 new jobs with the Tucano project.) The modifications of the RAF's 
Tucano, including a more powerful engine and stronger undercarriage, required such 
significant re-engineering by Embraer that the RAF version is commonly referred to as 
the "Super Tucano".47 The Tucano has also been license produced by Egypt, though 
Embraer produced and shipped all of the parts to Egypt for assembly. 
Subcontraction activities have provided the company with another avenue for 
technological development. Beginning in the early 1970s, Embraer produced parts 
(vertical tail assemblies and pylons) for Northrop's Tiger F-5E aircraft, which were 
exported to the United States. Embraer gained considerable know-how in the areas of 
metal/metal bonding, which was subsequently used in the production of the Bandeirante, 
Xingu, Brasilia, and Tucano aircraft. Embraer has also transferred its metal/metal 
bonding technology to the Brazilian automotive manufacturing sector. 
A recent subcontraction arrangement involves the manufacture by Embraer of 207 
advanced composite external wings for McDonnell-Douglas' new MD-ll wide-bodied 
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trijet. For this program Embraer developed the tooling and complete detailed design of 
three outboard flaps, which are fabricated using carbon epoxy fibre material, and are 
among the largest composite structures on the MD-ll, measuring 8.9 meters long. In 
interviews held at the U.S. company's Long Beach facilities, various supplier managers 
for the MD-ll emphasised that access to Embraer's expertise in composite material 
technology was a key factor in McDonnell-Douglas' decision to outsource this critical 
part of the aircraft.49 Included in this subcontraction arrangement was a technical 
exchange programme for the training of Embraer engineers at McDonnell-Douglas. Over 
this three-year programme, Embraer sent its aeronautical designers and engineers on a 
one-year rotational basis to work alongside their Douglas counterparts on the new MD-80 
project. The Brazilian company also benefitted from its subcontractor relations with 
McDonnell-Douglas in the areas of quality-control, programme management, and 
advanced material technology and processes. 
Embraer's Promotion of Linkages to 1M Capital Goods Sector 
Many industry analysts have argued that Embraer is nothing more than a final 
assembler of largely imported aircraft parts. This focus on nationalisation indexes of 
Embraer's products, however, obscures the essential decision by Embraer not to integrate 
vertically its entire production process. As an Embraer Equipment Division (EDE) 
representative pointed out, "From the day of its conception Embraer was willing to deal 
pragmatically with its industrial and technological limits. "so Embraer has concentrated 
its efforts on design, and systems engineering and integration. Both Embraer and the 
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CTA's Industrial Support Institute have encouraged the development, through backward 
linkage effects of local aircraft component suppliers. 
As stated above, the IFI played an early complementary role by qualifying local 
suppliers for Embraer. Since an agreement in the early 1970s between the United States' 
FAA, and Brazil's CTA over reciprocal homologation of aircraft, the IFI's focus has 
shifted. The Institute's activities now largely centre around certification of indigenously 
produced aircraft. With the growing demand for large series of parts brought on by the 
Tucano and Piper production requirements, Embraer established its own National 
Industrial Directorate, and its equipment subsidiary, the EDE. 
Since aircraft are characterised by batch production and manufactured for 
customers' specific requirements, economies of scale become an important determinant 
in parts production. In addition, because of the research and development costs, the 
industry is structured by highly specialised subtier manufacturers. For example, only a 
few companies in the world supply composite materials and engines for aircraft. As a 
result, Embraer has concentrated on systems integration of subcomponents supplied by 
local capital goods producers, major international suppliers, and in some cases, by the 
domestically-based transnational corporations. Thus, Embraer has turned its reliance on 
imports (avionics and engines) induced by customer specifications into a marketing 
advantage. A procurement director explains: 
If we can buy cheaper with the quality, then we buy outside ... because .. .it 
is a very, very expensive industry. Six point four million dollars for the 
price of our Brasilia. And each of its buyers chooses its own avionics --
Let's take radar. For example, Americans want King radar, the British 
buy Ferranti. Same for avionics. Eighty per cent choose Collins ... very 
dependable equipment. Our airframes use aluminum with special alloys. 
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We buy that from Alcoa here in Brazil but through their company in the 
United States, sometimes from Kaiser in West Germany. Not yet 
economically feasible to make special aluminum here in Brazil -- there are 
no economies of scale. Good technology is available in Brazil but not a 
sufficient market. 51 
Such pragmatism is also reflected in Embraer's decision not to rush into the 
production of its own engines (especially jet) and avionics. In keeping with its 
technology policy, Embraer instead has sought phased development encouraging the 
nationalisation of those products. The AMX programme has provided Embraer with the 
experience in building jet turbines. The company, in association with a Brazilian firm, 
Celma (an experienced engine maintenance company), and jointly with Britain's Rolls 
Royce might begin series production of jet engines in the late-1990s. 
The nationalisation indexes in 1978 for Embraer aircraft were as follows: 80% 
for the Ipanema, 75 % Bandeirante, 70% Xavante, and about 40% for the licensed Piper 
series. In 1991, the indexes for the Brasilia and Tucano are slightly lower (67%) 
because of the imports of composite materials and avionics. At the same time, a local 
supplier network has been built up as part of Embraer's policy to increase the 
participation of local firms in the manufacture of aircraft. (Table 3.7 provides a listing 
of Embraer's major domestic suppliers.) 
When asked about these links to Brazilian industry, the managing director of 
Embraer's EDE said that the company supplies the technology, training and quality 
control methods to these industries, and subcontracts about two-thirds of its production 
to approximately 350 Brazilian firms. He warned, however, that: 
One should see Embraer as an aeronautical industry from the Third World 
and Brazil's economic situation. Problems with subcontractors are not 
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Table 3.7 
Embraer's Domestic Suppliers 
FIRM 
PIRELLI 
ABC SISTEMAS 
ELEBRA 
AEROELETRONICA 
ENGETRONICA 
ELETROMETAL ACOS FINOS Sf A 
CIBA GEIGY QUIMICA S/A 
ARTEF ATOS ELECTRICOS E 
MECANICOS DE AERONAuTICA 
LTDA. 
NAKATA Sf A IND. COM. 
D.F. VASCONCELOS Sf A 
PRODUCT 
Tanks 
Navigation Control Panel 
Radio Altimeter 
Navigation Fixing Selector 
Flight Director Selector 
Navigation Mode Weapon Aiming Selector 
Interface Unit 
BC/MC IFU Control Panel 
Electronic Flight Control System 
Central Suppression Unit 
Bus Controller/Main Computer 
TV fIR Map Display System 
IFF Radio Set 
Air Data Computer 
Flap and Slat - ECU 
Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) 
GCUfCfA 
Standby Attitude Heading Reference 
(SAHR) V IUHF 
System Armament T-27 
VIR-l30 
DME-42 
ADF-60 
Radios T-27 
Ferrous and Non-ferrous Metals 
Resins. Hardeners. Catalyz.ers 
Brackets and Fasteners 
Shock Absorbers 
Optical Equipment 
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related to quality because of Embraer' s high standards, but of delays ... The 
economy is more a concern than technology. S2 
Moreover, the reputation that Embraer has achieved in the international market has 
opened doors for exports from the Brazilian airplane parts industry. 
Brazil's economy with its $120 billion debt, and its concomitant need for exports 
is precisely why Embraer has so heavily favoured development of products that are 
attractive to its export customers. In addition, Embraer avoided the mistake that India, 
Taiwan and other industrialising countries have made in building aircraft industries by 
relying almost exclusively on domestic military procurement. The company has 
maintained a balance between military and civil aircraft production from the start. In 
1987, for example, Embraer exported $320 million, which represented 68.1 % of the total 
value of production. (International sales were divided 33.4 % for military and 67.6% for 
civil aircraft.) Out of the 31.9% that constituted domestic sales, the civil market 
accounted for 25.7%. 
When asked whether Embraer would gravitate further towards military production 
because of the Tucano's popularity, Embraer's managing director, Ozilio Silva responded 
negatively, liThe trade in military aircraft appears to be in decline. The competition is 
very large. The costs of aircraft are very high."S3 In fact, Silva acknowledged that 
Embraer had not wanted to build the AMX fighter aircraft because of the plane's high 
costs of production and insufficient export market, but was pressured to do so by the 
Brazilian Air Force. Instead, Embraer has sought to develop dual purpose aircraft. For 
example, both the Bandeirante and the Brasilia have civil (e.g. commuter) and military 
derivatives (search & rescue, reconnaissance, maritime patrol). Table 3.8, Embraer's 
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Table 3.8 
A Breakdown 0/ Embraer's Aircraft Production 
Production Breakdown of Embraer % or Net Income 
Heavy Planes (1) 57.1 
Light Planes (2) 6.7 
AM-X 20.2 
Service 0.9 
Parts 9.4 
Other 5.7 
1. Heavy planes include the Bandeirante, Brasilia, Xingu, 
and Tucano programmes. 
2. Light planes include the Piper line of aircraft and the 
agricultural plane, the lpanema. 
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Aircraft Production Breakdown, shows the distribution of Embraer's military and civil 
aircraft production as a percentage of net income. 
Engenheiros Especializados S.A. (Engesa) 
A few years ago, television viewers saw the Colombian army storm the justice 
ministry in an attempt to dislodge terrorists, who were holding several judges hostage. 
Visible were several Cascavel armoured cars, part of a fleet of 100 purchased in 1981 
from one of Brazil's leading arms export companies, Engesa. 
Founded in 1958 by its current owner and president, Jose Luis Whitaker Ribeiro, 
the Sao Paulo-based company manufactured oil drilling equipment, and its own 
"boomerang/bogie" rear suspension system, which enabled the company's trucks and 
other heavy vehicles to deliver equipment to remote oilfields. Engesa's first military 
contract, worth $70 thousand, was with the U.S. Army to refit its two-ton trucks with 
the "bogie" suspension system. 54 One year later, the Brazilian Army also sought 
Engesa's automotive expertise. "It was 1968, a year of serious recession for us and for 
Brazil, and the Army required an inexpensive source to modify 100 four-wheel drive 
trucks. "ss Two years later, Whitaker had built a prototype armoured car, hoping to sell 
it to the Brazilian Army. Despite the Army's interest as well as the Marine's 
requirement for development of an amphibious armoured car, neither service's 
procurement budget could sustain the initial purchases of these vehicles (the Cascavel and 
Urutu respectively). Thus began Engesa's search for lucrative export markets. After 
disguising his armoured car as an ambulance, (because the military government, officials 
at CACEX and ltamaraty refused to permit its export), Whitaker sent a prototype to 
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Libya, where in 1974 Engesa secured its first export contract for 200 Cascavels and 
Urutus. 
The story behind Engesa's meteoric rise from an obscure equipment and transport 
producer to a world leading armoured vehicle manufacturer attests to strong private 
entrepreneurship, product development through linkage to the Brazilian and transnational 
transport industries, and to government/university research centres, as well as 
international marketing abilities. Before we examine these explanations, however, it is 
important to appreciate the initial constraints that Engesa faced in the development of its 
armoured car industry. These problems can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Customers 
• No tradition as purchasers of Brazilian military equipment; 
• Unknown product reputation; 
• Foreign militaries were often not well prepared or knowledgeable in terms of 
establishing technical requirements for weapons systems. 
(2) Export Market 
• Lack of familiarity with these countries; 
• No long-standing tradition as weapons manufacturer; 
• Lack of knowledge about potential competitors; 
• Great distance from high technology centres in the United States and Europe, 
which hindered keeping abreast of technological developments. 
(3) Suppliers 
• Reluctance on the part of foreign suppliers, which greatly reduced Engesa's 
bargaining power; 
• Unfavourable payment conditions (hard currency payments in advance of sales); 
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• Production scales for specialised items like guns and optronics were often 
incompatible with domestic supplier market conditions; 
• Short delivery times. 
(4) Government 
• Not yet prepared to have a significant defence industry in Brazil; 
• Technical/Commercial/Diplomatic support unavailable; 
• Extremely limited domestic defence procurement budget; 
• Non availability of credit programmes or lines of credit through CACEX; 
(5) Resources 
• Few experienced professionals; 
• Difficulties in importing necessary computer hardware and software, especially 
CAD-CAM technologies because of the Brazilian government's Informatics 
policies. 
(6) Foreign Politics 
• Restrictions imposed on exports of weapons to such pariahs as South Africa and 
Taiwan by the developed countries. S6 
When asked by this author what factors then explained Engesa's success, despite 
these considerable barriers to entry, company officials were quick to respond. They 
emphasised carefully phased product development, assisted by heavy investments in 
research and development, especially in engineering and technical resources; a 
procurement policy that entailed partnerships with domestic and foreign suppliers; and 
a marketing/sales strategy, which targeted market niches for intermediate-level weapons 
systems. S7 As each of these explanations also provide insights into firm-level behaviour, 
the author will address them individually. 
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First, in terms of product development, all of Engesa's armoured fighting vehicles 
(AFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) share the same characteristics: simple 
and flexible design concepts, low cost, good performance and reliability, easy use and 
maintenance. These characteristics also explain the major selling points of Engesa's 
products to its Third World customers. 
Second, the company's strong engineering and technical base is reinforced through 
linkages to other military, industrial and university centres: the Inst;tuto de Engenharia, 
Centro Tecnico do Exercito (CTEJ, INPE, IPT etc. The following Chart 3.2, 
Tech/Human Resources, provided by Engesa, illustrates the company's interfaces with 
Brazil's universities and research centres. Not only has Engesa tapped into available 
technological developments throughout the related metallurgical, electronics and chemical 
industries, this form of technology sharing also provides a way of selecting highly trained 
and educated future employees. 
In addition, the company's technical director maintained that there were 
significant efficiencies gained by having both civil and military R&D projects carried 
out under one department at the same time. (For example, maximised utility of expensive 
CAD/CAM systems, and fast response to sales and marketing requests).58 In terms of 
product engineering, one Engesa engineer said that because of the specialised, customer-
specific requirements inherent in the company's products, they often had to incorporate 
design changes within short periods of time.59 (Refer to Chart 3.3, Methodology of 
Work, which details the design and production process.) As a result, flexibility in design 
and systems integration are heavily emphasised. This requirement often has entailed 
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adaptations and modifications of transferred technology and reverse engineering. Finally, 
the company has invested heavily in human resource development for its employees. 
Such a policy includes incentives to undertake post-graduate programmes in the sciences 
and in business administration, as well as in-house language training. 
Engesa's international cost competitiveness strategy is based not only on cheaper 
wage rates (relative to the advanced industrialised countries), but on its procurement 
policy. Central to this policy is the company's "make or buy" decisionmaking process 
and its relations with external suppliers. According to company officials, this "make or 
buy" decision is made on the basis of whether the input is: of strategic value (e.g. must 
have the capability to manufacture); classified or sensitive (e.g. armour); domestic 
resource availability; and production scale. Engesa has particular difficulties with foreign 
suppliers because of the excessive time needed to secure import permits from CACEX, 
and because of ltamaraty's refusal to supply end-user certificates on Brazilian defence 
exports. 
However, company sources say they have been able to develop close relations 
with many foreign suppliers, as many of these military-related manufacturers need to 
export given their own countries' shrinking domestic weapons procurement budgets. 
Engesa's four strategies for securing reliable suppliers are: 1) "make suppliers become 
partners" (by encouraging the supplier to share the risks involved in product 
development); 2) "for strategic items assure possibility of technology transfer"; 3) 
"make losers become winners"; and 4) "seek companies that have branches in Brazil" 
An example of these two latter strategies is the company's search and acquisition of 
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German MWM engines (which lost a bid to supply the German Leopard II), for the 
Osorio main battle tank project. 60 
Obviously Engesa's sales and marketing strategy is pivotal in helping to explain 
Brazil's remarkable success in becoming among the world's ten leading defence exporters 
during the 1980s. The company had to overcome the many barriers to entry in the 
highly competitive international arms market; not least of which includes lack of export 
financing (such as that provided by the United States' Foreign Military Sales Assistance 
Program), and lack of military and government sales support. 
The director of Engesa's sales and marketing attributes the company's success in 
export markets to the fact that the company's teams are extraordinarily well prepared. 
"They have assessed the competition and its capabilities, they know Engesa's product 
capabilities thoroughly, and team members are interoperable in terms of their technical 
and financial backgrounds."6\ Another important corollary to this marketing strategy has 
been the establishment of commercial offices in the United States as well as in Europe. 
From these vantage points, Engesa can be closer to technology centres and to its foreign 
suppliers. A related factor is the company's renowned after-sales support, in terms of 
guaranteed access to spare parts, training for the crew, and maintenance (including on 
the front line during the Iran-Iraq war). 
Many analysts, however, rightly note that Engesa can take advantage of the 
country's non-aligned position in the international system and its affinity with other Third 
World countries. As Engesa's superintendent for marketing explained: 
We are a Third World country, we understand each other .... We are not 
like the United States or France who sell and forget a customer. And we 
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are not like the Russians, when they make a sale, they arrive with 500 
engineers and technicians and start interfering in domestic politics. We 
make a straight commercial deal.. .. 62 
In 1982-83 Engesa embarked on a programme of diversification back into the 
civilian automotive sector because its assessment of future military markets looked bleak. 
For reasons that will become apparent later, Engesa opted to acquire industries for this 
purpose rather than restructure through conversion planning. In 1983 Engesa purchased 
FNV, an automotive company, and bought from the Brazilian capital goods magnate, 
Bardella, its electric motors/subway transport division. (These acquisitions were made 
with the belief that investments in Brazil's urban public transport sector would be 
forthcoming.) In addition, Engesa entered into a joint venture with the Dutch MNC, 
Philips, forming Engetronica to manufacture and supply the expanding 
telecommunications business. (See Table 3.9, Engesa's Corporate Structure, for an 
overview of Engesa's subsidiary portfolio and its product lines.) By late 1984, however, 
Engesa was experiencing severe financial difficulties as a result of its failed 
diversification strategy. According to corporate officials, the problems centered around 
the rapidity of the expansion, little cash flow, no product familiarity, and lack of overall 
capability to manage these very different companies.63 
During the same period, Saudi Arabia expressed interest in Engesa developing a 
main battle tank for its army. The timing of the Saudi contract for the initial research 
and development phase was fortuitous for Engesa. Though Engesa was by now an 
established weapons exporter, it faced new entrants -- both domestic and foreign -- in its 
traditional product lines and markets. Simultaneously, the life cycle of its main product 
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Table 3.9: Engesa's Corporate Structure in 1989' 
Engesa has eight major subsidiaries, which including its Sao Jose dos Campos 
headquarters. are based primarily in the state of Sao Paulo. as well as in Salvador. 
1. Eniex S. A.; Equipamentos Especia/izados 
Specialised equipment and parts manufacturer for the petroleum (petrobras), transportation (GM), 
mining, agriculture, and forestry industries. 
2. Engesa Oufmica S.A.: 
Engesa is the majority stockholder in this joint venture with the state-owned ammunition 
company,lmbel. Engeq produces ammunition for Engesa's armoured personnel carriers' 90 and 
105mm guns. Other important customers include the Brazilian armed forces, Imbel and the 
armed services of foreign countries. 
3. Engelectrica S.A. Engesa Equipmamentos Eletricos 
Engesa's electrical motor manufacturing division. It produces generators, motors and "no-break" 
equipment for the company's military vehicles and for other civilian applications. 
4. Engesa EletrOnica S.A. 
A joint venture between Engesa (70% stockholder) and Inbraphil. the Philips Brazilian subsidiary. 
This division manufactures the fire control. optronics and communication systems for Engesa's 
APCs, as well as the Osorio. It also produces under license telecommunications equipment, 
avionics for Embraer and computer network hardware for IBM. 
5. Eniexo Exportadora S. A. 
A trading company, which is responsible for the marketing and sale of Engesa's and other 
Brazilian companies' defence exports. 
6. Aerobrasil 
Controls and undertakes "door-to-door" delivery of Engesa's military equipment with its 
company-leased Boeing 707 and 727 aircraft. 
7. FNV Veiculos & Eguipamentos 
Traditional producer of railway carriages, buses, agricultural and forestry vehicles, as well as 
specialised trucks. 
8. Orbita Sistemas Aeroespaciais 
Engesa is a partner is this missile consortium along with Embraer, Imbel and other defence-
related firms for the production of various air-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. 
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External Trade 
Military Products; 
Armoured Cars 
Jeeps and Trucks 
Spare Parts 
Civilian Products; 
Kits 
Domestic Trade 
Military Products: 
Armoured Cars 
Trucks and Jeeps 
Spare Parts 
Civilian Products: 
Tractors 
Jeeps 
Spare Parts 
Service 
Other 
Engesa's Production Breakdown1 
Percentage of Net Revenue 
70.6% 
69.2% 
1.4% 
29.4% 
10.7% 
18.7% 
ISince March 1990, when Engesa filed for bankruptcy protection, the company has 
undergone a major restructuring effort. Various subsidiaries have been sold off, for example, 
Engetronica was sold to Moddata, or have been closed down entirely (Aerobrasil) 
2'fhese figures are based on 1989 data provided from the Comissao Valores Mobildrios. 
They are for Engesa only and do not include the production activities of any of its subsidiaries. 
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lines was in decline, and the company's customers were requesting more sophisticated 
weapons. Thus, the decision to proceed with the development of a MBT as well as to 
enter into partnership with two other defence-related companies, Orbita and Helibras, 
was viewed as a means to upgrade and diversify Engesa's military market position. 
The Osorio MBT programme encapsulates Engesa's approach to developing new 
weapons systems. First, following the Saudi requirement for a light main battle tank, 
the company conducted a market feasibility study of other Third World countries, where 
bridges and roads could not support the 6O-ton MBTs such as the United States' M-1 A-1 
or the French AMX. Second, Engesa then searched for the best available armour, 
engines, suspension system, electronics, and gears. In keeping with its strategy of 
finding suppliers who would share the development costs, Engesa succeeded in attracting 
many foreign suppliers because the Osorio programme represented the only real new tank 
development project in the 1980s-90s. For example, Dunlop, supplier to the British 
Challenger I MBT, was willing to provide the Osorio's hydropneumatic suspension 
system (which keeps the tank lower on the ground versus the more conventionally used 
torsion bar suspension system). Within Brazil, Engesa could rely once more on the 
transnational automotive industry, particularly German MNCs to supply the smaller 85 
km/hr engine (MWM) and the gear box (ZF). 
Indeed, due to Engesa's engineering strength in systems integration, the 
configuration of the Osorio is unlike any other MBT on the international market; not 
only because of its recent conception and incorporation of new technologies, but because 
of its flexibility in taking account various export customer demand and needs. (In 
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contrast, U.S. and British defence firms have to tailor their products to suit the specific 
requirements of the domestic armed services.) This flexibility in design and options 
(guns, type of petrol, engines) is also reflected in the speed of the development process: 
It took only five years for Engesa to develop and test two prototypes of the Osorio. 
The development of this main battle tank also reflects the inherent difficulties of 
a Third World-based company in moving up the high-technology ladder to the production 
of more advanced weapons systems. First, the financial resources required have been 
enormous. Since Saudi Arabia gave the go-ahead for prototype production of the Osorio 
in 1985, Engesa proceeded to spend $60 million in research and development and 
prototype development. It was widely rumoured that Saudi Arabia had provided financial 
assistance for the initial R&D costs. When asked whether such reports were accurate, 
company officials said that they had not been able to "recover" the money previously 
offered. "After five years all Saudi Arabia provided was lodging and terrible food. ,,64 
However, Engesa said it was able to secure some government funding for research and 
development from FINEP (approximately four million), and technical assistance from the 
army's CTEx' 
Should the Saudi contract ever be finalised, the production budget will entail an 
additional $30 million investment, much of which Engesa expects to raise on the Sao 
Paulo stock market, Bovespa. Production of the Osorio will require drastic changes in 
production and assembly methods, new plant design and expansion, as well as the 
introduction and use of specialised materials and machining processes. Engesa argues 
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that such an investment in new materials and process technology will have significant 
spillovers for its other military (APes and AFVs) and civilian lines. 
Aside from financial constraints related to production costs, there are numerous 
other complications involved in the sales and marketing of the MBT. First, by the mid-
1980s several developed countries, primarily the United States, became concerned about 
Engesa's sales volume and customers (Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia). Additionally, the 
Osorio programme represented a distinct move to enter the high technology end of the 
international arms export market, which had been long dominated by the established 
u.S., Soviet and French firms. These concerns led the United States, in particular, to 
attempt to thwart the Saudi sale by restricting technology transfers of U.S. suppliers to 
Engesa.6S For a period of over a year, the Osorio's larger engine supplied by a Detroit-
based company was affected by the U.S. curb on its export. When asked whether such 
restrictions could seriously impair the Osorio and future programmes, a company official 
responded: 
They [the United States] did this kind of thing ... but we ended up having 
the engine. The version of the engine that we import, we have a kind of 
agreement with [the company] and it is characterised for a civilian 
application. 66 
In addition, because the Osorio was in direct competition for the Saudi contract 
with the U.S. Ml Abrams, British Challenger and the French AMX-40, Engesa required 
greater diplomatic support and export financing from the respective government 
ministries, Itamaraty and CACEX. While Britain sent its then Prime Minister Thatcher 
to Saudi Arabia, Engesa could only pressure Brasilia to dispatch the Army Minister 
Leonidas. The Minister's presence did not impress the Saudis since Brazil's own army 
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did not possess the Osorio because it could not afford the MBT's $2.2 million price tag. 
(However, the Army Minister was only too happy to help secure the Osorio contract for 
Engesa, because of a kickback arrangement: for every twenty Osorios Engesa sold, the 
Army would be able to purchase one at reduced cost.) 
Despite an announcement in August 1989 by the Saudi government to buy 318 
Osorios (renamed Al Fahd, the leopard), the contract worth $7.2 billion has yet to be 
finalised. 67 Subsequently, Engesa was forced to sell its highly profitable subsidiaries, 
FNV and Engetronica, because of the company's extremely severe cash flow. 68 The 
effect of these sales was to leave the company in the perverse situation of being even 
further defence dependent. In April 1990 after a 3,000 man layoff Engesa filed for 
bankruptcy protection, as its then liabilities were more than double the highest valuation 
of its assets. 
Avioes Brasileiros (A vibras) 
Avibras is a privately owned, low-profile, missile company.69 It is located at the 
centre of aerospace activities in Brazil, in the city of Sao Jose dos Campos in the state 
of Sao Paulo. Of the major Brazilian defence firms, A vibras has intentionally retained 
the greatest autonomy from government agencies and from the Brazilian armed forces. 
Avibras was established in 1961 by Joao Verdi Carvalho Leite, an ITA graduate, 
initially to manufacture aircraft. The only two aircraft (trainers) ever manufactured were 
never homologated by the CTA, since the two prototypes and the manufacturing facilities 
were destroyed by a fire. This disaster, as well as the creation of Embraer, persuaded 
the founders of Avibras to shift to the field of military high technology, mainly rockets, 
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missiles, bombs, as well as chemicals (solid propellant and explosives), and electronics. 
Avibras' military production programmes have placed the company at the forefront of 
rocket and missile production in the Third World. 
In cooperation with the eTA's Institute for Space Activities and the National 
Institute for Space Research, the company's first aerospace project involved the 
development of an experimental satellite launch vehicle for meteorological purposes, the 
Sonda I and II. Avibras concentrated on the development of the motor and its solid 
propellant. In addition to these space-related activities, A vibras has developed 
meteorological radars, antennas and their associated ground stations for satellite 
communication (Brasil sat and Intelsat) for the Brazilian civilian market. 
In the 1980s the company's turnover grew from under $7 million per year with 
about 500 employees, to well over $100 million per year and over 5,500 employees, 
reaching $1.2 billion from 1981 to the beginning of 1988. Out of this total, exports 
alone accounted for $1 billion. Indeed, of Brazil's defence firms, Avibras has 
consistently been the largest exporter. However, Avibras' turnover dropped sharply in 
1988 to under $30 million, with no revenues in 1989 and 1990. It recovered to about 
$70 million in 1991 and remained the same in 1992. 
Avibras' export success was achieved by spotting and developing a market niche 
for a new defence product, the internationally renowned Astros II System. This product 
was a key factor explaining the subsequent success of the company. Avibras' first client, 
Iraq, played a vital role in the growth and development of Avibras, by signing a contract 
and releasing a large down payment of about $100 million out of a $500 million contract 
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to a then very small, relatively unknown company, to supply a sophisticated rocket 
system that was still on paper. The Iraqi contract included the technology transfer of the 
Astros IIsystem, and the supply of 11 Astros II batteries, 60,000 SS30, 4,000 SS40 and 
1,200 SS60 rockets. The technology transfer was never completed, and only 1,000 SS40 
and none of the SS60 were delivered. The contract was breached at this point and no 
more deliveries or payments were made after 1987, leaving 25% of the contract 
outstanding. 
The Iraqi contract enabled the company to develop the Astros system and to build 
the manufacturing facilities. The development of the Astros system was achieved 
through massive investments in R&D, manufacturing, and human resources. During the 
peak years, about 400 engineers and 400 technicians were employed by the company, out 
of 5,500 employees. This team consisted of some of the best Brazilian as well as foreign 
scientists, engineers and technicians in the field. 
Saudi Arabia has been Avibras' largest client. Between 1986 and 1988 the 
country received 12 Astros II batteries and 30,000 SS30s. A second contract signed at 
the end of 1990 consisted of a shipment of 5,000 SS30, 4,000 SS40 and 600 SS60 
rockets that were delivered just before the Gulf War. Additional rockets and technical 
support are currently under contract. Qatar has one Astros battery and a small amount 
of rockets. Brazil has one battery and a small supply of rockets as well. Contrary to 
what has been published, Libya has never received any arms shipments from Avibras --
a contract was negotiated in 1983 but never came into force. Other potential clients that 
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have strongly considered the purchase of the Astros II system include Iran, (which has 
wanted a license to produce the system), Thailand, Venezuela, and Angola. 
Major Products 
The major product developments of the company are: 
1. Astros System 
The Astros II consists of 127mm (SS30), 180mm (SS40) and 300mm (SS60) 
rockets, which are able to reach targets from 9km to 70km, carrying a 30kg high-
explosive warhead, 24 subammunition of cluster or antipersonnel bombs, and 60 
subammunition of cluster or antipersonnel bombs. The firing is done using an armoured 
launching vehicle (LMU), supported by a ream munition armoured vehicle (RMD), and 
a fire control unit (UCF). A later version of the Astros system included a command and 
control vehicle and a maintenance workshop vehicle. A battery of Astros lis consists of: 
six launchers, three reammunition vehicles and one fire control unit, and is able to fire 
four containers per launcher in 20 seconds. Avibras provides complete logistical support 
and training for the system, which has been successfully battlefield proven by both Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia. 
2. Flying Intruders ru Low Altitude (FILA) 
This system was specified and ordered by the Brazilian Army, with an initial 
order of 13 units and a future order, that never materialized, of 150 units. Only nine 
units were delivered and the contract was breached. At this point 70% of the FILA's 
components can be manufactured in Brazil. The system is a technology transfer and 
license agreement between A vibras and a Swiss company, Contraves, based on the 
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Skyguard technology.70 This joint development project required the development of 
software, logistics, field and laboratories tests, maintenance, manuals, and client training. 
The project involved more than 200 people over a four-year period, with an extensive 
training program both at Contraves in Switzerland, and in Brazil for Avibras' engineers, 
programmers, technicians, and mechanics. 
3. FOG-MP 
This system consists of a fibre optic-guided missile with a ten kilometer range, 
hand-guided via a television camera in the nose of the missile. The FOG-MP barely 
made its first and only prototype flight, lacking further R&D. Avibras needs an 
additional U.S. $50 million to conclude the developmental stage since none of the 
manufacturing problems have been solved due to a lack of suppliers for most items. 
Procurement of sensitive components, such as laser diodes, micro cameras and guidance 
systems, will be difficult since they are available only outside of Brazil. The project is 
managed by Avibras Fibras Opticas (AFO), a subsidiary of Avibras. 
4. SBAT 70 
This sidewinder or ground-to-ground rocket can be supplied, but international 
market prices are so competitive that Avibras has virtually given up its production, and 
any further development of this rocket. 
5. Inertial Navigation System (Sis Nav) 
A land navigation system prototype and its gyro has been developed and tested. 
Whether the company could, in the short run, produce the gyros and miniaturized 
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systems to be used in missiles, is doubtful. To date the only application for this system 
is for offshore oil rig drilling guidance. This technology was initially developed at CTA-
INPE over a ten-year period. For two of these years a select group of engineers worked 
at Litton in the United States and with other companies in France, Germany and Japan.71 
6. SS300 arul Barracuda 
These two projects, a medium-range missile (SS300) and a naval version of the 
Astros II (Barracuda), never went beyond the prototype stage. Further investment in 
R&D would only occur if a firm order was received from a client. 
7. Antennas 
A vibras Fibras Opticas is also responsible for the 10m diameter 
telecommunication antennas, which were designed to be transported and assembled in the 
jungle without any special support or equipment. This subsidiary is also the major 
supplier of telecommunications antennas for Embratel used on telephone, television, data 
transmittal through satellite (Brasil sat and Intelsat). Special antennas and systems for 
private data transmission are being developed and ltau, a major Brazilian bank, has 
signed a purchase contract worth over $5 million. In addition, AFO produces home 
satellite TV reception antennas. 
The Development of a Supplier Network 
Underpinning Avibras' systems integration capability were decisions pertaining 
whether to produce components in house (because of the need to avoid loss of control 
over know how for sensitive components and because of difficulties in finding a reliable 
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source of supply), or whether to source parts to local as well as foreign suppliers. As 
a consequence, A vibras has established very strong bonds with its specialised suppliers 
including: 
Mechanical Parts of the Rockets 
From the design and specification stages, Avibras worked together with various 
suppliers to develop the production capability of needed components. The most sensitive 
items were the flow forming of motors and ogives. Production technology was secured 
through a joint R&D effort with the then West German suppliers of the flow forming 
equipment and the West German mechanical workshops that developed and produced the 
preforms. Afterwards, A vibras found local suppliers for the raw materials and 
mechanical components. 
Solid Propellent 
The formula was developed by the company and of all the materials required, 
only one item, Ammonium Perclorate, still is a critical import item. Avibras has had to 
depend on U.S. (KerrMcgee and Pepcon) and French (SNPE) suppliers, since a Brazilian 
facility (in Lorena, Sao Paulo) has been incapable of producing the propellent in 
sufficient quantities and quality.72 As for Hidroxil Terminated Polibutadien Resin, a 
local supplier, Petro flex (a former subsidiary of Petrobras now privati sed) is producing 
in quantities and quality needed. 
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Explosives 
Explosives for war heads and subammunition, including the raw material, are 
locally produced by Imbel and ICI's Explo. 
Electronics arul Telecommunications 
Dependence on foreign suppliers is enormous both for systems such as the firing 
control unit (Contraves), radios (Plesseyand Racal), navigation systems (feldix), special 
computers (CDC of Canada), and electronic components (integrated circuits, relays, 
connectors, capacitors, cabling). Most of the material is imported from the United States 
or from Europe. There are no local sources or any foreseen development of them, so 
that even if some of the equipment and boards could be assembled locally, most of the 
components would have to be imported. 
Vehicles 
The vehicles for the Astros system are designed and manufactured by Tectran, 
a subsidiary of Avibras, using a special German Mercedes Benz 6x6 chassis. Tectran 
also manufactures the launching platform (which is the most critical item) as well as the 
cabling, and assembles all instrumentation and accessories. Except for the chassis, which 
could be replaced only with a costly, redesigned adaption to a locally produced, Scania 
Vabis 6x6 chassis, all other items can be supplied domestically. 
According to a former company manager, four factors greatly affected Avibras' 
successful development of these suppliers. The first factor was the capability and 
willingness of local capital goods firms to supply the larger Brazilian defence companies 
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because of the various recessions in their industry. In conjunction, many local suppliers 
felt a certain national pride in supplying a domestic, high technology company such as 
Avibras. Third, most of Avibras' domestic and foreign suppliers are small-to-medium 
sized companies, which permits efficient and flexible transactions. A final factor is that 
cost concerns are not critical to Avibras' procurement policy since the markup on many 
of its products (the Astros) is as much as forty per cent. (Indeed, in terms of Avibras' 
procurement policy, cost factors are weighted fourth, behind safety, quality, and delivery 
time.) 
All these military projects have been financed by A vibras from its revenues. 
R&D has usually received the highest funding priority. Equipment, materials, 
components, training, consulting, travelling, have also been readily available (until 
recently). Salaries at Avibras are among the highest in the country, sometimes matching 
U.S. and European standards, and have attracted experienced personnel from various 
aerospace agencies and other companies, including those from abroad. 
During the late 1980s, when there were no outstanding contracts and deliveries, 
Avibras turned to local and foreign banks for loans of over $250 million to guarantee 
payment of salaries, fixed costs and R&D. Considerable effort was made to keep all 
R&D personnel. An important factor helping Avibras retain its R&D teams, was that 
its engineers and technicians were not easily absorbed by the commercial, manufacturing 
sector because of their high specialisation and salaries. 
In the first days of 1990, with debts piling up, no new orders at hand and 4,000 
employees on a paid leave without salaries for months, A vibras filed for bankruptcy 
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protection, concordata. The terms of the concordata allowed the company to repay 40% 
of its debt obligations within one year and the remaining balance within two years, with 
12% p.a. interest and no monetary correction. Since inflation ran very high in 1990 and 
1991, the total amount repaid was less than eight per cent of the original value, meaning 
the company was "pardoned" on about u.S. $350 million on debts owed to banks 
(Loyds, Banco do Amazonia, BeN) and suppliers. The concordata has severely hurt 
small and medium suppliers locally and abroad since over U.S. $50 million is still owed 
them. 
D.F. Vasconcelos 
Established in 1941, D. F. Vasconcelos (DFV) is Brazil's sole industrial precision 
optics manufacturer, and one of the country's oldest defence producers.73 The history 
of this company, as told by the founder himself -- a German expatriate, and former 
prisoner of war in England -- is characteristic of the experience of small private capital 
goods firms. Mr. Vasconcelos' first project was to supply the Brazilian army with 
rangefinders for coastal artillery, aiming circles and binoculars. A few years later in 
1943 Vasconcelos was called by the War Department to start an optical factory in Sao 
Paulo, and to go to the United States for specialised education (at George Washington 
University), and to buy the necessary equipment and technology (Brazil was entitled to 
this technology as a recipient under the Lend Lease Act). 
Since those years, the company has diversified several times, as highlighted by 
Table 3.10, D. F. Vasconcelos' Production Breakdown. Because of its excellent die 
casting facility, especially with aluminum, DFV produced carburetors in the 1950s for 
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Table 3.10 
D.F. Vasconcelos Production Breakdown 
BREAKDOWN OF PRODUCTION 
1) Professional Optical Equipment includes 
medical and hospital instruments. 
2) Consumer Optical Equipment includes 
binoculars, eyeglasses, telescopes, etc. 
3) Defence Equipment includes gun sights, 
periscopes, air-to-ground missiles, cluster 
bombs, night vision equipment. 
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Bendix, a multinational automotive company. With the oil crisis of the 1970s and the 
recession in the transport sector, DFV sold the division to Fiat and returned to the 
manufacture of optical equipment, especially medical and defence equipment, and more 
recently, robotics.74 With a reduced base of 750 employees from a high during the 
automotive boom of 2,000, DFV now concentrates its optics production in civil lines 
(binoculars and telescopes, camera lenses for a German company, Agfa) 
D.F. Vasconcelos also produces defence optical equipment for sale to the 
Brazilian armed forces and abroad. Additionally, the company is an important 
subcontractor to three other Brazilian defence firms: Embraer, Engesa and Bernardini. 
(Refer to Table 3.11, D.F. Vasconcelos' Principal Clients, for a complete listing.) For 
example, DFV developed and produces the heads up displays used in Embraer's Xavante, 
Tucano, and Brasilia aircraft. Using transferred technology through a joint venture 
agreement with Pilkington Glass of the United Kingdom, DFV has manufactured and 
provided periscopes and night vision/laser equipment for tanks and armoured vehicles 
(Osorio and Tamoyo as well as Jararaca, Urutu, Cascavel). Other products include: 
colli meters for motors, lenses for guns, stethoscopes for aerial photography, timing fuzes 
and mechanical devices for 37mm and 70mm unguided rockets, 40mm anti-aircraft gun 
using electronic radar etc. Given its expertise in high precision optics, D.F. Vasconcelos 
was contracted by the CT A during the mid-1980s for the research and development of 
an infra-red seeker/guidance system for an air-to-air missile, the Piranha. However, in 
1987 D. F. Vasconcelos was forced to abandon the prototype development of the Piranha. 
The CTA had held up funding and the company could no longer afford to continue the 
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Table 3.11 
D. F. Vasconcelos' Principal Clients 
Defence Equipment Anned Forces 
ENGESA - Engenheiros Especializados SIA 
EMBRAER - Empresa Brasileira de 
Aeronautica 
Professional & Consumer Optical Equipment Fotoptica Ltda. 
Casa Anglo Brasileira SIA 
Cinotica S.A. 
Mesbla S/A 
Comaci Hospitalar e Cientffica Ltda. 
Coday - Importa~ao e Comercio Ltda. 
Hospital das Clinicas da Faculdade de 
Mecicina da Universidade de Sao Paulo 
Optical and Mechanical Components Xerox do Brasil SI A 
Nashua do Brasil SI A 
IBM do Brasil Com. Ind. Ltda. 
Kodak Brasil Com. Ind. Ltda. 
MECAF - Mecanica Fina Ltda. 
3 M do Brasil Ltda. 
Micronal Aparelhos de Precisiio 
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project and support the R&D staff out of its current operating expenses. The CT A then 
forced D.F. Vasconcelos to transfer its team and research to a newly created missile 
company, Orbita. 
Orbita 
The creation of Orbita, an association of five aerospace-related companies, in 
1986 revealed underlying conflicts of interest among Brazil's leading defence producers. 
This association consists of Engesa and Embraer, each with 40 per cent participation; the 
remainder divided among three companies Esca, an aerospace company interested 
primarily in air traffic control and radar systems with 11 per cent; Imbel, the Brazilian 
Army's ammunition and propellant factory with five per cent participation; and Parcom -
- the splinter group that left D.F. Vasconcelos in 1989 at four per cent.7S The company, 
which is expected to have its own facilities on Embraer's land in Sao Jose dos Campos, 
is largely a paper company, as none of its three main missile projects -- the air-to-air 
missile (MAA-l) Piranha for the AMX aircraft; the surface-to-air missile (MSA-31); and 
the anti-tank MSS.12 have proceeded beyond the prototype development phase. 
According to an Orbita video provided by Engesa, Orbita will have the following 
company inputs: 1) Engesa, using its engineering and marketing strengths, is to be 
responsible for vehicles, warhead, ammunition, fire-control systems, and electronics. 
Engesa has already contributed to the development of the anti-tank missile through its 
division Engemissile, which was absorbed by Orbita. This division had been working 
on the development of the anti-tank missile in conjunction with Italy's OTO Melara; 2) 
Embraer contributes its background in project engineering, CAD/CAM designing, 
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composite materials technology, avionics, aerodynamics, and systems integration; 3) 
ESCA is providing its expertise in flight control systems, communications, systems 
engineering, and applicative software; 4) IMBEL supplies propellants and explosives; and 
finally 5) Parcom contributes its knowledge of infra-red guidance technology derived 
from the initial development at DFV of the air-to-air Piranha missile. Conspicuously 
absent from this group obviously is Avibras. 
Engesa's initiative in forming Orbita to compete with Avibras can be attributed 
to two motivations. First, enmity had existed between Leite of Avibras and Whitaker 
of Engesa because of the latter's desire to undermine Avibras' missile business. Second 
Engesa had a progressive interest in developing missiles to complement its military 
vehicle platforms. 
NAVAL 
The Brazilian shipbuilding industry was initiated during the 1950s, aided by the 
activities of the Grupo Execurivo da Industria de Construrao Naval, and fiscal incentives 
provided by the Brazilian government.76 Today, Brazil's shipbuilding industry consists 
of eight firms, though four dominate the sector. They include: Arsenal de Marinha do 
Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ), the state-owned shipyard, which is the main national supplier 
to the Brazilian Navy; Verolme, a private Brazilian company (formerly Dutch owned 
however), which is Brazil's largest shipyard, located in Jacuecanga, near Angra dos Reis 
in the state of Rio de Janeiro; Ishibras, a company 90 per cent owned by the Japanese 
conglomerate, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.; and MacLaren, another 
smaller, privately-owned Brazilian shipyard based in Niteroi at the Ilha de Concei~ao. 
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During the 1970s, the shipbuilding industry's share in exports of capital goods was very 
low, on average less than ten per cent of total production was exported. By 1983, 
however, the industry had exported nearly half of its total production, as indicated in 
Table 3.12, Sectoral Expons of Specialised Capital Goods. 
Brazilian Navy Defence Production Programmes 
Despite the presence of an extensive commercial shipbuilding sector, the Navy, 
in contrast to the experiences of Brazil's Air Force and Army, has been slow to involve 
the private sector in defence production activities. Some naval observers attribute the 
growing obsolescence and excessive concentration of naval assets (ships, office and 
production facilities in Rio de Janeiro) to this reluctance. As one Brazilian naval captain 
observed, "The bitter reality is that the present Navy cannot control even small selected 
South Atlantic areas and has painful difficulties patrolling even for a short time, the 
entire Brazilian coast. lin When asked what accounts for the Navy's different perspective 
from its fellow services, Admiral Mario Cesar Flores observed that the Navy is more 
internationally oriented and the Navy is very dispersed in its research and development 
activities, which are not widely connected to industry.78 For example, the Navy uses the 
Federal University of Rio, University of Campinas for electronics, University of Sao 
Paulo for nuclear-related technologies. The Navy also has a strong tradition of sending 
personnel abroad to U.S. universities, such as MIT and Caltech for specialised 
programmes. 
The approximately 49,000 man Navy operates roughly 110 ships, of which 37 
serve in the fleet. The remainder serve in support roles. Most of the vessels have been 
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Table 3.12: 
Sectoral Exports of Specialized Capital Goods 
(percentage of production) 
Subsector 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
1) Heating & Cooling 5.1 3.8 5.3 4.5 10.2 
Equipment' 
21 Mechanical 33.0 21.3 38.6 41.3 47.8 
2.1 - Machines2 25.7 13.1 29.8 35.8 38.8 
2.2 - Industrial Equipment 7.3 8.2 8.8 5.5 9.0 
3) Components & Materials 7.2 6.2 8.4 8.2 8.1 
4) Metal Structures 5.5 7.5 19.8 22.1 9.0 
5) Electrical Equipment 14.1 12.5 17.8 22.3 16.3 
61 Railroad 19.4 11.3 19.1 11.7 8.2 
7) Naval 17.4 34.2 49.9 17.3 30.6 
Source: PartbanklZanini 
, Excludes tabulations 
2Excludes diesel motors 
161 
scheduled for decommissioning within the decade, though owing to budgetary constraints 
modernisation and replacement programmes have been considerably delayed.79 For 
instance during the 1986-87 period the Brazilian Navy was allocated only $72 million for 
new construction programmes. 
In addition, a breakdown of the Navy's budget reveals that only 21 per cent is 
allocated for procurement; six per cent for research and development; and the remainder 
for personnel costs. The pattern of procurement has been to use the Navy's IPqM 
(Instituto de Pesquisas de Marinha) and invest in the conception of the project, and then 
transfer it to the Navy's own AMRJ shipyard.so (IPqM projects include sonar, acoustics, 
electronic equipment, missile technology, gyroscope guidance and the submarine 
propulsion programme.) Two programmes, in particular, are reflective ofthis approach: 
The corvette and nuclear submarine programmes. 
Corvette Prol:ramme 
In order to complement and eventually replace the Navy's aging fleet of World 
War II vintage destroyers, the Navy established a requirement for the indigenous design 
and construction of 12 corvettes. Preliminary design work began in 1978 at the Navy's 
Diretoria de Engenharia Naval (DEN) and construction of the first four were authorised 
in 1984. Because of the pressures of time, and limited facilities at the Navy's own 
shipyard, it was decided that two of the Inhauma class corvettes would be built by 
AMRJ, the remaining two by Brazil's leading private shipbuilder, Verolme. 
Approximately 65 per cent of the value of the corvette is locally produced and 
subcontracted by other Brazilian defence-related firms: its steel superstructure, anti-ship 
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missile "Barracuda," as well as the anti-air defence system (similar to the ground Fila 
version), are to be provided by Avibras; the 40mm gun is being produced under license 
from Bofors by CBV; and Helibras is to provide the Aerospatiale licensed-produced 
helicopters. The propulsion and fire-control systems and sonar are imported. 81 
Nuclear Submarine Programme 
Although the primary role of the Brazilian Navy is sea control, Brazil's 
investment in its submarine programme has been interpreted to project offensive power, 
and to serve as a deterrent. The main roles of the Brazilian submarines are to attack 
enemy naval forces, to blockade enemy harbours with mines, and to attack sealines of 
communication. The submarines also could be deployed defensively to control such 
choke points as the Rio-Santos-Vitoria area. The Navy has begun replacement of four 
U.S. Guppy-class units with West German Type 1400-class submarines. The leading 
ship, the Tupi, was built in West Germany and is already in service. An additional three 
have been constructed at AMRJ with supervision from the Ferrostaall Ingeniear Kontor 
LubecklHDW (Howaldswerke) consortium. 
Some local subcontracting also has been undertaken. For example, the special 
metal used for construction of the pressurised hulls is being provided by a former state-
owned steel company, Usiminas. The hull is to be manufactured by Nuclep, a division 
of the state-owned nuclear company, Nuclebras. Some of the Sao Paulo-based MNCs 
are also engaged in the project. Siemens, for example, is providing the electric motors. 
However, as the director of Naval procurement argued, the $70 million investment in 
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research and development costs makes it difficult to justify indigenisation of some 
components, especially communications equipment. The problem according to Admiral 
Flores, is not one of absorbing or developing technology, but one of finance. "Our 
biggest enemy," Flores remarked, "is the Brazilian economy. 1182 
Brazil's own nuclear-powered submarine programme has been the central 
development project of the Navy, and best reflects the division of labour between the 
activities of the Navy and private industry. Using the facilities of Copesp and Aramar, 
the Navy has concentrated on the technology and systems development for the propulsion 
system, not on the production of the submarine itself.83 Copesp's primary role is to 
develop the propulsion system in coordination with Aramar. The latter Institute will 
develop, nationalise and certify components, equipment and conventional naval systems, 
in particular those currently imported for steamships. Aramar also has been involved in 
the construction of a compact nuclear reactor that could make viable the nuclear 
propulsion system. The Navy's procurement division will be responsible for the 
submarine production programme, and for targeting local private sector involvement. 
When asked why this division of labour was established, Copesp's director, 
Admiral Orthon Pinheira da Silva, responded: 
Two reasons: First to fulfill the needs of the Navy. Second, because the 
applicability of this technology for the civilian nuclear energy programme, 
which because of bureaucratic politics has prevented the development in 
Brazil of a good civilian nuclear energy programme. ,,84 
The Navy wanted to avoid such political entanglements at the state level, and to develop 
the technology quietly, without international scrutinisation. In fact, this latter concern 
has proved well-founded, as the United States has been anxious about the spillover 
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potential of the submarine programme on Brazil's nuclear weapons capability. 
Washington has impeded the export of any material related to the programme, so the 
system for the fuel cycle, for example, has been developed indigenously. 
What then accounts for the relative success of the naval submarine propulsion 
programme? As Admiral da Silva explained, "the technology was available in Brazil, 
the only problem was how to find it. The management of the programme has been more 
of a challenge than a technical one. "ss According to him six reasons suffice: 
1} Definition of a long-run programme; 
2} Accounting system "center of costs"; 
3} Step-by-step development; 
4} Ensuring safety of systems -- for example waste disposal; 
5) Funding secure though at low levels; 
6} Participation of highly trained and qualified personnel on the project with 
linkages to universities and other R&D centres such as IPEN (Nuclear Energy 
Research Institute). 
Work on the nuclear-powered submarine has progressed relatively quickly. The zero-
power reactor, which serves as a test lab, is in operation, as is the primary circuit of 
pressurized water to cool the reactor core. The construction of a test compartment 
reproducing the submarine's propulsion model is underway, and the submarine's reactor, 
Renap I is to operate fully within the next five years. 86 Despite these advances the first 
NAC submarine is not expected to enter service before the year 2005. 
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Verolme 
Founded in 1959 as a subsidiary to a Dutch shipbuilding company, Verolme 
Vergnide Scheepsve!en, the company was acquired in 1983 by a group of Brazilians and 
is now 100 per cent nationally and privately owned. As of 1989 Verolme had produced 
92 ships of various kinds. It is Brazil's leading shipbuilding firm as detailed in Table 
3.13, Verolme's Sectoral Position. Verolme's installations include three construction 
docks with a capacity of 30 thousand, 150 thousand, and 60 thousand DWT, one dry 
dock for the construction and repair of platforms and large quantity of cranes and heavy 
moving equipment. 
Firm 
Verolme 
Ishi 
Caneco 
Mauei 
Table 3.13: Verolme's Sectoral Position 
(in 1987 CZS Millions) 
Social Capital Net Equity Perm. Assets 
1,806.0 5.896.3 9,817.2 
841.8 3,998.0 6,160.2 
240.0 2,415.4 2.623.8 
532.8 4,322.7 5.420.2 
Source: Comisst1o de Valores Mobildrios 
Gross Revenue 
5.589.3 
4.435.3 
2,280.4 
2,097.8 
Verolme's former owner and president, Peter Landsberg, had begun to diversify 
the company's manufacturing activities to offset the effects of the 1980s' recession in the 
capital goods sector, and in the international shipbuilding market.'7 Verolme expanded 
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its lines of production in two important ways. The first diversification efforts 
concentrated on supplying Brazil's expanding petroleum sector. For example, Verolme 
is now a major producer of semi-submerged and self-raising oil rig platforms and other 
kinds of equipment for oil exploration and petroleum production. Indeed, according to 
Table 3.14, Verolme's Principal Clients, Petrobras now accounts for 28 per cent of 
Verolme's total production. Another line of civil diversification is the construction of 
dredges under license from a Dutch company, Industrieele Handels Coombinatie - IHC. 
In addition, Verolme is investing in the production of specialised vehicles to combat fire 
for use at airports and in industry. 
A second strategy was to take advantage of the Brazilian Navy's new policy of 
subcontracting surface ship work to local private shipbuilding companies. Because of 
Verolme's substantial industrial capacity and technical know-how, the company was 
contracted by the Navy in 1985 to build two frigates of the" Almirante Inhauma class" 
as part of the Navy's frigate programme. (The Navy's own shipyard, AMRJ, is 
constructing two also; a total production of 12 units is expected.) 
As a result of the frigate contract Verolme invested heavily in expanding its 
shipbuilding installations. One of the principal investments for the frigate programme 
was the installation of a covered platform with a capacity of 600 deadweight tons. 
Verolme also sought to improve its efficiency by investing in the areas of automation and 
data processing, and by installing a system of information integration with IBM 4341 
computers. These investments involved nearly $15 million. 88 The results of such 
investments have been partially realised already: Verolme in 1989 had already completed 
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Table 3.14 
Verolme's Principal Clients 
Domestic 
• Vale do Rio Doce Navega~ao S.A. - DOCENAVE 
• McDermott Shipyard 
• Petr61eo Brasileiro S.A. - PETROBRAS 
• Odebrecht Perfura~6es ltda. - OPl 
• Cia. de Navegaf;io Lloyd Brasileiro S.A. 
• Marinha do Brasil 
• Montreal Engenharia S.A. 
• Cia. de Navega~tlo Marrtima Netumar 
• Cia. de Navegac;io do Amazonas 
• H. Dantas Comt1rcio Navegac;io e Industrias ltda. 
• S.P. light 
• Cia. Brasileira de Dragagem - CBD 
Foreign 
• Canadian Steamship lines - CSl 
• Sea mar Shipping Corporation 
• Aramco Overseas Company 
• Salem/Nang Fung 
• Gokal 
• Medway Maritime inc. 
• Seamaster Shipping Inc. 
• Seacloul Maritime Inc. 
• Firefly Maritime Inc. 
• Harpoon Maritime Inc. 
• Mundial Maritime Inc. 
• Hadron Shipping Inc. 
• McDermott Shipyard 
Ship Repair 
• Frota Nacional de Petroleiros - FRONAPE 
• Petr61eo Brasileiro S.A. - PETROBRAs 
• Vale do Rio Doce Navegac;io - DOCENAVE 
• Odebrecht Perfurac;6es Ltda. 
• Montreal Engenharia S.A. 
• Brasil Offshore Ltda. 
• Transportes Fluviais e Marrtimos S.A. 
• Minerac;6es Brasileiras Reunidas S.A. 
1987 Breakdown of Verolme's Major Clients 
• Petrobrcis 27.7%. C.S.l. (Canada) 
• Docenave 
• Odebrecht 
• Seamar 
26.6% 
4.8% 
15.7% 
• Marinha 
• Reparos/Outros 
168 
10.5% 
8.8% 
5.9% 
construction of one of the two frigates-- approximately two years ahead of the Navy's 
own frigate construction programme at AMRJ. Verolme would like to bid on the future 
Navy contract for construction of its nuclear-powered submarines. However, such a 
contract would require at least a $12 million investment for Verolme, and it is still 
unclear whether the Navy will subcontract construction. 
Verolme's third strategy has been to export. In keeping with trends in the 
Brazilian shipbuilding sector as a whole, Verolme exported to the United States and to 
Australia during the 1981-83 period when the company exported eight ships and four 
platforms. Since that time Verolme has exported on average over 40% of its total 
production. The company also sees the potential for an export market for the frigates. 
These Brazilian 2,000 ton ships have more armour than other competing 3,000 ton 
frigates and are equipped with helicopter anti-submarine warfare capabilities, 
sophisticated anti-air and anti-ship missiles, and a 4.5m gun. Potential export for these 
frigates are various Third World nations, especially in East Asia and in Latin America. 
SECTION III: THE BUBBLE BURSTS 
At the end of 1988, a succession of adverse factors began to have their effect on 
the Brazilian defence industry, as evidenced in Table 3.15, The Financial Crisis in the 
Brazilian Defence Sector. As indicated in Figure 3.3, Exports for Embraer, Avibras and 
Engesa, faced with declining international markets for their aerospace and armoured 
products, the country's three leading firms -- Engesa, Embraer and Avibras -- initiated 
major downsizing and debt restructuring programs. At the peak of arms trade boom 
these three firms employed 24 thousand scientists, engineers, highly skilled technicians 
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Table 3.15: 1JIe FiIuuadIII Crisis in lhe IJnujJitut De/ell« Sector 
Liquid Operational Net Profit Before Tax Net Profit Per Share Total Debts 
Receipts 
Firm 86 87 88 86 87 88 86 87 88 86 87 88 
Embraer 114.71 159.86 174.51 4.18 2.19 76.07 6.9" 1.9" -64.2" 67.5" 77.0" 78.6 
Avibras 63.98 120.14 NA 6.78 926. 70.00 26.5" 2.1 " NA 81.8" 58.9" NA 
En,esa 38.71 35.44 22.49 -306. -14.61 -35.18 5.8" -173.0" -77.6" 94.3" 107.2" 138.1 
-~ HeUbras 2.57 3.43 NA 382. -7.21 NA 75.0" 110.2" NA 94.3" 149.6" NA 
D.F. Vasconcelos 3.95 2.83 2.94 459. -1.27 88. 15.0" -58.9" 2.4" 36.7" 47.3" 33.2" 
Bernardini 1.78 1.99 1.98 -76. -149. 91. 
-1.3" -2.0" 0.5" 18.4" 12.6" 22.2" 
Orbila - 56S 1.07 - 275 -3.80 
-
9.3" -213.6" - 62.9" 130.3" 
Source: Quem I Quem na Economia BrasUeira. da Editora Visl1o, 1989. 
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and management. Today a small fraction of that labour force remains -- some 8,000. 
In response to the financial crisis and the pressure from trade unions, the Brazilian 
government has relied primarily on the country's banking system to provide short-term 
liquidity for these cash-starved firms. In general, however, the Brazilian government has 
yet to devise a coherent industrial policy, struggling to secure only temporary, ad-hoc 
measures to alleviate the crisis. There is some evidence that two of these firms --
Embraer and A vibras -- will succeed in diversifying further into other commercial 
transport and telecommunications industries. 
Engesa 
Engenheiros Especializados S.A. was the first of Brazil's defence firms to show 
signs of financial fatigue. Operating at tremendous losses since 1986, Engesa filed for 
bankruptcy protection, "concordafa," on 21 March 1990. Since that time, Engesa's 
economic viability and future have been hamstrung; the subject of a complex political 
battle involving the country's legal system, important financial institutions (the Brazilian 
National Treasury and the National Development Bank), the Congress, labour unions, 
the Army Ministry, as well as foreign creditors. A brief review of Engesa's tortured 
concordata process reveals a broader, fundamental division in Brazilian politics over 
whether this and other defence-related companies should be treated as national "strategic" 
assets, thus meriting major government-assisted bailouts in the form of debt cancellation 
and capital injections. 
At the center of this controversy are the terms and conditions for the repayment 
of Engesa's estimated $450 million total debt. This figure includes the company's debts 
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of some $178 million owed to the National Treasury (back taxes), Bank of Brazil, Banco 
Real, and the National Economic Development Bank, as well as its residual debts -- $40 
million in back salaries to 410 former unionised employees and $2 million to JEC 
Marconi of Great Britain for reimbursement of costs incurred in the development of 
components for the Osorio main battle tank.89 Although the judge, presiding over the 
con cordata , has insisted in demanding the monetary correction of these debts (due to 
Brazil's rampant inflation), nevertheless, the total amount repaid to date adds up to only 
0.3% of the original total.90 
This outcome was achieved by the Brazilian Army and the government applying 
pressure on the larger financial creditors, particularly the Bank of Brazil and Banco Real, 
"convincing" them to issue letters to the judge with their agreement to renounce 
"voluntarily" or postpone the debts owed to them. 91 As a result, 42 % of Engesa's debts 
have been cancelled. The Congress has subsequently initiated an investigation into the 
concordata's proceedings, challenging the Army's rescue operation of Engesa and the use 
of public funds to revive the moribund firm in the name of the national interest.92 
In Apri11992 an agreement was reached between Engesa's owner, Jose Whitaker, 
and the Brazilian banks over the company's future. The official document, the Profoc% 
de Intenroes e Procedimentos, calls for Engesa's remaining assets and facilities to be 
handed over to Imbel, a small arms and ordnance manufacturer, partly owned by the 
Army Ministry. Imbel is to hold a 20% share of Engesa and to sell the remaining shares 
to other Brazilian firms not yet identified.93 The Minister of the Army, Carlos Tinoco, 
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justified the "statisation" of Engesa arguing that, "The country is not able to run the risk 
of having a traditional arms industry in the hands of foreigners. ,,94 
Indeed, Engesa's owner, Whitaker, had been actively engaged in negotiations with 
foreign firms, including British Aerospace, which wanted to use Engesa's production and 
design facilities to build a military version of the Land Rover jeep. According to one 
inside source at Engesa, the tentative agreement with BAe began to jeopardise the Army's 
interest in and influence over the future of Engesa.9S 
Embraer 
The economic collapse of Engesa is an extreme case highlighting the 
vulnerabilities that some private defence, export-oriented firms face during recessions in 
the global arms trade. The current situation for Empresa Brasileira Aeronautica 
(Embraer), Brazil's mixed state/privately-owned aircraft company, is far more complex, 
given the Air Force's long-standing interest in the company. 
In the case of Embraer, the company's precarious economic position stems from 
the impact of recessions and declining markets for both its military and commercial 
aerospace products. According to Embraer's financial director, Manoel de Oliveira, "the 
world recession has affected our principal client, the United States . .,96 The acute 
financial crisis for many U.S. airline carriers has stalled deliveries in 1992 of nearly 33 
Brasilia aircraft -- Embraer's leading export product, which has recently accounted for 
50% of the company's sales revenue. In conjunction with declining commercial export 
sales, Embraer has incurred a 35 % drop in procurement orders by the Brazilian Air 
Force for its AMX subsonic military fighter due to federal budgetary constraints. As 
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Table 3.16, Embraer's Financial Balance, 1991-92, indicates, there have been additional, 
longer-term financial problems affecting the company's continued viability. 
Table 3.16 
EMBRAER'S FINANCIAL BALANCE 1991-1992 
Short term debts: 
Mediumllong term debts: 
Estimated Income 1991: 
Estimated Losses 1991: 
Totalliabilityafter 1991: 
Estimated Total Assets: 
u.S. $250 million 
U.S. $650 million 
U.S. $500 million 
u.s. $200 million 
u.s. $1,100 million 
U.S. $1,000 million 
The first difficulty is the non-existence of financing for Embraer's export sales 
from either Brazilian or foreign banks.97 Second, Embraer lacks the necessary funding 
for the finalisation of its two commercial projects -- the Brazilian! Argentine CBA-123 
"Vector" (19 seat twin turboprop commuter aircraft), and the Brasilia's successor, the 
EMB-145, a 45-seat regional jet. In the case of the EMB-145, Embraer estimates that 
it will require some U.S. $300 million to manufacture and commercialise the aircraft.98 
Embraer is responding to this dire economic outlook with a five-pronged 
approach. First, company executives have downsized the labour force by 30%, 
announcing in May 1992 the dismissal of about 2,500 employees. This reduction is the 
second since 1990, when approximately 4,000 Embraer employees were cut from a total 
workforce of nearly 13,000.34 A second response has been to restructure Embraer's 
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short-term debts. The relending of U.S. $407 million by the Bank of Brazil at reduced 
interest rates and with a five-year amortisation grace period will save the company $50 
million annually. 100 
Embraer's third strategy is to secure exports for its existing aircraft products. In 
early 1993 the company had guaranteed contracts in its portfolio of nearly one billion 
dollars for the next five years. These contracts include: the sale of 80 EMB-312 Tucano 
trainer fighter aircraft to the French Air Force, worth $200 million; 241 firm orders for 
the Brasilia; and about 250 pre-orders for the EMB-145 regional jet. Looking to secure 
a five billion dollar contract to supply an estimated 765 Super Tucano trainers for the 
U.S. Navy and Air Force Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS), Embraer has 
established a strategic alliance with the Northrop Corporation of the United States. IOI 
A fourth approach to ensuring the aircraft company's longer term viability is to 
diversify into other commercial markets. A noteworthy example is Embraer's equipment 
division's recent successful bid to supply anti-lock braking systems (ABS) to various 
domestic and multinational transport manufacturers. EDE already produces 150-200 ABS 
per year for various Embraer aircraft, and has adopted the technology and converted its 
ABS production line to supply 5,000 units a year for heavy trucks and buses. The ABS 
supplied by EDE is so competitive that some foreign transport manufacturers, including 
General Motors and Scania, estimate a 20% savings in operational and maintenance costs 
for the lifetime of the vehicle. I02 
By far the most politically controversial and economically problematic solution 
to Embraer's future is the Brazilian government's desire to privatise fully the aerospace 
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company. Initiated in 1991 by the Collor Administration, the privatisation scheme calls 
for a reduction in the Brazilian Air Force's voting shares from its current 51 % to only 
20%, and for the sale of the remaining shares -- 30% to a group of Brazilian investors, 
10% to Embraer employees, and 40% to foreign investors, preferably an aerospace 
company. The latter group of investors would be allowed to manage and run the 
company. The selling price for Embraer is understandably low -- U.S. $200 million --
given the company's outstanding sizeable liabilities, and it is anticipated that the BNDES, 
which has been in charge of the country's privatisation program, will accept external debt 
bonds by interested foreign investors. The original date for the privatisation of Embraer, 
set for August 1992, was first postponed, and has been suspended by the new Brazilian 
President, ltamar Franco. Prospects for the future privatisation of the aircraft company 
remain extremely uncertain due to a number of legal and political obstacles discussed 
below. 
At present, Embraer is in the midst of a complex legal struggle to prevent the 
company from slipping into private ownership before formal privatisation occurs. This 
extraordinary situation has resulted from the floating of debentures in 1989 to draw 
additional capital into the company. According to corporate law, holders of these 
debentures are now entitled to convert them into preferred shares since Embraer has not 
issued dividends in over three years. 103 If the debentures are converted into preferred 
shares, the ratio of preferred to ordinary shares would reach 80%, exceeding the two-
thirds ratio established under Brazilian federal law . To restore the correct ratio between 
the ordinary and preferred shares, the excess should be transformed into ordinary shares 
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with voting rights. Such a transformation, however, would result in the private sector-
held ordinary shares exceeding the 49 % limit established by the company, and Embra.er 
would thus slip out of state control. (According to the law which created Embraer, the 
Brazilian government, via the Air Force, is to hold a majority -- 51 % -- of the ordinary 
shares with voting rights.) In the meantime, Embraer is negotiating with the holders of 
the debentures in the hopes of buying back the excess preferred shares, and thereby 
maintaining state control of the company before privatisation is reinitiated. 104 Since 
Embraer does not have the necessary Cr $252 billion with which to repurchase the 
shares, the Air Force has been pressuring the Brazilian government to inject the 
necessary capital. 
A final factor complicating the prospects for the privatisation of Embraer is the 
lack of a political consensus not only between the trade unions, which are opposed to 
privatisation, and the aircraft company itself, but within the Brazilian Congress and at 
the executive level as well. Among labour's most vocal and powerful opponents of 
Embraer's privatisation are Antonio Donizetti Ferreira, President of the Metallurgical 
Union, and Edmundo Carlos de Carvalho, President of the Federal Workers Union in the 
Areas of Science and Technology. Donizetti deplores the selling of Embraer for the 
price of a "banana", suggesting that the government should direct investment to the firm. 
Such funding "exemplifies ... the rest of the world where private aeronautical firms are, 
in the last instance, helped by federal governments. ,,105 Leading congressional opposition 
to the proposed partial sale of Embraer to foreign investors are Aldo Rebelo and Ernesto 
Gradella. They argue that: 
178 
In the first case, the firm is of strategic value ... and is the center of technological 
capability in the country; in the second case, there is the risk that Embraer will 
be transformed into a mere secondary industry that would furnish parts for the 
prime manufacturers [e.g. Boeing and Airbus].I06 
Such views have gained the support of Brazil's new, more nationalist-oriented President 
Franco, who has suspended privatisation plans pending further congressional and 
financial inquiries. 
Avibras 
The future of Avibras has been positively affected by an abnormal inventory of 
Astros' rockets available for delivery just before the Gulf War, and the decision by Saudi 
Arabian Army to place a large order of rockets for their system. With those deliveries 
in 1990, and additional ones for the following two years, Avibras has been able to pay 
off its concordata in part by trimming the work force to about 800 people. 
A vibras is making enormous efforts to generate new export sales of the Astros 
II System. Such exports are the only way the company will likely experience renewed 
growth and gain significant capital inflows. Since the international arms market is less 
receptive and much more competitive today, A vibras will have to rely on business from 
traditional clients and perhaps from some African countries (Angola and Mozambique). 
As for other, new military products, there is no clear market niche for any of them 
today. It is also likely that the company will expand its activities outside of Brazil, in 
order to find better R&D and production sites both for Avibras' existing products as well 
new ones. Already Portugal has been considered as a possible location for the 
manufacture of ultralight leisure airplanes. 
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Another factor affecting the company's improved chances of survival is its recent 
move to diversify into the civilian market. Avibras is providing a range of services and 
products to the commercial market, using facilities, equipment and technological 
expertise gained from its military experience. Such "conversion" activities include: 
technology transfer of electrophoretic painting (used for rocket motors) to General 
Motors and Ericsson; high precision machining and milling; soldering of different metals 
by explosion (cladeamento); quality control methods; humidity insulation resins; and 
special vehicles, such as "Locotractor" (a truck with regular rubber wheels and steel 
wheels used at railroad terminals to push railway cars), and tractors manufactured by 
Tectran. 
The company has invested R&D in these commercial areas, and expects to 
develop more civil products and services. The target is to reach a 50% turnover from 
this market. This task has already proven difficult, since some attempts to diversify 
commercially have failure largely because of the high cost structure of the company. In 
order to reduce the 1991 figure of 95% revenue dependence on military products, 
Avibras will have to initiate further major cost reduction measures. 
Conclusion 
In this Brazilian case study chapter, the author has shown that the development 
and international competitiveness of the country's arms industry derived largely from 
firm-level initiatives. The author substantiates her hypothesis for Brazilian military 
production, demonstrating that domestic market factors in the capital goods sector, rather 
than state-centric explanations, induced firms to diversify into defence production. This 
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hypothesis is verified by the author using a three-stage econometric model based on her 
survey data of Brazilian defence and capital goods firms. 
In section II, the author provided in-depth, firm-level case studies from Brazil's 
aircraft, armoured vehicle, missile, and naval industries. In each of the case studies, the 
author delineated the respective strategies these defence firms adopted to augment their 
technological capabilities and competitiveness in international markets. A number of 
common strategies emerge from the firm case studies. They include: the use of exports 
to stimulate the firm's product development and improvement; collaboration with foreign 
manufacturers through licensing, coproduction and training activities; and conscious 
efforts by defence firms to develop and retain linkages with the local capital goods 
industries. These strategies are discussed at greater length in Chapter 5. 
The author now turns to the case study on India to understand why the country's 
defence industries, in contrast to Brazil's, have not succeeded in attaining the 
technological and manufacturing capabilities necessary for international competitiveness. 
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Chapter IV 
INDIA: THE COSTS OF STRIVING FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
SECTION I: TIlE STRATEGIC RATIONALE 
India's development of a defence production programme over the past forty years 
has been motivated by strategic factors. Three complementary explanations are 
commonly advanced by defence analysts; namely: 1) the triangular arms race in South 
Asia, 2) superpower involvement in the region, and 3) India's own hegemonic 
aspirations. Let us examine each of these explanations in tum. 
The most widely held explanation in the international relations literature suggests 
that India's defence capabilities have been largely conditioned by the continued arms 
build-up by its two main neighbours, the Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan. Since 
the country's independence, India has fought four wars with its neighbours: three with 
Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971, and one with China in 1962. Indeed, as indicated in 
Table 4.1, South Asia's Military Balance, India's military expenditure (as measured in 
constant 1985 dollars) is among the largest of the region's nations. It doubled from 
$4.09 billion in 1980-81 to nearly eight billion dollars in 1991-92. 
The Indian government's experience of a U.S. arms embargo during the 1965 war 
also provided the Ministry of Defence with the basis for its policy of self-reliance in 
defence production. Such a strategic rationale can be found in the 1964-65 Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) annual report: 
Weapons and equipment best suited for our conditions are not available 
in anyone country; nor is it possible to ensure a steady supply of such 
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Table 4.1 
SOUfH ASIA'S MILITARY BALANCE 
Expenditure & Armed Forces 
Defence Expenditure 
(constant 1985 $millions) 
Percent GDP 
1985-86 1991-92 1985-86 1991-92 
China 10,615 12,025 3.6 3.2 
India 6,263 7,990 3.0 2.9 
Pakistan 2,076 3,014 6.9 7.0 
'Excludes reserve and paramilitary forces. 
Source: The Military Balance. 1992-93. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992 
Anned Forces 
(thousands)! 
1991-92 
3,030. 
1,265. 
580. 
-0\ 
-
weapons and equipment from the respective countries of origin in the case 
of our being involved in hostilities. Therefore, it becomes a basic 
necessity to establish manufacturing capabilities. I 
More recent, regional developments -- the cementing of military cooperation between 
China and Pakistan, and an increasingly pro-active PRC in terms of that country's 
military modernisation programme and high visibility arms exports (e.g. CSS-ll and East 
Wind missiles to Saudi Arabia) -- have magnified India's threat perceptions, and are 
specifically linked to India's development of an intermediate-range, ballistic missile 
programme. 
A second interpretation for India's expanded defence, especially its naval 
capability, relates to the presence and subsequent introduction of sophisticated arms to 
the region by the two superpowers during the 1980s: the United States in the Persian 
Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, as well as following the more recent Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This primarily "defensive" 
rationale is one that the Indian government and defence community emphasize: 
India's arms acquisitions have been to balance the Chinese and pakistani 
arms build-up [and to maintain] an equilibrium with its neighbours who 
possess more sophisticated weaponry ... India's arms acquisitions have 
been made not with a view to become a military power but sufficiently 
well equipped to protect its political and economic interests and its long 
borders and coastline. 2 
Thus, as a consequence of Pakistan's receipt of $1.6 billion in U.S. military assistance 
(1982-87), including the acquisition of F-16 fighter aircraft and Harpoon anti-ship 
missiles, Indian officials argue that they had no choice other than to accept a Soviet offer 
of an estimated $1.74 billion arms transfer package (1988-93).3 This agreement included 
192 
the Indian licensed production of the Soviet T -72 tank, MiG-23 interceptors and the MiG-
29 Fulcrum. Throughout this period Pakistan ranked fourth (after Israel, Egypt and 
Turkey) among the beneficiaries of U.S. foreign military sales credits, while India 
became the second largest recipient of Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World.4 
The debate over which South Asian state initiated the arms re-action race blurs, 
however; a more uncomfortable third proposition. India's neighbours, including 
Australia, have suggested that the country's defence production programme and arms 
imports are providing the military basis for India's hegemonic aspirations in the 
subcontinent. S The recent reorientation of the Indian Navy has been cited as evidence 
of India's regional ambitions in the Indian Ocean. According to one analyst: 
The original sea control/shore defence orientation which largely 
emphasised preserving the integrity of India's coastal waters against a 
Pakistani threat, has steadily given way to an assertive naval 
orientation ... [The new strategic posture includes] ... the defence of sea 
lanes and the preservation of zones of influence, where the emphasis has 
shifted from a specifically shoreline defence to a portmanteau conception 
labelled "defence of the nation's maritime interests".6 
Such a conception has been interpreted by naval analysts to include the defence of India's 
coastline and seaborne trade, as well as its broader economic and foreign policy interests 
in the Indian Ocean. 
To meet these new naval requirements, India has relied principally on weapons 
purchased from the Soviet Union and Western Europe. The acquisition of the British 
aircraft carrier, Viraat, formerly the HMS Hermes, has been complemented by an 
inventory of naval aircraft -- Sea Harriers, Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 
Domier 228 light patrol aircraft, as well as a number of anti-submarine warfare 
193 
helicopters, including Sea Kings, KA-27s125s. Reportedly, India is also seeking 
collaboration with European shipbuilding companies to build a third aircraft carrier. In 
addition, India's naval fleet has been greatly expanded by recent deliveries of Soviet 
Kashin II destroyers, Foxtrot, Kilos and one Charlie I nuclear-powered submarine. (A 
new 704-acre submarine dockyard has been built with Soviet assistance at 
Vishakaputnam, headquarters of the Indian submarine fleet.f 
Various defence analysts point to the impact of India's enhanced naval and air 
capabilities on two of the Indian Ocean's six island states: the Maldives and Sri Lanka. 
In November 1988 Indian forces surgically suppressed a coup against the Maldivian 
government of President Gayoom, and India has continued to intervene in the Sri Lankan 
government's attempt to suppress the Tamil separatist guerilla war. Further away in the 
Bay of Bengal, Indonesia has begun construction of a large naval base on Sumatra 
reportedly in response to the Jakartan government's concern over India's future politiCO-
military intentions. 
Given these broad strategic objectives and willingness to commit a substantial 
proportion of the country's economic resources to their obtainment, the Indian 
government has established the largest state-owned military-industrial-research sector 
(MIRS) in the Third World. In the next section the author discusses the organisation and 
extent of India's defence production capabilities. 
The Indian Military Industrial Research Sector 
Indigenous defence production in India dates from 1801 when the East India 
Company established the Gun Carriage Agency near Calcutta. At the time of India's 
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independence from Britain in 1947, the country's defence sector consisted of 15 ordnance 
factories and one clothing factory. It was not until some fifteen years later, however, 
that the Indian government began to invest heavily in the development of a defence-
industrial capability. The reason for this massive expansion is aptly summarised in a 
later report of the Ministry of Defence: 
The main thrust of the Defence production effort is towards the twin 
objectives of modernisation of arms and equipment and achievement of 
progressive self-reliance and self-sufficiency •.. the conflicts of 1965 and 
1971 highlighted the need for defence preparedness, self-sufficiency and 
growing self-reliance in the field of defence equipment. 8 
Evidence of this commitment may be found in Table 4.2, Volume of Anns 
Production in India. Indian central government expenditure for defence production rose 
sharply following the Indo-Pakistani 1971 war. At present India's defence sector consists 
of eight state-owned defence industries or defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs), 
thirty-three ordnance factories, and thirty-four research-development laboratories and 
establishments. 
Before proceeding with an overview of this MIRS, a brief discussion outlining the 
political organisation of this structure is useful. Such a discussion will serve as a 
backdrop to the thesis's central argument that India's relatively unsuccessful experience 
in indigenous defence production (in comparison to Brazil's) has been hindered by 
government policies that tend to dampen firm-level incentives. 
The political economy foundation for the Indian government's socialist emphasis 
on self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and on the state's role in the industrialisation 
process, is articulated in the 1948 and 1956 Industrial Policy Resolutions. For example, 
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Table 4.2 
Volume of Arms Production in India 
Year 
1963 -64 
1967- 68 
1970-71 
1973 -74 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979 - 80 
1980- 81 
1981 - 82 
1982 - 83 
1983 - 84 
1984-85 
1985 - 86 
1988 - 89 
(Values in U.S. current dollars) * 
Ordnance 
Factories 
212.8 
121.1 
164.0 
235.1 
624.7 
672.8 
738.9 
853.7 
908.8 
918.6 
1,006.9 
1,025.5 
1,071.1 
Public Sector 
Undertakings 
62.8 
119.5 
214.7 
310.6 
487.3 
524.2 
618.3 
617.4 
953.5 
1,209.4 
1,404.8 
1,483.8 
1,444.9 
1,370.7 
Total 
275.6 
240.6 
378.7 
545.7 
1,112.0 
1,197.0 
1,357.2 
1,471.1 
1,862.3 
2,128.0 
2,411.7 
2,509.3 
2,516.0 
*Included in these figures is the civilian part of production, which amounts on average 
to 30 per cent of total production. 
Source: Government of India. Ministry of Defence, Annual Repon, various issues. 
Rupee conversion rates are from International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistical Yearbook, 1989. 
196 
the industrial policies enunciated by the newly formed Nehru government in 1948 
"envisage a mixed economy with an overall responsibility of the government for planned 
development of industries and their regulation in the national interest. ,,9 As a result of 
these policies, India's economy was divided into three discrete categories: 1) Schedule 
A industries", which were the exclusive preserve of the state. Located in this public 
sector were and continue to be the arms, ammunition and other defence-related 
equipment factories, atomic energy, mining, iron and steel, heavy equipment industries, 
and the industries related to communications, railway, aircraft, and shipbuilding; 2) The 
joint sector or "Schedule B industries", which included minerals, machine tools, road and 
sea transport, and many intermediate products; 3) Lastly, private firms, which as 
originally conceived were expected to supplement the state-owned sectors. As a 
consequence of this industrial structure, the Indian arms industry does not subscribe to 
the archetypical British and U.S. model, in which the defence sector is dominated by 
private firms competing for contracts provided by the defence services, with the 
substantial overview and funding approval by various parliamentary/congressional 
committees. 
With respect to the organisation of defence in India, due to constitutional and 
legislative limitations, the three services, Army, Air Force and Navy operate 
independently and outside the Ministry of Defence. More specifically, the Ministry of 
Defence has no direct financial control over the three services and thus serves only as 
a coordinating agency. Parliamentary involvement in the defence policy and budget 
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process is relatively weak since there is no formal defence committee in the Lok Sabha 
(the lower house of parliament). As a result of these weak institutional linkages, critics 
argue that defence policymaking is highly centralised at the prime minister level and is 
characterised by secrecy and extraordinarily poor coordination, particularly in relation 
to the weapons procurement process. These issues are taken up later in the chapter. 
The Ministry of Defence itself is divided into three departments: Defence, 
Defence Production and Supplies (DDPS), and Defence Research and Development. The 
OOPS was created in 1962 to expand the defence production base and to coordinate with 
and meet the equipment requirements of the armed forces. Under the administration of 
the DOPS are eight public sector undertakings and thirty-six ordnance factories. The 
ordnance factories produce a wide variety of basic items such as small arms and 
ammunition, explosives, clothing, and bridging equipment for the country's defence 
services, primarily the army, with a small proportion of production allocated to the 
paramilitary forces and the civil police. The ordnance factories produce more than 40 
per cent of all the goods and services in the military industrial research sector, and 
employ approximately 60 per cent of all workers. 
The majority of the defence public sector undertakings were established by the 
Indian government to meet the defence requirements for major sophisticated weapons 
systems in aircraft, armour, electronics, and special alloy fields -- areas which excluded 
private sector participation (e.g., Schedule A industries). A few defence sector units, 
particularly in the shipbuilding sector, were originally located in the private sector, and 
were subsequently acquired by the Ministry of Defence. 
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The eight defence public sector units are: 
1) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL); 
2) Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL); 
3) Bharat Earthmovers Ltd. (BEML); 
4) Magazon Dock Ltd. (MDL); 
5) Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. (GRSE); 
6) Goa Shipyard (GSL); 
7) Bharat Dynamics Ltd. (BDL); 
8) Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. (MIDHANI). 
Prior to 1986 there were nine dpsus. The ninth, Praga Machine Tools Ltd., was 
transferred that year to the Ministry of Industry. 
The oldest, largest and most prominent state firm is Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., 
whose main aerospace production factories are located in Bangalore and Nasik, though 
a further ten facilities are spread throughout six Indian states. 10 It was established in 
1940 by Messerswa1chand Hirachand and the government of Mysore as a private 
company and was acquired two years later by the Government of India for the overhaul 
and repair of the large allied fleet operating in India and the South East Asia command. 
HAL is responsible for the manufacture and overhaul of aircraft and helicopters as well 
as the related engines and accessories. More recently, HAL has begun to provide 
supplies of machined parts and assemblies for civil passenger aircraft manufactured 
abroad. These include parts for Airbus A-320 under-carriage doors for Aerospatiale. 
Bharat Electronics Ltd., was created in 1954 and is now India's second largest 
defence firm. It has production facilities in Bangalore, Ghaziabad and Pune. Seventy 
per cent of BEL's production (radio, radar and electronics equipment) is for the armed 
forces; the remaining 30 per cent is destined for the civil market (TV broadcasting 
equipment and satellite receiver terminals). The third state-owned defence company is 
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Bharat Earthmovers Ltd., which was created in 1964 with the transfer of the Rail Coach 
Factory from HAL. Its main products include railway coaches and earth moving 
equipment, including tractors, dumpers and bulldozers, for primary use in the civilian 
sector and in India's power and steel plants as well as mines. BEML is the largest 
exporter of the eight state-owned defence companies. 
India's naval sector consists of three shipyards: Magazon Docks, Goa Shipyards 
and Garden Reach Shipyards. Established in 1774 and acquired by the Ministry of 
Defence in 1960, Magazon Docks Ltd., is India's preeminent shipyard, which is capable 
of building warships such as frigates and submarines, in addition to cargo and passenger 
ships. In 1966 MDL began producing under U.K. license six Leander frigates. From 
1978-88 MDL produced a series of indigenously designed Godavari frigates. The latter 
3,000 ton frigate is the only ship of its kind in the world that can carry two helicopters 
and support an anti-submarine warfare role. At present MDL is building two diesel-
powered submarines under license from West Germany's Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft 
Ag (HDW). Approximately sixty per cent of the yard's production is in the civil sector, 
with specialisation on ship repair and construction of off-shore oil platforms, floating 
docks and cranes. 
Goa Shipyard Ltd was started as a Portuguese company in 1957 for the purpose 
of providing repair facilities for barges. It was acquired in 1964 and became a subsidiary 
of Magazon Docks in 1967. It specialises in ship repair and engineering work. 
Located in eastern India in Calcutta, Garden Reach Shipyards has been engaged 
in ship repair and engineering activities since 1884. It was acquired by the Government 
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of India in 1960, and despite severe financial losses, GRSE continues to manufacture air 
compressors, turbine pumps, diesel engines, and generators. Garden Reach Shipyards 
has manufactured fast patrol craft and inshore patrol vessels for the Coast Guard. Two-
thirds of its production is for the civil sector. 
Two relatively smaller defence firms were created recently for the production of 
missiles and specialised high grade, super alloys. Incorporated in 1970 at Hyderabad, 
Bharat Dynamics Ltd., has produced under license from West European companies the 
Euromissile and Aerospatiale's SS-11-81. In recognition of India's growing dependency 
on imported specialised steels and super alloys for the nuclear, aerospace and armour 
industries, Mishra Dhatu Nigam was established in 1973. It has received foreign 
assistance from France (Creusot Loire and Perchiney-Ugine Kuhlman), and from West 
Germany (Krupp) in the area of process technology. 11 Beginning in 1987-88, Midhani 
began production of nine different types of Soviet grade alloys used in the licensed 
manufacture of some Soviet MiG engines. 
These defence production units are responsible for the design, development and 
production of all major weapons categories: advanced jet fighters as well as various 
trainer aircraft and helicopters, main battle tanks, frigates, diesel-powered submarines, 
missiles, and electronic and communications equipment. Table 4.3, India's State-Owned 
Defence Industries, provides a breakdown of production, profitability, exports, and 
employment by the defence public sector units. The defence production units (combined 
dpsus and ordnance) are the second largest industrial sector in India, and comprise the 
largest proportion of India's state-owned capital goods industries. They are estimated 
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Table 4.3 
INDIA'S STATE-OWNED DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 
(1988-1989) 
Public Sector Defence Production Profits Expons Employment 
Firms (before tax) 
Hindustan Aeronautics 457.3 26.3 00.76 43,833 
Bharat Electronics 274.6 19.8 00.67 19,266 
~ Bharat Earth Movers 360.9 33.5 28.90 16,151 
tv 
Magazon Docks 167.7 -23.2 14,355 
Goa Shipyards 11.9 -.72 00.03 2,091 
Garden Reach Shipyards 53.0 -.64 10,427 
Bharat Dynamics 26.8 2.8 1,798 
Midhani 18.5 .22 1,507 
Note: Data, except employment, is measured in current U.S. millions. 
to consume approximately 20 per cent of the country's machine tool production, and 30 
per cent of all steel and related alloy output. Employment in the defence sector amounts 
to five per cent of total private and public sector employment. 
Created in 1965 and merged in 1985 with the Department of Defence Production, 
the Department of Defence Supplies' (DDS) purpose is to "mobilise indigenous capacities 
within the Civil sector for meeting defence requirements, especially those items which 
were being imported. 1112 While this latter Department has been the locus for private 
sector participation in defence production, in general such participation has been limited 
to the DDS' procurement of spares and components of a "non-sensitive nature". More 
recently, however, the DDS has been given the task of developing stronger links with 
Indian private industry -- a development that is discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
Defence Research and Development 
Subsequent to the establishment of the Department of Defence Production, the 
Ministry of Defence began to invest in a defence research and development base, 
recognizing that the high obsolescence rate of most weapons necessitated the development 
and introduction of new technologies and scientific innovations. As a former defence 
minister, Mr. R. Venkaturaman indicated, "Defence has become increasingly a part of 
technological regeneration .... In that context the aim of self-reliance becomes more and 
1 t ,,\3 more re evan . 
To secure greater self-sufficiency in defence production, and to spur 
indigenisation of imported foreign components and technologies, the Defence Research 
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and Development Organisation (DRDO) was established as the MOD's third arm in 
1958. In large part the creation of the DRDO dovetailed with the Indian government's 
interest (as articulated in the 1958 Scientific Industrial Policy Resolution) in establishing 
a state-sponsored infrastructure for research and development activities as well as for the 
purpose of training "scientific and technical personnel in the fields of science and 
education, agriculture, industry and defence. 1114 
As a result of such prioritization, the DRDO was formed by the amalgamation of 
the Defence Science Organisation and the Technical Development Establishment. 
Functioning as a central coordinating agency for the execution of defence-related 
research, the DRDO at present operates 42 major laboratories and employs approximately 
25,000 people, of whom 6,000 are scientists and highly trained engineers. IS As indicated 
in Figure 4.1, Percentage Distribution of Production of DRDO, the activities of the 
DRDO entail basic as well as applied research, design and development in the defence-
related fields of aeronautics, combat vehicles, naval technology, missiles and rockets, and 
metallurgy. Among the main DRDO laboratories engaged in such research activities are 
the Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) at Avadi, the 
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), the Aeronautical Development 
Establishment (ADE) in Banagalore, and the Naval Physical Oceanography Laboratory 
at Cochin (NPOL).16 
Despite the central importance of the DRDO's activities to these indigenous 
defence production efforts, expenditure on defence R&D, though enormous in 
comparison to the expenditure of other science-related government agencies, is relatively 
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insignificant in terms of its percentage of the total military budget. For example, as 
indicated in Table 4.4, R&D Expenditures by Major Government Scientific Agencies, 
while the DRDO has received the largest proportion (20 per cent) of central government 
funding for R&D, its allocation within the Indian defence budget has remained 
relatively constant at approximately two per cent. However, in the mid-1980s it jumped 
to just over four per cent. This increase was necessary to support the simultaneous 
design and development during the 1980s-1990s of India's ambitious defence production 
programmes: the Arjun main battle tank, the Light Combat Aircraft and Advanced Light 
Helicopter, the Gas Turbine Engine Project, and the Integrated Guided Missile 
Development Programme. Additional military research in relation to the above 
programmes is also being conducted within each of the defence public sector units. 
One means of evaluating Indian government investment in defence production and 
in research and development is provided by the MoD's Service/Department Defence 
Budget Allocation (Figure 4.2). As illustrated by this bar chart, the Army is the largest 
recipient of government defence expenditure, followed by the remaining two services 
(Navy and Air Force), and then by the defence production units and defence R&D. 
During the 1980s the service/department budget breakdown respectively was: 50 per 
cent (Army), 14 per cent (Navy), 22 per cent (Air Force), 10 per cent (Defence 
Production), and 4 per cent (Defence R&D). Declining government outlays for 
indigenous defence production during this period reflect the massive increase in foreign 
arms purchases by the three services, including, for example, the sizeable hard currency 
206 
Table 4.4 
R&D Expenditure by Major Scientific Agencies Under the Indian Government 
Agency 
1. Department of Atomic Energy 
2. Counci l of Scientific and 
Industrial Research 
3. Defence Research and 
Development Organisation 
4. Indian Council of Agriculture 
Research 
5. Indian Council of Medical 
Research 
6. Department of Science and 
Technology 
7. Department of Space 
8. Department of Electronics 
TOTAL 
(Values in current U.S. dollars) 
R&D Expenditure 
::::::::::::::::-;-;.;.:::;:::-:. 
1978-79 
74.3 
68.3 
81.5 
68.4 
6.5 
29.7 
55 .6 
6.2 
390.5 
1980 - 81 
97.0 
92.6 
101.4 
83.9 
10.7 
45 .0 
67.0 
5.5 
503.1 
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expenditures on Mirage-2000 and Jaguar aircraft for the Air Force, in addition to HDW 
submarines, Sea King helicopters, and the Viraat aircraft carrier for the Navy. 
A more comprehensive breakdown is provided by the Defence Service Estimates. 
Lakshmir, in his major study of trends in India's defence expenditures, reports that 
during the 1980s, budget allocation broke down as follows: pay and allowances 
accounted for 31 per cent, stores 32 per cent, ordnance factories nearly 14 per cent, and 
R&D only 2.1 per cent. 17 On this basis, Lakshmir reports that expenditure on stores 
increased by more than three times in constant prices from 1962-63 to 1984-85. He 
attributes this increase to the Indian government's belated recognition of the needs to 
acquire modern weapons (reflected by increasing expenditures on stores), to gear up the 
domestic production of weapons (by increasing ordnance factory expenditures), and to 
modify existing weapons technology (by augmenting allocations towards research and 
development). " ... Of this," Lakshmir writes, "the first one, namely acquisition of 
. . rta t "18 weapons IS very lmpo n. 
SECTION II: INDIA'S DEFENCE PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES 
Successive Indian governments have expended considerable effort towards 
achieving a high degree of self-sufficiency in the indigenous production of advanced 
weapons systems and the development of defence-related technologies. Perversely, this 
obsessiveness on self-reliance and technological autarky has necessitated extensive 
reliance on licensed production as well as arms imports principally from the former 
Soviet Union and West European sources. 
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The relative failure of India's defence industry stems from many factors. First, 
unlike Brazil, India failed to adopt an intermediate strategy for armament research, 
development and production. Second, although the breadth of India's defence R&D 
establishment -- the DRDO and its associated laboratories -- is impressive, many of its 
programmes have been overly ambitious and out-of-step with the manufacturing 
capabilities of the defence production units. Third, when projects are handed over to the 
defence units for development, they take an inordinate time at both the conceptual-design 
and prototype-production stages. The result is that by the time a weapon system sees 
fruition, the equipment is so obsolete that India's armed forces do not want it. Delays 
in production and a subsequent aversion to indigenously produced equipment have led 
to the sevices' preference for imports of foreign weapons systems. 
This cycle of failed production in defence is discussed below, drawing on the 
specific firm-level experiences in the armour and aircraft sectors. Much of the case 
study material that is provided in this section is derived from archival research in the Lok 
Sabha library and supplemented by interviews conducted with various defence ministry 
officials, as well as with industry engineers and scientists in India's defence and capital 
goods sectors. 
Indigenous Defence Production 
Successful indigenous production in India's aerospace and armour industries has 
often been severely hampered by the delays encountered in moving from the 
design/prototype to full production stages. As the cases of the Vijayanta and Arjun main 
battle tank as well as the Advanced Light Helicopter and Light Combat Aircraft 
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programmes illustrate, delays in indigenous production have become endemic, leading 
invariably to the induction of critical foreign sub-assemblies and components in the 
prototype phase, and eventually to off-the-shelf purchases of foreign equipment. 
Armour 
Though India's Combat Vehicles Research Development Establishment (CVRDE) 
successfully manufactured the Vijayanta tank under U.K. license (a modified Vickers 
Chieftain tank), its production took ten years, and the Indian army had to import Soviet 
T-55 MBTs because of the resulting perceived strategic vulnerability. At present, the 
Nasik ordnance factory is in the process of modernising the Soviet T-55s. These tanks 
are being upgunned with the indigenously produced Royal Ordnance 105 mm gun, and 
with an advanced Tank Fire Control System, which Bharat Electronics initially developed 
for the Vijayanta. 
Ironically, the indigenous design and production of the Arjun MBT has been 
similarly delayed. Initiated in 1980 by the Defence Research and Design Organisation's 
CVRDE, the MBT -80 Arjun is still in the development phase because of problems related 
to its power plant. The power plant is still undergoing tests at the Gas Turbine Research 
Establishment. Owing to this problem, the Arjun prototypes have been fitted in the 
meantime with imported German 1,200 hp MTU engines coupled with ZF transmissions. 
Persistent and serious delays in this programme led to the MoD's decision to seek a 
license-production agreement with the former Soviet Union for the manufacture of the 
Soviet T -72 tank as an interim measure. 
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In addition, indigenous defence production in this sector has been severely 
affected by the weak defence organisation structure: namely, the tremendous lack of 
communication and coordination between the Army and the Ministry of Defence, the 
defence production units and the R&D labs over the services' procurement 
requirements. One important example is the development by Bharat Earth Movers of a 
heavy duty truck for the Army. When the Army issued in 1978-79 a General Staff 
Quality Requirement (GSQR) for 95 heavy vehicles, BEML began development and 
production of the vehicles in 1980-81 without having any specific consultations with the 
Army. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence did not direct the Army to provide 
its exact performance requirements and specifications for these vehicles. In the 
meantime, the Army was permitted and proceeded in 1983 to import 45 vehicles. 
Although the prototype of the BEML vehicle was transferred to the Army for 
their evaluation and trials in 1984, by 1988 the Army had yet to finish its evaluation of 
the vehicle. BEML was not surprisingly concerned that such a delay would result in the 
technological obsolescence of its vehicle (because of a later need for a more fuel efficient 
engine), and losses to the company because of the anticipated low volume (due to the 
Army's previous imports).19 
One can well argue that this extensive lack of communication between the MOD, 
the user (Army), and defence industry (BEML) is in fact institutionalised within the MoD 
procurement structure. Justifying its lack of effective coordination in the BEML heavy 
vehicle fiasco, the MoD explained: 
The practice in the Defence Ministry is that whenever the users are 
thinking of a new equipment. .. they interact with Defence R and D and in 
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Aerospace 
some cases, with potential manufacturers also .... About the responsibility 
for design and development. There is a separate mechanism as to who 
will be entrusted with the job. It may be Defence R&D [the DRDO]; 
it may be Defence public sector undertaking; it may be any other 
laboratory in the country which may be entrusted with that job .... 20 (italics 
added for emphasis.) 
Hindustan Aeronautics' first aerospace project was the development of the HF-24 
Marut fighter during the later 1950-60s. HAL was able to design and eventually 
fabricate the airframe but had not considered the inclusion of a suitable aeroengine. By 
the time an imported engine (an Orpheus 703) was modified and fitted, the plane was 
technologically obsolete. Since the plane could not attain the supersonic Mach-2 speed 
required by the Air Force only 145 of an initial target of 214 aircraft were manufactured. 
When members of the Committee on Public Undertakings reviewed the HF-24 project 
in 1970, they concluded: 
the complexities of producing a sophisticated aircraft like the HF-24 had 
not been properly visualized either by the German engineers or HAL. 
The Committee are unable to understand as to what were the factors that 
contributed to the formulation of such unrealistic targets. The lack of 
experience in production planning must have been all too apparent to the 
management when they formulated such optimistic estimates 
initially .... Perhaps the only alternative open to HAL would be to enter 
into collaborative agreements with other countries to manufacture tried 
and proven designs. 21 
Continued disruptions and the lack of engineering and quality control expertise resulted 
in the cancellation of the Marut's successor and trainer version, the HF-25, Ajeet. A 
retired HAL engineer provided a similarly gloomy account: 
The Marut project best exemplifies what is wrong with our aircraft 
industry. Rather than waiting to establish a strong foundation for the 
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country's aircraft industry, HAL pushed ahead and tried to develop a 
modem combat aircraft comparable to any in the West. Yet in the 1950s 
and 1960s we simply did not have the necessary design experience, nor 
the infrastructure in terms of a diversified supplier base in metals and 
electronics and aeroengines to even begin the project.22 
Unfortunately the leaming-by-doing experience that HAL accumulated as a result 
of the Marutl Ajeet failures were not internalized. Similar divergences between design 
and production are being encountered, thus hindering progress on the two current, major 
aircraft production projects: the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and the Light 
Combat Aircraft (LCA). 
AdYanced Lii:ht Helicopter 
India's first indigenous helicopter programme was mooted initially in 1969 upon 
the recommendation of the C. Subramaniam Committee on Aeronautics. The Advanced 
Light Helicopter was planned as a high-tech replacement for the licensed-produced 
Cheetah and Chetak helicopters in service with the Indian Air Force (IAF) , with different 
versions for the Navy, Army and civilian use. The ALH was expected to be unique 
because of its three special features: heat resistance, light weight and crashworthiness. 
Twenty-two years later, however, HAL has yet to begin production of the ALH. 
Moreover, its intended customers, particularly the Indian Army and Navy, are unlikely 
to make any sizeable purchases because they have already imported Soviet and West 
European helicopters. When it is delivered to the services in the late 199Os, the ALH 
will be neither advanced nor light. Table 4.5, The Advanced Light Helicopter 
Programme, below charts the design and production problems that HAL has incurred in 
its development of the ALH.23 
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Table 4.5: Overview of the Advanced Light Helicopter Programme 
A high-level committee headed by former Defence Minister C. 
Subramanim recommends that India should develop an Advanced Light 
Helicopter. 
India enters into a ten-year agreement with Aerospatiale of France for the 
design of a single-engined ALH. The first prototype is scheduled to fly 
in 1982. One of the important factors in entering into an agreement with 
the French aerospace company was that in 1962 HAL had begun licensed 
production of Aerospatiale's Alouette III helicopters. 
The Indian Air Force changes its Air Staff Requirement to a twin-engined 
configuration and recommends that the ALH project be suitably modified, 
despite the fact that HAL had nearly completed a single-engine design. 
The IAF proposal is sanctioned by the MoD and HAL searches for 
another foreign collaborator. The cost of development of the project has 
escalated from Rs. 23.04 crore in 1972 to Rs 37.50 crore in 1979. 
The agreement with Aerospatiale is terminated and the Indian government 
is forced to pay cancellation fees of approximately four million U.S. 
dollars. The single-engine helicopter design, which was ready, goes to 
waste. In the intervening period of uncertainty a large number of 
engineers leave HAL in disgust. 
A seven-year collaboration agreement worth 89.7 million DM for the 
ALH project is signed with MBB of West Germany. Decision delays 
arise because of serious di fferences among HAL designers over the choice 
of collaborator. Work on the ALH project starts all over again from 
scratch. 
Disputes break out between HAL and MBB designers over the technical 
specifications of the aircraft. Because of the heavier weight of the MBB 
design, important indigenous avionics equipment (altimeters and sonars) 
developed by Bharat Electronics are replaced with lighter, imported 
equipment. Additionally, HAL's design for the retractable landing gear 
is replaced by MBB with skids, which save 160 kg, but lower the 
survivability of the aircraft from 95 per cent to well below 50 per cent.24 
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The Advanced Light Helicopter case study raises two important issues -- one old 
and one new -- relating to India's troubled defence production record. The first problem 
is the poor liaison between the Ministry of Defence, Air Force Headquarters and 
Hindustan Aeronautics in the ALH project. As witnessed in the previous examples of 
the Arjun MBT programme and BEML's development of a heavy truck for the Army, 
this problem appears to be endemic in the Indian arms industry, and has led to critical 
outside reviews. For instance, a former HAL insider, writing in the Deccan Herald, a 
Bangalore-based newspaper, wrote a scathing commentary on the mid-stream switching 
of the ALH design from a one- to a two-engine design: 
Here the pertinent point arises. In spite of so many Air Force officers 
holding key positions in the HAL and so much made of the ... liaison with 
the IAF, how is it possible that an activity on which lakhs and crores are 
spent gets rendered useless?25 
This issue was subsequently raised in the Lok Sabha by the Public Accounts 
Committee's investigation of the ALH project. When asked whether there had existed 
any continuous interaction between the HAL and the Indian Air Force, a representative 
of the Air Headquarters stated: 
Whenever the HAL feels that they have something new, they write to us 
about that. In fact, the twin engine concept was started by HAL. That 
kind of dialogue is always there. When we have looked for a new 
system, we have a direct liaison with the Defence R&D and through 
them, such a liaison exists with HAL. When HAL meetings take place, 
the minutes get transmitted to us. But at the conceptual stage we do not 
have any direct dialogue with HAL. 26 
(Italics added for emphasis.) 
What was further troubling to the Committee was the issue of why the Air Force opted 
for a single engine helicopter in 1970, a decision they were later obliged to reverse, 
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when twin-engined helicopters were deployed in the early 1960s. The committee was 
left with the impression that "the Ministry and the Air Headquarters have not been 
keeping themselves abreast concurrently of the latest technology in other countries. ,,27 
A second issue raised by the above case study pertains to the difficulties many 
defence industrialising countries experience in establishing design capabilities and in 
investing in the requisite human capital. As pointed out in the previous chapter, an 
important ingredient to the success of defence producing firms in Brazil was the heavy 
investments in research and development as well as in the education and training of 
personnel by those firms. Though Indian defence production units have made some 
investment in human capital, such investments have not translated into successful 
production. HAL's chairman explains the problem: 
India, in fact, did not have any helicopter design and development 
capability. The conscious design to set up such capability means 
educating people, training them, finding them from abroad also and 
getting a team of very highly skilled and competent engineers together. 
In this period of 5-6 years, we did grow from zero to a strength of about 
68 trained competent engineers who were ready for a take off.. .. But again 
because of the lack of continuing projects, the design group has languished 
[because of the exit of HAL engineers]. It languishes if a project which 
we start upon, does not get realised. To that extent there is discontinuity 
in the aircraft design .... What we are suffering from in the design field is 
that we could do with more projects of increasing complexity .• . so that 
what we learn from one is utilised in the more complex one and 
succeeding ... ones. 28 
(Italics added for emphasis.) 
Light Combat Aircraft 
In an important and recent departure from its role as an assembler of foreign-
manufactured aircraft (following the fold-up of the Marut HF-24 project) HAL, in 
collaboration with the DRDO, the Council for Industrial and Scientific Research and 
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several universities, embarked in 1980 on an ambitious indigenous programme to design, 
develop and produce a light combat aircraft (LeA) for the Indian Air Force requirements 
of the 1990s. The LeA is primarily an air superiority fighter with a secondary close 
support role and some interdiction capacity. It will not only replace the Service's aging 
MiG-21s, but has been touted by Indian defence officials to outperform the U.S. F-16s 
acquired by Pakistan. 
In an attempt to rectify and prevent the previous lack of communication and 
interaction between the services, defence research and production, the Aeronautical 
Development Agency (ADA) was set up to fund, manage, monitor, and coordinate the 
work of the various agencies involved in the LeA project. Additionally, the ADA and 
the Indian Government each commissioned feasibility studies from MBB and Domier in 
West Germany, British Aerospace in the United Kingdom, and Marcel Dassault in France 
on the basis of specific performance requirements provided by the Indian Air Force. 
Upon completion of the independent studies, a feasibility report, incorporating the 
studies' findings, was finalised in 1983. 
Despite such a promising start, the LeA project quickly ran into difficulties 
following the resignations in 1986 of the LeA's two top managers -- the ADA's director 
general, Dr. S. R. Valluri, and its chief designer (as well as former managing director 
of HAL), Dr. R. Mahindra. Their resignations were prompted by frustrated and 
repeated attempts to establish and secure institutional linkages between the R&D units 
designing the LeA and the production units, which were to manufacture the airframe, 
engines and subsystems for the aircraft. As Dr. Valluri reiterated, "My basic problem 
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was that the ADA's writ did not run beyond the four walls of its office ... ,,29 Because of 
its lack of authority and consequent need to secure broad consensus, the ADA became, 
"more encumbered with bureaucratic red tape. In a sense, design was being dictated 
from Delhi instead of being left to the designers to worry about. ,,30 
The vacuum created by the departures of Valluri and Mahindra further weakened 
the ADA's ability to run the project. Like the ALH, the LeA has subsequently 
undergone substantial changes, including the mid-stream switching of foreign design 
consultants from MBB to Dassault, and the Air Force's additional request of a beyond-
visual-range capability, which will increase the weight of the aircraft by four tons. In 
addition, the LeA's engines, avionics and radar are to be imported. For example, the 
U.S. government has permitted General Electric to supply seven F404 engines to power 
the LeA prototypes. These engines will eventually be replaced by the indigenously 
designed and manufactured GTX-35 gas turbine engine. Various U.S. companies --
Allied Signal, BASF, Litton, and Honeywell -- are providing the LeA's composite 
materials, flight control and fly-by-wire technologies.31 Indian defence industry analysts 
have cynically suggested that "the only thing Indian on the LeA will be the coconut that 
is broken over the prototype in accordance with Indian tradition. ,,32 
The latter two indigenous aircraft production programmes follow a remarkably 
similar cyclical pattern of failure. Nayar aptly characterizes this pattern: 
Firstly, [there was] the failure of the local aeronautics industry to meet the 
requirements of the airforce. This resulted in good measure from the lack 
of adequate investment in R&D. In part, however, it was the result of the 
lack of confidence by the IAF in HAL's products .... This lack of 
confidence in HAL had arisen out of the IAF laying down excessively 
stringent aircraft specifications, perhaps deliberately, far beyond the 
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existent capabilities of HAL to meet, which then took too long to deliver, 
with the result that the planes were usually obsolete when handed over to 
the IAF. As a consequence ... the IAF ... then felt free to press for foreign 
merchandise.33 
Nayar suggests that this pattern of failure incited a shift into licensed production of 
weapons systems in collaboration with foreign suppliers. 
11J.e. Indian Missile Program 
The Defence Research Development Organisation and its Defence R&D 
Laboratory (DRDL) have been responsible for the steady progress in India's ballistic 
missile programme. Under the Integrated Guided Missile Development program 
(IGMDP), the DRDO has produced and tested a series of missiles: the medium-range 
surface-to-air missile, Akash; the medium-range surface-to-surface missile, Prithvi, which 
has a potential range of 250 km and can carry a nuclear payload; the surface-to-air 
missile, Trishul; and an anti-tank missile, Nag. However, the apex of the DRDO's 
missile programme is the development of the intermediate-range ballistic missile, Agni. 34 
With the Agni's successful May 1989 test flight, India became the first Third 
World nation to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile that was largely derived 
from its sister, civilian space programme. The Agni, in fact, is a byproduct of India's 
Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (lGMDP). Initiated in 1983 with Rs. 
780 crore funding for a ten-year period, the IGMDP focuses on providing the three 
wings of the armed forces with a range of tactical missiles.35 
Both the low-level, surface-to-air missile (SAM), Trishul, and a battlefield-
support, surface-to-surface missile (SSM), Prithvi, have been flight tested and acquisition 
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orders have been placed by the Indian army. The defence public sector undertaking, 
Bharat Dynamics Ltd., is expected to begin manufacturing these missiles in late 1993. 
Similarly, a third-generation, anti-tank missile, Nag, and a medium-range, air-defense 
SAM, the Akash, are undergoing development tests. 
At the centre of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program is the 
intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Agni. The Agni carries a one-ton payload and 
can easily reach targets in Pakistan. This missile is also capable of reaching China's 
southern cities; carrying a half-ton nuclear or conventional weapon, the Agni could also 
hit Beijing to the northeast. 
The success of India's missile programme, in contrast to its aircraft and main 
battle tank programs, is indicative of what the country's defence sector can achieve when 
realistic targets are set and when a programme is fully supported within the Defence 
Research Development Organisation (DRDO) establishment and by the armed services. 
The IGMDP derives from the ongoing collaborative endeavors of the scientists of the 
DRDO and the Indian Space Research Organisation, as well as 30 other research centres, 
laboratories, universities, and defence public sector units. The Hyderabad-based Defence 
Research Development Laboratory (DRDL) is the nodal agency for the IGMDP. The 
director of the DRDL is Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who is also de facto operational head 
of the IGDMP. He is supported by Dr. V.S. Arunuchalam, Director-General of the 
Defence Research Development Organisation in Delhi. The project director for the Agni 
is R.N. Agarwal. 
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The purpose of the IGMDP is to design a series of missiles using common 
subsystems and technologies, many of which were derived from the satellite launch 
vehicle programme, the SLV-3. By integrating simultaneous development of its five 
missile projects, and in consultation with all three of the armed services, the IGDMP has 
avoided the delays and duplication that have characterized the Light Combat Aircraft, 
Advanced Light Helicopter and Main Battle Tank programs. Additionally, basic research 
funding has been channelled to technology directorates that are at work in the broad areas 
of propulsion, inertial navigation systems (for the Prithvi and Agni especially), infra-red 
thermal imaging and millimetric wave guidance systems (for the Nag), advanced 
composites, and special steel/aluminum forming techniques for missile structures. For 
example, a few miles to the south of the DRDL is the Research Centre, Imrat, which is 
a vast complex recently constructed for the testing and calibration of missile components, 
guidance, control and navigation systems. Comproc, an advanced composite materials 
test and production facility is now on line for work on carbon and glass fibres, which the 
missiles will require for outerspace and re-entry conditions. 
A critical component to the success of the IGMDP has been the access to crucial 
foreign technologies and assistance through India's sister space programme.36 The United 
States has given a license for the Combined Accelerated Vibration Climatic Test System 
used to test the impact of heat and vibration on re-entry vehicle components. It also 
transferred, as part of a larger mid-1980s technology agreement, electro-optica1 
instrumentation for the National Testing Range in Baliapal, Orissa. The equipment was 
used to track the Agni's test flight. In 1988, the United States agreed to supply an 
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advanced ring laser gyroscope to guide the Light Combat Aircraft. It is not clear what 
will prevent India from using it in the Agni's strap-down inertial navigation and closed-
loop guidance system. 
France has also provided much-needed technology in the area of liquid 
propulsion. The training Indian scientists received from France's Societe Europe~ne de 
Propulsion for the Indian version of the Viking rocket motor (used for the European 
Space Agency's Arianne Satellite Launcher) has been applied to the Prithvi and Agni 
launch stages. 
Perhaps the largest source of critical foreign technologies for the IGMDP has 
been the joint German-Indian guidance programme, which began in the mid-1970s. West 
Germany, via the state aerospace agency, Deutsche Forschungsanstait fur Lufthart und 
Raumfuhrt e. V. (DRL), provided India with three indispensable missile technologies: 
1) Guidance technology for the closed loop system for India's Advanced Space 
Launch Vehicle (SLV-3), Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Agni. (The Agni 
serves in a configuration of six boosters as the first phase rocket for the PSLV. In tum, 
the Agni boosters are adaptations of the first stage of the SLV-3.) 
2) Rocket testing. In 1974-75 the DLR tested a model of India's first stage of 
the SLV-3 in its wind tunnel at Cologne-Portz. It has also provided technical assistance 
for the construction of rocket test facilities in India, furnishing a complete design facility 
and training Indian engineers in high-altitude testing. The Agni's liquid fuel second stage 
was probably tested at this completed facility. 
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3) Advanced composite materials fabrication and handling. Beginning in the 
mid-1970s, Indian scientists received on-the-job training in composites at DLR's Stuttgart 
and Braunschweig sites. Such training has enabled the Indians to make rocket nozzles 
and nose cones as well as the domestically developed heat shield for the Agni. 
While Indian government officials have maintained that the IGMDP is built 
around the deployment of conventional munitions (e.g. fuel air-explosives), given the 
production capability of India's parallel nuclear programme, a nuclear-armed Agni is a 
likely outcome. 
licensed Production & Anns Impons 
The general failure of India's intermittent attempts at indigenous defence 
production as outlined above has forced the Ministry of Defence to review its policy of 
self-reliance and to rely increasingly on licensed production arrangements with and 
outright arms purchases from foreign defence suppliers. As one Indian defence scientist 
has wryly observed, "Every time we need to develop a better mousetrap, the country has 
to import a bigger cat. "37 
The experiences of the MBT and ALH, in particular, have influenced this shift 
in defence production policy. First, programme development was slower and 
extraordinarily more costly than initially anticipated. Second, both the Army and the Air 
Force were then left with the decision of either maintaining obsolescing equipment or of 
importing foreign weapon systems. The subsequent imports of the Soviet T -72 tank and 
MiG-25 aircraft demonstrate respectively the Services' mutual preference for the latter 
avenue. 
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Licensed production of defence systems is recognised by Indian defence planners 
as a compromise production solution for political and technical reasons. 38 On the one 
hand, India's armed forces are assured of faster deliveries of proven foreign weapons 
systems. On the other hand, licensed production is expected to provide the defence 
production units with greater learning opportunities through transfers and access to 
foreign technologies. 
The strong Indo-Soviet military cooperation that developed in the wake of the 
1962 war with China (culminating with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship in 1971) profoundly influenced India's shift away from indigenous to licensed 
defence production. 39 Since 1962, when India acquired the licensed production rights for 
the MiG-21 aircraft, India has become the only country outside the former Warsaw Pact 
states to license-produce Soviet aircraft. 40 HAL has gained considerable experience in 
the manufacture of the MiG-21s/-21 bis and the MiG-27. It is currently readying its 
Nasik facility for the production of the MiG-29 Fulcrums. Other Indian licensed 
production programmes of Soviet defence equipment include the manufacture of the 
already mentioned T-72 main battle tank and the AA-2 Atol air-to-air missile. The 
extensive reliance on licensed production agreements in aircraft is reflected in Figure 4.3, 
Indian Licensed Production of Major Conventional Weapons by Type. The Soviet 
Union's willingness to transfer such sophisticated and advanced weapons systems as Tu-
142 Bear reconnaissance aircraft, Kashin-class destroyers, Kilo-class as well as the 
Charlie I nuclear attack submarines are evidence of New Delhi's historic privileged 
relationship with MoSCOW.41 
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Office of Technology Assessment. The Global Arms Trade. Data from Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, SIPRI World Armament and Disarmament Yearbooks, 1970-90. 
With the 1977 election to power of the Janata Party -- a coalition that included 
parties critical of India's relationship with the USSR developed by Indira Gandhi's 
National Congress Party -- the Indian government embarked on a policy of arms 
diversification. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, Indian Licensed Production by Country of 
Origin, the United Kingdom became the leading supplier of licensed weapons systems 
during the 1980s, followed by the former Soviet Union, France and Germany. 
The MoD's urgent need to replace the obsolete Hunters and Canberras led to the 
decision by the Janata government to license produce the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft. 
The Jaguar was chosen in 1978 among such contenders as the Swedish Viggen, the 
Soviet Mig-23 and the French F-l Mirage. The decision was made because the first two 
had been ruled out: the Mig-23 to avoid continued dependence on Soviet arms supplies; 
and the Viggen because of a U.S. threat to veto the sale owing to its American-designed 
engine. 
The impact of the Jaguar decision was ironic. First, it induced the former Soviet 
Union to be more forthcoming in coproduction arrangements (for example, the Soviet 
Union subsequently agreed to accelerate the transfer of MiG-21 technology to India.f2 
Second, the diversification towards West European suppliers of arms and related 
technologies prompted a reappraisal by the Reagan administration of U.S.-Indian 
relations.43 The eventual signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in 1985 between 
the Gandhi/Reagan governments encouraged U.S. cooperation and responsiveness to 
India's request for technology transfers and supplies of critical components for the LCA 
project, thus marking a significant departure in the previously strained Indo-U.S. 
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Figure 4-4: Indian Licensed Production by Country of Origin 
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Office of Technology Assessment. The Global Arms Trade. Data from Stockholm International 
Peace Reseach Institute, SIPRI World Armament and Disarmament Yearbooks, 1970-90. 
relationship.44 The former Soviet Union sought to counter such intrusion into its strong 
defence relationship with India by offering to integrate the LeA's characteristics into the 
yet undeveloped MiG-35 aircraft. 
Though the Indian government's effort to diversify licensed production has been 
successful, the country's defence producing firms have experienced mixed results with 
these manufacturing collaboration arrangements. According to MoD officials and firm 
managers, the most positive benefit derived from licensed production agreements has 
been the firms' enhanced bargaining power with potential foreign defence contractors. 
While acknowledging that their stronger ability to secure financial and technological 
concessions from foreign suppliers has been importantly aided by their leverage in the 
highly competitive international arms market of the 1980s, Indian defence planners also 
say their favourable negotiating position resulted from their own increased technical 
capabilities. They point out that in contrast to the MoD's experience in the late 1960s, 
when the MoD was rebuffed by Western suppliers in its attempt to purchase high 
performance aircraft, French, British and German defence industries were now not only 
willing to allow licensed manufacturing but were also willing to share the technology and 
development plans related to their next generation weapons systems. 
In this respect, successive licensed production of sophisticated weapons systems, 
particularly with the MiG series, has clearly augmented Indian defence firms' 
capabilities.4s However, licensed production has not guaranteed the transition to 
indigenous design and production. Several Indian defence analysts argue that with the 
ready availability of Soviet weapons, both off-the-shelf and licensed-produced, the need 
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to become self-sufficient has been removed. (The successful development of India's 
missile programme is cited as a counter example of this argument.) Nor has licensed 
production in India necessarily led to the desired substantial savings in foreign exchange 
as compared to off-the-shelf purchases. An early SIPRI study found that the costs of 
licensed produced aircraft in India were on average 168 per cent higher than the cost of 
importing the same aircraft. The main reasons for the higher prices involved in licensed 
production were large material costs, inefficient use of labour, and escalating prices of 
imported components. (See Table 4.6, Costs o/Locally Produced and Imported Aircraft 
in India.) 
Indian defence firms also have encountered a new form of dependence with 
licensed production agreements. For example, several naval defence firms cited 
instances in which their production schedules of Leander and Nilgiri class frigates were 
behind schedule because of late deliveries of crucial spares and assemblies by their 
foreign suppliers. As one Air Force lieutenant colonel complained: 
Our increased dependence on the Russian equipment is causing much 
headache. Many of our MiG aircraft were ... out of action for some time 
because the Russians delayed in making fresh supplies of brake pads for 
the braking gear ... [and because] certain parts of MiG including the 
engines have still to be sent to Russia for overhaul, and major 
maintenance and repairs.46 
The non-availability of specifications and drawings from military equipment collaborators 
has caused additional delays because the designs have to be evolved by reverse 
engineering techniques and proved by extensive prototype trials. 
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Table 4.6 
Costs of Locally Produced and Imported Aircraft in India 
HJT-16 
Kiran 
(basic jet trainer) 
MIG-21 
(supersonic fighter) 
HF-24 
Mark I 
(supersonic fighter) 
Alouette 
(helicopter) 
HS-748 
(transport) [a] 
Gnat 
(fighter) 
($U.S. Thousand) 
A 
Total Production 
Cost 
340 
1,520 
940 
270 
1,490 
380 
B 
Cost of 
importing 
equivalent 
aircraft 
200 
830 
600 
170 
1,000 
200 
AlB 
(%) 
170 
183 
157 
159 
149 
190 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the 
Third World, Uppsala, 1971, p. 731 
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More importantly, however, licensed production by India's defence sector has 
undermined efforts to maintain indigenous research and design capabilities. A senior 
scientist at the National Aeronautic Laboratory complained that: 
The main problem in India is that licensed production has become so 
much a way of life .... If you take the Jaguar programme and you do not 
take an indigenous R&D programme, what are laboratories like this got 
to do? Every time you buy an aircraft from outside you make these 
laboratories an exercise in futility. 47 
The example of the Jaguar aircraft was similarly used by a HAL engineer to explain why 
HAL's attempt to indigenise further component production has been frustrated after the 
aircraft company had already assembled nearly 80 of the fighters, " ... [C]an we build a 
Jaguar aircraft today? You must have certain capabilities, a certain base, certain 
technologies, then you can go onwards. You cannot develop Jaguar aircraft with bullock 
cart technology. 1148 When asked why the situation had been allowed to prevail, the NAL 
scientist said: 
The reason is simple: there is a complimentarity of interests between the 
... public sector undertaking ... and the government bureaucracy whose 
security lies in licensed production because then they don't have to take 
responsibility for failure. With Jaguar a [Defence] secretary can sign the 
contract because he knows it is a proven aircraft. 49 
The result of India's forty-year period of experimentation with indigenous and 
licensed defence production is that neither the goals of self-sufficiency nor self-reliance 
have been achieved. Rather, the weapons procurement system has generated national 
political controversy over bribes paid by foreign defence companies to the Ministry of 
Defence and high-ranking Indian government officials. Indeed, charges of corruption and 
cover-up in the HDW and Bofors defence procurement scandals precipitated the 
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resignation of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his own party's defeat in a 
national election.so Additionally, funding for indigenous defence programmes -- the 
LeA, ALH, MBT -- has been severely reduced because of the budgetary constraints 
imposed by the massive importation of arms during the 1980s, and because the original 
requirements, which these indigenous weapons systems were intended to meet, are no 
longer a priority. A final irony is that according to Table 4.7, in 1990 India did succeed 
in becoming the Third World's largest importer of arms. 
Defence ExporlS 
Despite its status as one of the largest arms producers in the developing world, 
India has not been a major exporter of weapons. Official estimates of defence export 
sales average annually less than $10 million. Included in these estimates, however, are 
sales of civilian equipment produced by the defence production units. (For example, the 
sale of earthmoving equipment to some Mid East states is listed in Indian government 
statistics as an arms export.) Thus, the actual total value of India's arms exports is 
negligible. 
Arms exports have remained and will continue to be low for four major reasons. 
The first explanation is production delays and poor product reputation. As evidenced 
above, most of India's major defence production programmes have not proceeded beyond 
the prototype phase, and the technologies employed face extremely high obsolescence 
rates. Not surprisingly, the major buyers of India's arms are other even less developed 
countries such as Bangladesh, Uganda, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. 
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Table 4.7 
The Leading Importers of Major Weapons, 1985-89 
The countries are ranked according to 1985-89 aggregate imports. Figures are in U.S. $millions, at constant 1985 prices. 
Importers 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Third World 
1. India 1,876 3,683 4,585 3,383 3,819 
2. Iraq 2,871 2,447 4,247 2,005 418 
3. Saudi Arabia 1,447 2,395 1,956 1,770 1,196 
4. Syria 1,690 1,508 1,169 1,172 336 
5. Egypt 1,282 1,665 2,347 348 152 
6. North Korea 977 876 487 1,383 1,553 
N 7. Afghanistan 82 611 687 939 2,289 
\j.) 
~ 8. Angola 694 975 1,135 890 24 
9. Libya 969 1,359 294 65 499 
10. Taiwan 664 866 640 513 263 
11. Iran 710 746 685 538 261 
12. Pakistan 675 616 467 467 694 
13. South Korea 388 267 597 934 607 
14. Israel 193 466 1,629 327 93 
15. Thailand 305 74 644 510 330 
Others 5,753 5,026 4,601 4,012 3,893 
Total 20,576 23,580 26,170 19,256 16,427 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1990 Yearbook. 
Second, arms exports have been prevented by third party restrictions contained 
in licensed production agreements. For instance, Hindustan Aeronautics has wanted to 
offset some of its production costs by supplying locally manufactured MiG components 
to countries that deploy these aircraft such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The former Soviet 
Union has prevented such transactions. 
A third reason for India's low level of exports is the Indian government's concern 
not to jeopardize its acclaimed non-aligned status. In 1987 India refused to sell MiG-21s 
to Zimbabwe because it did not want to become embroiled in the Southern African 
conflict. A final factor is that the Indian government lacks an effective international 
defence export marketing agency. Only recently, in late 1989, was a high-level 
committee established within the Department of Defence Production and Supplies to 
promote Indian arms exports. Such government action, however, has not resulted in any 
increased sales of weapons primarily for the reasons outlined above. 
SECTION III: BRIDGING THE DEFENCE-INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 
The country has achieved a degree of self-sufficiency in small arms, 
ammunition and military software. We have a long way to go before we 
can call ourselves self-sufficient or self-reliant in this field. Our present 
efforts in the production of armament are essentially of the assembly 
variety. This is not something to be ashamed of if we have imported 
technology for the construction of frigates, aircraft and tanks. It 
constitutes a necessary first step towards greater indigenisation. Higher 
inputs in R&D are needed. Since budgetary allocations for R&D are 
scarce, the horizontal overlapping between the work of the public and 
private sector in this sphere should be curbed. In our quest for self-
sufficiency in defence production the total exclusion of the private sector 
should be eliminated, as unless this is done we would have unutilised a 
large segment of the nation's resources both in terms of manpower and 
funds. s1 
Jaswant Sing MP (1984) 
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Since the 1970s, India's defence production programmes have been the subject 
of much intergovernmental and outside critical review. Most explanations for the poor 
performance of the defence public sector undertakings have focused on such conventional 
factors as inadequate funding and poor ministerial coordination. 52 As a consequence, 
reform measures, which have redressed inefficiencies within the defence public sector 
units, have centered on ad-hoc, institutional solutions. Few defence analysts have 
concentrated on an important underlying structural economic constraint, namely, the 
continued government-legislated separation and autarkic development of India's private 
capital goods industry from the defence sector. 
Several vocal defence analysts have argued that the Indian government needs to 
adopt a truly integrated approach to defence and economic development. As pointed out 
by one analyst: 
It has to be appreciated that the two [defence and economic development] 
are not mutually exclusive -- in fact, one reinforces the other. A healthy 
economy with a broad industrial base, resulting from development and 
continuously expanding, strengthens defence capability. Similarly a strong 
defence protects the gains of development from external aggression.53 
Ideological, political and institutional constraints, however, have impeded the 
adoption in India of a Brazilian model of private sector-led defence industrial 
diversification. Consideration by the Indian government of the potential complementary 
and dynamic role of the private capital goods industries in augmenting the production 
capabilities of the defence sector has been missing. Moreover, an understanding that the 
integration of the capital goods and defence sectors would encourage both to become 
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more innovative and efficient in the areas of production, research and development has 
been also lacking.S4 
Instead, a narrow bridge, namely "ancillarisation", has been instituted to link the 
Indian capital goods industries with the defence sector. Ancillarisation is intended 
specifically to integrate India's small-scale capital goods producers in the defence 
production process through component purchases. The decision to adopt this more 
narrow solution has been shaped by the view that despite the poor record of Indian 
defence production, achievements in the defence sector are expected to provide 
technological spin-offs to India's private industrial sector thereby fostering broad 
industrial growth. 
This view has been especially prominent in the Lok Sabha. In a recommendation 
to Hindustan Aeronautics written by the Committee on Public Undertakings in 1968, one 
finds early evidence of the imitative behaviour that Sen ascribes to latecomer countries 
such as India in their efforts to establish "strategic industries": 
The Committee understands that in some of the Western countries ... the 
demands of aviation have led to the development of materials with high 
strength/weight properties often coupled with resistance to high 
temperatures. These have found applications in other branches of 
engineering. The hydraulic systems of aircraft were developed during the 
Second World War but now find use in tractors, earth moving equipment 
etc. Similarly the aviation industry provided an initial impetus to 
electronics, radar and radio. Most of the modem developments in this 
field have arisen from aviation demand. The experience of the foreign 
countries would suggest that the fruits of research which can be utilised 
by other industries in India should be made available to them. ss 
Aside from the perceived benefits of spin-offs from the military sector, some limited 
form of private sector participation has been expected to alleviate the chronic 
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underutilisation of capacity in the Indian capital goods industries. Severe foreign 
exchange constraints have been another sizeable factor favouring ancillarisation versus 
fullliberalisation. According to a senior Department of Defence Supplies official: 
85 per cent of India's defence needs are being imported ... ln an adverse 
balance of payments situation, the country can ill afford this. By 
involving the private sector, which will supplement the efforts of the 
ordnance factories, we are only trying to hasten the process of 
indigenisation and ease the foreign exchange situation in the long run as 
well. ,,56 
However, confining the private industrial sector to manufacturing only elementary 
products and intermediate components and spare parts has not only led to mutual 
antipathy between the two sectors, but has also widened the defence industrial divide. 
Since the 1970s, ancillarisation of defence production has proceeded at a snail's pace, 
with both the defence and private sectors blaming each other for the lack of progress and 
limited interaction. Private industry has argued that the Indian government and the 
defence ministry have not provided the necessary incentives to encourage their 
involvement. "What prevents realistic private sector participation is a total lack of 
planning," says Baba Kalyani of Bharat Forge, a small private company that supplies 
approximately twenty per cent of its annual output to the defence sector.57 In particular, 
the absence of long-term contracts that would permit generation of economies of scale 
to sustain production has been cited by various capital goods firms as a major factor 
dampening their participation and investment in production facilities for defence.5I 
A recent example was reported in Business India. The case involved Ruston & 
Hornsby (India) Ltd., a company that was contracted by the MoD to re-engine two East 
European military vehicles: Kolos Tatra 814 tank transporter and the Topaz armoured 
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personnel carrier. After three years of field testing by the Army of the re-designed 
engines, the company experienced considerable difficulty recouping its investment in 
product development. Recalling this experience, the company's general manager bitterly 
complained, "If the government expects active private sector participation it must ensure 
that firms are assured adequate return on investment within a reasonable time frame, 
besides assuring business on a continuing basis. ,,59 Multi-sourcing is another defence 
procurement practice that Indian firms object to because it unnecessarily limits capacity 
utilisation. A director of Indian Seamless Metal Tubes, a company that provides rifle 
barrels and shell casings to the ordnance factories admitted that, "[t]he system of periodic 
purchase by issuing tenders doesn't really justify sustained investment in R&D. ,,60 
Interestingly, further criticism of the defence sector's reluctance to involve private 
industry participation was provided by a former Defence Secretary, P.V.R. Rao: 
[A] factor which bedevils the situation regarding the harnessing of civil 
industrial capacity for defence needs is the attitude of the Government 
ordnance factories ... There [is] the nagging fear in the management that 
once the private sector developed its capacity, the ordnance factories may 
have to concentrate on the more difficult items and would not be able to 
produce a good annual report; besides in later lean years, the competition 
or the pressures for orders by the private sector may leave the ordnance 
factories without adequate work. 61 
In cases where defence production units have been conscientiously trying to 
develop private sector component suppliers, economies of scale difficulties and quality 
considerations impose barriers to entry for some Indian manufacturing firms. As one 
public sector defence firm, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd., explained: 
The industries like the forging industry on whom we depend, the steel 
foundries etc. are essentially first targeted to the automotive industry 
which has got a recurring and higher quantity of demand. Our 
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requirements are of larger sizes, smaller quantities, higher degree of 
specification.62 
When such requirements are not met by the private manufacturing sector, defence firms 
have had to integrate vertically all those facilities, leading to significant inefficiencies and 
duplicative efforts. For example, BEML's attempt to establish a captive foundry as well 
as a hydraulic shop resulted in delays of over ten years. In the interim, BEML had to 
resort to massive, outside purchases, and its facilities were faced with chronic 
underutilisation of capacity. Nevertheless, the defence ministry's criticism of poor 
quality is refuted by several private sector companies. Baba Kalyani of Bharat Forge 
counterargues, "If we can make complex forgings for nuclear reactors, there is no reason 
why we cannot make gun barrels ... While military items have to meet the most stringent 
standards, the fact is that the engineering requirements of some components required by 
defence can at times be fairly pedestrian. "63 
Within India there is little recognition that continued vertical integration of 
production within the defence public sector units has had the perverse effect of denying 
an important means of "learning by others", and of preventing greater specialisation 
within the Indian capital goods sector. In his massive study of technology development 
in India, Nayar acknowledges that India's state-owned defence industries continue to be 
isolated technologically from the civil-industrial sector because, "economic and technical 
spin-offs from the military-industrial complex do not carry into the industrial economy 
as a whole but rather remain quarantined not only within the public sector but within its 
individual units. ,,64 
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In the mid-1980s the Indian government recognised that ancillarisation of its 
defence industries had neither led to increased indigenisation levels (and hence improved 
savings of foreign exchange) nor to the technological regeneration of the depressed 
capital goods sector. Indeed the MoD's Secretary of Defence Production acknowledged 
that the country's: 
defence industrial effort cannot function as an island of high technology 
without an interactive relationship with the country's civil industry. The 
former has to depend for its raw material requirements, intermediate 
products and common user components on the civil industrial sector. 
Ultimately the degree of indigenisation of our advanced integrated weapon 
systems depends upon the extent to which the country produces 
sophisticated steel and other alloys, forgings and castings, basic electronic 
components, etc. This calls for integrated approach to industrial planning 
in defence and civil sectors.6S (Italics added for emphasis.) 
Rather than revamping the country's industrial policy in a way that would allow 
the full integration of the private, capital goods sector into the armaments industry, the 
Indian government has decided simply to strengthen the existing institutional mechanism 
within the Department of Defence Production and Supplies that already linked private 
industry to the defence sector. To provide for closer and continuous interaction between 
the public defence sector and private industry, a two-tier institutional mechanism was 
created in 1985 comprising an apex body headed by the Secretary of Defence Production 
and Supplies, and four functional groups.66 The apex body, which meets annually, is 
responsible for major policy issues (e.g., implementation of the phased programme for 
off-loading low technology items), and the functional groups are responsible for 
identifying civil industrial sources for the manufacture of specific defence items of a 
"non-sensitive nature". 
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The results of this new bridging mechanism have been marginal. Instead of 
increasing private sector industrial participation, capital goods producers' input into 
defence production actually declined. In 1988-89, the latest year for which data was 
obtainable, private sector production for defence was Rs. 134 crore.67 This figure in fact 
represented a 40 per cent reduction in the value of private sector supplies from the peak 
year in 1986-87 of Rs. 277 crore. Nevertheless, some of the dpsus have intensified their 
own ancillarisation programmes. Bharat Electronics, for example, constructed a 20-unit 
industrial estate to foster the ancillary and small-scale industry supply of parts, 
components and subassemblies. 
A few of India's larger capital goods producing "houses" -- the Tatas, Birlas, 
Dunlops, and Kirloskars among others -- are becoming involved in defence 
manufacturing, particularly in the defence transport area. The main battle tank 
programme is a case in point. Kirloskar Cummins and Kirloskar Pneumatics are 
designing components for the engine and suspension systems. Mico Bosch is providing 
the tank's fuel pump and Dunlop is supplying the rubber pads for the wheels. The 
computer has been manufactured by BEL and NELCO. 
Despite the continued, though limited, participation of the private sector in 
defence production, criticism remains. Some Indian defence economists argue that this 
new institutional set-up, established within the Department of Defence Production and 
Supplies, has succeeded only in creating one more institutional bottleneck, limiting 
effective interaction between private sector capital goods suppliers and the defence public 
sector units. "[T]he intervention of a third authority acts only as a hindrance in a 
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programme which requires close and continuous cooperation between the ordnance 
factories and the manufacturers. 1168 
More fundamental, are the criticisms raised by K. Subrahmanyam in an influential 
IDS A article.69 The fact that India was the only country in the world that attempted to 
develop a combat aircraft industry without developing an adequate civil aeronautical 
industry he attributes to the continued compartmentalisation of defence and civil industrial 
demands. Paradoxically, however, Subramanyam implicitly suggests that the simple 
integration of India's industrial sector with defence will not necessarily lead to greater 
self-sufficiency or self-reliance. 
The defence industrial sector cannot function as a high performance island 
in a sea of dependent technologies in civil industries. Self reliance in 
defence involves a large and efficient R&D base and ability to transform 
the results of R&D into economic industrial mass production. Twenty-
five years after the second five year plan our industrial economy is by and 
large a licensed one. Our civil industry is yet to design on its own a 
motor cycle or a passenger car.70 
Arguably, the weak link between India's defence and civil industries is its inefficient and 
stagnant capital goods sector. Hence, simply strengthening the linkages between the 
capital goods and defence sectors may not correct the poor technological and 
manufacturing performance of the country's arms industry. 
The Defence/Capital Goods Nexus 
The development of an independent arms industry and a diversified capital goods 
sector has been central as well as indispensable to India's strategy of self-reliant, import-
substitution industrialisation. According to one Indian advisor: 
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A strong industrial house, especially its capital goods component, and 
along with that an independent arms industry are the sine qua non of 
national independence, and, for underdeveloped countries necessarily 
become the first order objectives of national economic policy.71 
Despite the achievement of a relatively self-sufficient, diversified industrial base, India's 
capital goods sector has been marked by persistent stagnation since the mid-1960s. The 
steep decline in the growth of the capital goods sector from 19.6 per cent per annum 
during 1960-65 to a mere 2.6 per cent between 1966-75 substantially reflects the early 
stagnation in industrial output.72 This section briefly discusses the economic stagnation 
of this vital sector and some of its causes. 
The poor performance of India's capital goods sector is indicated by low 
productivity levels, and a depressed growth rate of value added in industry. With regard 
to the second indicator, Table 4.8, Growth Rates of Sub-Periods and Tests of 
Deceleration Use Based and Input Based Classification, shows that the growth rate of 
{alue added in the industrial sector declined overall from approximately eight per cent 
~Jer annum in the 1959/60 - 1965/66 period to 5.7 per cent in the latter 1966/67 -
1979/80 period. The deceleration was heavily concentrated in the capital and 
intermediate goods sectors. 
Accompanying the substantial slowing down of real growth in the capital goods 
sector from 1966 onwards was the pronounced decline of growth in the machinery and 
transport equipment sectors, which various economists argue had disastrous backward 
linkage effects to the basic goods industries. As indicated in Table 4.9, Value Added in 
Selected Capital Goods Industries, Fifth Year Plan, in real terms, value added decreased 
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Table 4.8 
Growth Rates of Sub-periods and Tests of Deceleration • --
Use Based and Input-based Classificiation 
(195~ to 1965-66; Period I: 1966-67 to 1978-79: Period II) 
Value Added Value o/Oulput 
I /I I 
(A) Use-baud classification 
Total 8.0 5.7 8.Sc 
(1) Basic Goods 11.0 6.0 12.2c 
(2) Intennediate Goods 5.7 4.4b 9.4 
(3) Capital Goods 15.4 6.8 15.8 
(4) Consumer Goods 4.7 5.6b 5.9 
(a) Durables 11.5 11.5b 12.3 
(b) Non-durables 4.2 4.9b 5.7 
(b) Input-based classification 
(1) Agro-based 3.7 4.1b 5.9 
(2) Metal-based 14.1 6.6 14.6 
(3) Chemical-based 8.2 8.4b 11.3 
II 
6.5c 
7.2c 
7.3 
6.1 
6.2b 
12.6b 
5.7b II') 
'<t 
C'I 
5.1b 
7.1 
11.2b 
Notes: (a) The figures show an antilogarithm of the relevant regression coefficient minus I, where the equation estimated is ofthe fonn Log y = I + I'D + bt + b'Ot. 
All data are in 1970-71 prices. 
(b) Statistically not significantly different from the growth rate of the earlier period. 
(c) Excluding electricity and gas. 
Source: U. Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India, 1985. 
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Table 4.9 
Value Added in Selected Capital Goods Industries-Average Annual Real Growth Rates 
in Percentages at Constant 1960 Prices 
Period AU MQChinery MQChine Chemical AU Other Hlavy AU Other Transport 
and Eq"ipment Tools Eq"ipment Mechanical El«trlcals Electrical Eq"ipment 
MQChinery MQChinery 
(1960-76) 
1960-1978 6.7 9.9 31.7 10.8 18.0 13.0 2.6 
ThirdFVP 
1961-196S 12.7 28.7 37.9 20.1 23.9 IS.0 8.7 
Annual Plans 
1966-68 0.2 -14.2 -IS.6 -2.6 7.4 3.6 0.2 
Fourth FYP 
1969-73 13.8 19.6 132.0 10.7 29.6 17.4 9.6 
Fifth FVP 
1974-78 -1.9 -O.S 10.3 8.S 6.3 IS.9 -9.0 
Sollrces: 1. National Accounts Statistics, various years 
2. Statistical Abstract of India, 1979, Tables 167 and 168, pp. 407. 
Professional 
and 
Scientific 
IlIStruments 
13.3 
0 
4.S 
34.3 
12.6 
3. "Wholesale Price Statistics, India 1947-78", H.L. Chandok, Pub by Economic and Scientific Research Foundation, New Delhi, 
October, 1978. 
4. Census of Indian Manufacturing Industries, for period up to 1960. 
S. The Annual Survey of Industries (summary results for the census sector and factory sector) aU volumes covering the period up 
to 1978-79 (the period volume was published in 1983, and contains the latest published figures of 1983). 
6. Monthly Statistica of the Production of Selected Industries. All issues published up to 1983 (covering the periods up to 1980). 
7. Statistical Abstract of India, aU volumes published up to 1983 (covering the periods up to 1980). 
8. Monthly Abstracta of Statistics, published by the Central Statistical Organisation, and the Department of Statistics of the 
Ministry f Planning, Government of India, New Ochli. 
9. Profiles of Indian Industries, Economic Intelligence Service Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Bombay. 
Cited in, I.J. Ajluwalia, Indrutrial Growth ill India, 1985, p.466. 
for the transport and machine tools industries, both of which had negative growth rates 
of -9.0 and -5.0 per cent respectively. 
Closely paralleling the recessionary experiences of Brazil's capital goods sector, 
the demand for Indian capital goods industries as measured by gross output also 
experienced similar fluctuations. Table 4.10, Gross Output in Selected Indian Capital 
Goods Industries, documents the instability of demand for Indian capital goods and 
reinforces the particularly severe impact on the machine tool and transport industries. 
While the machine tool sector's average annual real growth rate declined from 12 per 
cent (1969-74) to 0.4 per cent (1974-78), transport decelerated even faster from 25.4 per 
cent in 1969-73 to -6.0 per cent in 1974-78.73 
An examination of industrial output data for the 1980s, provided by Kelkar and 
Kumar, reflects a distinct shift away from the metal-based and machine-building 
industries. They find that the growth rate of the machine tool sector's output, excluding 
airconditioners and refrigeration, declined to 5.47% annually over the period 1981/82-
1988/89, while that of the metal products was reduced even further to 3.95% over the 
same time period.74 The acceleration in the industrial sector during the 1980s instead 
was led by the chemicals, petrochemicals and allied industries. Another interesting 
feature of India's industrial performance is revealed by looking at the relative growth 
rates of industrial output when classified by end-user categories. During this period the 
fastest growing segment was the consumer durables whose output increased at 14.7 per 
cent annually. 75 
247 
tv 
~ 
00 
Table 4.10 
Gross Output in Selected Capital Goods Industries-Average Annual Growth Rates in Percentages 
at Constant 1960 Prices 
P~riod All Machin~ry Machin~ Ch~mical All Oth~r H~avy All Other Transport Prof~ssional 
and Equipmtnt Tools Equipment Mechanical Electricals E/~ctrical Equipment and 
Machin~ry Machin~ry Sci~ntific 
Instruments 
(1960-76) 
1960-1978 8.0 10.5 34.7 12.1 17.7 14.2 3.3 13.7 
Third FYP 
1961-1965 15.4 29.6 45.4 18.3 26.5 17.2 12.4 11.2 
Annual Plans 
1966-68 4.8 1.4 9.9 7.1 15.6 9.8 1.3 8.9 
Fourth FYP (1969-71) 
1969-73 9.3 12.0 110.0 8.3 18.7 12.8 25.4 16.1 
Fifth FYP (1975-78) (1974-76) 
1974-78 2.5 0.4 5.9 1.2 8.0 22.3 --6.0 23.2 
1. Census of Indian Manufacturing Industries, for period up to 1960 
2. The Annual Survey of Industries (summary results for the census sector and factory sector) all volumes covering the period up to 
1978-79 (the period volume was published in 1983, and contains the latest published figures of 1983). 
3. Monthly Statistics of the Production of Selected Industries. All issues published up to 1983 (covering the periods up to 1980). 
4. Statistical Abstract of India, aU volumes published up to 1983 (covering the periods up to 1980). 
S. Monthly Abstracts of Statistics, published by the Central Statistical Organisation, and the Department of Statistics of the Ministry f 
Planning, Government of India, New Dehli. 
6. Profiles of Indian Industries, Economic Intelligence Service Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Bombay. 
Source: U. Ajluwalia,lndlUtrial Growth in India, 1985, p.452. 
This gap between India's potential and actual industrial performance (given its 
large domestic market, resource base and well developed scientific and technical 
manpower) continues to be the focus of much scholarly debate.76 Perhaps the most 
widely accepted explanation for the country's industrial stagnation is the inefficiency 
argument.17 According to this theory, the state has developed a stranglehold on the 
industrial sector. The slow growth of the capital goods sector is the inevitable result of 
the Indian government's import-substitution trade and industrial policies. "Nearly all the 
elements of the industrial policy regime -- ranging from .. .investment, capacity creation, 
technology choice, prices [and] foreign collaboration ... have had a growth choking 
effect.,078 In addition, the long duration of India's import-substitution strategy has 
perversely encouraged the development of a high cost, obsolescent industrial structure, 
sheltered from foreign competition -- critical factors that have rendered India's few 
exports uncompetitive. 
Indeed, India's industrial policies have played a pervasive role in shaping the 
development of its defence and capital goods sectors. The Indian government's industrial 
policies have been traditionally devised and implemented with the aim of influencing the 
pattern of sectoral investment down to the individual firm-product level. The net effect, 
however, has resulted in reduced domestic competition and the limited ability of firms 
to improve their performance. Specifically, for example, firms have limited flexibility 
in choosing plant location and size, obtaining foreign technology, altering product lines, 
and reducing their workforces. 
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The broad objectives of the government's industrial policy are articulated in the 
various Industrial Policy Resolutions (1948, 1956 and 1973) and Statements (1980 & 
1984). Primary amongst these objectives are: 
1) Public ~ participation in ~ defence aru! ~ industries 
As discussed previously, public sector control of the "commanding heights" of 
India's economy has been an integral part of the country's development strategy. Certain 
sectors, infrastructure and defence especially, are reserved exclusively for the public 
sector. In addition to reservation policies, the public sector enterprises enjoy preferential 
licensing, purchase and financing arrangements from the government. 
The overall financial performance of the public sector enterprises has been 
extremely poor. Political interference in the day-to-day functioning of public sector 
enterprises, overstaffing, labour undiscipline, as well as over-cautious top-heavy 
bureaucratic management practices, are blamed for the public sector's chronic 
inefficiency. As evidenced by the recent introduction of reforms in the defence sector, 
the infusion of private-sector values and integration into the public sector has been 
seriously considered to be an important solution. As a chairman of a parliamentary 
committee remarked: 
For a message from one of the public-sector steel plants to reach 
Krishnamarthy [then chairman of the Steel Authority of India] could take 
weeks ... But Russi Modi [long-serving chief of the private sector Tata Iron 
and Steel Co.] is only a phone call away from anybody on the shop floor. 
They say the dinosaur went extinct because it took nearly three minutes 
for nerve impulses to travel from its tail to its brain .... 79 
250 
2) Controls on Large or Dominant Firms 
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) was implemented 
in 1970 in an effort to regulate entry and growth of India's largest private capital goods 
firms or "houses", thereby limiting the concentration of economic power, and to check 
practices that restrict competition. This industrial policy severely limits the market 
entrance or expansion of MRTP firms (defined in 1990 as enterprises or interconnected 
firms that possess assets of or over Rs one billion or a dominant market share of 25 per 
cent or more). For example, between 1982 and 1984, the approval rate of industrial 
license applications involving MRTP clearances was roughly half that of companies in 
general (40-50 per cent), and the application processing time was also longer, taking as 
much as two or more years in half of the cases. so 
3) Promotion of Small-Scale Industry 
The promotion of small scale industry takes a number of forms: a) reservation 
of products for exclusive manufacture by small scale capital goods firms, b) exemption 
from licensing, c) exemption from corporate tax and preferential excise and sales tax 
rates, d) exemption from many labour regulations, c) preferential access to domestic and 
imported raw materials, and f) purchase support through government procurement for 
small-scale industry products. 81 Since small-scale firms are defined strictly, that is 
limited to investments in machinery and equipment not exceeding U.S. $272,000 or 
$350,000, these conditions create a powerful incentive to remain small. According to 
one Indian economist, "the panoply of privileges creates a small enterprise economy 
within the economy which is entirely exempt from competition from medium sized and 
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large firms, and which cannot benefit from economies of scale. d2 It also reinforces the 
high cost structure of Indian industry. 
Since the 1991 economic liberalisation programme initiated by Prime Minister 
Rao, the government has sought to reduce these controls and regulations on industrial 
growth. 83 This domestic liberalisation package included various measures: 1) delicensing 
of many product groups (e.g., automotive ancillaries, machine tools), with the exception 
of industries pertaining to security, strategic, environmental and social concerns; 2) 
Reduction in the number of industries reserved for the public sector from 17 to eight (the 
defence industries will continue to remain in the state sector); 3) raising the asset 
threshold for MRTP companies, thereby enabling more firms to operate without 
restriction of the Act); 4) increasing the ceiling asset size for small-scale firms and some 
reduction in the product reserve list; and 5) liberalisation of capital goods imports. 
Generally, such industrial policy reforms are intended to lower some of the 
institutionally created barriers to entry in a number of industries, thereby increasing the 
opportunity for greater domestic competition. In addition, the scaling up of firm sizes 
will permit greater economies of scope as well as scale, and consequently a better chance 
for attaining international competitiveness. Finally, such reforms are expected to provide 
firms with more discretion in corporate planning, without continued reference to 
governmental machinery. 
Conclusion 
This case study chapter has outlined the paradoxical character of India's defence-
industrial capabilities. In comparison to Brazil, the Indian government has actively 
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intervened through direct ownership and other industrial policies to establish and promote 
its arms industry. While the government has succeeded in creating the largest and 
broadest military industrial research complex among the NICs, it has largely failed in its 
objective of indigenous and self-sustaining arms production. 
A number of factors were highlighted in this chapter which explain this failure. 
From the beginning, the emphasis on self-sufficiency precluded strong collaborative 
partnerships with experienced foreign defence manufacturers, thereby denying an 
important learning opportunity for India's defence firms. As a consequence, Indian firms 
have not been able to use foreign technologies effectively to augment their own nascent 
technological capabilities, and to build systematically on those capabilities. Additionally, 
Indian defence firms have set unrealistic weapons production targets, given their 
insufficient technological and manufacturing experience and lack of contact with the 
country's capital goods firms. As intimated throughout the chapter, the cycle of failed 
indigenous production and, hence, continued reliance on licensed production and arms 
imports, is the result of such firm-level shortcomings. It is also due to injudicious 
government policies, particularly those that have led to the stagnation of the capital goods 
sector, and to the fragmented linkages between this sector and the defence industry. The 
interaction between India's defence and capital goods firms and the state is now examined 
in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter V 
THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF FIRMS AND STATES 
Introduction 
The preceding case studies starkly reveal significant contrasts in the performance 
of Brazil's and India's defence and manufacturing industries. As this author suggested 
in Chapter 2, a useful theoretical explanation for this difference is one that elucidates the 
determinants of firms' technological capabilities, and how the state, through its critical 
ability to shape the external environment in which firms operate, asserts itself as a major 
influence on firm behaviour. This chapter explores the strategic interaction of firm 
behaviour and government policies, drawing upon and integrating the previous Brazilian 
and Indian case study chapters. 
Before we analyse how the strategic interaction of firms and states has conditioned 
the Brazilian and Indian experiences, it would be useful at this juncture to summarise and 
highlight the main findings of the case study chapters. Though much of the material in 
the latter two chapters is intended to provide the reader with a detailed knowledge of the 
evolutionary development of Brazil's and India's defence and capital goods industries, 
the case studies also yield interesting preliminary insights regarding the roles of firms and 
governments in the process of defence industrialisation. 
Clearly India's heavy emphasis on technological self-reliance has led to the 
emergence of a very large and relatively sophisticated defence sector. Nevertheless, 
these public sector industries coexist with private manufacturing industries, both of which 
are highly inefficient and technologically lagging behind the world frontier. As argued 
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in this chapter, the development of these industries and low export levels have been 
largely conditioned by industrial, trade policy-induced constraints. While the Indian 
government has actively promoted the technological development of its defence and 
capital goods producing firms, via a science and technology policy, the overall impact 
on Indian firm R&D behaviour is limited because firms do not invest in improving their 
technological capabilities largely because of a lack of competitive pressure. This 
important finding will be developed later in this chapter using a game theoretic 
framework. 
By contrast the Brazilian case study chapter shows that the successful emergence 
and international competitiveness of the defence industries was an almost accidental by-
product of the manufacturing and R&D activities of the capital goods firms. In 
particular, Brazilian firms consciously targeted and combined foreign and local sources 
of technology in ways that progressively contributed to the technological sophistication 
of their products and exports. The impact of the Brazilian state in shaping a conducive 
environment for its firms has been limited to its technology and trade policies. Indeed, 
as argued earlier, the development of Brazil's defence firms has been neither fully 
independent of government policies, nor have they evolved primarily as a consequence 
of such direct government intervention. 
Four preliminary observations emerge from the above discussion: 
First, successful technological development requires access to foreign elements 
of technology. As the case study of the Brazilian aircraft industry, Embraer, indicates, 
the complementary use of foreign technology, via licensing and coproduction 
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arrangements, permitted the early establishment of internationally competitive products, 
which has not been possible under India's more autarkic strategy. 
Second, the very ability to search, select, assimilate, adapt, and master foreign 
technologies depends on a firm's own conscious efforts. As will be discussed later in 
this chapter, Brazilian firms are far more innovative and competitive than their Indian 
counterparts because their technology strategies provide for longer-term learning. 
Third, capital goods and defence exports may themselves facilitate technological 
development. The closer a firm's product is to the world frontier, the more likely that 
firm will be under pressure to invest in keeping up with technological developments and 
upgrading its products to suit customers' demands in a world market. Recognition of the 
potential technological benefits deriving from exports was an important component of 
Embraer's and Engesa's development strategies. 
A final observation emerges from comparing the Indian and Brazilian case study 
chapters. Considerable technological effort occurs regardless of the policy environment. 
However, there appear to be important differences in the nature and direction of the 
technology that is undertaken. 1 As mentioned previously, under India's relatively more 
protectionist regime of import substitution, firms' R&D efforts concentrated on 
substituting imports -- raw materials, components, technology -- which could have been 
obtained more readily and cheaply from abroad. In Brazil's more competitive 
environment, which includes an export orientation and encouragement of direct foreign 
investment, there has been greater pressure on local Brazilian firms to reduce costs, 
upgrade quality, and keep up with global technology changes. Thus, contrary to what 
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many development economists presumed, India's import-substitution stralegy has 
perpetuated dependence on foreign technology, while in Brazil, its grealer export 
orientation has lead to much more substantial autonomy. 
Embedded in each of these findings are complex issues concerning the inter-
relationship between firms' technology strategies and the role of states in shaping the 
external environment in which firms operate. On the basis of this brief, comparative 
analysis of the Brazilian and Indian case studies, let us now delineate the influence of the 
Brazilian and Indian governments' trade and technology policies on firms' technology 
strategies. 
SECTION I: How STATE POLICIES AFFECT TIlE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF FIRMS 
Trade Policies 
Brazil 
A central differentiating feature of Brazil's industrialisation is its impressive 
manufactured export performance. As Table 5.1 indicates, Exports of Capital Goods, 
1961-1979, beginning in the 1970s, Brazil became a leading exporter of manufactured 
goods. One of the most striking characteristics of the country's export composition is 
the very high share of capital goods and defence products -- the largest among Argentina, 
India, Korea, and Mexico. 
Indeed the total value of Brazilian manufactured exports including defence has 
experienced substantial growth since 1965. Moreover, Brazilian firms have enjoyed an 
impressive record of both product differentiation as well as market diversification. In 
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1964 primary product exports accounted for a full 85 per cent of Brazil's exports, with 
coffee alone accounting for over 50 per cent. By 1978, the share of agricultural exports 
had declined (coffee only accounted for 18 per cent of total exports). The share of 
manufactured products in total exports rose from about 18 per cent in 1965 to 57 per cent 
in 1980.2 According to World Bank figures, the average annual growth rate from 1965 
to 1980 was 27.9% in current U.S. dollar terms.3 According to CACEX data the biggest 
exporting group was the transport sector, accounting for 42 per cent of exports in the 
sample. The prominence of military producers as leading capital goods exporters is 
reinforced in Table 5.2, Brazil's Leading Exponers. 
An important element in Brazil's strong manufactured export performance has 
been the diversification of export markets. Like the other NICs, Brazil has been a strong 
exporter to both the industrialised and developing countries. Chudnovsky finds that 
"developing countries as main destination for Brazilian exports of capital goods declined 
their participation from 70 per cent in 1970 to 56 per cent in 1984. n4 He also notes that 
there were a few products, mostly exported to the South in 1973-75, that were shifted 
to the North after 1980-82. They included aircraft, electric measuring control 
equipment, piston engines, statistical machines, and transistors. These five leading 
capital goods exports to the North accounted for 73 per cent of the value of such exports, 
reflecting a high degree of concentration. In recent years Brazil's competitive position 
in manufactured exports has been overtaken by the East Asian NICs. However, 
significant exceptions to the overall decline include such technologically sophisticated 
areas as aircraft, missiles, telecommunications equipment, and optical equipment. 5 
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Table 5.2 
Brazil's Largest Exporters of Non-Food Manufactured Producl", 
1979 
Finn 
1. Petrobras 
2. Volkswagen 
3. Interbnls 
4. General Motors 
5. Mercedes Benz 
6. Ford 
7. Philco 
8. Fiat 
9. IBM 
10. Siderurgia Nacional 
11. Siderurgia Paulista 
12. Metal Minera~o 
13. COBEC 
14. Saab 
15. Aracruz Cellulose 
16. Embraer" 
17. Comex 
18. First Diesel 
19. Cellulose, Nipo 
20. Comp. Navega~ao 
21. Verolme Estal: 
22. Engesa" 
23. Caterpillar 
24. Engexco" 
25. Pirelli 
(U.S. Millions) 
Main Product Exports 1979 
Gasoline 323.8 
Motor Vehicles 213.3 
Alcohol 133.2 
Motors 128.4 
Trucks 126.9 
Motor 116.7 
Trucks 111. 7 
Motors 93.3 
Office Equipment 92.4 
Steel Sheets 89.6 
Steel Slides 78.4 
Iron 75.8 
Cast Iron 73.5 
Trucks 71.5 
Pulp 68.S 
Aviation Equipment 68.5 
Trucks 64.4 
CED Cars 59.9 
Cellulose 56.4 
Freight Ships 49.3 
Freight Ships 47.9 
Amoured Vehicles 47.2 
Earthmoving Equipment 42.S 
Optical Instruments 41.4 
Car Types 34.1 
"Brazilian military manufacturer 
Source: CACEX. 
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Cross-tabulated data from the author's survey reflect both the increase in capital 
intensity of Brazilian manufactured exports, as well as export market diversification. 
What is interesting to note from Table 5.3, Destination of Brazilian Capital Goods 
Expons, is that the leading capital goods exports are machinery, fabricated metal 
products (including small arms, ammunition, heavy ordnance and tanks), aircraft, and 
iron/steel basic products. Reflecting this concentration of manufactured exports are two 
regions that are disproportionately important as markets for Brazilian manufactured 
exports. The main destinations for capital goods exports are Central/Latin America and 
the United States/Canada. In terms of defence exports, Europe and Latin America 
predominate for aircraft, the Middle East/Persian Gulf for missiles and tanks (Iran-Iraq 
war), and Latin America for naval exports. This penetration by successful exporters of 
defence and capital goods producers into the markets of the industrialised countries is an 
important new trend. However, except for firms such as Embraer, Avibras and Metal 
Leve, which have found market niches for their products, most domestic firms have 
entered the export market at the lower end as producers of low-cost final products or as 
subcontractors to larger domestic and foreign capital goods manufacturers. 
In analysing the respective roles of the firm and the state in the technological 
development of the capital goods and defence sectors, it is important to assess to what 
extent the export behaviour of Brazilian firms can be attributed directly to government 
trade policies, namely the provision of export incentives, and/or to the technological 
strategies of defence and capital goods firms. The econometric model based on the 
author's survey data, presented in the Brazilian case study chapter, indicated the 
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Table 5.3 
PRODUCT 
Destination of Brazilian Capita l Goods Exports 
Product Frequency by Region 
usAf 
CAJ/ADA 
EUROPE JAP~ CENTAAJJ 
LAT AM 
MJD-£ASTI AUSTR.I TOTAL 
01 
\0 
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negligible effect of government export promotion policies on defence producing firms. 
However, international trade economists have tried to demonstrate the linkage of these 
policies to Brazil's broader manufactured export performance. 
Since the early 1980s the Brazilian government has tried to increase the export 
orientation of the industrial sector primarily because of the balance-of-payments 
considerations deriving from the effects of the OPEC oil schocks in the 1970s-1980s, and 
the country's estimated $120 billion external debt. A system of fiscal and financial 
export incentives has been used to compensate for variations in the real exchange rate 
and to target specific subsectors, for example, the multinational automotive industry. As 
Tadini notes: 
Government support becomes indispensable, through a consistent and 
stable policy, that aims to provide the sector with the necessary 
instruments for the promotion of its products in international trade. This 
policy would like to have as its objective reducing the difficulties and 
minimising the high costs of finding new markets that confront firms when 
they act in isolation.6 
Tyler's work reveals that the most direct and widely used are fiscal incentives to 
export. Using his stratification such major incentives include: 
1) Exemptions or reductions in the federal and state industrial product and 
value added taxes (IPI) and (ICM) respectively; 
2) Export tax credit (Credifo Premio); 
3) Income tax exemptions for profits earned from exports; 
4) Drawback provisions allowing duty-free import of materials used to 
produce finished export products -- e.g. Befiex system.7 
The Central Bank of Brasil, through CACEX, also provides two programmes for 
financing manufactured exports. The Fund for Export Financing (FINEX) offers pre-
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and post-shipment export financing. Through Resolution 674 of the Central Bank, 
CACEX also gives certificates entitling export manufacturing firms to receive financing 
for their working capital requirements as a percentage of the value of their exports.8 
Two important studies, however, one by the World Bank, which focuses on the 
competitiveness of Brazil's capital goods industries, and the other by Tyler, who assesses 
Brazil's export performance in general, suggest that these incentives by themselves have 
not been sufficiently strong to explain the growth of capital goods exports.9 Referring 
to the 1970s, the World Bank argues that while export incentives were important to 
export sales, their magnitude only offset the effects of the overvalued cruzeiro, which 
would favour domestic sales over exports. Tyler expands this point further by suggesting 
a slight anti-export bias, which is evidenced "through a comparison of the protection 
afforded to the domestic market and the subsidisation provided for export production. ,,10 
Both studies conclude that the development of Brazilian capital goods exports was made 
possible by increased productivity and competitiveness. Teubal, in his study of leading 
capital goods producing firms concurs that the Brazilian government's export policies do 
not provide an adequate explanation of the industry's international competitiveness. 
Rather, he suggests that an important technological learning or "capacitation effect", 
together with enhanced firm reputation, underlies the increased productivity and exports 
from the Brazilian capital goods sector. ll 
The author'S survey data does suggest that the competitiveness of individual firms 
and buoyant demands of the world market, rather than export incentives, increased export 
activity. Out of a sample of 94 defence and capital goods producers, 54 firms were 
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significant exporters over the 1977-1989 period, and out of that latter total, only four 
companies indicated that their exports had declined. Table 5.4, Reasons for Increased 
Capital Goods Expons, reveals the sectoral location of Brazilian firms' exports and the 
firms' reasons as to what accounts for their success in international markets. Over 50 
per cent of these exporting firms emphasised the expansion in world demand for their 
products, 35 per cent suggested their product reputation, while less than one per cent 
attributed their foreign sales to government export incentives. 
What then can be concluded from this section on the effect of the Brazilian 
government's trade policies on the competitiveness of the country's firms? Obscured 
behind the debate on the causal linkage between the provision of export promotion 
policies and increases in manufactured export activity is a more fundamental point. The 
Brazilian government's export orientation has been a powerful force for broader 
industrial and technological development. Clearly the incentives and signals the 
government provides are an environmental stimulus for Brazilian firms. During an 
interview with the author, a high-level government official in the Brazilian Ministry of 
Planning acknowledged this point. "The examples of the arms industries and aeronautics 
speak eloquently for themselves in this sense. The competition from foreign trade 
demands permanent technological updating. 1112 However, export orientation by itself is 
not enough to promote or sustain technological deepening or rapid export growth. Indeed 
the same government official cited the definition of realistic and viable objectives by 
Brazil's high technology firms as another important firm-level factor: 
The decision to manufacture aircraft according to international market 
demands, and to invest in technology development for this market segment 
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Table 5.4: Reasons for Increased Capital Goods Exports 
Sector Increase in Government Product 
World Expon Reputation 
Demand Incentives 
Photographic & Optical 1 1 
Aircraft 2 1 1 
Motor Vehicles 21M· 212M 
Shipping 1 1 1 
Electrical Apparatus M M 
Missiles & 1 M 
Communication 
Electric Ind. Machinery M 
Machinery & Equipment 112M 2 
Office & Computing 1 
Equip. 
Special Ind. Machinery M 1 
MetalIWood Machinery 1 11M 
Fabricated Metal 31M 1 
Products 
Non-Ferrous Metal M 
Products 
Iron & Steel Basic 2 1 
Products 
Paints & Varnishes 1 M 1 
Petroleum Refining 2M 
Chemical Products 1 
Synthetic Fibres & 1 
Resins 
Fertilizers 1 M 
Total 19/9M 21M 1217M 
• Note: M indicates a multinational firm. 
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was one of the reasons for the accomplishments of Embraer. The same 
is valid in the case of Engesa. 13 
In sum, it appears that the Brazilian government in part promoted exports because 
they are considered to be an important means of acquiring access to additional world 
technologies, not only because of the benefits of participating in international markets, 
but also because such participation requires Brazilian firms to broaden and deepen their 
technological capabilities. As we shall see in the following section, India's trade policies 
have been far more restrictive towards imports of technology. Furthermore, India has 
not made very effective use of exports to broaden its technology base. 
India 
"I believe, as a practical proposition, that it is better to have a second-rate 
thing made in our country than to have to rely on the first-rate thing that 
we have to import .... " (Nehru)14 
A crucial element of the Indian government's industrialisation strategy has been 
the pursuit of import-substitution policies. The original basis for this strategy rested on 
the perceived need to protect India's infant manufacturing industries and on pessimism 
about the prospects for export. India's import-substitution policies during the 1970s have 
been extensively analysed by Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and, later, Bhagwati & 
Srinivisan (1975).15 According to these authors some of the major characteristics of the 
import control system included: 
a) Protection was granted to industries often in complete disregard for the relative 
costs or quality of domestic versus foreign production. w[T]he general incentives to 
reduce costs and to maintain quality cannot but have been reduced by the sheltered 
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markets provided by policies of automatic protection and strict control over domestic 
try ·,,16 en , 
b) In order to obtain imported goods, the twin principles of "essentiality" and 
"indigenous non-availability" had to be met. In addition, the system of actual user 
(import) licensing on a "fair share basis" meant that efficient capital goods firms could 
not expand by competing away scarce imports from less efficient ones; 17 
c) The phased manufacturing program prevented imports of all parts and 
components that were targeted for indigenisation; 
d) There are strict controls on direct foreign investment through the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1974. Under FERA rules, foreign shareholding 
cannot exceed 40 per cent of total equity. Shares of up to 74 per cent are permitted if 
investment is located in high technology industry that has been targeted by the Indian 
government for development. As a result of these relatively unattractive conditions, few 
foreign firms have been interested in investing in the country. The effects of India's 
control on direct foreign investment (DFI) versus Brazil's more open policy are 
illustrated by comparing stocks of DFI and as a percentage of GDP. In 1984 the stock 
of DFI in India was approximately $1.5 billion compared to Brazil's $24.6 billion. 
Direct foreign investment as a percentage of GDP was only 0.6% in India in contrast to 
Brazil's 13.1 % .18 
The effects of import-substitution policies in discriminating against exports has 
been extensively analysed in the literature. 19 As mentioned earlier, the emphasis on 
import substitution in the 1960s partly stemmed from the belief in self-reliance by Indian 
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economic planners in the face of a perceived external demand constraint. However, as 
Table 5.5, India's Share in World Expons, indicates, India's exports since the 1960s 
have grown more slowly than world trade, leading to a decline in its share of world 
exports. As an Indian oversight committee on trade policy observed: 
It is particularly disturbing that India's share in world trade declined at a 
time when developing countries as a group were actually able to increase 
their share. This. .. suggests that we did not make full use of available 
trade opportunities in the past. 20 
Table 5.6, Expon Performance of Selected Counlries, compares India's 
manufactured export performance since 1970 with other Latin American and East Asian 
NICs, as well as with China. As illustrated, the dramatic effect of shifts towards export-
oriented policies by these latter countries is shown in the dollar value growth rates of 
their exports. Although Indian manufactured exports grew at a relatively constant rate 
between 1974-78, mainly as a result of the improvement in the real exchange rate for 
exports (brought about by the devaluation of the rupee), by 1980 growth slowed down 
markedly. 
This deceleration spurred various official governmental reviews of India's trade 
policy and created renewed interest in introducing export incentives. The findings of the 
1980 Tandon Committee on Export Strategy were particularly influential in shaping the 
government's export reform policy: 
A trade regime in which there is significant reliance upon tariffs and 
licensing affords substantial effective protection to domestic producers in 
import-competing lines while exports receive no comparable protection. 
In fact since this type of protection raises the general cost-structure of 
industry, exports actually suffer from negative effective protection.21 
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Table 5.5 
SHARE OF L'IDIA'S EXPORT IN GLOBAL EXPORTS OF MANUF ACIlJRED Goons 
(U .S. $ million) 
Year Indian Export World Export Indian Export as Per 
Cent of World Export 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1970 2,026 315,100 0.64 
1975 4,355 875,500 0.50 
1980 8,378 2,002,000 0.42 
1981 8,373 1,976,733 0.42 r--
r--
1982 8,807 1,845,641 0.48 C"I 
1983 8,713 1,811,600 0.48 
1984 9,874 1,904,600 0.52 
1985 8,750 1,923,400 0.45 
1986 9,178 2,113,600 0.43 
Source: nGCI and UN Trade Statistics. Cited in V. Kelkar & R. Kumar, "Industrial Growth in the Eighties: 
Emerging Policy Issues," Economic and Political Weekly, 27 January 1990, p. 215 
Argentina 
China 
India 
Mexico 
Table 5.6 
Export Performance of Selected Countries Since 1970 
(in U.S. $ billion at current exchange rates) 
1970 1975 1980 
1.77 2.96 8.02 
2.31 7.69 18.27 
2.03 4.36 8.38 
1.31 2.99 15.30 
8.11 
24.98 
9.46 
24.33 
a The figures for 1984 are obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics, 1986. 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Interational Trade and Development Statistics, 1985. 
(New York: United Nations). Cited in D. Nayyar, "India's Export Performance, 
1970-85." In The Indian Economy, R. Lucas & G. Papanek (eds), 1988, p. 245. 
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Thus, in an effort to offset the higher production costs and other disadvantages of 
exporting from a highly protected and controlled economy, the Indian government has 
used numerous, complex incentives to assist exporters of manufactured capital goods. 
According to Nayyar, India's export promotion policies perform two basic roles: "First 
... to provide compensation for disincentives implicit in domestic economic policies and, 
second, ... to provide an incentive for product and market development. ,,22 Principal 
government measures include: 1) the duty-drawback system, which reimburses exporters 
for the higher prices of foreign and domestic inputs; 2) free trade zones and bonded 
manufacturing; 3) incentives for and assistance with export marketing; 4) cash 
compensatory support (reimbursement for indirect and local taxes); 5) profit tax and 
export credit subsidies; and 6) subsidies on domestic raw materials. However, judging 
from the poor export performance between 1978-90, these measures have been largely 
ineffective. 
A number of studies have analysed the impact of India's import-substitution trade 
policy, with its particular emphasis on self-sufficiency, on Indian firms' export 
capabilities. Several (including the same author) have reached conflicting conclusions. 
Lall, in a 1982 study, argued that India's import-substitution policies were responsible 
for the development of the country's broad and deep technological industrial base. 
Linking that base to exports by Indian firms led him to conclude that India was ahead in 
terms of both the diversity and complexity of technology exports, followed at some 
distance by Argentina, with Korea, Mexico and Brazil occupying the middle ground.23 
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A consensus has emerged, however, which reaches the opposite conclusion of 
La.1l's assessment. In a study for the World Bank, Dahlman and Sercovitch compare the 
local development and exports of technology in Argentina, Brazil, India, Korea, and 
Mexico. They find that the composition of India's technological exports largely consists 
of technical services rather than products, and that the destination of most of these 
exports are to other developing countries as they are based on appropriate technological 
needs and experience. 24 
Other researchers support Dahlman and Sercovitch's findings, arguing that India's 
extended period of import-substitution and technological protection for its infant 
industries has saddled the economy with large areas of outdated technologies, an 
inefficient industrial structure, and products which can only find limited markets in lesser 
developed countries. 25 Even Lall is forced to acknowledge in a later study that India's: 
best firms find markets for their accumulated technology in some Third 
World countries, but these are small (and shrinking) markets: technology 
exports and technological development can co-exist with growing 
technological backwardness . . . . The export ... to lesser industrialised 
countries should not conceal the fact that many ... are too obsolete to be 
beneficial to the exporting country itself.26 
The combined effects of the Indian government's anti-export, self-reliance biases 
have blunted incentives for firms to invest and develop technological capabilities, and 
thereby have retarded the growth and exports of the country's defence and manufacturing 
firms, largely because of their lack of exposure to foreign technologies and markets, as 
well as competitors. The specific consequences are elaborated by Lall: 
While stimulating efforts to indigenise production ... such a regime 
encourages firms to remain at a plateau of technological capability. Since 
the market they serve is protected ... against imports of more advanced 
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products (and against entry by foreign investors), it is easier and profitable 
to rest at the technological level they reach initially. Internal competition 
could, in principle, provide a spur to innovation.27 
An outstanding example of how such barriers to trade and technology lead to both 
under-investment in technological development and much wasteful, duplicative 
manufacture of products that could be obtained more cheaply abroad, is the Indian 
automotive industry. This industry still produces a 1950s' vintage car at what amounts 
to twice the cost of a modem Japanese import. Only with the introduction of competitive 
pressures introduced by a recent joint venture between the Indian government and a 
Japanese car maker have the two traditional local firms sought to improve their cars by 
seeking foreign licenses and technical agreements. Even so newer cars are still more 
expensive compared to imports and of poorer quality because the technology of India's 
machine tools and other automotive inputs is way behind other countries such as South 
Korea, Brazil and Taiwan. According to Gumaste, one conspicuous input which is 
missing in the Indian automotive industry is the lack of exposure to international levels 
of technology. "Over protection from international competition and technology is the 
principal factor behind the technological obsolescence of Indian industry. ,,28 
The largely negative impact of the Indian government's trade policies on Indian 
defence and capital goods firms is an important factor in understanding why Brazilian 
firms have outperformed their Indian counterparts (as measured by the technological 
sophistication of Indian defence and manufactured products and exports). This 
comparative assessment is developed further in the following discussion of Brazil's and 
India's technology policies. 
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Technology Policies 
Both Brazil and India have promoted broadly based scientific technology policies 
to stimulate the development of their defence and capital goods industries. However, 
different strategies were adopted by the governments, leading to contrasting results. 
India's massive science and technology "push" strategy has met with little success, partly 
because of the organisation of its "infratechnology" system itself (ivory tower research 
divorced from production, insufficient attention to the needs of industry, over-regulation 
of technology imports), and partly due to the stifling emphasis on self-reliance. 
By contrast, the Brazilian government has relied on a more indirect technology 
strategy. It has tried to create a conducive environment that stimulates the technology 
acquisition and upgrading efforts of firms by providing specialised technical services, 
research and development support, and by encouraging direct links between the users 
(defence firms) and producers of capital goods. The country has also relied on foreign 
investment as a source of both technology and capital. In contrast to India and other 
NICs, Brazil's policy towards direct foreign investment has been extremely open. 
Indeed, in comparison with India and Korea, Brazil also has sustained the largest absolute 
inflows of foreign technology (patents, licenses and technical assistance) and capital 
goods. 
Let us now turn to a more detailed, comparative assessment of how Brazil's and 
India's technology policies have shaped the environment of their respective capital goods 
and defence firms. As will be discussed, the nature of the relationship between a 
government's technology policy and its industries crucially affects the production, 
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dissemination and utilisation of domestic technologies as well as the adaptation and 
modification of foreign technologies. 
Brazil 
A policy of science and technology that distinguishes between autonomy 
(the capacity to decide with independence), and self-SUfficiency (capacity 
to produce in the form of autarky). Our goal must be autonomy .... It is 
super ingenuous that Brazil has the power to advance on all technology 
fronts simultaneously ... The rigorous selection of technologies for 
priority areas is an equally essential strategy for countries that, like Brazil, 
are deficient in technology development. 29 
(A high-ranking minister responsible for Brazilian science and technology affairs) 
In Brazil, technology absorption and development policies have been promoted 
by various state agencies largely out of an awareness of the strategic importance of 
technology for political and economic autonomy, rather than as an appendage to an 
export-led industrialisation policy. The coupling of an explicit technology policy, with 
implicit technological consequences of industrial and trade policies, has led to the 
expansion of exports of Brazilian manufactured goods incorporating relatively high 
technologies. 
Using an implicit market failure approach to explain the role of the Brazilian 
government in facilitating technology development, various analysts have described 
institutional-based technology policies. Analysts, such as Dahlman and Adler concur that 
the facilitating role of the Brazilian government centres around three broad policies: 1) 
The development of a science and technology infrastructure; 2) The encouragement of 
indigenous technological capabilities at the firm level; and 3) The stimulation of demand 
for local technology.30 A brief review of these policies will reinforce the survey-based 
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econometric finding that diversification among capital goods producers into defence 
production was aided indirectly by government-sponsored research and development 
activities. 
1. Development Qf a Science aIKl IechnolQKY Infrastructure 
The most important supply-side government policy has been the creation of 
Brazil's physical and human R&D infrastructure. Since the 1920s various governments 
have established such research institutions as the Technology Research Institute (lPT) in 
Sao Paulo, and the National Institute of Technology (INT) in Rio de Janeiro, as well as 
the National Research Council (CNPq). The importance of the CNPq is evidenced by its 
multiplicity of roles: the formulation and execution of science and technology policies; 
inter-ministry coordination of S & T issues; and the promotion of research and training 
at the university level. 31 
The principal instrument for the implementation of science and technology policy 
has been the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT) and, 
under its control, the National System of Scientific and Technological Development 
(SNDCT). Since the creation of the SNDCT, four Basic Plans have been issued, 
covering the periods 1973-76, 1975-79 1980-85, and 1985-90. The first plan promoted 
an increase in the volume of resources for science and technology by strengthening the 
FNDCT and other financial mechanisms. The 1975-79 plan aimed at broadening the 
supply of science and technology and reinforcing the technological capabilities of national 
firms. The third and fourth plans reflect a reorientation in Brazil's science and 
technology policy, reducing the previous emphasis on highly specific activities and 
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programmes to the idea of "emerging potential" technologies. (e.g., biotechnology, 
artificial intelligence etc.).32 
The relationship of the first two plans for science and technology demonstrate two 
essential underlying factors: 1) A pattern of informal cooperation among various state 
institutions: financial agencies of the Secretariat of Planning, BNDES & FINEP, the 
military ministries, private Brazilian firms, and academic research institutions; and 2) 
An inherent technology strategy of relying initially on licensing white investing 
simultaneously substantial resources in research and development, local design activities, 
and improvement of manufacturing technology for Brazilian state and private enterprises. 
Two programmes, initiated by the Ministry of Aeronautics and the Ministry of 
the Army demonstrate the state's interest in linking the capital goods sector to defence 
production. In PBDCT 73/74 the Ministry of the Army established a priority for the 
research and development of armoured vehicles. 
Based on the experience acquired by some industries [Engesa and 
Bernardini] in Brazil, in the production of heavy tanks and tractors, for 
military and civilian purposes, the Army is going to promote, in 
cooperation with the automotive industry, the development of armoured 
vehicles ... as well as turrets, armaments and armour materials. The joint 
effort carried on by the Army and the Brazilian industry will make it 
possible to obtain armoured equipment, suitable for military purposes 
without need for resorting to the acquiring of technology from abroad.33 
This cooperation with the automotive industry led to various collaborative efforts during 
the mid-to-Iate 1970s between the army and domestic private firms. Biselli, a Sao Paulo-
based company, diversified its production line of chassis for heavy duty trucks for army 
vehicles and tank transporters. Gurgel, a manufacturer of all-terrain vehicles, began to 
produce jeeps for the Army. The Institute for Military Engineering's design for a 
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versatile vehicle capable of being landed by a parachute resulted in the prototype 
development by a Rio-based company, Jamy. 34 
The Air Ministry's programme contained in the PNDCT concentrates on research 
and development of aircraft and aeronautical equipment. The Ministry states that it 
intends to make the country technologically self-sufficient in relation to the materials 
considered basic to the aerospace industry by providing "R & D assistance, standardising 
aircraft and mechanical, electronic equipment. ... The research .. .is concentrated on 
aircraft and gliders, aircraft propulsion systems and engine systems, engineering, 
electronic equipment and non/metallic materials used in the aeronautical industry. dS 
The research institutes attached to the Brazilian armed forces are another vital link 
between science and technology policies at the federal level and domestic private 
industry. On the "push" side these centres direct industrial research and development in 
relation to the broad science and technology planning objectives, or in terms of their own 
specific requirements. On the "pull" side, however, the military research centres are 
receptive to the needs of Brazilian defence-related companies (e.g., quality control and 
materials testing). 
The CTA has received broad financial cooperation from FUNTEC, FINEP and 
the CNPq, and of all the military R&D centres has the closest links to its respective 
industry, Embraer.36 As mentioned in the previous case study, Embraer's creation and 
success owes much to the initial Bandeirante project developed at the CTA, and to the 
availability of highly trained personnel from the ITA. Both the eTA and IFI have been 
instrumental in the technological upgrading of the aircraft industry and its suppliers from 
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the local capital goods sector, through their technology assessment of quality control, 
testing and inspection activities. As Colonel Sergio Vane, former director of the 
Department of Aeronautical Engineering at the CTA observed, "the purpose of the CTA 
as regards the country as a whole is to use this infrastructure of personneL .. means and 
techniques in other sectors, such as the capital goods industry and engineering 
services. ,,31 This view is also widely shared by the Army, and to a lesser extent the 
Navy's military research institutes. 
The Army has had the oldest science and technology policy. Its research and 
development institutes comprise the Army Technological Centre (CTEj, the lnstituto de 
Engenharia Militar (IME), and the IPT, among various others. Its research institutes 
have had a looser relationship with the domestic armoured vehicle industries. The 
Vefculo Blindado Brasileiro (VBB) prototype was created at the 1PT and the engineers 
who worked on the project were later hired by Engesa -- the product of their efforts was 
the armoured car, the Urutu. However, as indicated in the II PND, and by the case 
study of Engesa's development of the Osorio MBT, industry has often wagged the tail 
of the Army. Instead, these institutes have concentrated on broad technology related to 
communications, electronics, metallurgy, and electrical & mechanical engineering, and 
have coordinated with the Institute for Aeronautical Research (IPA) and the Army 
Research and Development Institute (IPD) in missile-related, aerospace research.38 
The Navy has been slow to develop extensive links with Brazil's large 
shipbuilding industry. As the naval case study illustrates, while industry has participated 
in the recent corvette project, with the assistance of the Institute for Military Research 
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and the Navy's CPqM, the nuclear submarine programme has been kept largely within 
the Naval institutes Copesp/ Aramar and its shipyard, AMRJ. 
2. Firm-Level R&D 
To support indigenous technology capabilities at the firm level, the Brazilian state 
has provided subsidised financing through the BNDES' agencies, Scientific and Technical 
Development Fund (FUNTEC) and FINEP. Since its creation in 1964, FUNTEC has 
concentrated on funding education and applied technological research, as well as on 
strengthening local, autonomous industrial technological development, mainly through 
the Subprogram me on the Demand and Utilisation of Technology. In particular, 
FUNTEC has minimised risks for those Brazilian defence and capital goods firms 
interested in technological innovation, and has then tried to support the diffusion of 
technological development acquired or undertaken in industry. Two important defence-
related companies, Embraer and Engesa have been recipients of FUNTEC financing: 
Engesa for the development of a forestry tractor and Embraer for the design and 
construction of electronic components for aircraft. 39 
Working in tandem with FUNTEC is FINEP, whose own financing activities have 
been directed towards priority areas in the capital goods sector. FINEP's programmes 
include: subsidised financing for consulting, feasibility, product development, and 
management studies. It has also used risk-sharing instruments and, to a lesser extent, 
equity participation to foster national firms' technological activities. According to Adler, 
FlNEP's financing activities have been targeted to the needs of small to mid-sized capital 
goods firms rather than large companies. " ... [I]t financed 83 percent of total support 
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cost for technological development of national enterprises in 1973 and 86 percent in 
1978. "40 In the period 1973-89, FINEP subcontracted 1,761 technological support 
operations valued at U.S. $810 million.41 
The programme that supports local private technological development activities 
is ADTEN. The main activities financed through this programme are: R&D for new 
products and processes in agriculture, industry and health; research related to adapting 
imported technologies; purchase and absorption of imported technological packages; and 
the establishment of quality control and R&D centres.42 Together these programmes' 
funding of R&D project support, especially in the early stages of the development of 
Brazil's high technology industries, helped to support the infrastructure necessary for 
successful innovative capabilities at the firm level. 
As revealed in the three-stage model, the Brazilian government's policy of 
protecting the local capital goods sector through the "Law of Similars" was an important 
variable in explaining the movement by capital goods firms into defence production. In 
conjunction, the government, again through the BNDES, has promoted the demand for 
local technology in the form of incentives to purchase domestically produced machinery 
and equipment. An important instrument is FINAME (Agencia Especial de 
Financiamento Industrial). This agency provides competitive, flexible financing for the 
production and commercialisation of domestically manufactured heavy equipment and for 
the development of advanced industrial technologies. 
A separate study links technology exports from Brazilian capital goods firms to 
these firms' reliance on government financing for research and development as well as 
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these firms' use of technology institutes and centres. The author of this study found that 
"of over 80 locally-owned technology exporting companies, 44 (or 55%) benefitted from 
financial support from the government to carry out R&D projects (in many cases in 
association with domestic scientific and technical institutions). 1143 Thus, the Brazilian 
state has acted to guarantee and widen the domestic market for local capital goods firms, 
especially for the more complex products, by reducing the risks associated with 
technological development, adoption and diffusion. 
The Brazilian government has recognised the risk aversion of local firms to 
purchase domestically supplied products and technologies because the net benefits to be 
gained from adopting new technologies or goods embodying those technologies are 
uncertain. In some cases local sources of technology may be more expensive than 
foreign ones, in other cases firms may be willing to pay more for foreign technology or 
products rather than risk using an untried local source. By subsidising purchases of 
domestically developed technologies, the Brazilian government has enabled local 
technology suppliers to gain experience, thereby allowing them to lower costs and 
generate necessary economies of scale. 
India 
In a country of India's size and endowments, self-reliance is inescapable and must 
be at the very heart of technological development. (Government of India)" 
Without enhancing its scientific and technological capacity, India could not be 
economically and politically independent. (NehrutS 
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Unquestionably, the Indian government's technology policies have had a 
significant influence -- both at the firm and sectoral levels -- on the pace, development 
and structure of growth of the country's defence and capital goods industries. In contrast 
to the Brazilian government's primarily indirect role in promoting the technological 
development of these two interrelated industries, the Indian government's intervention 
in these sectors has been extraordinarily invasive. As was explored in the preceding 
chapter, the Brazilian government has used various incentives both to spur firms to 
upgrade their technological capabilities through learning-by-doing, and to ensure 
technological diffusion throughout the defence and capital goods sectors through learning-
from-others. By ensuring such diffusion, the state deliberately stimulates technological 
development through competition between and cooperation among Brazilian firms. 
The Indian government, however, has adopted a narrowly conceived technology 
push approach that uses highly regulatory mechanisms to direct the technological 
capabilities of the defence and manufacturing sectors. There are three major objectives 
of the Indian government's technology policies: 
(1) the creation of a massive scientific infrastructure through the expansion of the 
educational system and the strengthening of government research institutions; 
(2) the promotion of "self-reliant" indigenous technological capability in the 
strategic defence-industrial sectors; 
(3) the control over Indian firms' access to foreign technologies, through 
restrictions on direct foreign investments (FERA) and transfers of technology. 
A discussion of the largely negative impact of all three objectives on the technological 
capabilities of Indian defence and capital goods firms is now developed. 
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1. Scientific Infrastructure 
The establishment of an extensive scientific infrastructure, consisting of 
specialised research and development laboratories as well as consultancy, engineering and 
design organisations has been central to the Indian government's "technology push" 
approach. The Indian government also has expanded the stock of human capital through 
heavy investments in science-related higher education. The purpose of the laboratories 
and institutes is to generate applied technologies in the areas of defence, manufacturing 
and agriculture, which can be transferred to and utilised by industry. Defence-related 
research in the aerospace, nuclear energy and space areas is organised by the Defence 
Research Development Organisation and constitutes the largest proportion of government 
R&D (See Table 5.7, Distribution of Indian Government Spending on Sciences and 
Technology). Industrial research, however, is coordinated by the Council of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR) and its commercialisation arm, the National Research 
Development Corporation (NRDC), and by the Department of Science and Technology 
(DST). 
Established in 1942, the CSIR's primary function is to assist both public and 
private sector industry in technology development, updating, indigenisation, energy 
conservation etc. The CSIR also conducts R&D in its 33 laboratories in areas of 
national, "strategic" priority -- aeronautics, microelectronics, biotechnology, information 
technology -- which the Indian government considers vital to national security and to the 
economic growth of the country.46 To promote the utilisation of the CSIR's research by 
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Table 5.7 
Distribution of Indian Government Spending on Sciences and 
Technology 
CSIR 
DST 
Industrial Research 
• Heavy Industry 
• Mining and Metal Woking 
• Other 
Food Industry 
Atomic Energy 
Aeronautics and Space 
Social Programmes (family planning, health, education, ... ) 
Transportation and Communications 
TOTAL 
TOTAL IN 109 Rs 
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IN.!&. 
16.2 
11.8 
15.0 
4.5 
4.4 
6.1 
15.0 
15.1 
11.0 
7.8 
8.1 
100.0 
15.68 
industry and to act as a link between the research organizations and industry, the NRDC 
was established in 1953.47 
The DST was established in 1970 with the principal responsibilities of promoting 
new areas of science and technology, undertaking or financing research, design and 
development in the universities and private sector, and supporting and coordinating 
national research institutions and scientific bodies. Since 1974, the DST, along with the 
Directorate General of Technical Development, has been charged with promoting 
indigenous technology in the private sector. Specifically related to the promotion of the 
technological development of India's capital goods sector, the latter organization's 
Monitoring Division has been involved in assisting productivity improvements, 
modernisation of plants and facilitating standardisation within the sector. A breakdown 
of the research and development activities within this massive scientific infrastructure 
reveals heavy sectoral concentration. Aggregated and broken down by Government 
Ministries, the Ministry of Defence dominates, accounting for 27 per cent of total 
government (central and state) R&D expenditures, followed by Heavy Industries (25 per 
cent), Petroleum (19%), Communications (14%), and Chemicals and Fertilizers (8%).48 
Despite the Indian government's sustained efforts to develop technology capability 
through promoting the utilisation of government research, on the whole these attempts 
have failed. As Nayar concludes, "The pattern ... was one of the laboratories under 
government auspices carrying out research .. .isolated from the production system .... For 
this reason there was abundant criticism about the lack of linkage between scientific 
research and the productive system [industry]. 1149 According to one estimation, the 
294 
contribution of government research to industrial output during the 1970s-early 1980s 
t so was less than one per cen . 
Subsequent studies on the extent of utilisation of government research by industry 
in the mid-1980s confirm the lack of effective linkages between the R&D institutes and 
industry. Using NRDC data, Alam and Langrish found that "out of a total of 2,015 
processes referred [to the NRDC by the labs] up to 1978, only 44 per cent were licensed 
to industry of which only 18 per cent were reported to have gone into production. "SI 
Their sample indicates that 85 percent of the licensed processes were not put into 
production. Various analyses have reasoned that the alienation between government 
R&D and private sector industry continues because of institutional failures (e.g., poor 
bureaucratic communication and coordination) and because of the undue influence of 
"self-reliant" objectives of the kind of R&D undertaken by the government laboratories. 
As one eminent science planner observed: 
That we have not made much progress in growth of technological self-
reliance in spite of the significant amounts of money being spent on 
science and technology is a measure of the alienation that exists between 
R&D and industry, and a reflection on the implementation of an avowed 
policy.52 
In relation to the first set of analyses, researchers have been divided over the 
extent and kinds of institutional linkages. Attributing the underutilisation of government-
sponsored R&D to the need to strengthen links between industry (including defence) and 
the government laboratories, Valluri suggests: "There does not seem to be a reliable 
mechanism in the concerned government departments to monitor the progress towards 
technological self-reliance. ,,53 In particular, the poor communication and coordination 
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between the Ministry of Defence, the research organisations and defence production firms 
have been singled out. A Secretary of Defence Production and Supplies admitted this 
institutional failure in testimony to a review conducted by the Indian Parliament's 
Committee on Public Undertakings: 
We in this Ministry have not evolved any special mechanism for 
monitoring R and D projects of defence public sector undertakings. I 
concede that this is an area where we need an improvement over what we 
have been doing in the past. 54 
Nevertheless, other analysts of India's technology policies argue that what is needed is 
not further institutionalisation, but decentralisation. Citing the NRDC as an illustration, 
Chakrabati has argued that it has imposed only another "new organisational and 
procedural barrier between research institutes and potential users. ,,55 
Analysts have also criticised the Indian government's bias towards basic and 
adaptive R&D due to its obsession on self-reliant technology. "Funding for research 
institutions has been expected to form a sheet-anchor for the growth of an indigenous 
technology base, as distinct from an industrial manufacturing base," observed one former 
defence research official.56 Desai, too, has long argued that: 
India has an important asset in the form of national laboratories which 
should be used, not for import substitution in technology as at present, nor 
for facilitating the indigenisation of imported technologies as captive R&D 
used by firms but to support the large-scale, long-range cooperative R&D 
by industries. 57 
This sentiment is also shared by critics of India's poor defence production record. "The 
country, "suggests Bajpai: 
should avoid the sentimental error of carrying out R&D in areas where the 
technology is available for ready purchase, or of duplicating the effort in 
areas which have been covered elsewhere .... In the name of self-reliance 
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avoidable but precious effort is at present being devoted in our research 
establishments to reinventing wheels. S8 
Finally, there are the promising and interesting research findings of Alam and 
Langrish, who suggest that the failure to transfer government-sponsored technologies to 
industry derives in part from poor incentive structures within the CSIR/NRDC 
bureaucracies (e.g., low salaries and royalty payments for these scientists), but primarily 
from the skewed size distribution of Indian private sector firms.s9 Their study found that 
while small firms had considerable interest in government research, the technology 
transferred from the government labs often required further development and these firms 
lacked the necessary technical and marketing resources to produce and/or market the 
product successfully. Though large Indian firms were likely to possess such resources, 
they expressed little interest in government R&D because of their preference for proven 
imported technologies. 
2. Private Sector R&D 
In recognition of these collective criticisms, the Indian government, beginning in 
the mid-1970s, encouraged private industry to undertake its own R&D. The direct 
incentives included tax concessions, foreign exchange allowances and the relaxation of 
some licensing requirements. For instance, private sector R&D units recognised by the 
DST receive a fiscal concession in which 125 per cent tax write-off is available for all 
capital and revenue expenditures incurred in research and development. Other incentives 
include liberalising imports of certain capital goods and raw materials for R&D, and 
297 
special investment allowances for firms utilising R&D transferred through the national 
laboratories. 
Data provided by the DST indicates that private sector R&D activity has expanded 
in response to these incentives. In 1950 there were only 13 R&D units in the private 
industrial sector. By the mid-1980s, however, there were an estimated 816 "recognised" 
R&D facilities. 6O According to data compiled by the DST, private industry outspends the 
public sector in respect to total industrial R&D expenditure by a small amount (Rs 
236.75 crore as against 235.76 crore 1984-85).61 The main areas of private sector R&D 
are in the chemicals, electrical equipment, pharmaceutical, and transportation industries.62 
Using DST data, Lall reports that there is a close correlation between firm size and R&D 
spending amongst private firms. R&D spending "declines consistently with firm size, 
though at the very tail end this is slightly reversed, presumably because of high R&D 
spending by some small electronics firms. 1163 
None of these broad indicators, however, reflect the nature and quality of research 
and development activity by Indian capital goods and defence firms. In a separate study 
of the Indian government's technology policies, Alam concluded that the qualitative effect 
of government incentives in directly promoting indigenous research and development 
capabilities by Indian firms has been marginal. "While these incentives may encourage 
firms to set up R&D departments and to even take up preliminary research activities," 
Alam states that, "they are rarely responsible for making a firm technologically 
dynamic. "64 Furthermore, Alam, among others, has pointed out that there is a serious 
upward bias created by the DST incentive structure. For example, the R&D tax 
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incentives only encourage firms to report expenses incurred in other activity as R&D 
figures and to inflate generally their R&D expenditures and not the achievements of 
Two separate studies report that the increase in private firm-level R&D has 
occurred largely as a consequence of the poor reputation of the government laboratories. 
The government has largely failed in its efforts to turn its laboratories into "engines" of 
technological advance. Desai writes, "When forced to go to them, Indian firms have 
preferred to increase their own R&D effort. ,,66 Furthermore, despite government 
incentives to support technological development at the firm level, "large sectors of Indian 
industry have fallen behind advances in technology abroad, and show technological 
. t ,,67 mcompe ence. 
3. Technology Import Policy 
In contrast to Brazil, the Indian government's technology import policies are 
exceedingly restrictive. The motivations underlying these policies are three-fold: to 
conserve foreign exchange, to promote self-reliance, and to control or direct foreign 
technologies in strategic defence and industrial sectors. There are six major policy 
mechanisms the Indian government employs to regulate transfers of foreign technologies. 
First, to lower the cost of foreign technologies for Indian firms, the government 
prescribes royalty payment ceilings for various industries. Currently, the computation 
of royalty payments is determined by the net selling price, which is calculated by 
deducting the cost of imported components and components brought out in India. Thus, 
royalty payments are normally restricted to three to five per cent of sales and subject to 
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a 40 per cent income tax, leaving between 1.5 to 2 per cent for the foreign collaborator -
- hardly attractive or competitive by international standards. 68 (Royalty rates of five to 
ten per cent net of tax are the norm for international technology contracts.) 
Second, the government imposes restrictions on the duration of collaboration 
agreements. In an attempt to induce faster technological adoption by Indian firms, the 
standard duration of these contracts was lowered from ten to five years. This time 
period, however, is widely considered inadequate for the successful transfer of complex 
technologies. 
Third, technology transfer agreements, which limit the potential of Indian firms 
to export, are prohibited. This government policy has negatively affected both the supply 
of technology and its quality without having significantly increased the possibility of 
exports. 69 A fourth mechanism is the ban on the use of a supplier's trademark in the 
domestic market. Fifth, various government laws have weakened the protection of 
international patents. 
Lastly, even when foreign technology collaboration agreements meet all these 
conditions, they are subject to a lengthy review and approval process: first by the 
Technology Evaluation Committee -- composed of members of the DGTD, the DST, the 
CSIR, and NRDC -- and then by the concerned government department. Evidence of 
the veto power of the latter is provided by Lall. He maintains that the "extremely 
nationalistic Department of Electronics has been able to so restrict technology inflows as 
to set Indian electronics firms back by over a decade in a very fast-moving technology. "70 
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The broader impact of India's restrictive technology import policies is suggested 
by various researchers.?l The conventional view is that while such mechanisms have led 
a number of India's larger industrial firms to buy technology skillfully, these policies, 
nevertheless, tend to discourage major research and development activity related to 
design capability or process innovations. In addition, such import restrictions have led 
to the gradual technological obsolescence of some sectors of Indian industry because the 
technology payment restrictions prevent Indian firms from obtaining technology in its full 
breadth and depth, and from keeping abreast of world technology. 
One example is India's public sector steel industry, which employs technology 
that is at least three decades old.72 This technological obsolescence is acknowledged as 
a major deterrent to the potential competitiveness of India's defence and manufactured 
exports. Ahluwalia succinctly comments: 
The restrictive policy toward import of technology implied inadequate 
access to the latest technology [and] .. .led to a major and widening 
technological gap in India relative to the rest of the world. This not only 
prevented upgradation of the quality of domestic production, thereby 
reducing the competitiveness of Indian exports in the world markets, but 
also led to inefficient use of raw materials, particularly energy, with its 
wide-ranging impact on the cost-structure in the economy.?] 
In essence, rather than achieving self-reliance in defence and capital goods 
production, the government's defensive policy of restricting imports of technology has 
contributed to the technological dependence and stagnation of Indian firms. Lall argues 
that India's technological promotion policies have been pushed too far. Pointing to the 
example of Japan, he notes that: 
after all, Japan continued to import massive amounts of technology while 
fostering its own R&D and absorptive efforts. It did not attempt "self-
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reliance" in all technologies at all costs - its main concern was to get its 
manufacturing industries up to competitive world standards and then to use 
its accumulated knowledge to establish leadership in selected areas. Its 
interventionist regime was geared to economic efficiency, which India's 
patently is not. 74 
While the successful experience of Brazilian firms highlights the importance of 
combining transfers of foreign technologies with in-house R&D and learning-by-doing 
activities, Indian firms have yet to adopt such a longer-term integrated approach, and 
thereby develop stable, smooth learning trajectories. Indeed, as a former Chairman of 
HAL acknowledged, " ... we are not making the investments necessary to keep technology 
current. ... If today we import technology but do not make the investments that. .. are 
needed to develop from this foundation forward ... then we are going to be in a sterile 
situation of repeated imports of technology. ,,75 Recognition of such costs explains why 
India has finally begun to liberalise its policies on technology imports, thereby providing 
industries, such as transport, machine tools, computers, and electronics, access to more 
advanced foreign technologies. 
Impact Qf Indian Government's TechnolQgy Policy QIl Firms 
As this author argues, the intersection of the Indian government's technology 
import policy and strategic firm behaviour jointly have constrained technological 
development as well as diffusion. The two most pernicious effects of the Indian 
government's technology import policy relate to the relatively low price paid for 
technology through royalty payments and the short duration of collaboration agreements. 
Bell & Scott-Kemmis conclude that both effects have prevented Indian firms from 
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obtaining foreign technology in its full breadth and depth and from keeping abreast of 
world technology. 76 
Contrary to the common view that foreign suppliers deliberately limit the 
technological content of collaboration agreements by minimising the knowledge and 
expertise they make available, are the findings provided by these two researchers. In 
their discussion with British technology suppliers to Indian firms, Bell & Scott-Kemmis 
found that: 
almost 75 per cent stated they would have been willing to broaden the 
initial provision of information and know how ... Furthermore, over 50 per 
cent of the suppliers would also have been willing to assist their Indian 
partners develop their own capacities to undertake technological 
improvement activities ... .In both these cases, the great majority of 
suppliers emphasised that they would have provided such technological 
assistance if the level of payment had been higher to recuperate the costs 
involved and that this was the only significant condition.77 
This finding is reinforced by recent studies conducted by Alam, Cooper and the Cabinet 
Secretariat of the Government of India.78 These studies underscore the fact that 
government restrictions on payments of transfers of foreign technologies have severely 
constrained the technological content as measured by the older age of the technology 
transferred and by the limited provision of training/technical assistance. 
A number of Indian firms agree that government restrictions generally limit their 
ability to obtain necessary technological assistance. According to a senior manager in 
an electronics product firm: 
We find that some suppliers are fairly willing to provide more 
comprehensive know-how but they want extra payment for that. This is 
a problem because of the government restrictions on what can be paid, so 
acquiring more training, more assistance and more comprehensive 
technology is difficult. .. .If firms want to pay more to acquire more they 
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either find another channel of payment, try to convince the supplier to 
accept less, find trade-offs on other issues, or give Up.79 
A report by the Economic Administration's Reforms Commission regarding the 
effect of government policies (including trade and industrial) on technology development 
and acquisition also criticised the low royalty payment restriction. 
In the prevailing environment of controls and clearances ... [Indian firms] 
try and operate within these norms and guidelines so as to obtain speedy 
clearances and get ahead with their projects, making such compromises in 
regard to quality or other considerations as necessary. Besides ... the 
regulation of capacity ... through industrial licensing and the restrictive 
attitude to imports protect the Indian entrepreneurs from the rigours of 
competition, and quality is not a condition of survival. This results in an 
acquiescence in and a perpetuation of low level and out-moded 
technologies. 80 
Evidence of the technological content/royalty payment trade-off is provided by an 
UNCTAD study of 20 of India's leading capital goods firms.81 An examination of the 
age pattern of imported designs transferred to the sample firms under foreign licensing 
is indicated in Table 5.8, Age of Designs Imported Under Collaboration. In 53 per cent 
of the collaboration agreements, designs were introduced into the Indian market more 
than nine years after their introduction into the world market. Very few designs reflected 
more recent technology (e.g., only 12 per cent involved the supply of designs between 
one and five years). 
A number of scholars have suggested that the government's policy of limiting the 
duration of collaboration agreements has had an additional deleterious impact on the 
technological capabilities of Indian firms. One negative effect is that it limits the benefits 
of foreign collaboration to Indian firms. The five-year duration may be too short for 
many firms to absorb and "unpackage" the technology, as well as to begin production. 
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TableS.8 
Age of Designs Imported Under CoUaboration bI the Sample FU"IDS 
Machine tools Equipment for Electrical equipment Total for complex 
Age in I process industry III capital goods 
years II (I +11 + III) 
DT FT Fe Total DT FT Fe Total DT FT Fe Total DT FT Fe 
1-5 1 
- 1 2 - - - - 2 - 1 3 3 - 2 
(12.5) (-) (20.0) 
6-8 2 I 2 5 2 1 
-
3 4 1 2 7 8 3 4 
(33.3) (33.3) (40.0) 
9 above 5 1 1 7 4 4 
-
8 4 1 3 8 13 6 4 
(54.2) (66.7) (40.0) 
Total No. 
of 8 2 4 14 6 5 
-
11 10 2 6 18 24 9 10 
agreements 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
DT = Domestic firm with technical collaboration. 
FT = Foreign minority joint ventures. 
FO = Foreign-controlled joint ventures (including subsidiaries of foreign firms). 
Source: UNCT AD. Technology Issues in the Capital Goods Sector: A Case Study of uading Machinery Products in India, 1983. 
Total 
5 
(11.6) 
15 
(34.9) 
23 
(53.5) 
43 
(100.0) 
\I') 
o 
C'i 
Given such time constraints, Indian firms are forced to narrow the extent of their 
technology transfer agreements. 
SECTION II: TIlE FIRM 
The previous section discussed how the Brazilian and Indian governments' trade 
and technology policies have shaped, via inducements and restrictions, the environment 
of their defence and capital goods firms. It is difficult, however, to relate these firms' 
technology activities, observed in the case studies, entirely to the governments' 
application of specific, direct promotion policies and instruments. Rather, the 
comparative case studies point to the relative ineffectiveness of such policies and 
instruments. The survey-based, econometric model in the Brazilian case study chapter 
found that government policies had a marginal impact on the technological development 
and subsequent export success of the major defence/capital goods firms. Indeed, the 
conclusion drawn from the chapter is that Brazilian firms benefitted from the absence of 
(restrictive) government policies. In the India chapter, one is confronted by a dismal 
record of manufacturing failures in the defence and commercial sectors, despite the 
government's promotion of extensive science and technology policies. 
What then accounts for the competitiveness of Brazilian firms or the poorer 
performance of Indian enterprises? As argued in the introduction to this chapter, firm-
level technological capabilities and strategies are important determinants of international 
competitiveness. As acknowledge by an OECD study, "No amount of national provision 
of physical or human resources or political support will lead to competitiveness and 
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dynamic growth if the firms concerned cannot bring the package together in the form of 
b"l" " 1182 viable capa I Itles. 
To understand more clearly the factors affecting Brazil's and India's divergent 
experiences, we need to focus our analysis at the level of the firm, and to examine 
comparatively Brazilian and Indian firms' respective efforts and strategies to develop 
technological capabilities. Indeed, various studies from the literature on industrialisation 
and technology development have argued that the poorer industrial performance of some 
NICs is due to the absence of sustained efforts by firms to acquire and use the 
capabilities necessary for continuous technological development. For example, according 
to Bell: 
the accumulation of technological capabilities is not accomplished through 
costless, automatic learning-by-doing ... [it] takes conscious efforts to 
develop a technological strategy, to invest in resources for technological 
changes, and progressively to accumulate technological capability. (Italics 
added for emphasis.)83 
It is equally important to understand why a firm chooses a particular technology 
and what factors affect firms' abilities to choose in the first place. Thus, a necessary 
corollary to the analysis of the divergent performances of Brazilian and Indian firms must 
describe the firms' environment, particularly in terms of competitive pressures, and 
explain how the environment influences the technological behaviour of the firm. 
In an attempt to elucidate the complex strategic interaction between a firm's 
behaviour and the government policies that condition its environment, this section is 
divided into three parts. The first assesses comparatively the technological efforts and 
strategies of Brazilian and Indian firms. The second analyses how environmental 
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variables, such as firm size, degree of vertical integration, low product specialisation, 
and market concentration influence the efforts by Brazilian and Indian firms to develop 
an indigenous technological capability. In the final part, the author, borrowing from the 
game theoretic literature, describes the strategic interaction between rival firm behaviour 
and government policies. This discussion provides the basis for understanding why 
Indian defence and capital goods firms are technologically both dependent and stagnant 
in comparison to their Brazilian counterparts. 
Finn-Level Strategies Towards Technological Development 
As the case studies illustrated, both Brazilian and Indian firms have relied heavily 
on inputs of foreign technology, primarily via licensing activities. However, one is led 
to the conclusion that Brazil's firms, such as Embraer, Engesa and Avibras, have been 
far more effective than, for example, India's Hindustan Aeronautics, in ensuring that 
foreign technologies contribute to the development of indigenous manufacturing and 
design capabilities. Clearly the technological efforts made and strategies pursued by 
Brazilian firms to adapt, assimilate, and improve the technology transferred are important 
explanatory factors. As is argued in this section, the successful technological 
development of Brazil's defence and capital goods firms resulted from these firms' own 
long-term strategic efforts to build systematically on foreign technological inputs --
licensing, coproduction arrangements -- and on their own accumulated research and 
development experiences. To ascertain the importance of technology strategy on firms' 
competitiveness, let us now tum to Brazilian and Indian firms' contrasting approaches 
towards technological development. 
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An immediate factor that differentiates Brazilian and Indian firms is their 
respective motivations for utilising license agreements as a means to augment their 
technological capabilities. A major study of the capital goods industries of various 
developing countries reported that Indian firms have used licensing agreements "at an 
early stage or even at the time of the establishment of the firm, as in the case of some 
leading firms in India. ,,84 By comparison, "in the case of the Brazilian domestic firms, 
the practice of concluding licensing arrangements relating to the manufacture of mostly 
complex capital goods started relatively late in their lives, on average twenty-three years 
. ti d' ,,85 after thelr oun atlOn .... 
Various other studies reinforce this divergent licensing strategy between Brazilian 
and Indian firms. For example, an UNCTAD study of India's leading manufacturing 
enterprises found that an Indian firm tends to pursue, "a static strategy of rapid 
diversification under foreign licensing to maximise short-run profits, rather than a 
dynamic strategy of increasing its market share ... through product innovations based on 
its own development of design capabilities.86 The author in her interviews with Indian 
capital goods firms also found that licensing was used as defensive measure to prevent 
loss of market share or entry by a potential competitor via rival pre-emption (A firm 
strategy that is discussed at length in Section III). Teubal's study of a few select 
Brazilian capital goods firms provides an interesting contrast to Indian firm licensing 
behaviour. He maintains that Brazilian firms consider foreign licensing and other "know-
hoW" agreements to be a useful, and in some cases, a necessary condition for 
diversification and shifting into more complex, but technologically related product lines.87 
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That Brazilian firms have clearly focused on assimilating foreign technologies 
purchased at each stage, building on them and progressively moving assistance to higher 
and more specific levels is extraordinarily important because such a technology strategy 
actually conditions the successful use of a license. In other words, the accumulated 
technological capacity of a firm seeking or implementing a license decisively affects the 
outcome of its use. It can affect, for example: a) whether and the extent to which 
technological problems are correctly defined and anticipated; b) the appropriateness of 
the choice of technology and the supplier; and c) the negotiation of and conditions for 
the agreement. 88 Whether or not adaptive efforts will follow the acquisition of a license, 
however, depends on firms' efforts, particularly research and development activities. 
(Obviously firms' own technological efforts may be influenced in part by government 
incentive (or disincentive) structures.) We shall now address these themes returning to 
the Brazilian and Indian case studies. 
Brazil 
Despite the varying experiences of the firms surveyed by the author, Brazilian 
capital goods and defence producers shared broad strategies towards the development and 
integration of both domestic and imported technologies within the firm. The impact of 
these shared approaches, taken as a whole, may explain the relationship of increasing 
technological content with the expansion of Brazilian manufactured and defence exports. 
As revealed in Table 5.9, Firm Strategies to Augment Technological Capability, 
Brazilian firms have commonly used seven strategies to enhance their technological 
capabilities. These include: 
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(1) Internal research and development activities; 
(2) Use of imported capital goods; 
(3) Hiring of foreign personnel; 
(4) Use of specialised training and educational programmes for their employees; 
(5) Use of government, military or university research institutes; 
(6) Licensing and coproduction arrangements; 
(7) TNe technology transfers to Brazilian subsidiaries. 
Though ten per cent of the firms surveyed relied on technology transfers from their 
parent transnational corporations, since this strategy does not apply to wholly Brazilian-
owned firms, we will leave it aside, and concentrate on the remaining six strategies. 
By far the most widely used means of technology development was internal 
research and development activities: 84 out of the sample's 94 firms were engaged in 
their own research and development. The sectors, which were most actively engaged in 
R&D were communications equipment (5), fabricated metal products (12), automotive 
(5), aircraft (5), and missiles/small arms (7). Of the 65 firms that relied on imports of 
capital goods, the missiles/small arms (8), and automotive (5) were most prominent. A 
total of 59 companies considered the hiring of highly skilled Brazilians as well as the 
sending of personnel abroad for specialised training to be important means of increasing 
technological development. Of these firms, aircraft (5) and automotive (5) dominated. 
Fourth on the list was reliance on external research and development institutes with 41 
firms, of which the leader was the aircraft industry (9), followed by missiles/small arms 
(4). 
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Thirty-four firms used licensing/coproduction arrangements. The sectoral leader 
again was aircraft (4), then split equally (three each) between shipping, missiles and 
metal products. Finally, the hiring of foreign personnel was a strategy employed by 26 
firms, of which missiles (4), aircraft (3), chemical products (3), and non-ferrous metals 
(3), accounted for half of the responses. By combining these strategies into three distinct 
groups a clearer, integrated approach towards technological development at the firm level 
emerges. 
The first is the encouragement of active technology absorption by means of a 
pragmatic approach that assimilates foreign and domestic technology sources: licensing 
and coproduction activities in conjunction with in-house research and development. 
Erber has called this strategy of combining indigenous R&D and reliance on foreign 
technology through licensing, "walking on two legs" .89 His research on the Brazilian 
capital goods industry indicates that one of the legs -- licensing activities -- has proven 
to be extremely beneficial in a number of important ways. First, by relying on a tried 
product through licensing for part of its product range, the firm diminishes the technical 
and economic uncertainties inherent in new product development. It can then concentrate 
on its own products, "reducing the overall risk of failure .... " to the firm.90 This 
approach reflects the strategy of Embraer in the AMX programme. 
Second, if a firm has an independent technological capability, it can apply the 
designs, skills and fabrication technology (know-how and know-why) transferred via 
licensing to other manufacturing areas. A final advantage of licensing may be the 
reduction of delivery times. As Erber notes, "[t]he development of designs is a very 
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time-consuming process ... especially when the product is new for the enterprise and 
more so in the case of capital goods subject to high performance requirements ... 91 The 
same is particularly true for defence products and such an approach is best represented 
by Engesa' s strategy of partnership with its key foreign and domestic suppliers. 
The mail questionnaire survey responses also provide important information in 
understanding the reasons why Brazil's defence and capital goods producers have used 
licensing to augment their technological capacities. Table 5.10, Reasons for Licensing, 
outlines the technical and commercial reasons for licensing and coproduction as measured 
by the frequency of responses by the sample firms. Two dominant complementary 
explanations emerge for licensing: The first -- in terms of its high response frequency -
- is procurement specifications by firms' customers. One may recall that for custom-built 
capital goods, especially in the defence and transportation sectors, customers will have 
special requirements, e.g., engines and avionics for aircraft, optronics, engines and guns 
for tanks. Furthermore, in some markets, licensing may be a sine qua non for entry, 
e.g., imposed by the customer due to high performance and reliability requirements or 
because of traditional links with some suppliers. 
The second reason for licensing is a technical one, namely licensing amongst this 
sample has been most often used to acquire designs. Licensing for acquiring technical 
assistance or because of competitive pressures related to the structure of the industry, or 
threats posed by other suppliers are other explanations. Together these four reasons 
account for 78 per cent of the basis for licensing activities by Brazilian firms. 
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This corporate strategy of combining licensing with a firm's own investment in 
internal R&D capability is aptly reflected in the following quotation from a leading 
Brazilian capital goods producer: 
We ought to draw the benefit of large international R&D investment, 
choosing that technology that helps us to solve our difficulties; at the same 
time, we have got to invest ... in the development of our own technology, 
mainly in those areas most favourable to us. This way we shall improve 
our bargaining power vis-a-vis our foreign partners, placing ourselves on 
an equal footing; in a position to exchange technology rather than to rely 
on foreign technology. 92 
The second strategy that Brazilian defence and capital goods producing firms have 
used to enhance their technological capabilities, and hence competitiveness, is the usage 
of what Dahlman labels "specialised technological agents" -- research institutes, 
information centres, consulting engineering firms, universities. 93 As Dahlman argues, 
the information flows between producing firms and specialised technological agents are 
often extraordinarily important because, "[u]nlike competing firms, whose interest is to 
limit diffusion, the interest of the specialised technological agents is to carry out 
diffusion. ,,94 
In the Brazilian case study chapter, firms' usage ofthe domestic and technological 
infrastructure, particularly the research and development institutes of the armed forces 
(the CTA, CTEJ has been very high. Indeed, the regression model, found in Chapter 
3, reinforces the importance of access to these specialized technological agents among 
all military producers as well as those of the defence subsectors. The aircraft and missile 
industries, as theorised earlier, have the strongest links to the CT A and affiliated centres. 
Eighty-six per cent of the surveyed firms in the aircraft-related industries and 83 per cent 
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of missile-related companies said that they relied on the CT A as a means to upgrade their 
technological capabilities. The army and naval sub sectors had the least strong links to 
their respective military research institutes, in part reflecting lower levels of technology 
inherent in manufacturing these goods, and because of the broader and more diversified 
linkages to the automotive and other transport industries. About 41 per cent of the 
armoured car/tank subsector relied on research and development centres provided by the 
CTE
x 
and INPE, and 40 per cent of the naval industries actively sought the participation 
of the IP~. The proximity of these technological agents is an important source for the 
information flows needed by firms for adaptations and innovations in manufacturing 
products as well as in new investments. The linkage between Brazilian firms and 
research centres has crucially aided these firms' capabilities and international 
competitiveness because of the lowered information search costs for firms -- a point that 
is developed shortly. 
A third strategy pursued by Brazil's defence and capital goods firms is heavy 
investment in human capital formation, either by hiring specialised foreign personnel or 
primarily by providing employees with specialised education and training programmes, 
through universities and technical colleges in Brazil as well as overseas. As Bell notes, 
firms need not accumulate technological capacity only by creating it. If the skills and 
knowledge are not available within the firm, they "may be acquired through the simple 
mechanism of hiring the people who embody those resources. ,,9.5 Again, the proximity 
of the graduate aerospace institute, ITA, has been an important source both for training 
as well as hiring purposes of some Brazilian firms. For example, during Avibras' peak 
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production period, approximately 55 per cent of its engineers and technicians were 
former IT A graduates. 96 Similar studies involving machinery producing firms in Brazil 
and Argentina indicate that hiring readily available human resources was an important 
component in these firms' learning processes.97 
In terms of training, the case studies demonstrate that all of Brazil's leading 
defence firms have used extensive training programmes for their personnel, often in 
conjunction with licensing and coproduction arrangements. Close examination of a 
number of other studies suggests that various kinds of formalised training were often far 
more important as sources of technological capacity than were forms of doing-based 
learning. For example, Dahlman emphasises the importance of the massive technology 
training efforts undertaken by the Usiminas steel company in Brazil. Even during the 
earliest investment stage, when Brazilian engineers were allocated to work alongside their 
Japanese counterparts, there was also extensive training in Japan. 
This technology strategy involved a more active and explicit training approach 
than one in which learning was "passively" acquired through mere participation. 
Although various kinds of "doing" played some role in augmenting the technological 
capacity of the firms involved, the effort made to undertake explicit training was 
probably much more significant. The explicit investment in the acquisition of 
technological capabilities by Brazil's defence and capital goods firms can now be 
dramatically contrasted with the experiences of Indian firms. 
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India 
Unlike the positive experience with foreign licensing of Brazilian firms, only 
rarely has the technological content of these agreements made significant additions to the 
technological bases of India's defence and capital goods firms. Three important factors 
help explain Indian firms' poorer technology acquisition and development strategies. 
The first relates to an earlier discussion regarding Indian firms' defensive use of 
licensing either through rapid diversification or rival pre-emption. Both cases suggest 
that firms' accumulated technology experiences and capabilities may be relatively shallow 
and limited. A major survey of both British and Indian firm managers and engineers 
involved in technological collaboration agreements confirms this picture of limited 
technological dynamism.98 For example, approximately 50 per cent of the British 
suppliers interviewed in this study considered that their Indian partners had not acquired 
the capacity to manufacture a new or improved product. In almost all of these cases 
considered to have been relative or complete failures, the suppliers indicated the limited 
technical and managerial capabilities of their Indian partners. 
Successful collaboration, on the other hand, was invariably related to prior 
learning experiences of Indian firms. Accordingly, many of the foreign suppliers 
emphasised the importance and need for a close and extended relationship with the Indian 
firms in order to transfer successfully the know-how and know-why which could 
contribute to these firms' capacities to pursue trajectories of continuous technical change. 
However, because of the limited duration and possibility of renewal of these 
collaboration agreements, such vital technology flows were effectively blocked. 
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A second issue pertains to Indian firms' choices of technologies. The technology 
selected will affect a firm's potential ability to adapt the technology to local conditions, 
to modify it to sustain productivity improvements, and to move closer to the international 
technology frontier. Teece's conceptualisation of "path dependency" is useful in the 
above context: 
A firm's core business ... stems from the underlying natural trajectory 
embedded in the firm's knowledge base .... Hence, a firm's initial point 
of entry in a technological regime, and the trajectories/paths which are 
initially selected, will define in large measure the kinds of competencies 
in certain areas. 99 
The consequences of path dependency are well demonstrated in the case studies 
of Indian defence firms. In choosing to acquire the very latest in foreign high 
technologies, presumably to attain an equal footing with the advanced Western countries 
(the Light Combat Aircraft and the Advanced Light Helicopter projects for example), 
Indian firms were locked into a situation of continuously receding from the frontier as 
it advanced. In contrast, by selecting technologies behind the frontier (turbo-powered 
aircraft), Brazilian firms were able to open technological "black boxes" in ways that led 
to their progressive development. 
A third factor explaining why the technological content of many foreign licensing 
agreements are both narrow and shallow is that Indian importing firms' strategies and 
efforts towards foreign technology acquisition are similarly narrow and shallow. 
Evidence of such firm-level failure is reported by Bell and Scott-Kemmis: 
the primary reason for ineffective absorption appeared not to be the 
inherent difficulty of absorption. The problem appeared to be largely a 
result of inadequate efforts to absorb the technology .... The immediate 
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reason ... seemed to lie within the firms themselves and associated with the 
firms' approaches to commercial and technological development. 1oo 
The survey conducted by these two researchers found that in over hal f of the 
collaboration agreements examined, the Indian partner's objective did not extend beyond 
acquiring the capability to carry out basic manufacturing activities. The objective of 
developing capacities for improving the imported technology appeared to have had some 
influence on the technological content in only 20 per cent of the cases. IOI 
An UNCTAD study of leading Indian capital goods manufacturers, including 
some defence firms, provides concrete evidence for this negative assessment of Indian 
firms' efforts. As indicated in Table 5.11, Elements of Technology Trans/erred Under 
Licensing, Indian capital goods firms, like their Brazilian counterparts, sought licensing 
agreements as a means to secure designs -- over fifty per cent. Yet, compared to 
Brazil's capital goods and defence firms, very little emphasis was paid by Indian firms 
to other equally important and complementary means of improving their technological 
capabilities. A prominent Indian economist, Bagchi, concurs with this assessment, 
observing that, "the experience of such countries as Japan and South Korea and the 
example of exceptional enterprises in India indicate, successful absorption of borrowed 
technology requires substantial in-house expenditure on research and development and 
adoptive engineering. "102 Referring specifically to the defence sector, one Indian defence 
official has written: 
Manufacture of a product under license from abroad does not make us 
self-generating. This practice is more in the nature of an intravenous drip 
for a sick patient. Unless it is accompanied by other relevant treatment, 
the patient may be doomed to die ... .It is only when we understand the 
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scientific, technical, engineering and design principles that we can claim 
to have imported the latest technologies. 103 
While Brazilian firms clearly assigned a high priority to the training and hiring 
of specialised personnel, Indian firms have made relatively little use of licensing 
agreements to secure technical assistance through sending personnel abroad for training. 
Referring back to Table 5.11, only 13 per cent of licensing agreements included 
arrangements for technical assistance, and only 17 per cent incorporated specialised 
personnel training. Bell & Scott-Kemmis found that neither British technicians' visits to 
India nor Indian visits to technology suppliers were included in half the technology 
collaboration agreements. Access to laboratories and design offices of the British 
suppliers was also rarely included. This narrow technology acquisition pattern by Indian 
firms was noted by one U.K. engineering firm: 
The Indian government and many Indian firms are on the wrong track. 
You would think that they would be trying to maximise technology 
transfer and building a basis for development into the future. But what 
they do is negotiate the price for technology to such a low level that 
suppliers do not really transfer technology at all. The Indians often don't 
concern themselves with what is technology transfer but just focus on 
price. Through this agreement (the Indian partner) will not have the 
capacity to develop this technology .... At present they don't get technology 
transfer, just designs. 104 
Another area in which Indian firms are comparatively weaker than their Brazilian 
counterparts is their neglect of the importance of learning through informal searching. lOS 
One study of the more successful NICs indicates, "The acquisition of technological 
capability ... comes from conscious efforts to monitor what is being done, to try new 
things, to keep track of developments throughout the world .... "106 One reason why 
Indian firms bypass this step, in essence failing to search for better technological 
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solutions, is that the costs, particularly for India's many small-sized capital goods firms 
are too great. As we have seen in the case of Brazil, these costs can be reduced if firms 
tum to specialised technological agents that are able to capture economies of scale in 
their searches and are knowledgeable about what technologies will work in local 
conditions. Unfortunately, the characteristic fragmentation and poor coordination 
between India's massive technostructure and the country's defence and manufacturing 
firms often preclude such diffusion of information. 
In summarising this comparison of Brazilian and Indian firms' technological 
strategies, one can begin to separate the effect of firms' own strategies from the impact 
of governments' trade and technology policies. The relative technological performance 
and export success of Brazilian defence and manufacturing firms was not an automatic 
outcome of government promotion policies. Rather, it resulted from these firms' 
conscious efforts to identify what they needed from the acquisition of foreign technology, 
and from efforts to absorb and complement that technology with their own related R & 
D activity. In a significant number of instances, however, such efforts to acquire 
additional technological capabilities seem to have been induced by the need to respond 
to stimuli and demand for technical change; hence the importance of a firm's external 
environment. 
In India, too, it appears that the overall impact of technology policies may have 
been limited for two interrelated reasons. As discussed above, most Indian firms do not 
select appropriate technology strategies that would enable them to improve and even 
generate new technOlogy, not only because of limited learning and accumulated 
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experience, but more importantly on account of a lack of competitive pressure. To quote 
two Indian firm managers: 
1) The market in India is not that sophisticated. Our economy is really 
very patchy .... There are many areas where technology is about 10 years 
behind the developed countries. But firms don't accept this, they don't 
accept the need to change and to learn. I07 
2) There is very little pressure for technological excellence and little 
incentive for technical change. Our customers are not demanding and our 
markets are not competitive. lOS 
In conclusion, the development of a firm's technological capability lies at the 
centre of successful manufacturing as well as exports, and of the ability of a firm to 
adapt and generate new technologies. A firm's technological and manufacturing 
capabilities are the result of a strategy that emphasises investment in learning by the firm 
itself. However, a firm's technology strategy is also influenced by external competitive 
influences, a subject to which we will now tum. 
The External Environment 0/ a Finn 
In the vast literature on technological innovation and diffusion, many different 
variables have been adduced to explain the competitive influences that affect the strategic 
behaviour of firms. Among the most important to be studied and of relevance to our 
comparative analysis of Brazilian and Indian firm technology behaviour are firm size, 
vertical integration and market concentration. These variables are not mutually exclusive 
and often overlap; they may also be conditioned by government policies. As indicated 
shortly, an important element in the explanation of the weaker performance of India's 
defence and capital goods firms is that the government's industrial, trade and technology 
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policies have molded the external economic environment of its firms in ways that do not 
provide the necessary incentive structure conducive to innovation. 
1. ~ Distribution and Diversification 
According to the Schumpeterian hypothesis tested in the literature from industrial 
organisation, large-sized firms are expected to be more innovative because of their ability 
to finance R&D and other resources related to new product development and 
marketing. 109 By comparison, small-sized firms usually cannot afford this internal 
division of labour. Table 5.12 provides a breakdown of firm size by manufacturing 
output in Brazil and India. 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, Indian industrial policies are skewed towards 
the creation of high barriers to entry and growth for large firms (MRTP legislation), and 
towards the promotion of small-scale industries. Table 5.12 reflects this size distribution 
among Indian firms, which is peculiar because of the noticeable absence of middle-sized 
firms. Such skewed ness has only reinforced the pattern of weak firm technological 
competitiveness. It has also resulted in undue vertical integration and low product 
specialisation among Indian firms. The larger sized firms often operate under 
monopolistic conditions and therefore lack incentives to undertake R&D to improve 
their products while a great number of firms are too small to utilise either adaptive or 
innovative technology effectively. 
The effects of MRTP and industrial licensing controls (e.g., caps on plant 
capacity) have encouraged horizontal integration. Large firms tend to establish 
subsidiaries for new product lines rather than to diversify within product categories in 
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Table 5.12 
Manufacturing Output by Firm Size 
India I Brazil 2 
(1982/83) (1986/87) 
12.7% 6.0 % 
7.1 % 7.0 % 
7.7% 13.0% 
15.0% 34.0% 
13.0% 12.0% 
15.5% 16.0% 
12.7% 12.0% 
16.3% 10.0% 
Data derived from Annual Survey of Industries, 1982/83, cited 
by World Bank, India, 1989, p. 98. 
2 Data provided by Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico e Social, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
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an existing manufacturing facility or company. 110 Lall argues that the impact of the 
Indian government's industrial policies on such diversification is largely negative because 
they: 
Induce large industrial firms to diversify into completely unrelated 
activities which are assigned priority in the relevant Plans, where they 
have no technological advantage or experience, and so spread resources 
very thinly and induce a lack of specialisation. This holds down the 
absolute size of the undertakings in many industries to tiny scales by 
international standards, and so prevents firms from launching R&D 
efforts on scales that allow for the absorption of new technologies. III 
This discussion of diversification highlights important differences between the 
performance of Brazilian and Indian defence and capital goods firms, in spite of the fact 
that both countries' capital goods sectors were faced with unstable demand and low rates 
of capacity utilisation. First, India's capital goods firms have pursued a policy of 
defensive diversification, in some cases because of the constraints imposed by 
government policies, and in others to gain simple monopolistic advantage. In stark 
contrast, Brazil's capital goods firms diversified into defence in response to domestic 
sectoral conditions as well as international trade demands, and successfully entered the 
highly competitive international arms market on the basis of product and cost advantages. 
Second, in India the absence of a large cohort of mid-sized capital goods firms, 
as well as product reservations and protection from international competition for both 
large and small firms, are indicators in and of themselves of intentionally restrictive 
competitive policies. The combined effects of these policies have weakened the 
incentives for India's small-scale capital goods firms to undertake R&D activity or to 
improve their existing technologies. The experience of some Indian defence production 
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units with ancillary production by small-scale capital goods producers has been poor 
product quality, lack of standardisation and quality control. In many cases poor product 
reputation has encouraged the further vertical integration of the public sector defence 
production units to the detriment of developing extensive, private-sector subcontraction 
networks. Indeed, as Chudnovsky et al., confirm, the relatively high degree of vertical 
integration of the leading producers of capital goods in India is not only reflected in the 
fact that the size distribution is biased in the direction of large firms, but also in the 
small proportion of their total costs which is accounted for by subcontraction work.1I2 
2. Vertical Integration 
Many analysts of technology change in both the advanced and newly 
industrialising countries have suggested that there are distinctive institutional and 
organisational choices that affect the quality and level of a state's indigenous technology 
capability. For instance, Ranis observes that one of these choices is reflected by the 
debate regarding subcontraction as opposed to more vertically integrated firms within an 
industry.113 He, like other theorists of industrial organisation, point to the significance 
and potential applicability of the Japanese model. Industrial subcontracting in Japan is 
used widely as a means of generating efficiencies in the manufacturing production 
process and in enforcing quality standards. 
The author's data collected from a sample of Brazilian capital goods firms indicate 
the occurrence of a fair degree of subcontracting, though its occurrence is demonstrably 
linked to the size of the company (as measured by employment and value of output). In 
interviews with the major defence producers in Brazil, company executives consistently 
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emphasised a policy of promoting inter-industry linkages through industrial 
subcontracting activities. In some instances, this subcontraction policy was motivated by 
a strategy of reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. In other cases, firms indicated 
cost considerations, the government's domestic content laws, and its financing 
programme for the purchase of domestic capital goods as reasons for industrial 
subcontraction. 
As indicated in the Brazilian chapter, particularly in the case study of the aircraft 
industry, Brazil's predominantly medium-sized, defence-related firms have subcontraction 
arrangements with other medium and smaller specialised capital goods producers. The 
most notable example is that of Embraer, which along with the CTA's IFI, has 
transferred technology to improve and ensure the quality of its many suppliers, most of 
which have been accustomed to working for the less stringent technological requirements 
of the automotive industry. Moreover, a small number of these suppliers have become 
significant exporters in their own right, as a result of their affiliation with such an 
internationally recognised company. 
One of these firms interviewed was Metal Leve, a medium-sized, private company 
that began producing ball bearings and pistons for the local automotive subsidiaries of 
the TNCs in the 1950s, and later for the international aircraft industry .114 Beginning in 
1968, Metal Leve diversified its product range by investing in quality control, and gained 
experience in the manufacture of aircraft pistons for Pratt & Whitney engines used in 
Embraer aircraft. Today it is the sole manufacturer of aircraft pistons for general 
aviation, producing exclusively for Teledyne-Continental and Lycoming. The export 
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ratio of the company's products rose from eight per cent in 1970 to approximately 50 per 
cent in 1992 (18 per cent is direct export sales, the remaining is intrafirm trading 
arrangements via the Brazilian-based automotive TNCs). Estimated total annual export 
sales are $45 million. When asked about the sources of its comparative advantage in 
both domestic and international markets, Metal Leve's marketing director said that the 
company competes on price, quality and delivery. "Timing is especially important in the 
automotive sector because of assembly schedules, quality is most important in aircraft 
because of reliability. 11\ IS 
Metal Leve's success also has been based on a technology strategy that includes 
the effective absorption of imported technology through intense training in-house and at 
the technology suppliers' facilities and the systematic adoption of transferred technology 
to local conditions. In 1979, with financial assistance from FINEP (a $2.2 million loan), 
Metal Leve established its own R&D centre, which has been involved in broader 
research related to CAD/CAM, mechanical physics and metallurgy, particularly advanced 
bonding technology for aluminum, metal and composites. The centre employs 
approximately 300 people. Reflecting its emphasis on the importance of export markets, 
as a source not only of technical information but of continuous pressure to improve 
performance from its automotive customers, in 1989 Metal Leve set up the Advanced 
Technology Centre in Ann Arbor, Michigan as an extension of its Sao Paulo R&D 
facility. 
As this brief case study of Metal Leve indicates, subcontraction arrangements 
have stimulated the further development and diversification of the Brazilian capital goods 
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sector. In particular such arrangements have led to improved and faster adoption rates 
of technology, and have generated greater specialisation and the achievement, in some 
cases, of international scale economies. However, it is important to stress that the 
necessary prerequisite for such a learning process through subcontraction is the pre-
existence of a diversified and complex industrial structure. What distinguishes the 
Brazilian case from the Indian experience is that within Brazil's diversified capital goods 
sector, there has been the strong and long-lasting interaction between both public and 
private sector firms engaged in the production of machinery and transport equipment and 
the defence-related industries. 
By contrast, subcontraction to ancillary firms is underdeveloped in India, 
accounting for only an estimated ten per cent of total manufactured production (as 
compared to rates of at least forty per cent and higher for the Brazilian defencelcapital 
goods firms).116 Rather, "ancillarisation" is used by Indian defencelMRTP firms as a 
defensive strategy for releasing internal capacity and for cutting production costs due 
especially to excise taxes and higher prices of intermediate goods. In this regard these 
larger firms can take advantage of the small-scale industries' low "infrastructure costs", 
since small firms may layoff labour without government approval and are exempt from 
both minimum wage and employee benefit payments. 117 
The correspondingly high degree of vertical integration among India's defence and 
capital goods firms means that these firms are denied important "learning from others" 
opportunities. In his seminal work, Perspectives on Technology, Rosenberg 
acknowledges that in the capital goods sector especially, a major inducement for 
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technological change derives from demands imposed by one firm on its suppliers. \18 For 
example, the technological performance of Brazilian defence and capital goods firms was 
raised through these firms' efforts to improve product quality, materials application, and 
process technology (Embraer and Metal Leve). These efforts were stimulated by the 
firms' domestic as well as international environments. Thus changes introduced or 
required by customers (e.g., Embraer's redesign and production changes of its Tucano 
trainer fighter for Britain's Royal Air Force), suppliers and competitors (particularly in 
international markets) were crucial sources of threats, opportunities and ideas 
competitive incentives very much lacking in India's protected industrial milieu. 
This low level of subcontraction has also meant that the growth of India's defence 
and capital goods manufacturers has been significantly hindered by the absence of such 
a network of producers. As Pack has observed of these technologically related sectors, 
"[a] principal requirement of the entire mechanical-engineering sector is the development 
of a subcontracting network. ,,119 In his extensive study of the Indian automotive industry, 
Gumaste argues that the development of the transport sector has been similarly impeded 
by the absence of an extensive subcomponent network: 
It would be futile to expect a flower to bloom in a desert. We cannot 
expect our automobile industry to produce vehicles of a world standard 
unless our technological upgradation and modernisation takes place in all 
the upstream industries. Technological development in an import 
restricted economy is a cumulative process ... One cannot expect high 
levels of technology in one industry unless all other industries are also 
technologically up-to-date.120 
Two important concluding caveats derive from the discussion of firm size and 
vertical integration. First, as Schumpeter pointed out, admittedly large firms may be a 
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necessary condition for building up those technological capabilities where complexity or 
risk create significant economies of scale and scope. The case is stronger in 
industrialising countries, such as India, where the deficiencies of supplier networks create 
the need to internalise functions that would be external to firms in more industrially 
advanced countries. Second, as the Brazilian case study demonstrates, relative largeness 
can be counterbalanced by competitive inducements to innovation and efficiency either 
through domestic market pressures and/or by international trade pressures. 
In the case of India, however, its firms have been denied sources and incentives 
for important learning through investment in improved technological capabilities because 
of a lack of such competitive pressures. As is discussed next, the issue of competition 
assumes special significance in the Indian context since the government's trade and 
industrial policies, coupled with extremely low levels of domestic competition, mean that 
competitive pressures have been very limited. 
3. Market Concentration 
As Table 5.13, Product Concentration in Selected Capital Goods Industries, 
indicates, the defence-related, transport and heavy equipment industries in India are 
highly concentrated. Despite the implementation of various industrial policies to control 
large, dominant firms, production of capital goods, including some defence equipment, 
is highly concentrated in only a few firms. Concentration ratios are also high in India's 
machine tool sector, in which the top three firms account for over 75 per cent of the 
value of production, and the public sector enterprise, Hindustan Machine Tool, accounts 
for 60 per cent of total sectoral outpUt.121 
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Table 5.13 
Product Concentration (Monopoly) in Selected 
Capital Goods 
1980 
No. of units Degree of 
Concen tration 
Non-Electric Machinery 
• Boilers and steam generating plants 16 H 
• Textile machinery 248 N 
• Earth-moving machinery: 19 H 
• Metallurgical Machinery 20 H 
• Chemical & Pharmaceutical Machinery 77 N 
• Mining Machinery 11 M 
• Refrigeration & Airconditioning 20 L 
Transport Equipment: 
• Trucks and Buses 7 H 
• Jeeps 1 H 
• Passenger Cars 4 H 
• Scooters 13 H 
• Motorcycles 4 H 
• Railway Wagons 13 L 
• Mopeds 8 H 
• Diesel engines (vehicular) 6 L 
Degree of concentration is defined by the extent of share of top three enterprises in the 
production (or sale) as given below: 
H: High concentration 
M: Medium concentration 
L: Low concentration 
N: Nil concentration 
67 per cent or more 
60 per cent or more 
50 per cent or more 
below 50 per cent 
Source: Market and Market Shares for 200 Industrial Products. Bombay: Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy, August 1980. Cited in UNCTAD, 1988. p. 17. 
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Four-firm concentration ratios are also high in such intermediate goods industries 
as basic metals, synthetic fibres and paper products. To a substantial degree these 
relatively high market concentration levels are attributable to the effects of government 
licensing policies, which as discussed above confine production of certain products to 
different size classes of firms. In many segments of Indian industry characterized by 
high four-firm concentration ratios (particularly transport), the average change in an 
individual firm's market share was well below five per cent annually. 122 
India's highly concentrated industrial market structure also raises important 
implications for firm-level R&D activity. Such a market structure, following 
Schumpeterian-based arguments, should insulate dominant firms from competitive 
pressures and thus enable them to appropriate the "fruits" of their innovations. However, 
as indicated by the relatively poor performance of India's defence and capital goods 
industries, the presence of market power with concentration has allowed Indian firms to 
reap profits without necessarily being innovative. This is because Indian industry has 
been highly protected, which means, that although appropriating the rewards from R & 
D is not difficult, there has been no pressure to undertake technological change. 
Government policies have been the key determinant of the degree of competitive 
pressure and therefore of the technological strategies and efforts of many Indian firms. 
As a result, private sector R&D has been directed at complying with local use 
regulations rather than aimed at overall improvement in production or efficiency. In an 
interview conducted by Bell & Scott-Kemmis with a consumer electronics producer, the 
latter explained: 
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The Indian market is very traditional and in this context product change 
is risky. Many firms are used to receiving high [profit] margins but they 
are often not used to and not willing to make significant development 
efforts. They often just copy products which are successful on the Indian 
market rather than trying something new. This will only change when our 
markets change through greater competition. 123 
In essence, Indian firms are induced to opt for the stability of market shares 
through satisficing behaviour. Only when competition is introduced have Indian firms 
countered with and intensified technological improvements. For example, according to 
studies conducted by Morehouse and Laroia, only when India's oligopolistic tractor 
industry was threatened by Punjab Tractors' (PTL) successful entry and introduction into 
the market of an indigenous tractor was there a qualitative shift in the established firms' 
attitudes towards Rand D.124 In this competitive situation, the technological strength of 
PTL was a positive factor in its manufacturing success and in inducing other companies 
to improve their engines and models. 
Many Indian firms prefer, however, to use licensing of foreign technology as a 
means to secure rapid market entry or product improvement rather than to innovate 
through indigenous research and development. As will be investigated in Section III, 
given the combined effects of 1) Indian firms' own technological strategies, 2) 
concentrated market structure, and 3) government policies, there seems to be little 
positive incentive to induce firms to increase their technological capabilities via licensing. 
In other words, Indian firms are, in fact, behaving rationally as they respond to the 
above effects. Let us now turn to a formal discussion of this interaction between the 
state and firm using a game-theoretic framework. 
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SECTION III: A GAME THEORETIC ApPROACH: R&D PATENT RACES 
In the preceding two sections, the writer has delineated a comparative analysis of 
government policies and firm strategies in Brazil and India. Section I concentrated on 
describing the institutional arrangements and incentives these two governments employ 
to promote technological growth and change in the context of defence industrialisation. 
Section II focused on the firms themselves -- contrasting Brazilian and Indian firms' 
choices and pursuits of technological strategies, and their respective external economic 
environments. In this final, brief section, the author uses a game theoretic framework 
to illustrate formally how the interaction between government policies and external 
environment affects firm technology behaviour. 
The industrial organisation literature offers many game theoretic models that 
analyse the incentives for technological innovation, adoption and diffusion among firms 
in relation to market structure and strategic firm behaviour. 12,5 In particular, these models 
investigate the opposing effects of monopoly power and competition upon a firm's 
incentive to engage in innovative activity. Some of this game theoretic literature is 
especially applicable to the comparative analysis of Brazilian and Indian firm behaviour. 
The first are deterministic models of patent races. The most influential one was 
developed by Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The second are "memoryless" patent race 
models of Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980), Lee & Wilde (1980), Loury (1979), and 
Reinganum (1983a) (1983b). A third line of game theoretic research, which incorporates 
the effects of learning into patent races, is associated with Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, 
and Tirole (1983). 
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To understand the applicability of these models to the analysis of Brazilian and 
Indian firms, the author will first describe in simplified terms the assumptions 
underpinning these models. Subsequently, the author will then tie various attributes of 
these patent race models to the technology behaviour of Brazilian and Indian firms. 
1. A Deterministic Model 
Gilbert and Newbery use a stylised, deterministic model to examine the question 
of whether an incumbent monopolist, faced with a potential entrant who competes for a 
patentable innovation, would have less incentive to innovate than the potential entrant. 
Their model is based on the assumption that the date of innovation is a deterministic 
function of research and development expenditure. The more one spends on R&D, the 
earlier the date of innovation or discovery. "In its simplest representation, the date of 
invention, T, is a deterministic function of the time path of expenditures. The present 
value of an optimal expenditure path defines a cost function C(1), that is a decreasing 
function of the invention date." 126 Figure 5.1 below provides a useful representation of 
Gilbert & Newbery's deterministic assumption. 
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R&D 
Expenditure 
T Date of Innovation 
e(T) 
The issue then is who is willing to pay more for the innovation: the monopolist 
or the potential entrant? Gilbert and Newbery show that the "efficiency effect" implies 
that the monopolist would be willing to pay more than a potential entrant, especially if 
the innovation is "non-drastic". The "efficiency effect", as Tirole explains, presumes" 
... that in a homogenous-good industry, a monopolist does not make less profit than two 
noncolluding duopolists. "127 In essence, a monopolist could divide itself into two parts 
and mimic the R&D activities of its two rival competitors. To express this "efficiency 
effect", symbolically: 
Let U", be the monopolist's profits (excluding the purchase price of the 
innovation), if it remains a monopolist and buys the innovation; 
U"" is the monopolist's profit if there is entry, e.g., if the competitor 
purchases the innovation and shares the market with the monopolist; and 
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TIe represents the entrant's profits (also excluding the purchase costs associated 
with the innovation): 
Then, the efficiency effect can be represented as: 
The efficiency effect implies: 
II", > TIe 
Namely, the profits the monopolist will secure by innovating and remaining a monopolist 
exceed the profits the potential entrant will obtain if it innovates. In brief, the 
monopolist is willing to pay a higher price for the innovation than the entrant. Given the 
deterministic relation Gilbert and Newbery assume, whereby the more a firm spends on 
R&D advances the date of innovation, the monopolist will be the first to innovate, 
secure the patent and preempt the would-be entrant, thereby deterring entry. In effect, 
the patent race becomes an auction. The innovation and patent are being auctioned off, 
and they will go to the firm willing to pay the highest price -- the monopolist.128 
While the efficiency effect in the Gilbert & Newbery model implies that the 
monopolist will preempt a potential entrant by securing the patent, this effect does not 
necessarily lead to the adoption or implementation of the patented technology by the 
monopolist. Indeed, the monopolist may want to obtain property rights, via the patent, 
on a technology or product innovation even though the firm will make no use of it. As 
Gilbert & Newbery note: 
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A firm with monopoly power has an incentive to maintain its monopoly 
power by patenting new technologies before potential competitors and that 
this activity can lead to patents that are neither used nor licensed to others 
(sometimes called "sleeping patents,,).129 
This behaviour, which is known as "shelving", may occur as a consequence of the 
preemptive behaviour by the monopolist. In some cases, the possibility of shelving may 
even strengthen the incentive for preemption by the monopolist. 
Gilbert and Newbery's model provides two examples of shelving yo First, 
shelving may occur if the patent relates to a product technology that is not superior to 
that of the monopolist. Second, a similar situation arises when a patented substitute 
product is not sufficiently differentiated from the monopoly's existing product to warrant 
incurring the costs associated with introducing the new product to the market. In both 
instances, the monopoly's payoff to exploiting the patent, given that the potential entrant 
can no longer threaten to exploit the innovation, is too small to overcome the costs of 
adopting the new innovation. The sole purpose of acquiring the patent then is to 
eliminate the potential entrant's threat. 
Having described the possibility of shelving behaviour by firms, let us now 
analyse the factors influencing the firm's decision of whether or not to exploit the 
innovation. Arrow observes that with patent protection, a firm's incentive to invest in 
research and development is less under monopolistic than under more competitive 
conditions. 131 The reason, Arrow explains, is that the monopolist gains less from 
innovating than a competitive firm because the monopolist "replaces" itself, whereas the 
competitive firm becomes a monopolist. This property has been subsequently labelled 
the "replacement effect". 
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Teece has used the "replacement effect" in his study of technology and market 
structure. 132 He argues that vertically integrated firms often have specialised investments 
in place, and that since the primary role for vertical integration is to protect specialised 
assets from recontracting hazards, vertically integrated firms are likely to have a higher 
proportion of their asset base dedicated to particular technologies. He concludes, "[t]hus 
a monopolist which is vertically integrated and has assets specialised to the old 
technology may indeed delay the commercialisation of new technology if it is confident 
that it does not face competitive threats. ,,133 
2. "Memoryless" Patent Race Models 
As outlined previously, what drives Gilbert & Newbery's model explaining the 
persistence of monopoly is its deterministic stylisation of the research and development 
process. However, in reality, the innovation process is characterised by considerable 
uncertainty. Various game theorists have attempted to model the importance of 
uncertainty in relation to patent races. 134 In these patent race models, a firm's probability 
of successfully innovating and obtaining a patent at a point in time depends only on the 
firm's current research and development expenditure and not on its past expenses (Le., 
a firm's accumulated technological experience), hence the term "memoryless". 
According to these highly stylised models, firms compete vigorously until the innovation 
is secured via a patent. 
Reinganum (1983b) similarly addresses the question of the effect of current 
monopoly profit upon an incumbent firm's incentive to invest in R&D in the context 
h · . od I 135 Th' d . of a memoryless, stoc ashc racmg me. IS mo el was deVIsed to compare the 
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results with those of Gilbert and Newbery. As we found in the Gilbert & Newbery 
deterministic model, the incentive to preempt dominates, e.g., an incumbent monopolist 
has a greater incentive to preempt than does the challenger. However, when the date of 
rival discovery is drawn from a continuous distribution as in Reinganum's stochastic 
racing model, concern for preemption is much less acute. Her model shows that which 
of the two firms -- the incumbent monopolist or the potential entrant -- spends more on 
R&D, and thereby innovates first, depends on the two effects identified above in the 
deterministic model; namely, the "efficiency effect" and the "replacement effect". 
Reinganum demonstrates that either of the two effects may dominate. 
Let us first consider the case of a drastic innovation. For drastic innovations the 
preemption incentive is the same for both firms. Since the winner de facto becomes a 
monopolist, there is no dissipation of monopoly rent, i.e., there is no efficiency effect; 
hence the replacement effect will dominate. According to Reinganum, "when the first 
successful innovator captures a high share of the post-innovation market, then in a Nash 
equilibrium the incumbent firm invests less than does the potential entrant. ... [Hence] the 
incumbent is less likely to be the innovator than the challenger. ,,136 
The intuition behind why the replacement effect dominates in the case of drastic 
innovations is straightforward: when the innovation is uncertain, the incumbent firm 
receives profits before the successful innovation. The innovation period is of random 
length, but is stochastically shorter the more the incumbent (or challenger) invests. The 
incumbent has less incentive than the challenger to shorten the period of its incumbency 
(or to "replace" itself). 
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Second, let us now consider cases for less superior or "non-drastic" innovations. 
According to Tirole, "in order to eliminate the replacement effect, it is sufficient to 
choose an R&D technology in which the amounts committed per unit of time are 
considerable, so the probability of discovery per unit of time is high. ,,\31 Hence, in the 
case of non-drastic innovations, innovation is more readily achieved earlier, and the 
monopolist is much more concerned with the possibility of innovation by the entrant --
the efficiency effect -- than with the date of its own "replacement" . "J38 Thus, Reinganum 
shows that for a non-drastic innovation the monopolist wi111ikely persist because it has 
a higher probability of securing the patent. 
3. "Leapfro~~ing" Patent Race Models 
Gilbert & Newbery's deterministic model, as well as Reinganum's "memoryless" 
patent race model are both limited depictions of the innovation process. The stylisations 
of the R&D process in these models are not sufficiently rich to capture the important 
role played by factors central to firms' innovative capabilities. These factors include 
accumulated R&D experience through various forms of learning (learning-by-doing, 
learning-by-searching etc.), the ability to monitor and respond to rivals' R&D efforts, 
and simple luck. 
Recall, for example, Reinganum's 1983 work on a memoryless patent race model 
described above. In this model a firm's probability of discovery during the next interval 
is a stochastic function of what amount of expenditure a firm devotes to R&D at that 
point in time. While Reinganum introduces a limited form of uncertainty into the 
innovation process, the role of a firm's past R&D expenses, Le., experience or 
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learning, has no effect on its current likelihood of discovery. Indeed, experience is not 
a factor in her model, nor in Gilbert & Newbery's. Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and 
Tirole develop a very useful and more realistic patent race model because they attempt 
to formalise firms' R&D experience and/or learning effects. The underlying 
assumption of their paper is that a firm's probability of making a patentable discovery 
during any short interval depends not only on current research and development 
expenditure, as in the "memoryless" models, but on the firm's accumulated technological 
experience to date -- its "stock" of experience. 
The Fudenberg et al., paper examines when patent races will be characterized by 
vigorous competition and when they will "degenerate" into monopoly. Under certain 
conditions, a firm may be able to prevent the entry of its competitors by virtue of being 
a marginally earlier entrant into the race -- a result which they label "E-preemption" .139 
The authors demonstrate that what determines whether races are characterised by E-
preemption or competition depends on whether a firm, which is behind in the race (as 
measured by the expected time remaining until discovery if both firms incur the same 
costs), can "leapfrog" the leader; that is, accumulate more experience and jump ahead 
in the race. 
Tirole provides the necessary intuition behind the e-preemption result and the 
possibility of leapfrogging found in the Fudenberg et al., model. l40 He uses the analogy 
of a foot race between two runners, both of whom are equally good, and prefer to run 
at a slower pace rather than exhaust themselves by running faster. The leader has eyes 
in the back of its head and can monitor whether the follower is catching up. Since the 
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leader can always adjust its speed to the follower's, there is no point for this lagging 
rival to speed up. If the follower did, the leader would be certain to see this and speed 
up too. The lagging rival would be running harder but with no better chance of catching 
up. Forseeing this result, the follower has no incentive to increase its speed. Indeed, 
if a firm is only slightly, i.e., "E", behind in accumulated experience, it has no incentive 
to continue the race and drops out, leaving the other firm to invest and innovate. As 
long as the leader has eyes in the back of its head, that is, can monitor the other firm, 
so that there is no chance that it will be leapfrogged, the race goes to the leader, who 
proceeds at the slower pace. 
Now, suppose that the runners race on tracks separated by a wall with holes in 
it, allowing the competitors periodically to check their relative positions. The leader can 
no longer afford to run at a slow pace; if it did, the follower unobserved could run faster 
and leapfrog the leader. Thus, competition is engendered in this race due to the 
imperfect monitoring (lags in information) of rival firms' R&D investment activities. 
Fudenberg et al., provide two patent race models, which demonstrate how 
leapfrogging can occur. The first is a multistage patent race. Likening the race to 
separate research and development activities, Fudenberg et al., offer a two-stage, fixed 
intensity model, in which a firm must complete the first stage -- make a preliminary 
discovery -- before proceeding to the second stage -- progress towards a patentable 
innovation -- with the rewards going to the winner of the race. 141 In this two-stage race, 
the winner of the patent race can leapfrog the leader by making the preliminary discovery 
first. 
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Leapfrogging occurs in this model because the probability of success is a 
stochastic function of R&D effort. Completion of the first stage is a random event, and 
by being lucky in the first stage, a firm with less experience could leapfrog a more 
experienced rival. 142 Preemption occurs at the date of the preliminary discovery, but it 
is not E-preemption in that neither firm drops out of the race at the very start if the other 
firm has slightly more experience. The possibility of leapfrogging is thus shown to 
generate competition. As Tirole succinctly observes of the Fudenberg et al., multistage 
patent race, "Competition is most intense when firms are even. When the lagging firm 
draws even, both firms intensify their research effort. The leader tends to invest more 
in R&D than the follower. ,,143 
Using a deterministic patent race model inspired by Gilbert & Newbery's work, 
Fudenberg et al., provide another example of how leapfrogging may occur if firms have 
only imperfect information about the R&D activities of their competitors. This second 
possibility of the follower leapfrogging the leader arises via information and/or response 
lags (firms observe their rivals' R&D efforts, but with some delay). Information lags 
occur because within the current time period, each firm must choose its R&D effort 
without knowing what rival firms are doing. Fudenberg et al., explain, "[i]n this case 
a firm may leapfrog not because the success probability is stochastic, but because it can 
make progress toward invention without revealing its progress to a more experienced 
competitor. "144 The authors again find that if a firm is behind by a sufficiently large 
amount, it drops out of the race, allowing the remaining, lead firm to proceed with its 
research and development at a slower monopoly pace. 
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To conclude this first part, the author has described the "deterministic", 
"memoryless" and "leapfrogging" game-theoretic models, and has briefly discussed their 
conceptual evolution and linkage. In the next part, she will demonstrate the potential 
relevance of these patent race models to an explanation of the contrasting technology 
behaviour as well as strategies of Indian and Brazilian firms. 
Application of Game Theoretic Models to Indian and Bradlian Finn Behaviour 
Despite the simplicity of the stylisations of the technological innovation process 
underlying these models, two of them -- the "deterministic" and "leapfrogging" games -
_ elucidate respectively Indian and Brazilian firm behaviour. Let us start with the Gilbert 
& Newbery deterministic model as applied to the Indian case study. To illustrate the 
applicability of their game-theoretic model, let us first recapitulate the technology 
strategies and environments of Indian firms. Throughout this discussion the reader may 
refer to Figure 5.2, India: The Strategic Interaction of Firms and Government. 
As discussed in the case study chapter and in Section II above, though Indian 
defence and capital goods firms rely extensively on foreign licensing, they invest little 
in complementary technological activities, such as research and development and 
leaming-by-searching. In many cases, the Indian government's industrial, trade and 
technology policies have unintentionally encouraged the emergence of a highly 
concentrated market structure, consisting of a few, huge, vertically integrated firms. The 
combined effects of firms' narrow technology strategies and external environment has 
limited the adoption of new technologies as well as their diffusion. 
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Figure 5.2: India: The Strategic Interaction of Firms and Government 
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As suggested earlier, Gilbert & Newbery's stylisation of a patent race is a poor 
representation of innovation because they assume a deterministic relationship between R 
& D expenditure and the time of innovation. In this deterministic setting, which firm 
innovates first reduces to which firm is willing to pay more for the innovation. In effect, 
the innovation is auctioned off to the firm willing to pay the most for it. Although a 
weak model of patent races, Gilbert & Newbery's model is a much better representation 
of the technology licensing process in India. In the Indian licensing context, the issue 
is which firm is willing to pay more to secure the foreign license. 
Paralleling the outcome of their deterministic model, one may then expect to find 
similar strategic behaviour among Indian firms; namely, that the country's monopolistic 
firms would be willing to pay more to acquire foreign licenses. Since these firms will 
expend more for the license there will also be preemption. The tendency for India's 
monopolistic firms to preempt rivals from acquiring foreign licenses has, in fact, been 
confirmed by a recent study that examined the relationship of firm size to imports of 
foreign technology. The study, which is based on questionnaires and interviews, found 
that larger firms both paid substantially more and obtained an absolutely higher 
proportion of licenses than other sized firms. 145 
An additional factor related to the preemptive licensing behaviour of Indian firms 
is that some firms will strategically seek shallow and/or narrowly focused technology 
transfer agreements. If the agreement is complex, for example, that is, contains training 
and other forms of technology acquisition, the license is likely to take a long time getting 
through the Indian government's approval process. There is then the risk that the license 
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may be denied by the government, or that the foreign supplier may become impatient and 
loose interest and seek a rival Indian partner. 
By granting only one foreign license for a particular technology to a single firm, 
the Indian government, in effect provides the recipient firm with monopoly power and 
hence allows for shelving. The rationale behind the Indian government's policy of 
granting the Indian licensee with exclusive market access is to prevent the foreign 
licensor from setting up a subsidiary in the country for the duration of the agreement. 
Additionally, the Indian government wants to prevent anyone foreign technology supplier 
from dominating the market. 146 
Due to the replacement effect outlined in the Gilbert & Newbery deterministic 
model, there will be strategic shelving of technology by Indian firms if there is a single 
license. Indeed, as discussed above, foreign licensors to Indian firms found that these 
firms tended to sit on the acquired technology, denying its potential diffusion. This 
shelving behaviour was also observed by Indian bureaucrats in the commerce ministry. 
In an interview with this author, one bureaucrat acknowledged, "Very few of India's 
MRTP firms do anything with the technology they import. Even though many are 
extremely profitable, they won't invest much in complementary R&D. "147 
What would happen, for example, were the Indian government to allow multiple 
licensing between foreign suppliers and Indian firms? The strategic behaviour of Indian 
firms might shift. Initially a firm might successfully preempt a rival from obtaining a 
highly sought after foreign technology. Later, however, the firm would be more likely 
to exploit the technology contained in the license because of the fear that if it did not 
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make use of the superior technology, a rival could profit by exploiting a licensed 
technology that was less superior. 
The tendency towards preemption and technology shelving by Indian firms has 
led to the structural uncompetitiveness of the country's economy. First, such behaviour 
has contributed to the continued obsolescence of the country's technological base. 
Limiting technology acquisition via foreign licensing to securing and obtaining licenses 
that incorporate relatively older technologies, only reinforces path dependent 
development. As hypothesized earlier, large, vertically integrated firms will have a 
greater commitment to old technology because of the significant technology-specific 
investments they have made upstream and downstream. Second, since adoption and 
diffusion of new technologies is thwarted because of shelving, few externalities are 
generated in terms of inter-firm learning through subcontraction arrangements. 
Preemption and shelving thus also buttress India's highly concentrated market structure. 
In stark contrast to India, Brazil's more competitive domestic and trade 
environments have stimulated the adoption, development and exploitation of foreign as 
well as domestic technologies by its defence and capital goods firms. Learning by doing 
and the accumulation of experience are central features of R&D in Brazil. In these 
respects, the Fudenberg et al., "leapfrogging" model may be a better representation of 
the strategic incentives that inform Brazilian firm behaviour. Throughout this discussion 
please refer to Figure 5.3, Brazil: The Strategic Interaction of Firms and Government. 
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Figure 5.3: Brazil: The Strategic Interaction of Firms and Government 
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Industrial, Technology, Trade 
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Recall the earlier argument that Brazilian firms have accumulated more 
technological expertise than their Indian counterparts. This difference was explained by 
the fact that Brazilian companies consciously expended considerable effort to accumulate 
and improve their technological capabilities through research and development activities, 
subcontraction, specialised employee training assistance, and searching. White Brazilian 
firms also sought foreign licenses, they tended to use licenses to help upgrade and 
complement their existing technological capabilities, rather than as Indian firms tended 
to do -- use licenses strategically to bar substitute products from entering the market. 
The Brazilian government's technology policies have encouraged indirectly the 
technological learning and search activities of Brazilian firms, and have supported inter-
firm diffusion of technology. First, the provision of financial project and R&D 
feasibility assistance to Brazilian firms, via FINEP programmes, has certainly lowered 
the costs entailed in searching for new technologies as well as reduced the uncertainties 
involved in their adoption. Second, the funding or encouragement of the work of 
specialised technological agents, for example, Brazil's universities and the R&D centres 
of the military, has encouraged the diffusion of technology among firms, thereby 
reducing the potential for shelving. A direct application of the Fudenberg et al., model 
is now offered. 
One may recollect from the discussion of Fudenberg et al., that the possibility of 
leapfrogging the leader in a patent race induces competition and intensifies R&D 
activity. For example, their multistage patent race model demonstrates that the closer 
firms are to each other, the fiercer the competition, and the more firms will invest in 
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research and development in the hope of obtaining the patent first. One of the perhaps 
unintended consequences of the Brazilian government's trade and technology policies is 
that such broad policies have engendered close competitive relations between the 
country's domestic firms. For instance, the government's trade policies of promoting 
direct foreign investment and exports by Brazilian firms has pressured domestic firms to 
employ competitive technologies that are very close to the international frontier. By 
allowing for relatively open competitive foreign licensing and collaboration arrangements, 
Brazilian firms are induced to exploit these technologies earlier and at faster rates of 
adoption than their Indian counterparts, who are motivated to shelve. 
In effect, by applying competitive pressures from domestic as well as 
international sources, and subsidizing firms' technological efforts, the Brazilian 
government has induced firms to race at relatively close distances. We can thus explain 
the larger investments in learning and in R&D-related activities by Brazilian firms, 
which in tum have contributed overall to these firms' international competitiveness. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has integrated the previous case studies on the Brazilian and Indian 
defence industries and has provided a comparative assessment. As outlined in Chapter 
2, the variation in technological and manufacturing capabilities as well as in international 
competitiveness of these two countries' arms industries can be explained in terms of firm 
strategies, as well as the strategic interaction among firms and the state. Accordingly, 
this chapter has delineated and contrasted Brazilian and Indian firms' technology 
strategies. It has also outlined the trade and technology policies of the Brazilian and 
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Indian governments. The author has then analysed the differing and separate effect of 
these policies on Brazilian and Indian firm behaviour. As evidenced by the game 
theoretic discussion above, the interaction between the defence and capital goods firms 
and the state in Brazil provided a conducive and competitive environment in which firms 
could pursue strategies that augmented their capabilities and competitiveness in the global 
arms market. In contrast, the interaction between the Indian government and the 
defence/capital goods firms stultified competitive inducements for firms to develop 
dynamic technological and export capabilities. 
357 
Endnotes 
IThis point is made by Carl Dahlman and Francisco Sercovitch, "Local 
Development and Exports of Technology," World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 667, 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,1984), 43. 
2World Bank, Industrial Policies and Manufacturing Exports (Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank, 1983), 23. 
lIbid., 27. 
4Daniel Chudnovsky, South-South Trade in Capital Goods: The Latin American 
Experience, Texta para Discussao N. 57 (Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Federal de Rio 
de Janeiro, Instituto de Economia Industrial, Outubro, 1984), 23. 
5See J. Tavares de Araujo, L. Haguenauer, and J. Borco Machado, "Protecao 
Competitivade e Desempenho Exportador da Economia Brasileira nos Anos 80," Revista 
Brasileira de Comercio Exterior, Vol. 5, no. 26 (Novembro-Decembro 1989). 
6Venilton Tadini, 0 Setor de Bens de Capital Sob Encomenda: Analise do 
Desenvolvimento Recente (1974183) (Sao Paulo: Departamento de Economia, 
Universidade de Sao Paulo, Faculdade de Economia e Administra~ao, 1986), 107. 
7See William G. Tyler, The Brazilian Industrial Economy (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1981). 
8See World Bank, page 65 for details. 
~hese studies are respectively: The World Bank, Brazil: Protection and 
Competitiveness of the Capital Goods Producing Industries, Report No. 2488 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1980), and William G. Tyler, Advanced 
Developing Countries as Export Competitors in Third World Markets: The Brazilian 
Experience (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1980). 
l<7yler, Advanced Developing Countries, 56-57. 
IIMorris Teubal, "The Role of Technological Learning in the Exports of 
Manufactured Goods: The Case Study of Selected Capital Goods in Brazil," World 
Development, Vol. 12, no. 8 (1984): 854. 
12Interview with official from Brazil's Ministry of Planning, Brasilia, August 
1989. 
358 
14Cited in Lorne E. Kavic, India's Quest for Security (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), 107. 
ISJ.N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India: Planning for Industrialisation: 
Industrialisation and Trade Policies Since 1951 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1970); and J.N. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivisan, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic 
Development: India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). 
16Bhagwati & Srinivisan, 226. 
17Isher Judge Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation Since the Mid-
Sixties (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 114. 
ISSanjaya Lall, Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries 
(Paris: DECD, 1990), 57. 
19See Martin Wolf, India's Exports (New York: Oxford University Press for the 
World Bank, 1982); Depak Nayyar, India's Exports and Export Policies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976); and Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, 
Repon of the Commitfee on Trade Policies (New Delhi: Government of India, December 
1984). 
2°Cited in Ahluwalia, 116. 
21Ibid., 115-116. 
22Depak Nayyar, "India's Export Performance, 1970-85: Underlying Factors and 
Constraints," in 171e Indian Economy, eds., Robert E. B. Lucas and Gustav F. Papanek 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 225. 
23See Sanjaya Lall, Developing Countries as Exporters of Technology: A First 
Look at the Indian Experience (London: Macmillan, 1982). 
24C. Dahlman and F. Sercovitch, 47. 
2SSee, for example, Ashok V. Desai, ed., Technology Absorption in Indian 
Industry (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1988). 
26Cited in Dahlman and Sercovitch, 45. 
27Lall, "India," 555. 
359 
28See V.M. Gumaste, Technology Self Reliance in the Automobile and Ancillary 
Industries of India (Madras: Institute for Financial Management and Research, 1988), 
109. 
29Confidential interview with a high-ranking minister responsible for science and 
technology affairs, Brasilia, August 1989. 
30Cari Dahlman, "Foreign Technology and Indigenous Technological Capability 
in Brazil," In Technology Capability in the Third World, eds. Martin Fransman and 
Kenneth King (London: Macmillan Press, 1984). See also Emanuel Adler, The Power 
of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: 
University of California Berkeley Press, 1987). 
31For a thorough review of these research institutions see Adler, page 163. 
32See I PBDCT, Plano Basico de Desenvolvimenro Cientfjico e TechnolOgico, 
1973-74 (Brasilia: Presidencia da Republica, 1973); and II PBDCT, Plano Bdsico de 
Desenvolvimento Cientfjico e TechnolOgico, 1975-1977 (BrasOia: Presidencia da 
Republica, 1975). 
33See I PBDCT, Plano Bdsico de Desenvolvimento Cientfjico e TechnolOgico, 
1973-74, 68-69. 
34Company interviews. See also Roberto Pereira de Andrade and Jose de Souza 
Fernandes, Vefculos Milirares Brasileiros (Sao Paulo: Aquarius, 1983). 
3.51 PBDCT 1973-74, 72. 
36Interview with CTA officials, Sao Jose dos Campos, November 1988. 
37Ibid. 
38See II PBCDT, 1975-1977. 
3~orld Bank, Brazil: Industrial Policies and Manufacturing Exports, 230. 
4°Adler, 195. 
41 Carl J. Dahlman and Claudio R. Fri schtak , National Systems Supporting 
Technical Advance in Industry: The Brazilian Experience, World Bank Industry and 
Energy Department Working Paper Industry Series Paper No. 32 (Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank, June 1990), 14. 
42World Bank, Brazil: Industrial Policies and Manufacturing Exports, 103. 
360 
43Prancisco Sercovitch, "Brazil," World Development, Vol. 12, no. 5/6 (1984): 
594. 
44Government of India 1983 Technology Policy Statement cited in Gumaste, 8. 
45Cited by Thomas Owen Eisemon, "Insular and Open Strategies for Enhancing 
Scientific and Technological Capacities: Indian Educational Expansion and its 
Implications for African Countries," in Technological Capability in the Third World, 
eds., Martin Pransman and Kenneth King (London: Macmillan, 1984), 269. 
46A. Rahman, Science and Technology in India (New Delhi: National Institute 
of Science, Technology and Development Studies, February 1984), 41. 
47Ghayar Alam and John Langrish, "Government Research and its Utilisation by 
Industry: The Case oflndustrial Civil Research in India," Research Policy, 13 (1984): 
56. 
48Data derived from "Industrial R&D Expenditures by Public Sector· Ministry· 
Department - State - Government-Wise During 1980-81," in A. Rahman, Science and 
Technology in India, 192. 
49Baldev Raj Nayar, India's Quest for Technological Independence (New Delhi: 
Lancers Publishers, 1983), 327. 
50Ashok V. Desai, "The Origin and Direction of Industrial R&D in India" , 
Research Policy, 8 (1980): 91. 
51 Alam and Langrish, "Government Research and its Utilisation by Industry," 55. 
52S. R. Valluri, "Management of Rand D Institutions and Self-Reliance," 
Economic and Political Weekly, 25 August 1990, Mill. 
S3Ibid., M112. 
S4India, Parliament, Committee on Public Undertakings, Bharat Eanh Movers 
Ltd., Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence Production and Supplies, 1987-88. 
Eighth Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1987), 38. 
55Cited in Diana Crane, "Technological Innovation in Developing Countries: A 
Review of the Literature," Research Policy, Vol. 6, no. 4 (October 1977): 390. 
56Valluri, "Management of Rand D Institutions and Self-Reliance," MIll. 
361 
S7 Ashok V. Desai, "Technology Acquisition and Application: Interpretations of 
the Indian Experience," in The Indian Economy: Recent Developments and Future 
Prospects, eds., Robert E.B. Lucas and Gustav F. Papanek (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1988), 177. 
58U.S. Bajpai, ed., India's Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment (New 
Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1983), 64. 
59 Alam and Langrish, "Government Research and its Utilisation by Industry," 57. 
6<Nayar, India's Quest for Technological Independence, 328. 
611ndia Weekly. 7-13 August 1987. 
62Ibid. 
63Sanjaya LaH, "India's Technology Capability: Effects of Trade, Industrial, 
Science and Technology Policies," in Technological Capability in the Third World, eds., 
Martin Fransman and Kenneth King (London: Methuen, 1984), 234-35. 
64Ghayur Alam, "India's Technology Policy: Its Influence on Technology Imports 
and Technology Development, " in Technology Absorption in Indian Industry, ed., Ashok 
V. Desai (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1988), 153. 
66See Ashok V. Desai, "Origin and Direction of Industrial R&D in India," 
Research Policy, 9 (1980): 74-96; "The Slow Rate of Industrialization: A Second 
Look," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 19, nos. 31-33 (1984), 1267-1272; and 
"Technological Performance in Indian Industry: The Influence of Market Structure and 
Policies," in Technology Absorption in Indian Industry, ed., Ashok V. Desai (New Delhi: 
Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1988), 26. 
67Ibid. 
68Keya Sarlcar, "Machine Tool Industry: Gearing Up -- With a Little Help from 
Japan," Business India, 23 September - 6 October 1985, 87. 
69 Alam, "India's Technology Policy," 146. 
7OUn, "India's Technology Capability," 236. 
362 
71See, for example, R.M. Bell and D. Scott-Kemmis, "Indo-British Technical 
Collaboration Since the Early 1970s - Change, Diversity and Forgone Opportunities," 
Science Policy Research Unit mimeo (Brighton: University of Sussex. 1984). 
72World Bank, India: An Industrialising Country in Transilion (Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, 1989), 86. 
73 Ahluwalia, Industrial Growlh in India, 162-63. 
74LalI, "India," 562-63. 
7SGovemment of India, Public Accounts Committee, 1981-82 (Seventh Lok Sabha) 
Development of a Helicopter, Ministry of Defence (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 
March 1983), 26. 
76See Don Scott-Kemmis and Martin Bell, "Technological Dynamism and 
Technological Content of Collaboration: Are Indian Firms Missing Opportunities?" in 
Technology Absorption in Indian Industry. ed., Ashok V. Desai (New Delhi: Wiley 
Eastern Ltd., 1988). 
77Ibid., 89. 
78See Alam, "India's Technology Policy," and Charles Cooper, "Supply and 
Demand Factors in Indian Technology Imports: A Case Study," both in Technology 
Absorplion in Indian Industry. Refer also to Economic Administration Reforms 
Commission, Report No. 20, Technology Development and Acquisition (New Delhi: 
Cabinet Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhavan, 1983). 
79Scott-Kemmis & Bell, "Technological Dynamism," 94-95. 
80Economic Administration Reforms Commission, Report No. 20, Technology 
Development and Acquisition, 26. 
81See UNCTAD's study, Technology Issues in the Capital Goods Sector: A Case 
Study of Leading Machinery Producers in India (New York: United Nations, 1983). 
82Sanjaya Lall, Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries 
(Paris: OECD, 1990), 61. 
83Martin Bell, Bruce Ross-Larson and Larry E. Westphal, "Assessing the 
Performance of Infant Industries, It Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 16, nos. 
1-2 (September-October 1984): 123-24. 
363 
84D. Chudnovsky, Ma Nagao, and S. Jacobsson, Capital Goods Production in the 
Third World (London: Francis Pinter Publishers, 1983), 110. 
8SIbid. 
86UNCTAD, Technology Issues in the Capital Goods Sector, 121. 
87Teubal, 861. 
88Chudnovsky et al., 66. 
89F.S. Erber, Technology Development and State Intervention: A Study of 
Brazilian Capital Goods Industry, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Brighton: University 
of Sussex, 1978). 
9OJbid., 95. 
91Ibid., 93. 
92Sercovitch, 594. 
93Carl Dahlman, Bruce Ross-Larson, and Larry Westphal, "Managing 
Technological Development: Lessons from the Newly Industrialising Countries," World 
Development, Vol. 15, no. 6 (1987): 772. 
94Ibid. 
9SR.M. Bell, ""Learning" and the Accumulation of Industrial Technological 
Capacity in Developing Countries," in Technology Capability in the Third World, eds., 
Martin Fransman and Kenneth King (London: Macmillan, 1984), 197. 
96Interview with Avibras employee, Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil, August 1989. 
97See H.N. Da Cruz and N.B. Da Silva, "Mudan~ Technol6gica no Setor Metal 
Mecanico: Relat6rio Parcial, Parte II," mimeo, IDB/ECLA/IDRC Research Programme 
on Scientific and Technological Development in Latin America (Sao Paulo: Funda~o 
Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas, 1981); and Carl Dahlman, A Microeconomic 
Approach to Technical Change: The Evolution of the USIMINAS Steel Firm in Brazil, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (New Haven: Yale University, 1979). 
98See R.M. Bell and D. Scott-Kemmis, Indo-British Technological Collaborations 
Since the Early 1970s: Change, Diversity and Forgone Opportunities, 5 vols (Brighton, 
U.K.: Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 1985). 
364 
99See David J. Teece, "Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm," in 
Technical Change and Economic Theory, eds., Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman 
. ' Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg, and Luc Soete (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 
264-65. 
1000. Scott-Kemmis and M. Bell, "Technological Dynamism and Technological 
Content of Collaboration," 97-99. 
IOIIbid., 91. 
102 Amiya Bagchi, "The Economic Impact of Trust and Confidence," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 30 May 1985, 78-79. Also cited in Eddie J. Girdner, "Economic 
Liberalisation in India: The New Electronics Policy," Asian Survey, XXVII, no. 11 
(November 1987): 1188-1204. 
I03Valluri, "Management ofR and D Institutions and Self-Reliance," Mill. 
I04D. Scott-Kemmis and M. Bell, "Technological Dynamism and Technological 
Content of Collaboration," 94. 
105See R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, An Evolutionary 711eory of Economic 
Change (Boston: Belknap Press for Harvard University Press, 1982). 
I06Dahiman, et aI, "Managing Technology Development," 754. 
I07Bell and Scott-Kemmis, "Technological Dynamism," 72. 
I08Ibid., 73 
I09For a useful review of the literature, see Stephen Davies and Bruce Lyons with 
Huw Dixon and Paul Geroski, Economics of Industrial Organisation (London: Longman 
Group, U.K., Ltd., 1988). 
lI0See Kripa Shankar, "Characteristics of Diversification in Indian Industry," 
Economic and Political Weekly, 3 June 1989, 1250. 
l11Sanjaya Lall, "India's Technology Capability," 231. 
112Chudnovsky, et aI., 139. 
l\3Gustav Ranis, "Determinants and Consequences of Indigenous Technological 
Activity," in Technological Ca/J.abiliry in the Third World, eds., Martin Fransman and 
Kenneth King (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1984), 102. 
365 
114The following discussion is based on company data and an interview with 
Gustavo Frank, Marketing Director for Metal Leve, Sao Paulo, November 1988. 
IISIbid. 
116Chudnovsky, et al., 138. 
117Bharat Bhusan, "Ancillarisation: A New Production Strategy," Business India, 
16-29 January 1984, 88. 
118Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976.) 
119Howard Pack, "Fostering the Capital Goods Sector in LDCs, II World 
Development, Vol. 9, no. 3 (1981): 232. 
120Gumaste, 109. 
121Keya Sarkar, "Machine Tools Industry: Gearing Up with a Little Help from 
Japan," Business India, 23 September - 6 October 1985, 88. 
122World Bank, India: An Industrialising Country, 105. 
I23Bell and Scott-Kemmis, 92. 
124See Ward Morehouse, "Technology and Enterprise Performance in the Indian 
Tractor Industry: Does Self-Reliance Measure Up?" Economic and Political Weekly, 20 
December 1980, 2139-52; and V.K. Laroia, "Case Study of Swaraj Tractors," paper 
presented at a UNIDO-ICRIER Workshop on Management and Technological Change, 
ICRIER, New Delhi, 1988, which is cited in Kathuria, M120. 
125See, for example: P. Dasgupta & J. Stiglitz, "Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, 
and the Speed of R&D," Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (1980): 1-25; D. Fudenberg 
& J. Tirole, "Preemption and Rent Equalisation in the Adoption of New Technology." 
Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985): 383-401; D. Fudenberg, R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz, 
and J. Tirole, "Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races, II European 
Economic Review, 22 (1983): 3-31; R. Gilbert & D. Newbery, "Preemptive Patenting 
and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, 74 (1982): 514-526; C. 
Harris & J. Vickers, "Racing with Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, 54 (1987): 
1-22; T. Lee & L. Wilde, "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," 
Quanerly Journal of Economics, 194 (1980): 429-436; G.C. Loury, "Market Structure 
and Innovation," Quanerly Journal of Economics , 93 (1979): 395-410; J.F. Reinganum, 
"On the Diffusion of a New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach," Review of 
Economic Studies, 48 (198Ia): 395-405; -- "Market Structure and the Diffusion of New 
366 
Technology," Bell Journal of Economics , 12 (1981b): 618-624. -- "A Dynamic Game of 
R&D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behaviour," Econometrica, 50 (1982): 671-
688; -- "Technology Adoption under Imperfect Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 
14 (l983a): 57-69; and -- "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," 
American Economic Review, 73 (1983b): 741-48. 
J26Gilbert & Newbery, 515. 
127Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organisation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1989), 393. 
mI would like to acknowledge the invaluable comments provided by Dr. Robert 
powell, U.C., Berkeley, regarding the Gilbert & Newbery deterministic model. 
129Gilbert & Newbery, 514. 
130Gilbert & Newbery, 518. 
l31See Kenneth Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Inventions," in The Rafe and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed., R. Nelson (Princeton: 
princeton University Press, 1962). 
132See David J. Teece, "Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm," In 
Technical Change and Economic Theory, eds., Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, 
Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg, and Luc Soete (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988). 
133Teece, 275. 
134See P. Dasgupta & J. Stiglitz (1980); T. Lee & L. Wilde (1980); G.C. Loury 
(1979); and J. Reinganum (1982). 
13SSee Reinganum (1983b). 
136Reinganum (1983b), 741. 
137Tirole, 396. 
139Fudenberg, et al., 3. 
14orirole, 398. 
14tFudenberg, et al., 10. 
367 
142Ibid., 14. 
143Tirole, 399. 
I44Pudenberg, et al., 14. 
145Cited in Sanjay Kathuria, "Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies of Shumpeterian Hypotheses for Developed Countries and India," 
Economic and Political Weekly, 26 August 1989, MI13-MI24. 
146r'fhe Indian government's licensing policies are currently under review as part 
of the country's broader economic liberalisation programme initiated in 1991. 
147Interview, Ministry of Commerce, Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C. 
February 1991. 
368 
Chapter VI 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes the thesis and is divided into four sections. First, the 
author returns to the research questions posed in the introductory chapters concerning 
defence industrialisation in the NICs. She reconsiders the broad objectives of the thesis 
and briefly summarises her argument. In the second section, the author re-examines the 
three hypotheses of her conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 2 regarding: 1) 
firms' technology strategies, 2) an integrated defence-industrial base, and 3) government 
trade, industrial and technology policies. She argues that these hypotheses illleraclh'ely 
account for the variance in Brazil's and India's defence industrial capabilities and export 
competitiveness. In section three, the author revisits her critical analysis in Chapter 2 
of the relevant scholarship on defence industrialisation in the NICs from international 
relations, international political economy, comparative politics as well as development 
and neoclassical economics. Drawing on the empirical findings of the Brazilian and 
Indian case studies, she discusses the limitations of political science and economics-based 
theoretical explanations. The inadequacy of these explanations is traced to their failure 
to incorporate the pivotal role played by firms. In the fourth and final section of this 
chapter, the author briefly outlines some of the important theoretical implications as well 
as limitations of her own work, and suggests avenues for future research. 
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The Argument in Brief 
This thesis has broadly addressed an issue central to both international relations 
and economics; namely, how competitive advantage, which is essential in determining 
a state's power and wealth, is created and distributed among nation states. Competitive 
advantage in this thesis has been defined in terms of a country's possession of two 
industries that are militarily and economically strategic -- the defence and capital goods 
industries. Though all states are motivated to develop and sustain these critical 
industries, the ability of states to be competitive internationally in these high technology 
sectors varies enormously. In particular, the thesis has focused on the growth of the 
newly industrialising countries' defence and manufacturing industries during the 1970s 
and 1980s and their potential export success in global markets. The objective of the 
thesis has been to explain how these countries derived their defence-industrial 
capabilities, and what accounted for the variance in capabilities and export 
competitiveness among the NICs. 
As evidenced in Chapter 2, much of the literature on the emergence of the NICs 
in the international political economy has concentrated largely on the state. This thesis 
has demonstrated that firms also play important roles in explaining the development of 
a state's defence industrial capability and competitiveness, and, consequently, its position 
in the international system. The author has employed comparative case studies from two 
newly industrialising countries, Brazil and India. She has shown that the interaction 
between firms and states determines the development of and variance in these two 
countries' capabilities and international competitiveness. In brief, she explains that the 
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successful performance and competitiveness of Brazil's defence industries, in marked 
contrast to India's, resulted from Brazilian firms' deep and complex technology 
strategies, tight inter-industry linkages between defence and capital goods firms, and 
government policies that stimulated and reinforced technological innovation and diffusion 
at the firm level. 
The Conceptual Framework 
In an attempt to integrate the roles played by firms and states in the defence 
industrialisation process of the NICs, the author constructed a conceptual framework 
consisting of three dimensions. In this second section, the author re-examines this 
framework and her research design in light of the case study findings. Before doing so, 
however, it is useful to remind the reader that although each of the three dimensions of 
the framework provide a direct and separate means for comparing Brazil and India, these 
dimensions are, in fact, meant to be treated interdependently. It is only by exploring the 
interactive effects of state policies, linkages between the capital goods and defence firms, 
and firms' technology strategies that one can account for the variance between Brazil's 
and India's arms industries. 
Firms' Technology Strategies 
The first dimension of the author's conceptual framework is the technology 
strategies of defence and capital goods firms. As discussed in Chapter 2, a technology 
strategy entails decisions and conscious efforts by a firm to monitor new technologies, 
to absorb and adapt these technologies, and to invest in its own R&D capability. The 
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author hypothesised that differences in the technology strategies of firms (whether they 
were sufficiently "deep" or not) would account for a firm's relative performance and 
competitiveness domestically and internationally within an industry. Consequently, a 
primary objective of the author's survey research and company site visits in Brazil and 
India was to explore and define the technology strategies of defence and capital goods 
firms. Thus, the contrast between Brazilian and Indian firms' technology strategies led 
the author to anticipate that Brazil's defence industry would be more capable and 
competitive because the technology strategies of Brazilian firms appeared to be more 
complex, involving most if not all of the activities described above. 
In Chapter 3, the author showed that the successful technological development and 
international competitiveness of Brazilian defence companies (Embraer, Engesa, A vibras, 
D.F. Vasconcelos etc.) resulted in large part from these firms' technology strategies of 
making long-term cumulative R&D efforts and building systematically on foreign 
technological inputs -- licensing, coproduction, technical training arrangements. Further 
investigation of Brazilian defence and capital goods firms' technology strategies and 
comparative assessments with Indian firms occurred in Chapter 5. The author's survey 
research found that three common traits marked Brazilian firms' successful technology 
strategies. 
The first was the active search, transference and absorption of both foreign and 
domestic technologies. The second was the use of "specialised technological agents" --
universities, research institutes, consulting engineering firms -- by Brazilian defence and 
capital goods firms to enhance their own in-house technological capabilities. The third 
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approach pursued by Brazilian firms was heavy investments in human capital formation, 
by hiring foreign personnel or by providing company employees with specialised training 
and educational programmes in Brazil and abroad. This three-pronged technology 
strategy reduced overall risks, lowered information search costs and shortened 
production-to-market times. It also ensured that foreign technology sources reinforced 
rather than rep/aced Brazilian defence and capital goods firms' technology strategies --
a critical factor explaining the relative competitiveness of the Brazilian arms industry in 
comparison to India's. 
The explicit investment in the acquisition of technology capabilities by Brazilian 
firms was dramatically contrasted with the experience of Indian firms. The Indian case 
study, particularly the review of the Light Combat Aircraft and Advanced Light 
Helicopter defence production programmes, projected a picture of limited indigenous 
technological capability and extreme reliance by firms on all types of foreign technology 
assistance. The author linked this evident lack of competitiveness of India's defence 
industry in part to the shortcomings of the technology strategies devised by the country'S 
defence and capital goods firms. 
In Chapter 5 three important factors were identified that helped to explain Indian 
firms' inadequate technology acquisition and development strategies. The first related 
to the lack of consistent and sufficient investments in in-house R&D activities. The 
second factor was that, as a consequence of these firms' limited technical experience, 
Indian defence and capital goods firms often made poor, uninformed technology 
selections. This shortcoming stemmed from these firms' overestimation of their own 
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technological absorption capabilities and underestimation of what was required to secure 
the successful transference of imported technologies. Indeed, the third factor, the narrow 
technology acquisition approaches of Indian firms, accounted for this underestimation. 
Compared to Brazilian firms, Indian companies attached little importance, and 
thus expended little effort in absorbing, adapting and using foreign technologies to 
upgrade their existing R&D capabilities. For example, the reader learned that most 
technology transfer agreements with foreign suppliers did not include any technical 
training assistance, company site visits, or the hiring of specialised personnel. It was 
also evident that Indian firms' technology strategies generally had not enabled them to 
generate new or even improve existing technology, not only because of their limited 
capability to learn but because of the inefficient use of foreign technologies. Hence, the 
first dimension of the author's conceptual framework -- the technology strategies of 
defence and capital goods firms -- provided one of the pieces to the larger puzzle of why 
India failed to develop a largely indigenous defence industry, capable of achieving a 
modicum of export competitiveness. 
An Inte~rated Defence-Industrial Base 
The second dimension of the author's conceptual framework is the degree of 
integration of a country's defence-industrial base. The author hypothesised that the 
relatively successful performance and competitiveness of some NIC arms producers, in 
contrast to others, was based on having a highly integrated and diversified defence-
industrial base, characterised by strong linkages between defence and capital goods firms. 
Thus in researching and contrasting the defence-industrial bases of Brazil and India, the 
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author investigated the extent of the linkages, particularly in the form of subcontraction 
activity, between these two technologically strategic sectors. She also delineated some 
structural factors -- firm-size, vertical integration and market concentration -- that 
conditioned these linkages. As evidenced in Chapter 5, in several instances the linkages 
between the defence and capital goods sectors were affected by government policies --
the third and last dimension, which will be discussed below. 
The author's survey research in Chapter 3 provided clear evidence of unusually 
strong inter-industry linkages between Brazil's defence and capital goods firms. Rc.1cting 
to recessions in the Brazilian capital goods sector, many of these firms diversified into 
military production, later becoming sizeable arms exporters. A number of smaller capital 
goods firms, as well as foreign multinational corporations based in Brazil, converted part 
of their production lines to supply these larger, domestic defence companies. 
The beneficial effects of these inter-industry linkages on the competitiveness of 
the Brazilian defence and capital goods firms was discussed in Chapter 5. They included 
more rapid technological development and diffusion between the capital goods and 
defence industries. For example, many important defence exporters, such as Embraer 
and Engesa, actively promoted and strengthened subcontraction arrangements with 
smaller capital goods firms, transferring various technologies and manufacturing know-
how in order to improve and ensure the quality of their suppliers. This diffusion of 
technology, as well as the promotion of capital goods sales abroad through the export 
activities of Brazilian arms producers, enabled many local capital goods firms to generate 
important economies of scale and specialisation. 
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In stark contrast to Brazil's integrated defence-industrial base, Chapter 4 showed 
that the linkages between India's defence and capital goods firms were extremely weak 
and fragmented. Ideological, institutional and economic factors had constrained the 
development in India of a truly integrated defence-industrial base. Two factors were 
particularly detrimental and reinforced the autarkic development of each sector. The first 
was the government's legislated separation ofthe state-owned defence industries from the 
country's largely private capital goods sector. The second was that the defence and 
capital goods firms were both reluctant to implement the Indian government's 
ancillarisation policy, which was intended to encourage private sector subcontraction by 
the state-owned defence firms. On the one hand, this government directive threatened 
the inefficient, vertically integrated defence firms, which resisted the ancillarisation 
policy, arguing that the private capital goods sector was incapable of producing defence 
items of the necessary high quality and standards. On the other hand, the ancillarisation 
programme failed to attract private sector participation because it did not ensure that 
defence firms would provide long-term procurement orders of sufficient scale. As 
evidenced in Chapters 4 and 5, the continued lack of integration between India's defence 
and capital goods firms prevented these industries from becoming more competitive and 
innovative through inter-sectoral learning and sharing. 
Government Policies 
State intervention, particularly government technology, industrial and trade 
policies, is the third dimension of the author's conceptual framework. The author 
hypothesised that differences in the extent and form of state intervention would also 
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account for the variance in the pace, development and international competitiveness of 
the NICs' defence industrial capabilities. On this basis, she argued that the more a 
government's policies acted to stimulate pressures from both domestic and international 
market forces, the more technologically advanced and export competitive a country's 
defence industries would be. 
In Chapter 5, the author compared the trade, industrial and technology policies 
of the Brazilian and Indian governments. The differences in these countries' policies 
were striking. In Brazil, for example, the government did not have a coherent, well 
formulated set of technology, industrial and trade policies targeted towards the arms 
industry. To the contrary, as investigated in Chapter 3, the Brazilian government's 
involvement was extremely limited. Its' technology, industrial and trade policies 
indirectly shaped a conducive environment that facilitated firm-level initiatives. For 
instance, the Brazilian government's technology policies helped to stimulate the 
technology acquisition and upgrading efforts of defence and capital goods firms by 
supporting government-related R&D institutes and universities, and by lowering the cost 
for private-sector R&D activity. The Brazilian government's industrial policies --
domestic content laws and subsidised purchases of local capital goods -- spurred the 
development and broadening of the capital goods industry through subcontraction 
arrangements, thereby strengthening linkages between the defence and capital goods 
sectors. Finally, the government's open trade policies of promoting direct foreign 
investment and exports encouraged Brazilian defence and capital goods firms to reduce 
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costs, to upgrade product quality and service, and to keep abreast of global technological 
innovations. 
By contrast, the defence-industrial policies of the Indian government were very 
articulate and highly specific. It used numerous technology, industrial and trade policies 
to direct as well as regulate the activities of its defence and capital goods industries. 
Such policies, however, had tremendous, negative unintended consequences for the 
viability of India's defence industry and has led to the perverse situation of the Indian 
government having to rely extensively on foreign licensed arms production and imports. 
In terms of technology policies, the Indian government promoted technological 
self-reliance in defence production, primarily through the establishment of a massive 
government science and technology infrastructure. Nevertheless, as indicated by Indian 
defence firms' sad record of production, this infrastructure was often characterised by 
excessive fragmentation, poor inter-ministerial coordination and a high degree of R & 
D concentrated in isolated government laboratories. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Indian government's industrial policies legislated 
the autarkic separation and development of the public defence sector from the private 
capital goods industries. Thus, given the relatively narrow focus on defence-related R 
& D and the institutional separation of the defence and capital goods industries, potential 
inter-industry technological spillovers were prevented. Lastly, the government's inward 
trade policy of import substitution protected and insulated India's defence and capital 
goods industries from international market forces, by discouraging direct foreign 
investment and by tightly regulating imports of foreign technologies. As a consequence, 
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Indian firms not only had limited exposure and access to foreign technologies, but were 
denied important sources of competitive pressure. 
In summarising the third dimension of the thesis' conceptual framework, it is 
important to emphasise the often unintended consequences of governmental policies. 
India tried to develop a competitive defence sector, but the unintended outcome of its 
trade, industrial and technology policies was precisely the opposite. This is what Chapter 
5, particularly the game theoretic analysis of the Indian government's foreign technology 
licensing policy, revealed. The discussion of the Gilbert & Newbery deterministic model 
showed that the combined effects of the Indian government's trade, industrial and 
technology policies ironically induced many of the country's defence and capital goods 
firms strategically to preempt rivals from acquiring foreign licenses. By granting only 
one foreign license for a particular technology to a single dominant firm, the Indian 
government unintentionally provided the recipient firm with monopoly power, which then 
enabled the firm to shelve the technology and thus deny possibilities for its diffusion. 
Consequently, Indian defence and capital goods firms were neither induced to use up-to-
date technologies nor to share those technologies through subcontracting arrangements 
with other firms. Hence, by looking at the strategic interaction of firms and the state, 
the technological obsolescence of Indian industry became more understandable. 
In contrast to India, the indirect effects of the Brazilian government's broad 
technology, industrial and trade policies incited close competition as well as collaboration 
between defence and capital goods firms. This was demonstrated using the Fudenberg, 
Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole "leapfrogging" model. Thus, the unintended effect of these 
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government policies was to induce Brazilian firms to invest in improving their 
technological capabilities, which, in tum, contributed to their overall export 
competitiveness. 
Bringing the Finn In 
In this section the author returns to her criticisms, raised in Chapter 2, of political 
science and economics for their failure to integrate firms into their theoretical 
explanations of defence industrialisation in the NICs. Drawing on her research findings, 
the author discusses the analytical impact of firms on the main schools of thought, paying 
particular attention to the theoretical implications for international relations, international 
political economy, and comparative politics. Indeed, one of the important contributions 
of this Ph.D thesis is that it provides a number of counter-intuitive findings that challenge 
some of the IR, IPE and comparative politics precepts. 
Political Science 
Starting with the scholarship from international relations, the author argued that 
this literature could not adequately explain defence industrialisation, in particular, the 
variance in defence production capabilities among the NICs. There are two principal 
reasons for this failure. First, international relations almost exclusively emphasises the 
role of the external strategic environment in determining the defence production activities 
of the NICs, and second, the international relations' literature on defence production in 
the NICs lacks a conceptual framework. Underlying such theoretical inadequacies is the 
neglect to consider and incorporate the crucial role of firms. 
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Regarding the first criticism, the author suggested earlier that the observable 
variance in the NICs' defence industrial capabilities and export competitiveness posed a 
puzzle for international relations theory. Due to the presumed linkages between 
motivations and capability, IR theory predicts that states facing greater strategic threats 
would have the most technologically advanced and competitive defence production 
capabilities. Paradoxically, however, this is not what we observed in the Brazilian and 
Indian case studies. 
As the Brazilian chapter showed, the Brazilian arms industry succeeded in 
becoming the leading arms producer and exporter among the NICs, in the absence of a 
strategic threat. This case study demonstrated the importance of examining firms' 
motivations and strategies, as opposed only to states'. As evidenced in Chapter 3, the 
emergence of Brazil's defence industries could not be explained in terms of industry 
simply responding to the military government, which, in tum was influenced by some 
strategic threat. Rather, on the basis of her interviews and survey research, the author 
found that firms diversified from capital goods into defence production because of market 
conditions -- recession in the Brazilian capital goods sector and a buoyant demand for 
arms by the Persian Gulf and Mid East states. 
In stark contrast, the Indian case study, Chapter 4, revealed why, in spite of 
serious strategic pressures such as the threat of war with Pakistan and China, a regional 
arms race, and hegemonic aspirations, India's defence industry has been largely incapable 
of meeting the country's security needs. Given the stronger motivation on the part of the 
Indian government (in contrast to Brazil), the IR literature predicts that India would have 
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a more advanced defence industry. Yet, the country does not. Why then do we see 
industry failure in India? 
The Indian case study and the comparative analysis of Chapter 5 provided answers 
to this particular puzzle. These chapters offered important insights into the reasons for 
this failure at the level of firms; for instance, the overestimation by the Indian arms 
industries of their technological and manufacturing capabilities, their lack of contact with 
capital goods suppliers, their shallow technology strategies etc. These chapters also 
highlighted the negative impact of Indian government policies on these firms, particularly 
the lack of competitive market pressures to induce these firms to invest in and diffuse 
technology. In sum, both the Brazilian and Indian case studies show that the influence 
of a country's external environment on its defence-industrial capability is underspecified 
because firms are not treated as intervening variables between motivations and 
capabilities. 
Returning to the second criticism of international relations, especially the subfield 
of international security studies, the author found the literature on defence 
industrialisation lacking both theoretical and comparative frameworks. In particular, the 
literature was characterised either by individual country case studies or by 
macrostatistical surveys, neither of which conceptually clarified the relationship between 
defence production and industrialisation in the NICs. The thesis fills these theoretical 
and methodological lacunas by providing a conceptual framework of defence 
industrialisation -- one that incorporates firms, links defence-industrial activities in an 
economy, and examines government policies -- in a comparative analysis of two of the 
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NICs' largest defence manufacturers. It is hoped that this framework and research 
design has extended not only our understanding of defence industrialisation in these two 
NICs, but can offer a basis for future comparative studies. 
The variance in Brazil's and India's defence-industrial capabilities and 
competitiveness, which emerged clearly from the case study chapters, also poses a 
theoretical puzzle for both international political economy and comparative politics. As 
indicated in Chapter 2, particularly in the works by Sen, Gilpin and Haggard, 
international political economy and comparative politics theories suggest that the 
international system (characterised by anarchy and inter-state competition) and state 
power ("strong"/"weak" states) jointly should explain the variance in the industrial and 
export performance of states' defence industries. These theories argue that strong states 
are relatively more effective in achieving certain industrial objectives because of their 
ability to devise and implement necessary policy instruments. Nevertheless, as the reader 
learned from Chapters 4 and 5, the Indian government, a purportedly "strong" state, with 
many policy instruments at its disposal, has been unable to secure the development of an 
indigenous, technologically competitive defence industry. Why then do even "strong" 
states have difficulties in obtaining their objectives? 
The author's research suggests a fundamental weakness underpinning international 
political economy and comparative politics theories: Their assumption that industry 
success or failure derives from the relative strength of states is obviously 
underdetermined. Both the Brazilian and Indian case studies, as well as Chapter 5, 771e 
Strategic Interaction of Finns and States, show that analyses confined to examining state 
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policies present a partial and sometimes misleading image of the capacity of governments 
to achieve economic objectives. For example, in the case of Brazil, the author 
demonstrated that the success of the country's arms industries was not the result of direct 
state intervention, via trade and industrial policies on the part of a "strong" military 
government. Rather, these defence firms achieved global competitiveness on their own, 
using various technology and manufacturing strategies that emphasised coproduction, 
licensing, and technical assistance arrangements, often with foreign defence companies. 
In the contrasting case of India, the reader witnessed tremendous state intervention 
and support for the country's defence industries through direct state ownership, 
regulation of foreign technology transfers, and government procurement, among many 
other policies. Yet, such state intervention failed to secure the objective of a relatively 
technologically self-sufficient defence industry, capable of producing an array of 
indigenous aerospace, armour and naval equipment. 
Thus, as documented throughout this thesis, the ability of Brazilian and Indian 
government officials to attain viable, competitive defence industries depended as much 
upon what was outside the state, namely firms -- the importance of well-conceived 
technology strategies, and tight inter-firm linkages between the defence and capital goods 
sectors -- as what was inside the state (i.e. government policies and the ability to 
implement them). In short, this thesis has shown that theories from international 
relations, international political economy and comparative politics need to be extended 
to incorporate the potential contributions of firms. 
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Economics 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a tendency by both neoclassical and 
development economics to relegate the NICs to being manufacturers and exporters of 
simple, low-cost, labour-intensive products. The puzzle raised by this caricature is how 
can neoclassical and development economics account for the NICs' development and, in 
some cases, international competitiveness in what is obviously one of the most 
technologically sophisticated industries in the world: defence production? The author 
argued that in order to solve this puzzle, economics had to move beyond the conventional 
neoclassical paradigm and to integrate the roles played by technology, firms and states. 
For example, the author's microstudies of Brazilian and Indian defence firms, as 
well as the discussion in Chapter 5 of the strategic interaction of firms and states, raised 
a number of insightful findings regarding technology, its use by firms, and the impact 
of government policies on its development and diffusion. In Brazil, the reader learned 
that defence firms, such as Embraer, Engesa and Avibras, invested heavily in R&D 
activities as a central means of enhancing their international competitiveness. The survey 
findings revealed that many of these companies shared broad technology strategies which 
emphasised the successful development and assimilation of both indigenous and imported 
technologies. Such firm-level initiatives were complemented by the Brazilian 
government's financial support of several military-related R&D institutes (the CTA, 
CTEx and CP qM). 
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By contrast, the author's research in India found that technology development in 
the defence sector was characterised by high levels of obsolescence and extreme 
dependence on foreign technology suppliers. By focusing on the inefficient transfer and 
use of these foreign technologies, for example in the Light Combat Aircraft and 
Advanced Light Helicopter programmes, which in some cases was attributed to perverse 
Indian government licensing policies, the author could explain why India's defence-
industrial capabilities were relatively underdeveloped in comparison to Brazil's. 
The central criticism raised by the author concerning analyses of defence 
industrialisation in the NICs from development economics was a methodological one. 
The author's comparative case study approach has provided a far richer account of the 
relationship between arms production and industrialisation in the NICs than that offered 
by the macrostatistical studies of development economics. The author's research has 
shown that the trade-off between defence production and growth is both more complex 
and ambiguous than the guns versus butter calculus suggests. 
For instance, the case study on India revealed that the country has been paying 
an enormous societal price in terms of lower productivity, duplicative research and 
manufacturing efforts, and large defence expenditures because ofthe Indian government's 
failure to integrate private capital goods firms into its autarkic defence sector. By 
comparison, it could be argued that the cost of Brazil's arms industry to the economy has 
been much lower, because of the substantially less government fiscal support for this 
industry and because of the export revenues generated by the defence firms. Even the 
economic impact of the recent restructuring of the Brazilian defence industry has been 
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minimal because of the latitude and ability of these primarily private-sector firms to 
diversify back into capital goods production. 
This concludes the author's analysis of the implications of her research findings 
for theories of defence industrialisation in the NICs offered by international relations, 
international political economy, comparative politics, neoclassical and development 
economics. In brief, this thesis has demonstrated that the apparent dichotomy between 
the market-led approaches of economics and the "statist"-oriented explanations of political 
science is illusory. Individually, neither fully captures the development of and variance 
in the defence industrial capabilities and export competitiveness of the NICs. 
Future Research 
This thesis on defence industrialisation in the NICs has important theoretical 
implications regarding the way we view states and firms in the international system. In 
this final section, the author reflects upon her own analytic treatment of these two 
important actors. Recognising some of the limitations in this thesis, which stem in part 
from her conceptualisation of states and firms, the author discusses how such limitations 
can be mitigated through future research. She begins this discussion by addressing the 
fundamental issue of the role of the state in shaping the arena in which firms interact. 
The author then turns to the issue of firm behaviour -- in particular, what factors, 
internal to the firm, condition the adoption of certain technology strategies. 
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Contending Images of the State 
A crucial finding that emerges from the thesis (see Chapter 5) is that the arena 
in which firms interact profoundly affects outcomes; i.e. Brazilian defence firms' 
superior technological and export performance in comparison to Indian firms. The 
author described some aspects -- government policies and market structures -- of the 
arena in which firms operate. But how does one think about the origins of this arena? 
What factors shape this arena in the first place? 
In evoking the Brazilian and Indian case studies, two different views emerge 
regarding the determinants of this arena. Each view derives from a particular 
conceptualisation of the state. The first view holds that the state can choose the arena 
in which firms operate. Government policies derive soley from state preferences, they 
do not evolve from the strategic interaction with other non-state actors. The state, in this 
View, is a unitary actor and, in the domestic realm, is an omnipotent one. The state 
stands outside the arena in which firms interact. Indeed, the state creates this arena. 
This image of the state underpins much of international relations theory. 
This view of the state leads to specific kinds of research questions. In particular, 
what are the consequences of different government choices, i.e. policies, on the arena 
and, ultimately, on the behaviour of firms. This thesis, especially its game theoretic 
discussion of Indian firms' licensing behaviour, directly addresses this question. It neatly 
illustrates the often unintended consequences of various government trade, technology 
and industrial policies on the arena of Brazilian and Indian firms. The prevalence of 
Important but unintended consequences demonstrates how difficult it is for a state to 
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obtain its desired outcomes, even if the state were sufficiently strong that it could specify 
the arena in which firms interact. 
In the second view, the arena is determined by the strategic interaction among 
competing actors. Government policies are the resultant of a political process. In this 
view, the state is not a unitary actor. It no longer stands outside the arena but is one 
actor in a larger arena. This image of the state is central to comparative politics. 
Comparative politics, however, emphasises the interplay and structural relations between 
primarily political actors -- bureaucracies, political parties and interest groups, social 
classes etc. An important contribution of this thesis has been to demonstrate that firms 
too are important actors in this process. 
What is underdeveloped in this thesis, however, is a clearer discussion of how 
firms participate in this process. To address this limitation, the author needs to return 
to her firm-level case studies in Brazil and India. There she must draw out more 
precisely the strategic interaction between firms and other domestic as well as foreign 
actors -- government ministries, armed forces, key entrepreneurs, trade unions, the 
United States and the former Soviet Union to name a few -- out of which the arena is 
formed and shifts. Whether such interactions share any systematic properties across 
these and other disparate cases remains to be seen. These are important areas for future 
research and will help clarify the respective roles of states and firms in the process of 
defence industrialisation in the NICs. 
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Inside the Firm 
Two areas for future research arise from the author'S conceptualisation of firms. 
Both relate to the author's unintentional "black boxing" of the firm. First, despite the 
author's extensive use of firm-level case studies, there is a tendency to treat firms as 
homogeneous in their preferences and behaviour. This limitation stems from constraints 
imposed by the author's comparative cross-national, inter-industry research design. To 
draw an effective comparision between the technological and export capabilities of the 
Brazilian and Indian defence industries, the author first had to search for and aggragate 
similarities in the technology strategies of Brazilian firms and Indian firms respectively. 
Only by aggragating individual firm behaviour to the sectoral level could the author then 
observe systematic cross-national industry differences from which to make generalisable 
conclusions. 
One possible area for future research would be to tease out the intra-industry 
differences within either the Brazilian or the Indian defence sectors. For instance, why 
is it that India's missile programme has largely succeeded when the country's aircraft, 
naval and armour programmes have stagnated? To analyse this particular question, the 
author could use her existing firm data base and employ a comparative inter-jinn 
research design. 
The second area for future research pertains to the question: Where do firms' 
technology strategies come from? In particular, what are the possible factors, internal 
to the firm such as ownership characteristics, labour-management practices, firm 
structure, that might condition the selection and adoption of a particular technology 
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strategy, i.e. firm behaviour? The thesis does not directly address these important and 
related questions. Though the literature from economics on the determinants of firm 
behaviour is growing -- for example, transaction cost, principal agent and other 
institutional theories -- the application of these theories to empirical studies is still in its 
infancy: Whether such theories can successfully explain the selection of particular 
technology strategies by firms is a potential area for further research. 
Admittedly these issues regarding the conceptualisation of the state and firm 
constitute weaknesses and important agendas for future research. Nevertheless, only by 
exposing the reader to the broader theme that firms matter, can we now begin to ask 
another set of questions, such as the ones posed above. The author has succeeded in the 
first task, the second lies ahead of her. 
-Works that examine firms as economic institutions include: Alfred Chandler, The 
Visible Hand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); B. Holmstron and J. 
Tirole, "The Theory of the Firm," In Handbook 0/ Industrial Organisation, R. 
Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1989); and Oliver O. 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions o/Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985). 
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Appendix 
A Note on Sources and Methods 
A central task of this thesis was to relate differences in the international 
competitiveness of countries to the strategic interaction between firms and states. Using 
case studies from two newly industrialising countries, the author was interested in 
explaining what accounted for the contrasting performance and international 
competitiveness of Brazil's and India's defence industries. Her particular objective was 
to study whether national competitiveness in international markets was linked to firm-
level factors. 
To examine the determinants of international competitiveness at the firm level, 
it was necessary to conduct fieldwork in Brazil and India for two reasons. First, what 
published information exists on Brazilian and Indian defence firms is generally only 
available in country. Second, and more importantly, the information available in the 
public domain even in Brazil and India is insufficient to examine the development of 
defence capabilities and export competitiveness by these countries' firms due to the 
militarily sensitive nature of the industry involved. 
This research consisted of interviews and a questionnaire survey in Brazil and 
India. In both countries she interviewed individuals from defence and capital goods firms 
(corporate managers as well as engineers), the armed forces, as well as officials from 
various government ministries related to finance, industry, trade, and science and 
technology. These interviews provided the author with detailed information about the 
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technological and export capabilities of individual firms and about how government 
policies affect the defence and capital goods industries. 
However, it was necessary to rely on more quantitative, econometric methods, 
based on mail questionnaire survey data, in order to draw broad comparisons among 
Brazilian and Indian firms regarding their technological capabilities, export 
competitiveness and interaction with the state. To obtain this data, the author developed 
sample questionnaires and tested them on a small population of firms in both countries. 
From the outset, the author was concerned about viability of survey research methods 
because questionnaire surveys have not been widely applied in the developing world. 
Indeed, the sample survey in India met with such extremely low response rates that the 
plan for a broader survey had to be abandoned. Instead, the author had to rely 
extensively on interviews, company site visits and archival research in the Lok Sabha 
parliamentary library. 
In Brazil, the questionnaire met with much more success and was subsequently 
sent to approximately 500 of the country's defence and capital goods firms. The 
questionnaire surveyed a broad cross-section of Brazil's manufacturing sectors to 
establish whether and what kinds of linkages existed between the capital goods and 
defence firms. Specifically, the author needed to collect the data necessary to test her 
hypothesis that many Brazilian capital goods producers diversified their product lines into 
defence, and later supplied the expanding global arms trade of the 1980s. The author 
also wanted to gauge the ability of these firms to use foreign technologies effectively. 
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All of the major Brazilian defence companies were surveyed, since the omission 
of anyone firm in such a small population might introduce some bias. The remaining 
firms were randomly selected from various annual listings of capital goods producers. 
The response rate to this international mail questionnaire survey was a surprising 40 per 
cent -- overwhelming by even domestic survey standards. The Brazilian survey is 
included in this appendix with its English translation. 
Using the data from the mail questionnaire, the author constructed a three-stage 
econometric model, which consisted of two probit and one ordinary least squares 
regression equations, to test whether and how the diversification by Brazilian firms into 
military production was affected by various government policies. The three-stage model 
and a discussion of the results are found in Chapter 3. Both the questionnaire data and 
the econometric results enabled the author to conclude that the relative success of Brazil's 
arm industry during the 1970s-1980s was attributable to a particular firm-government 
interaction that stimulated the indigenous technological sophistication and international 
competitiveness of Brazilian defence manufacturers. 
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QUESTION ARlO 
Gostaria de com~r Cal-endo-Ihe perguntas gerais sohre 0 tipo e 0 tamanho de sua companhia. 
1. Qual e sua posi~ao na firma? _________________________ _ 
2. Ano de funda~ao da firma? 
3. Tipo de companhia: 
Privada _____ _ Publica _____ _ Mista 
4. Qual e a participa<;ao estrangeira no patrimonio da firma, representada como porcentagem das acroos? 
5. Numero total de empregados: 
Nenhuma 
Abaixo de 20% 
De 20% a 50% 
Acima de 50% 
em 1977 
em 1987 
Gostaria de saher 0 que sua companhia produz e quais os mercados para seus hens e/ou servi~ost 
tanto dom~ticos como internacionais. 
6. Quais sao suas principais linhas de produtos? 
Produto#l __________________________________________________________ __ 
Produto #2 ________________________________________ __ 
Produto #3 ___________________________________ _ 
7. Houve uma mudan~a significativa ou diversifica~ao em qualquer das Hnhas de produtos desde a cria~io 
da firma? 
Sim Nao 
7a. Se hove, quando equal foi a mudan~a? 
7h. Quais as raroes para a mudan~a? ________________________ _ 
395 
8. Valor total da produ~iio em cruzeiros/cruzados para: 
1977 1987 ________ _ 
9. Qual e a participa~ao de cada um dos principais produtos da firma no Mercado domestico? (Expresse-a 
PQ[ favor, £Q!!!Q porcentagem.) 
Produto #1 Produto #2 ____ Produto #3 
10. Quais sao os principais fregueses de seus principais produtos no Brasil? ~ poss{vel, especifigue, PQ.[ 
favor, Q nome da firma.) 
Para 0 produto # 1 : 
Firmas particulares ______________________________ _ 
Empresas publicas _____________________________ _ 
Mullinacionais _______________________________ _ 
Outras firmas ________________________________ _ 
Para 0 produto #2: 
Firmas particulares ______________________________ _ 
Empresas publicas _____________________________ _ 
Mullinacionais ________________________________ _ 
Outras firmas ________________________________ _ 
Para 0 Produto #3: 
Firmas particulares ______________________________ _ 
Empresas publicas 
Mullinacionais -------------------------------
Outras firmas ________________________________ _ 
11. Valor das exporta<;Oes em cruzeiros/cruzados dos principais produtos: 
Produto #1 
Produto #2 
Produto #3 
1977 1987 
12. Caso as exporta<rOes da firma tenham aumentado ou diminu{do significativamente durante os dez 
ultimos anos, quais foram as principais razoes para a flutua~io? 
13. Destino da exporta~o dos principais produtos? 
Produto #1 
Produto #2 
Produto #3 
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No pr6ximo grupo de questoes, gostaria de saber como sua companhia desenvolveu sua" linha" de 
produtos. Interesso-me, especialmente, na" fontes e esp~ies de tt.'Chnolgias que sua finna ou divisilo 
tenha utili7.ado. 
14. Que meios foram utilizados para criar ou aumentar sua capacidade de produ~iio? 
Pesquisa e desenvolvimento dentro da pr6pria empresa 
Importalliio de bens de capital estrangeiros, tais como maquinas operatrizes 
Contrata¥iio de projetistas estrangeiros 
Envio de pessoal ao estrangeiro 
Uso de servi¥os de pesquisa govemamental (Especifique, por favor) 
Acordos de concessoes 
Qutros meios 
15. Caso sua firma tenha importado varias tecnologias, inclusive esbo~os e componentes, houve 
neeessidade de qualquer modifica¥ao na teenologia reeeibida? Por exemplo: 
Adapta¥ao de materiais Iocais aos modelos estrangeiros 
Introdu~ao de equipamento estrangeiro as Iinhas de produ~ao 
Economia de materiais importados escassos 
Qutras neeessidades? 
16. Sua firma utilizou qualquer tipo de acordos de eoneessiio? 
Sim Nao 
16a. Se utilizou, para que produto!produtos? 
16b. Quais foram as prineipais razoes teenieas para a eoneessiio? 
Qbten¥ao do es~o do produto 
Assisteneia teeniea 
Qutras razoes 
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16c. Quais foram as principais raz6es comerciais? 
Po){ticas de compra de seus fregueses 
Necessidade de competir com firmas ja possuidoras de tal technologia 
Outras raz6es 
17. Quais sio os seus principais concessores? 
18. Sua firma esta envolvida em qualquer tipo de acordos de subcontra~? 
Sim Nio 
18a. Se estiver, com quem? ~ posslvel, fomeca Q ~ da firma envoi vida, RQ! favor.) 
Multinacional :--___________________________ _ 
Empresa privada 
Empresa publica ___________________________ _ 
Qutra firma _____________________________ _ 
Finalmente, gostaria de saber qual ~ a sua avalia~o do efeito das poliUcas e das regulamenta~ do 
govemo federal sobre sua firma. 
19. Como as poHticas ou as regulamen~ govemamentais afetaram sua companhia? (Seia 
especffico,nQ! favor.) 
Financiamento subsidiado para a aquisi~io de bens de capital ______________ _ 
Isen~o de tarifas e impostos sobre as importa~ 
Financiamento subsidiado para estimular e fortalecer as capacidades technol6gicas da firma 
Incentivos fiscais para a exporta~io 
Qutros __________________________________ _ 
19a. Fazendo urn balan~o, que tipo de impacto economico estas politicas produziram: 
Positivo (Especifique, por favor) 
Negativo (Especifique, por favor) 
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Brazil Questionnaire - (English translation) 
I would like to start by asking you some general questions concerning the type and sh·.e of your 
company. 
1. What is your position in the firm? _________________________ _ 
2. Year of foundation of the firm? 
3. Type of Company: 
Private _____ _ Public Mixed 
4. What is the foreign equity participation in percentage of shares? 
5. Total number of employees: 
None 
Under 20% 
20-50% 
Over 50% 
in 1917 
in 1987 
I am interested to know what your company produces, and what your markelli are •• both domeo;tic 
and international -- for your goods and/or services. 
6. What are your main product lines? 
Product#1 ____________________________________________________________ __ 
Product #2 ____________________________________________________________ _ 
Product #3 ____________________________________________________________ _ 
7. Has there been significant change of divervification in any of your product lines since the creation of 
the firm? 
Yes No When 
7a. If yes, what was the change? ________________________ _ 
7h. What were the reasons for the change? 
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8. Total value of production in cruzeiros/crumdos for: 
1977 1987 
9. What is the domestic market share, for each of the firm's main products? (Please express as a 
percentage.) 
Product #1 ____ Product #2 Product #3 
10. Who are the principal customers for your main products in Brazil? <If possible, could you please 
~ the ~ of the firm.) 
For product #1: 
Privatefinns~ ______________________________________________________________ ___ 
Public enterprises 
Multinationals 
Other finns 
For product #2: 
Privatefinns ________________________________________________________________ ___ 
Public enterprises 
Multinationals 
Other firms 
For product #3: 
Private finns 
~-------------------------------------------------------Public enterprises 
Multinationals 
Other firms 
11. Value of exports in cruzeiros/crumdos for main products: 
Product #1 
Product #2 
Product #3 
1977 1987 
12. If the firm's exports have increased or decreased significantly over the past ten years, what have been 
the main reasons for the fluctuation? _______________________________________________ _ 
13. Destination of export for main products? 
Product #1 
Product #2 
Product #3 
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In this next series of questions, I would like to know how your company has developed il'i product 
lines. In particular, I am interested in the sources and kinds of technologies your firm or division 
has utilised. 
14. What means have been used to create or augment your production capacity? 
Internal research and development 
Importation of foreign capital goods, such as machine tools 
Hiring foreign personnel, such as consultants 
Sending personnel abroad 
Use of local industrial, university research or government research institutes. (Please spedfy) 
Other methods 
15. If your firm has imported various technologies, including designs and components, have you had to 
make any changes in the technology received? For example: 
Adaptation of local materials to foreign designs 
Introduction of foreign equipment to production lines 
Economise scarce imported materials 
Other necessities? 
16. Has your firm used any licensing agreements? 
Yes No 
16a. If yes, for which product/s? 
16b. What are the main technical reasons for licensing? 
Obtaining product design 
Technical assistence 
Other reasons 
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16c. What were the major commercial reasons? 
Procurement policies of your customers ______________________ _ 
The need to compete with firms already possessing such technology 
Otherreasons ________________________________ __ 
17. Who are your major licensors? 
18. Is the firm engaged in any subcontracting arrangements? 
Yes No 
18a. If yes, with whom? ill possble, could mY please provide the ~ of the firm involved.) 
Multinational ____________________________ _ 
Private firm 
Public enterprise 
Other firm 
Finally, I would like your assessment of the effects of federal government policies or regulations on 
your business. 
19. How have government policies or regulations affected your company? (Please be specific.) 
Subsidised financing for purchase of capital goods 
Exemption from duties and taxes on imports 
Subsidised financing to stimulate and strengthen your firm's technological capabilities 
Fiscal incentives to export 
Other 
19a. On balance, what kind of economic impact have these policies had on your firm: 
Positive (Be specific, please) 
Negative (Be specific, please) 
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